BOND.

1. The defendant executed, as surety, a bond to a Railway Company, conditional for the faithful discharge by H. C. of his duties as clerk, so long as he should continue in the service of the Company. Whilst H. C. continued in such service, that Company and another Railway Company were dissolved and united into one Company by an Act of Parliament, which enacted, that "all bonds, &c., made or entered into before the union, with, in favour of, or by or for either of the dissolved Companies, should be and remain as good, valid, and effectual, in favour of and against, and with reference to the new Company, and might be proceeded on and enforced in the same manner, to all intents and purposes, as if the new Company had been a party to and executed the same, or had been named or referred to therein, instead of the persons, Company, or party actually named therein;" and also, that "every clerk, &c. who was in the service of either of the dissolved Companies at their union, should, immediately after it, hold and enjoy his office and employment with the salary thereunto annexed, until he should be removed therefrom by the new Company." H. C. accordingly remained in the employ of the new Company :-Held, that the defendant was liable to the new Company for a breach of the bond committed by H. C. after the union. Eastern Union R. Co. v. Cochrane, 792

2. By 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. cxii., a Company was empowered to borrow money by bond, payable in such manner and at such times as they might think proper; and it was enacted, that all persons to whom any such security should be given, should be equally entitled to a claim

or lien on the rents, rates, tolls, and profits, in proportion to the respective sums mentioned thereby to be secured, and without any preference by reason of the priority of date of any such securities, or on any other account. The Company gave to the plaintiff a common money bond :Held, that an action lay on such bond, notwithstanding the above provision.

Whether effect would be given to the above clause, forbidding a preference, in restraining executionQuære. Bolckow v. The Herne Bay Pier Co., 231

1. The defendant applied for and obtained an allotment of shares in a Joint-stock Company, completely registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, the capital of which was to consist of 500,000l., in 50,000 shares. He paid the deposit, and his name was inserted in the register of shareholders, but he never executed the deed of settlement, or any deed referring to it. The proposed capital was never subscribed, but the Company commenced business with less; and, not succeeding, an Act of Parliament passed for winding up the concern; which, after reciting the deed of settlement, that the proposed capital had not been subscribed, and that all the subscribed capital had not been paid up, empowered the directors to sue for

calls, enacted, that, in such actions, the register should be primâ facie evidence of the defendant being a shareholder, and of the number of his shares, provided that such calls should be made according to the provisions of the deed of settlement, and, as regarded the liability of shareholders, should be deemed to have been made under such provisions; and that nothing in that Act contained, except as therein expressly enacted, should render liable to calls any shareholder or other person who would not have been liable thereto if that Act had not passed. The defendant having been sued for calls:-Held, first, that though there was a primâ facie case against the defendant of his being a shareholder, his name being on the register, yet that the primâ facie case was rebutted, the private Act applying to shareholders only, and the defendant not being a shareholder within 7. & 8 Vict. c. 110, s. 30, as he had never executed the deed of settlement; Secondly, (Martin, B., dubitante), that, even if the private Act extended to subscribers, the defendant was not liable, for his contract was conditional (provided the capital was subscribed for), and that condition had not been performed or waived. The Galvanized Iron Co. v. Westoby, 318

2. To an action for calls, a plea of infancy should allege a repudiation of the contract within a reasonable time after the defendant became of The Dublin and Wicklow

full age. R. Co. v. Black,

434

3. The defendant, by letter, applied to the provisional committee of a Railway Company to allot to him one hundred shares in the proposed Company. In answer he received the following letter: "Sir,The provisional committee having allotted to you fifty shares of 201.

each in this undertaking, I am instructed to request that you will pay a deposit upon them of 17. 10s. per share, on or before the 30th instant," &c. "I beg also to inform you that scrip certificates for the above number of shares will be delivered to you in exchange for this letter and the banker's receipt for the deposit, after the execution of the parliamentary contract and subscribers' agreement, which will lie for your signature at this office on and after Monday the 30th instant."

"The shares allotted to you will be considered forfeited, if the deposit be not paid within the period specified above; and the parliamentary contract and subscribers' agreement must be signed on or before the 20th of August, 1845." The defendant accepted the fifty shares, paid the deposit, but never signed the parliamentary contract or subscribers' agreement. On the incorporation of the Company the defendant's name was placed on the register of shareholders-Held, in an action for calls, that the defendant was not a shareholder, and therefore was not liable for the calls.

