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-Will Construction Real Property Statute, 1864, S. 150Locke King's Act-Devise of mortaged lands" after the payment of my just debts"-Words importing contingency Should my daughter also die"-" Should either of them die"--The words "after the payment of my just debts" preceding distribution of real estate are not sufficient to show a contrary or other intention so as to exonerate the real estate from the payment of a mortgage existing over it at the time of the death of the testator-The words importing contingency referred to the time of the death of testator. Dilnot v. Hinkley 6.

-Will-Construction

-

not

Vesting of share "Survivors" -The fact of an annuity being charged upon a share under а will does necessarily show that the share has vested-a gift to "survivors" must be confined to those in existence at the time of the occurrence of the event on which the gift over takes place. Butterworth v. Hepburn 22.

Will-Codicil-Devise - Construction-Rule in Shelley's case (1 Rep. 93 b)-Words of division. Testator by his will dated 11 Sep. 1854 gave and devised (inter alia) a piece of land called Keilor Hill to trustees upon trust to convey the same to his son John his heirs and assigns when he should attain the age of 21 years. He afterwards made a codicil wherein it was stated as follows. "The true "intent and meaning of the foregoing "will, is that my eldest son John

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gets share and share alike with his "brothers and sisters over and above the property called Keilor Hill, but "which property he shall have no power to sell during his lifetime, but should he have issue then to "become their property dividing the "same amongst them at his death, if "no issue then it shall become the "property of my next son, &c." Held that John's interest was limited to an estate for life in the Keilor Hill land. Russell v. Russell 58.

-Will-Construction-Legacies directed to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of personalty-Personalty insufficient-The concurrence of the facts, that the persons directed to pay are not merely executors but trustees of the real estate, and that, after the gift of legacies, the testator's real and personal estate is disposed of as a residue, go to show that the real estate is to be resorted to, if the personalty prove insufficient. Buchanan v. Smith 47.

-Will Legacy - Gift inter viros Satisfaction Ademption.

Where a testator devised and be queathed his real and personal estate to trustees on trust (inter alia) to pay an annuity to his wife for the purpose

of providing herself with a suitable residence, &c.; and after making his will, but before his death, transferred the house in which he then resided to his wife for life remainder to his children. Held that the annuity was adeemed by the gift of the house inter viros. Also held that if the doctrine of ademption did not apply, on the testator's death, his widow would be entitled to receive the annuity unfettered by such conditions as the testator had imposed. Salway v. Snowden 53.

Will- Construction Vested interest. A testator by his will devised certain lands to trustees upon trust, subject to the payment of certain annuities, &c., to accumulate the rents for all the children of his (the testator's) son, who should be living at the death of the testator, until the youngest of them should attain the age of 21 years, at which period he directed his trustees to sell the property and divide the proceeds of such sale and such accumulations amongst the children equally. He further declared that in case any of the children should die before he or she should be entitled to receive his or her share, without issue, then the trustees should hold such share upon trust for the survivors or the survivor. Held that under the terms of the will the children of the testator's son living at the time of the testator's death took a vested interest in the property as from the death of the testator. Higginbotham v. Barrett

216.

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Will Bequest of corpusDuties on Estates of Deceased Persons Statute 1870" (No. 388) ss 11, 24--Calculations of Duty payable on the shares of widow or children-A mere direction in a wili to divide corpus on a future event does not dispose of interim incomeTo fix the duty payable on the shares of a widow or children, whether under a will or an intestacy, or vested or contingent, each share should be separately valued and duty at the appropriate rate on such value should be deducted from such share by the executor or administrator. Sec. 24 (No. 388) is not to be construed strictly against those whom it is intended to benefit, [It is not clear on what principle the Court has acted in directing that the duty to be deducted from the interests of the infant defendants is to be calculated at the same rate as is payable under sec. 24, (No. 388).] Trustees &c. Coy r. Terrill 162.

-Will-Old Will not provedNo personalty existing at time of application-Probate for purposes of title-Administration Act 1872, sec. 6---Death of Testator before Act. A testator died in 1868 having previously made a will whereby he gave all his property to his wife, and appointed her sole executrix. The de

ceased, at the time of his death, was possessed of real estate of the value of £300, which at present is worth £600, and of personalty at present of no value whatsoever. On motion, Probate was granted to the executrix. In the will of David Jones, 185.

