1851. ATT. GEN. use any portion of the line when completed, was a permission on the part of the Legislature to complete and open a portion THE BIRMING only of the line. That the board of management under the HAM & OXFORD Act, to be selected from several Companies, formed an independent body, which ought to be represented. JUNCTION RAILWAY CO. &c. Mr. Bacon, in reply, cited Attorney-General v. The London and Southampton Railway Company (a), and Attorney-General v. The Manchester and Leeds Railway Company (b). The LORD CHANCELLOR.-The equity on which this information is supposed to be founded, arises out of an alleged breach of a duty imposed by an Act of Parliament. The question is, whether the defendants have failed in the performance of that duty; and, if so, whether the non-performance of such duty gives to the Attorney-General the power to come to this Court, and in effect to compel a specific performance of an Act of Parliament. The Attorney-General appears here in order that the defendants may be stopped from doing that which is not expressly forbidden by the Act of Parliament; but unless I were prepared to say that the Attorney-General is entitled, in every case where the public interests may be or are alleged to be neglected, to come into equity, I must hold, that, in the present case, no sufficient grounds have been shewn for his interference. Undoubtedly, the Attorney-General has a right to represent the public, either in equity or by prosecution at law, in cases where the public interests are exposed to danger or mischief; and in the course of the argument, several authorities were cited to shew that such interference is recognised in equity; but the informations in all these cases were directed to the repression of acts which the parties had no legal right to do, and which were not only not authorised to be done, but were in fact acts of public nuisance. I cannot extract from this information any grounds to warrant the exercise of such a jurisdiction in the present case; and under these circumstances the demurrers must be allowed and the appeal motion dismissed. BEFORE VICE-CHANCELLOR LORD CRANWORTH. WEBSTER V. THE SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. THIS was a motion to restrain the defendants, the South Eastern Railway Company, from keeping possession of, or entering or continuing in or upon a certain piece of ground, and also from digging, using, interfering, or in any manner meddling with the same, and from committing any waste or spoil thereon or on any part thereof. The material facts stated in the bill and affidavits were referred to in the outset of the judgment, and are as follow : The bill stated, that the plaintiff, in July, 1836, became seised or otherwise well entitled to an estate of freehold for his life, amongst other hereditaments, of and in a certain piece of land containing about one quarter of an acre; and that, up to the time of the filing of the bill, he had so remained seised. That in 1836 the defendants obtained an Act of Parliament, and in 1846 obtained a further Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. lxiv., empowering them to make a railway from Tunbridge Wells to join the Rye and Ashford Extension of the Brighton, Lewes, and Hastings Railway near Hastings; and under that Act the powers to take land compulsorily were to last for three A. Jan. 21st & 25th. sold a piece of land, and conveyed it to a Railway Company. After that the powers of the Company to take land compulsorily had ceased, W. claimed the piece of land conveyed by A., and filed his bill to restrain the Company from keeping possession there of. The affi davits did not shew shew a clear title in W.:Held, by the Vice-Chan cellor, that, in a case and in the ab sence of con clusive eviright of the claimant, the dence of the Court will not interfere by injunction, but leave the party to his remedy at law. 1851. WEBSTER V. THE SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY CO. years. The bill then stated that the Company in 1849, during the absence of the plaintiff, served notices at Battle Abbey, the seat of the plaintiff, setting forth that they intended to take certain pieces of land, the property of the plaintiff. That, the plaintiff being abroad, the Company caused the said pieces of land to be valued; and, the sum having been fixed, they paid the amount into Court. On the 13th of December, 1850, the Company, without the license, consent, or knowledge of the plaintiff, or of any person on his behalf, entered upon, and wrongfully took possession of, a piece of land not included in the former notices and valuation, and commenced using the same for the purpose of their railway, without having made or offered to the plaintiff any compensation in respect thereof. The plaintiff was absent from home on the said 13th of December, and was not informed of the Company having so entered into