must continue to rule under the present tariff, may have a more important bearing upon the political status of that State than could be exerted by the presence of fleets or the pressure of armies." TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF MOLASSES IN THE UNITED STATES DURING EACH OF THE LAST EXPORTS OF ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA, IN 1861. The St. Paul papers have published an abstract of the exports that have passed through the hands of dealers and commission merchants in St. Paul the past season. It is, we believe, the first time that any thing of the kind has been practically attempted there. Hereafter it will be less difficult to get hold of these statistics; and the table now published will serve as a valuable reference for the future. Only the produce that has actually passed through the houses of St. Paul dealers is included in the subjoined figures. The great bulk of the wheat, corn, oats and pork crop of the Minnesota Valley went below without being landed at St. Paul. For instance, the DAVIDSON line of steamers, and the CITY BELLE, while she was in the trade, carried the main bulk of the produce of that fertile region, and transferred sacks and barrels at the St. Paul levee to boats running below, or transferred their laden barges to these boats; and of all this immense amount of stuff, the St. Paul reporters can give no correct account. They estimate that at least 200,000 bushels of wheat passed St. Paul in this way, to say nothing of other produce. The value of furs brought in St. Paul and shipped eastward has been carefully examined, and is stated at $200,000. JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY AND FINANCE. 1. BANK OFFICERS, Small STOCKHOLDERS And large BorROWERS. 2. Weekly Bank Returns OF THE NEW-YORK CITY, BOSTON AND PHILAdelphia, and SEMI-WEEKLY RETURNS OF THE PROVIDENCE BANKS. 3. SEMI-ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE WESTERN BANK OF MISSOURI AND BRANCHES. 4. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BALTIMORE BANKS. 5. THE PAWNER'S BANK OP BOSTON. 6. STATEMENT OF THE CANADA BANKS. 7. ILLINOIS BANK LEGISLATION. 8. TREAS URY NOTES BY THE CART LOAD. 9. NEW-YORK BANK CIRCULAR TO CHICAGO. 10. STRANGE FORGERY OF BANK OF ENGLAND NOTES. BANK OFFICERS, SMALL STOCKHOLDERS AND LARGE BORROWERS. In looking over the reports of the bank commissioners of the several States for the past year, we have been surprised at certain peculiarities in the exhibits made by the different banks. In the first place, the directors appear, in the majority of instances, to be wonderfully small stockholders. Judging from this, one would think that they knew just enough of their own management not to have any confidence in it, or that, being behind the scenes, they saw very evident signs of weakness. Of course, this conclusion is not necessarily a correct one. There are many instances where stockholders wish to have the benefit of the great experience and business tact of certain men, and therefore make them directors, although holding but little stock. Still, to us, the fact, as it appears by these bank commissioners' reports, is certainly a little peculiar. For instance, take the Massachusetts banks: We there find one named with $860,000, which has 7, who together own only 90 This list might be increased indefinitely, with many more similar instances in Massachusetts, and others in other States, but the cases cited are sufficient to serve as an illustration. Several of the banks referred to above, however, are among the soundest in that good old State, and we do not, therefore, refer to them for the purpose of casting suspicion on their management. As we said before, men with little stock are frequently made directors because their services are desired, and we presume that some such reason existed in many of the above cases. Yet still it seems strange that the soundest men should, in the majority of instances, be the smallest stockholders. Then, again, how extremely peculiar it is to find that directors in banks need to borrow so much money. In many cases it seems that they require for their necessities one-half the capital of the bank, in others they seem to be satisfied with a little less, say a third or a quarter, and generally the amount of loans to the directors is in an inverse ratio to the amount of stock they hold. In some snug little banks, where the direct ors own a large proportion of the stock, they never borrow any of the money; but in other cases, where the directors can scarcely be called stockholders (the amount they hold is so small) in such banks, the directors seem to need for their own use about one-half the capital. Look at the following instances. We again cite from the Massachusetts report: Capital. Directors. Shares. 66 8 544 borrowed Amount of Directors' Liability. One bank named, of... $ 600,000 with 9 owning only 77 were borrowers to the amount of $306,319 Another one, of....... 600,000 "10 66 66 191 66 303,578 While another, of only. 150,000 66 000,000 In this Massachusetts report there are 98 banks whose condition is * stated, and of that number the liability of the directors of fifteen is, in the aggregate, more than half of the capital of those fifteen banks, and the liability of the directors of twenty-three more is over one-third of the capital of those twenty-three banks, and twelve more have directors who owe the banks an amount equal to one-quarter of their capital. Thus fifty of the ninety-eight banks reported are blessed with directors who require from one-half to one-quarter of the banks' capital for their own use, and the directors of ten of these are now indebted to their banks in the aggregate amount of over four millions of dollars. This, we say, looks to us to be a little peculiar, when compared with the fact, that where the directors need so much money they are, as a general thing, very small stockholders. We submit, therefore, whether or no some legislation is not necessary for the purpose of regulating this matter. If it is not advisable to require that each director should be a large shareholder, would it not be well to prevent their appropriating to their own use so large a proportion of the capital? Cannot and should not some limit be placed beyond which they may not go? We throw out these hints now with the intention of returning to the subject another time, for we deem it of the greatest importance that it should be settled, just how much of a bank's money (of which the director is the guardian or trustee) he ought to be allowed to loan himself. Are not the interests of the stockholder and of the director, when he becomes so large a borrower, irreconcilable and adverse? BALTIMORE BANKS. The annual reports of the several note-issuing banks of Baltimore, made to the comptroller of the State on the 7th January, gives the following exhibit of their general condition, compared with the corresponding period of last year: The above table shows a decrease in the line of discounts, as compared with last year, of $3,659,922; a decrease in circulation of $103,418; a decrease in deposits of $1,285,718; and an increase in specie of $1,219,223. CITY WEEKLY BANK RETURNS. NEW-YORK BANKS. (Capital, Jan., 1862, $69,493,577; Jan., 1861, $69,890,475.) Weekly Specie. Circulation. Net Deposits. Clearings. January 4,...$ 154,415,826 $ 23,983,878 $ 8,586,186 $111,789,233 $100,642,429 66 11,... 152,088,012 25,373,070 Date. Loans. 18,... 149,081,433 25,.. 145,767,680 8,121,512 113,889,762 105,634,811 26,120,859 7,369,028 118,327,160 107,732,780 26,698,728 6,828,017 110,874,786 100,001,959 BOSTON BANKS. (Capital, Jan., 1862, $38,231,700; Jan., 1861, $38,231,700.) Jan. 6,.$ 65,612,997 $8,920,486 $6,451,587 $27,093,839 $9,187,924 $8,701,873 " 13,. 64,704,039 8,580,607 6,612,512 25,642,994 9,634,227 8,805,255 20,. 64,409,585 8,585,277 6,549,871 25,441,327 9,547,319 9,018,388 66 27, 63,025,191 8,562,175 6,284,268 24,030,776 9,593,545 PHILADELPHIA BANKS. (Capital, Jan., 1862, $11,970,130.) 8,727,348 Banks. Due from Banks. $3,645,956 $1,796,805 Due to Loans. 66 Date. 2,121,146 1,702,716 20,698,496 4,120,261 1,575,116 20,058,098 4,209,006 1,858,688 PROVIDENCE BANKS. (Capital, Jan., 1862, $15,454,600.) AGGREGATE SEMI-ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE WESTERN BANK OF MISSOURI AND |