-Will-Married woman-Affidavit of separate estate-Jurisdiction -Proof that a married woman died possessed of separate estate is necessary to give the Court Jurisdiction in granting probate of a will made by her. In the will of Grace McCracken, 204.

-Will-Holograph will written on 3 pages-Attestation Clause, etc., at end of 1st. page only-Incorporation by reference-"Named hereafter " In the following named proportions. Held that the lastmentioned phrases, occurring on the 1st. page of the will did not constitute a sufficient reference to incorporate the 2nd, and 3rd. pages. Probate granted to the 1st. page. In the will of P ppercorn, 213.

Will-Rule against perpetuities-Interest-Executory Bequest. A testator directed his Trustees to pay a sum of £200 per annum to A. B. for life for the maintenance &c. of herself and children and to accumulate the balance of the income for the benefit of the children during the life of A. B. He further directed that all his realty and personalty should be converted into money on the death of A. B., and he declared that the proceeds should be divided amongst the children left by A.B. at her decease, upon their attaining if girls the age of 25 years or marrying under that age and if boys upon attaining the age of 30 years. He further pro

vided, that, in the event of the death of A. B. before the children should attain the specified ages, the trustees should pay to their respective guardians the interest upon the shares of the children and should pay the interests direct, to any child who should attain 21 years. In the event of the death of A. B. and her children without leaving lawful issue, he directed his estate to be divided according to the statute of distributions. He further directed that A. B. should have the use of a certain cottage during her life so long as she should, reside there free of rent. Held on the construction of the will, that the shares of the children vested on the death of A.B. Held that A.B. was not entitled to let the cottage, but that her interest in it ceased when she ceased to reside there. A reference was made to chambers to ascertain what increased allowance should be made for the maintenance &c. of the children, the sum specified in the will being insufficient. Perpetual Executors and Trustees &c., Limited v Hale 229.

Will exercising power of appointment only. A testatrix died during the lifetime of her husband,

having made a will whereby she simply disposed of certain property over which she had a power of appointment; she did not make any disposition of the other property of which she was possessed; she ap pointed trustees but no executors. The trustees appointed were also the trustees under the original instrument which conferred the power of appointment on the testatrix. On application, letters of adminis tration cum testo annexo were granted to the trustees, limited to the property disposed of by the will; sureties were dispensed with. In the Will of Elizabeth McIntyre 250. -Will-Construction Option -A testator by his will made the following provision:--“I grant to my said nephew the option to be declared by him in writing to my executor within six months from the date of my death to pay the sum of £500 in cash to my executor in Melbourne, within nine months from the date of my death, and to take the said cottages absolutely in which case I devise the said land and cottages subject to Mrs. Bowes' life estate to my said nephew and his heirs absolutely. And in case the said John McKendrick exercises his option declining to pay the said sum of £500 and take the property, or in case he accepts but from any cause whatever does not pay to my executor in Melbourne within nine months from the date of my death the said sum of £500, then in either case I devise &c." Held reversing the judgment of the court below that only the right to make the declaration above-mentioned was personal to the nephew; the payment of the money could be performed by his administratrix. McKendrick v. Lewis 135, 262.

-Will-Construction-General Gift to trustees of all testator's property including realty and personaity-Trusts expressed in terms applicable only to personalty. Direc. tions given by the Court to trustees. A testator, by his will, after giving all his property to trustees and making certain specific bequests, directed that his trustees should "get in and pay the rest and residue of my property of whatever description" in a certain manner specified. The rest and residue of his property comprised realty and personalty. Held that the term "rest and residue of my property" passed both realty and personalty although associated with terms applicable only to personalty. The Court when applied to, on originating summons will give leave to trustees to exercise their discretion as regards taking contemplated legal proceedings. By doing so, it does not design to pronounce any opinion as to the possible result of such proceedings; it simply intends to justify the trustees as between them and their c. q. ts. in incurring expense in taking legal advice and acting upon it.

Fitzgerald v. Smith 280.

-Will-Probate granted by registrar-Estate afterwards found to exceed £500. When Probate has been granted by the Registrar and the estate of the deceased is afterwards discovered to exceed £500 in value, the proper course is to apply to the Supreme Court to grant probate of the will and to call in and revoke the probate granted by the registrar. Re Aldwell 280.

-Will-Reg. Gen. 23rd. June, 1873, r. 4-Affidavit as to the residence of witnesses. Held that it is not a sufficient description of the residence of a witness to state that the witness was clerk to a firm of solicitors of 14 Bloomsbury Square, London. In the will of William Dundas Fisher, 59.