Semble, that the defendant could not recover back his deposit. The Waterford, &c. R. Co. v. Pidcock, 437

CARRIER.

1. A carrier of passengers, unless there be a special contract, is only bound to carry the personal luggage of a passenger; and if he have with him merchandise, the carrier is not liable for its safety, unless the carrier knows that it is merchandise and does not object.

A man and his wife travelling by a third-class train are entitled, under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85, s. 6, to take a hundred weight of luggage between them. The Great Northern R. Co., Apps., v. Shepherd, Resp. 310

2. The defendants, a Railway Company, advertised themselves to carry parcels, &c. from London to Glasgow (though their own line ended at Preston), and habitually received, booked, and carried parcels of all descriptions from London to Glasgow (receiving prepayment for the whole distance), having made arrangements with the other Companies, by which the defendants' vans, being locked in London, were carried through from Preston to Glasgow, under the management and by the locomotive power of the other Companies.

The defendants had issued written orders to their servants, that "packed" parcels be invoiced to termini of the defendants' line only. The plaintiff had received notice of this order, but it had never been enforced against any one but the plaintiff, and the defendants had knowingly carried packed parcels from London to Glasgow since the order was issued; but they refused to carry a packed parcel for the plaintiff further than Preston :Held, first, that, by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, ss. 86, 87, and 89, the defendants were left in the position of common carriers; and that, having held themselves out, and acted, as common carriers from London to Glasgow, they were bound by the common law to receive and carry all goods tendered to them to be carried from London to Glasgow, although the latter place was out of England. Secondly, that, being common carriers, and having carried packed parcels for some persons, they were bound to carry them for all.

Semble, that a common carrier cannot, in any case, refuse to carry "packed" parcels.

Held, also, that a common carrier has no right, in all cases, and under all circumstances, to demand what

are the contents of a parcel tendered to him to be carried, and cannot justify his refusal to carry, simply on the ground that information as to its contents was refused. Crouch v. The London and North Western R. Co., 717

3. The plaintiff delivered at a station on the defendants' railway, a package, addressed "S. & Co., East India Docks, passenger ship Melbourne, Australia," and paid one sum for the carriage to London. By the practice of the defendants, goods delivered at that station for London are carried by their own line to Birmingham, and thence by the London and North Western Railway to London. Before the package reached London, the plaintiff gave the clerk at the London station of the London and North Western Railway Company an order (written across the receipt which had been given for the package) to send it to "S. & Co., Bell Wharf, Ratcliffe, London ;" which order the clerk promised to obey, saying, there was no extra charge. The package was, however, delivered according to the first address, and consequently lost :-Held, that the defendants' contract was to deliver according to the plaintiff's directions; that the plaintiff had a right to countermand his original direction; that the clerk was the agent of the defendants to carry out their contract, and therefore to receive the countermand; and that the defendants were liable for the loss consequent on the countermand having been disobeyed. Scothorn v. The South Staffordshire R. Co., 810

4. By the 14th section of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. lxi., the Great Northern Railway Company is empowered to demand for the carriage of small parcels any sum which they may think fit. The Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 Vict. c. 20, is incorpo

rated with the special Act; and sect. 90, while it empowers a Company to vary the tolls upon their railway as they may think fit, provides, "that all such tolls be at all times charged equally to all persons, and after the same rate, in respect of all. . . goods of the same description, and conveyed by a like carriage passing only over the same portion of railway under the same circumstances, and no reduction or advance in any such tolls shall be made, either directly or indirectly, in favour of or against any particular Company or persons using the railway-Held, that the Company were compelled to charge all persons alike; and that, although they might charge for "packed parcels" at a higher rate than an ordinary package, they were not justified in charging a carrier more than the rest of the public. Crouch v. The Great Northern R. Co.,

