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abstract actual admit affirm allow appear argument assertion association becomes begin belief body called cause certitude chapter character clear common conception conclusion condition consciousness consistency course criterion definition deny Descartes difficulty distinct distinguished doctrine doubt effect element error evidence existence experience fact faculties feeling force further give given ground human idealism ideas immediate individual instance intellectual intelligence judge judgment knowledge known least Logic material matter means memory mental mere metaphysical Mill mind nature necessary necessity never object once organism perceive perception philosophy physical position possible present principles probability proof proposition proved question reality reason regard relation result scepticism sensation sense side simple speak substance sufficient supposed theory thing thought tion true truth ultimate universal validity whole writers
Page 335 - Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man.
Page 335 - I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
Page 335 - A great philosopher * has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters...
Page 335 - I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads; or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse.
Page 270 - When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
Page 273 - For any demonstration that can be given to the contrary effect, the " collection of perceptions " which makes up our consciousness may be an orderly phantasmagoria generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness...
Page 224 - ... without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses.
Page 214 - I believe I must tell you what I think of my new position. It strikes me very oddly, that good and wise men at Cambridge and Boston should think of raising me into an object of criticism. I have always been, — from my very incapacity of methodical writing, — "a chartered libertine...