-Will-Rule 4-Residence of witnesses --If it be impossible to state the residence of a witness at the time of the death of testator, the Court will require an affidavit of the residence of such witness at the time of the making of the will or an averment that such residence is also impossible to discover. In the will of Donald McAskell, 49.

Wills Statute 1864 (No. 222), Sec 8-Will-Printed form-Signature of testator inserted in blank space following the disposing clauses, and above the appointment of execu tors-Not a valid testamentary paper. In the will of John Thomas Ryan 5.

-Wills Statute 1864 (No 222) Sec. S-Will--Printed form. A testator wrote his will on a printed form and filled up the back of the form with various provisions in continuation of those on the first page. It was signed and attested on the first page only. The attesting witnesses did not appear to have seen the second page, but all had been written before the signature and attestation. Held not a valid testamentary paper. [In re Ryan (10 A. L. T. p 5) followed.] In the will of George Cruickshank,

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section repugnant to or inconsistent with that interpretation. A corporation may be prosecuted and fined under that section for knowingly offering for sale unwholesome food. Knowledge on the part of servants authorised by the corporation to expose food for sale is the knowledge of the corporation Q. r. Panton Exp. The Farmers' Produce Company Limited 141.

-sec. 131. Where property is private property, the forming or setting out of a street on that private property, as well as a lane or passage, renders the adjacent owners liable. But where property is public property or land of the Crown, it is only in the case of a lane or passage that the adjacent owners are liable to take steps to form, pave, level, drain, or make it good. Access by the public is an essential character of the word known as "Street" in this Act. Sandilands v Wright 154. Public Service Act-(No. 773.) sec. 70. See Education Act (No. 447,) sec. 22. Mills v Regina 148. Rabbit Suppression Act--(No. 683) Sched. 15. Rabbit Suppression Amendments Acts (No. 721) sec. 2 and (No. 813) sec. 16. Costs. Objec tion taken by justices. A notice purporting to be in the form prescribed by sec. 2 of Act No. 781 is not necessarily invalid because the blank in the form for the area in acres is not filled up. The words at the end of

sec. 2 of Act No. 721 providing for the modes of service of this notice on the owner of land are mandatory. Where an objection was taken by the justices and not by the party showing cause, the Court in making the order to review absolute did so without costs. Quare whether a party shewing cause against an order nisi to review being made absolute can uphold the justices decision on other grounds than those mentioned in the order. Rothwell v. Murphy. Rothwell r. Parish 257.

Real Property Statute 1864 -(No. 213), Real Property (Amendment) Statute 1885 (No. 873,) Adverse possession. The Real Property (Amendment) Statute 1885 No. 873 is limited in its operation towards further declaring the first portion of the 19th sec. of the Real Property Statute 1864 dealing with dispossession and discontinuance of possession. Pearson v. Russell 132.

---ss. 18, 38, 47 Equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds-Statute of Limitations. An equitable mortgagee by deposit of title deeds took action against the representative of the mortgagor, a purchaser from the same and the Registrar of Titles to enforce payment of the sum due on foot of the mortgage together with interest and costs; he also claimed an injunction against the Registrar of Titles to restrain him from registering the purchaser as proprietor of the land, and

also against the purchaser to restrain him from proceeding with his application to be registered as proprietor. The deposit had been made 15 years before action brought. Held that the Statute of Limitations was a good defence to the claim for the recovery of the sum advanced &c. Held that the interest of the plaintiff in the land had been extinguished by the statute, and in consequence the plaintiff could not interfere with the proceedings taken for registration. Barnet r. Williams 230.

-Sec. 28-Statute of Limitations -Coparceners. Section 28 of The Real Property Statute (1864)" is not confined in its operations to actions between coparceners, joint tenants, tenants in common, and stranger; it applies to actions between coparceners joint tenants, and tenants in common, inter se. Beaumont v. Hochkins 263. -Part V. Application of proceeds of sale of settled land. Person in possession. Compensation. Income of tenant for life. Corpus. A conditional agreement for the sale of certain settled land had been approved of by the court. In carrying out the sale it was found necessary to compensate a person in possession of portion of the land. Held that the expenses thereby incurred were properly payable out of corpus and not out of income. In the settled estate of Clarke 211.