787

5. The plaintiff took a horse to a station of the defendants, who were common carriers of horses, to be conveyed along their railway; on paying for the carriage he received and signed the following ticket: "This ticket is issued subject to the owner undertaking to bear all the risk of injury by conveyance and other contingencies. The Company will not be responsible for any damages, however caused, to horses travelling on their railway or in their vehicles." The horse was injured by a collision on the railway from want of due care, but without any wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the defendants' servants-Held, that there was a special contract between the parties, which was valid under section 6 of the Carriers' Act, 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68; and that the ticket was not a mere public notice within the 4th section of that Act; and that by the terms of the contract

the defendants were protected from liability in respect of the injury to the horse. The Great Northern R. Co., Apps., and Morville, Resp., 830

6. The plaintiff having some cattle to be carried on the defendants' railway, saw them put into a truck, and on paying for the carriage received and signed a ticket containing at the foot of it the following notice:-"N. B.-This ticket is issued subject to the owner undertaking all risks of conveyance whatever, as the Company will not be responsible for any injury or damage, howsoever caused, occurring to live stock of any description travelling upon their railway, or in their carriages." During the journey some of the cattle became alarmed and escaped from the truck, owing to its being so defectively constructed as to be unfit and unsafe for conveying cattle :— Held, in an action against the defendants as common carriers for the injury so caused to the cattle, that the defendants were protected from liability under the circumstances by the terms of the ticket; as they were such as to exclude any implied stipulation that the truck was fit for the purpose for which it was to be used. Chippendale, App., and the Lancashire and Yorkshire R. Co., Resps.,

824

7. The defendants, the proprietors of a Railway, contracted to convey the plaintiffs' horses thereon, subject to certain terms contained on a ticket, whereby it was stipulated that the ticket was issued subject to the plaintiffs' undertaking to bear all the risks of injury by conveyance and other contingencies; and that the plaintiffs were required to see to the efficiency of the carriages before they allowed their horses or live stock to be placed therein; and that, the charge being for the use of the railway carriages and locomotive

power only, the defendants would not be responsible for any alleged defects in their carriages or trucks, unless complaint was made at the time of booking, or before the same left the station, nor for any damage, however caused, to horse, cattle, or live stock of any description travelling upon the said Railway, or in the defendants' vehicles :-Held, that this exemption applied to all risks of whatever kind, and however arising, to be encountered in the course of the journey, including the risk of a wheel taking fire owing to neglect to grease it, whether from "negligence," "gross negligence," or "culpable negligence." Austin v. The Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire R. Co.,

300

8. The declaration stated, that the defendants were the owners of a Railway, that the plaintiff delivered to the defendants a horse, to be carried by them for hire on their Railway from A. to B., subject to certain conditions assented to by the plaintiff, and contained in a notice at the foot of the ticket of the defendants, for the conveyance of the horse; which ticket stated that it was issued subject to the owner's taking all risks of conveyance whatsoever, as the Company would not be responsible for any injury or damage (howsoever caused) occurring to live stock travelling upon their line. It then alleged, that, whilst the horse was in the custody of the defendants, it was injured by the horse-box, in which it was, being propelled against some trucks, through the gross negligence of the Company :-Held, (Platt, B., dissentiente), that the declaration was bad in arrest of judgment; that the defendants had engaged to carry the horse under a special contract, the terms of which were contained in the notice, by which the plaintiff

had agreed that the defendants should not be responsible for any loss, although it were occasioned through their negligence. Carr v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire R. Co., 426

9. On the delivery of goods by the plaintiff at Bristol to the defendants, he received from them a note, stating that the goods were to be conveyed by the Company as below, and on the conditions stated on the other side. Below was a statement that "Bristol" was the station from which, and "Paddington" the station to which, the goods were to be carried; and that the plaintiff's address was at "Brompton." One of the conditions at the back of the receipt stated, that goods addressed to consignees resident beyond the immediate vicinity of the Company's Goods Stations would be forwarded by public carrier or otherwise, as opportunity might offer; but that the delivery of the goods by the Company would be considered as complete, and the responsibility of the Company cease, when such carriers received the goods; and that the Company would not be responsible for loss or damage to goods beyond the limits of their railway. The plaintiff's goods were safely conveyed to the Paddington station, and there given to a person specially appointed by the Company for the collection and delivery of goods, and through his negligence were damaged on their delivery at Brompton. The defendants' charge included the carriage from Paddington to Brompton-Held, that the contract of the defendants was to carry from Bristol to Paddington, and that they were not liable for the subsequent damage. Fowles V. The Great Western R. Co.,

421