possession of the piece of land until three or four days after. The bill prayed an injunction in the form hereinbefore stated, but did not ask for any other than general relief. It appeared from the affidavits filed on behalf of the Company, that they had in their books of reference and plans stated the piece of land in question as belonging to the Dean of Battle and his lessees, who were then in possession thereof; and that they had paid the purchase money and obtained a conveyance from them. The affidavits were conflicting as to the title of the parties claiming the piece of land in question. Mr. Malins and Mr. Schomberg, in support of the motion for an injunction, contended that the plaintiff had made out a primâ facie title to the piece of land in question; and that the Company had no right to retain possession of or convert the land to their own use, without first settling with him. That the necessity for the Court's interfering at the present time to prevent the user of the land, was the more urgent, because, if the title of the plaintiff was established, the Com pany had no power unless they obtained the plaintiff's consent to take the piece of land at all, their powers to take land compulsorily having expired: Brocklebank v. The Whitehaven Junction Railway Company (a), Kinnersley v. The North Staffordshire Railway Company (b), and Barker v. The North Staffordshire Railway Company (c). Mr. Bethell, Mr. R. Palmer, and Mr. Baily contended, that the plaintiff had not shewn a good title to the land in question; that the Company were primâ facie owners of the piece of land under the conveyance made to them by the Dean of Battle; and that the Court could not interfere with their possession until a better right had been established at law.—They cited Davenport v. Davenport (d), and The London and North Western Railway Company v. Smith (e). Mr. Malins replied. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I am of opinion that no case whatever has been made for relief. The Company do not claim a right to take this piece of land as part of the plaintiff's property under the powers of their Act; but they claim to be themselves the owners, and to hold it under a title adverse to the plaintiff. I find no authority for supposing that the Court will, in such a case, look upon a Railway Company in any other manner than as an individual owner. In the case of Brocklebank v. The Whitehaven Junction Railway Company, the Company were proceeding under the powers of their Act; so in Barker v. The North Staffordshire Railway Company. In these cases the decisions of the Court proceeded on this ground, that, where a Company (a) Ante, Vol. 5, p. 373. (b) Ante, Vol. 6, p. 662. (c) Ante, Vol. 5, p. 401. (d) 7 Hare, 217. 1851. WEBSTER v. THE SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY Co. 1851. WEBSTER V. THE SOUTH RAILWAY Co. are intending to take away a person's land, that person has a right to say, you shall not enter until you have estab lished your right under your Act to do so. But the ground of those decisions does not apply to the present case, where the Railway Company claim adversely to the plaintiff. It is true, they have taken possession of other lands of his, about which litigation is still proceeding; but this piece of land is no part of that in litigation between the parties. This case does not come within the principle of the cases cited If I were to grant an injunction in suits of this nature, I should, instead of preventing, most probably cause irreparable mischief; I should be allowing any third person, after the Company had given their notices and obtained a conveyance of land, to come in, and, by a short statement that he is entitled, call on the Court to interfere and stop the railway. The Court might thereby compel the Company to come to terms with the claimant, and inflict a great injury on them. There is nothing to shew that it is important to the plaintiff to have the land in question, or that he cannot obtain at law, by action of ejectment, all the relief to which he is entitled. This renders it unnecessary to consider the question, which is a very difficult and improper one to discuss on an application of this sort-to whom, on the balance of evidence, the land does in fact belong? All I can say is, that the plaintiff has stated facts which, if established, would justify a jury in saying that he is entitled. On the other hand, he is met with statements on the part of the defendants, which would, if established, shew that he was not so entitled. It is a case of very minute circumstances, leaving the matter of title doubtful; the evidence is equipollent. My opinion therefore is, that, where the question of title is in dispute, a bill filed on claim of right, and no more, will not entitle the plaintiff to call for the summary interference of the Court. If I were to decide otherwise, the Company, after a com |