-s.s. 79, 89. Charitable trust -Settled estate-Sale-Investment of proceeds of sale. A testator devised certain land to trustees, in trust to pay the rents, etc. thereof, or permit the same to be enjoyed by such person as may be the incumbent for the time being of the Episcopalian Church at Pentridge (now called Coburg). Held that this devise constituted a settlement within the meaning of Sec. 79. The Court if the parties wish it, will include in the same decree, an order for sale of the settled estate and for the investment of the proceeds of the sale. In re Delaney's Settled Estate, 23.

-S.S. 79, 89, 101 - Sale Distribution of proceeds of sale -Family arrangement. George Wall, by his will, gave the beneficial interest in all his property, to his wife during life or widowhood, with remainder (according to one construction of the will) to his nine children. The tenant for life filed a petition for the sale of the settled land. Subsequently to the filing of the petition, but before the hearing an agreement was entered into between all the beneficiaries (all being adults), that the proceeds arising from the sale should be distributed amongst them in certain proportions. No order made, it not being the province of the court to carry out a mere family arrangement. In re Wall's settled estate, 140.

-S.S. 89, 95, 114-Petition

for sale of settled estate - Consent of persons interested. When a petition is presented for the sale of estate settled within the meaning of the above-mentioned Statute, the consent of any person, whose consent is necessary, must be unconditional [compare in re Wall's settled estate, 10 A L.T. p. 140]. In re Mahoney's settled estate.

--s.s. 95, 113-Rules of the Supreme Court 1884, Order XVI. part 3-Appointment of guardian of infants to consent on their behalf. In an application for the appointment of a guardian of infants to consent on their behalf to the prayer of a petition for the sale of estate settled within the meaning of the abovementioned statute, it is not sufficient to show that the proposed guardian has no interest adverse to the infants, and is a person of respectability. Similar statements to those made on similar applications under the English Settled Estates Act will be required. [See Daniels' Chancery Forms, 4th Ed. form 2227,] Order XVI part 3 (Rules of Supreme Court) does not apply. In the Settled Estates of John Lobb 138.

Res judicata-See Police Offences

Statute 1865. Stone v. Kendall 174. Rescission of Contract — See sale of Land. Woolcott v. Poggie 36. Rescission of Contractwith out notice-See Sale of Land. Perry r. Sherlock 45. Restitution-Form of Writ of Restitution. Main v. Haskin 276. Restraint of Trade-See Contract. Grace v. Carrick 144. Retainer-Where a verbal retainer only has been given to a solicitor, the onus of proving such retainer lies on the solicitor, and, where the evidence of the solicitor's authority is merely his oath against the oath of the alleged client, such retainer will not be held to be proved. Pearl v. Commercial Bank 266.

Review of Taxation-See Practice.

Sale of Land-Conditions of sale -Power to Vendor to rescind-Objection to title-Ability to remove objections-Rescission-Order LVIII r. 4-Reception of fresh evidence. A condition in a contract for the sale of land that if the purchaser shall make any objection to or requisition on the title which the vendor shall be unable or unwilling to remove it shall be lawful for the vendor at any time to annul the sale and repay to the purchaser &c., is to be construed strictly against the vendor. But where the vendor was willing to remove all objection but was unable to do so for several months and the purchaser was only willing to grant him the time necessary on condition that the vendor would give an indemnity. Held -That this was the imposition of a new condition which the vendor was not bound to accept and that he was entitled to rescind the sale at once.

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Semble (per Holroyd J.,) ability" means ability at any time provided the purchaser is willing to wait. The Court under order LVIII r. 4 received in evidence a judgment which had been drawn up after the date of the decision from which the appeal was brought. Woolcott r. Peggie 36. -Vendor and Purchaser-Conditions of sale — Right to rescind without notice-Forfeiture of deposit - Rescission. In a contract for

the sale of land one of the conditions provided that "if the purchaser shall fail to comply with the above conditions or shall not pay the whole of the deposit or shall not duly pay the balance of the purchasemoney or either of them his deposit money or so much thereof as shall have been paid shall be actually forfeited to the vendor, who shall be at liberty, without notice, to rescind the contract and resell the property bought by the purchaser by public auction or private contract and it shall not be necessary previously to tender a transfer to the purchaser." Held That as soon as the purchaser failed to duly pay the balance of the purchase-money the deposit was actually, and in fact, forfeited, without any other act on the part of the vendor, and that the vendor had the right to rescind the contract without giving any notice. Perry v. Sherlock 45.

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-Contract for--Form of contract-Specific performance. Pudney v. Strong 109.

-Form of contract for sale of land. Corcoran v. O'Rourke 139. Auction-Sale falling through -Notice to Vendor Practice of office-Evidence. When the sale of a piece of land at auction falls through by the default of the purchaser, it is the duty of the auctioneer forthwith to give notice thereof to the vendor. The oral evidence of the auctioneer that it is the practice of his office to send such notice is not satisfactory evidence that such notice was sent. Miller v. Turner 186. Au

were

-Specific performance thority of land agent-" Cash Payment. The defendant instructed Messrs. McEwan and Co., a firm of land agents, to sell his property. The instructions given by him entered in the property list of the firm and the entry, after describing the property, concluded with these words £10 per acre; half cash, balance at 5 per cent. for two or three years." Acting under this authority Messrs. McEwan and Co., executed a contract of sale of the land to the plaintiff. The payment of the purchase money was provided for by the 1st. condition which was as follows; "The purchaser shall, on the signing hereof, pay a deposit in cash of £50 of the total amount of the purchase money, and in one month a further sum of £407 1s. 3d., and also then give his acceptance for the residue in

one amount of £457 1s. 3d. at 36 months with interest at the rate of 5 per cent. added to such acceptance respectively." There was another condition (the 12th) which provided that the purchaser should have power at any time during currency to retire the above mentioned acceptance rebate at 5 per cent. per annum being allowed. Held by the majority of the court affirming the judgment of the court below (Williams J. dissentiente), that the instructions to sell being general, the agents were bound and had the power to exercise some discretion in carrying out the general instructions given, and that they had exercised that discretion in a reasonable manner. Evidence is admissible to show what meaning the term "cash payment" has acquired by the usage of trade. Donaldson v. Noble 37, 189.

Commission-Evidence fit to submit to Jury-Admissions by not answering letter. Evidence fit to be submitted to a Jury is evidence from which a Jury of reasonable men might find a verdict. The question how far not answering a letter is an admission discussed. Newcomen v. O'Grady 2. A.J.R. 123 Commented

on.

McEwan v. Poole 202. -Commission-Several agentsAgent effecting the sale-UsageWhere land was put in several agents' hands with a condition, in writing! that whichever effected the sale should get the commission, and the plaintiff was the first who mentioned the purchaser's name at the price at which the land was afterwards sold but another agent had first got the offer but had not mentioned the purchaser's name-Held there was evidence to go to the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to commission. Quare: Whether evidence of usage is admissible. Bannister v. Henderson 203.

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the reasonableness of the charges, and therefore in such a case a client is not debarred from setting up the defence that the charges were not reasonable and proper Onus of proof. Wilkie v Groom 239. Solicitor and Client See Retainer. Pearl v Commercial Bank 266.

Specific Performance Form of contract for sale of land. Corcoran v. O'Rourke 139.

--Defence The forms of defence to an action for specific performance as provided by Appendix D sec. 2, No. 2 should be used Defence denying each and every allegation contained in the statement of claim ordered to be amended. Kilpatrick r. Lang 160.

-See sale of Land. Stamp Act, (No. 645) s. 51-Promissory note-Document requiring stamp

-Contract of sale-Bought note. In order that a document may be a promissory note within s. 51 of the Stamp Act, No. 645, it must substantially contain a promise to pay a definite sum of money, and nothing more. A document containing a promise to pay money as part of a contract containing other stipulations would not be a promissory note within the meaning of the Act. The defendant had purchased from the plaintiffs, who were brokers, 500 shares in a mining company, and had signed a document which was in form a bought note, but which was really a contract of sale, by which, after stating that defendant had bought the shares, it was agreed that the purchaser should pay £10 of the pur chase money forthwith, and the balance, £27 10s. at any time on or before 19th. August, 1888, and that the vendors should deliver scrip on payment. Held (Higinbotham., Č.J., dissentiente): That the instrument was not liable to stamp duty as a promissory note, and could be received in evidence without being stamped as such. Mortgage Insurance Corpora tion v. Commissioners of Revenue, 21 Q.B. D. 352 followed. Per Higinbotham, C. J.-That the fact that there is no stamp duty on agreements by the Victorian as by English Stamp Act distinguished this from the English cases, and that the desire to prevent inconvenience and uncertainty ought not to influence judicial opinion in the interpretation of the terms of s. 51, which are not ambiguous, and therefore ought to be construed literally. Hickling v. Todd,

236.

Street formed or set out on

private property See Health Amendment Act 1883. Local Board of Health at Malvern v. Lorimer 246. Sandilands v. Wright 154. Substituted Service. See Practice. Flower v. Foy 109. Sunday Trading, See Licensing

Act 1885. Ellis v. Bourke 258. Supreme Court (Constitution

1852) Act, 15 Vict.; No. 10 Sec. 34 -Appeal to Privy Council---Extension of time for entering into the requisite security. Pearson v. Russell 209.

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Time enlargement of-For leave to appeal to Privy Council. Pearson r. Russell 272. Trade Marks Registration Act. 1876-(No. 539)—S. 2— Trade Mark-Definition-" Essential Particular "--Combination of letters. To enable a plaintiff to maintain an action for an infringement of a trade mark, he must be in a position to show that the trade mark has been infringed in an Essential Particular." A combination of letters of which the sound conveys a descriptive meaning which might be expressed by words in common use cannot be appropriated as a trade mark, so long as it conveys that meaning only, and has not become by use the distinctive mark of a partici. lar manufacturer. (Semble). Regis tration of a trade mark of which only a part is actually used by the proprietor in marking the articles of his manufacture is unauthorized by the Act, and may be made a ground of defence in an action for its infringement. Woolstenholm r. Woolhouse 165.

Tramway Act (No. 765,) sec. 12—

"

Amending Act (No. 815,) secs. 2 and 3-Construction-Tramway, meaning of. Per Higinbotham C. J. and Kerferd -The word " tramway" in sec. 12, must be construed differently in different parts of the section, meaning the main line, and the main line together with sidings. Per A'Beckett J.-The word tramway" in the 12th section means the main line only. The Mayor and Coun cillors of the City of Prahran v. The Melbourne Tramways Trust, 180. Transfer of Land Statute, 1866---(No. 301), Sec. 117, Judicature Act, 1883 (No. 761), Sec. 10(7), Removal of Caveat--When the Full Court is not Sitting, a Judge in Chambers, if satisfied with the urgency of the matter, may hear and determine an application to remove a Caveat. In ገ ይ Eliza Johnson; Phillips (Careator) 1. Usage-Quare ---Whether evidence of usage is admissible. Bannister v. Henderson 203. Veterinary

Surgeons Aot 1887---(No. 956) Sec. 20 (I)—Mandamus---The Veterinary Board has no discretion to reject an applicant who is proved to have continuously prac ticed for the seven years required by Sec. 20 (I) on the ground that it is not satisfied as to his competency. Exparte Barnes, 267. Vouchers-See Accounts. Keiller Thompson, 168. Writ If the plaintiff sign judgment in an action without having served the defendant with the writ of summons, such judgment is irregular only and an application to set it aside mus

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Custom. Cobb v. Dunn, 214.

Illegal

Mount Elte

Companies Act 1864 Association -- Calls. Company v. Sundo, 183. Local Courts Act 1886 Sec. 119-Prohibition-The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue an order in the nature of a writ of Prohibition before the hearing of an action in the Local Court is not ousted by the defendant filing an objection in the Local Court to the jurisdiction of the Local Court. Hopkins v. D. and J. Fowler 206. Public Health Act, Section 58-Street-A roadway laid 1873, out upon private land, but for the use of and used by the public, is a street," although not levelled and formed, and although there houses upon one side only, and a railway which runs alongside the road 66 adjoins or abuts' it. Glenelg Railway Company Limited The v. The Loral Board of Health of the Corporation of the town of Unley, 204. Will-Proof of Testator's execution of will A testator filled in in his own handwriting a printed form of will, writing his name both in the testi

are

monium and in the attestation clauses, but not otherwise signing, and the will was attested by three witnesses

On the death of the testator 35 years after, letters of administration cum test were granted on proof of his handwriting, and that one witness acknowledged his own signature but could not recollect anything, the other witnesses being dead or not to be found. In the Goods of George Pulford 54.

TASMANIA.

Application to vary Certificate of Chief Justice -Equity Procedure Act (21 Vic. No. 44), s. 58. Lawler v. Swann 10.. Application for rules nisi for prohibition-Police Government Act (29 Vic. No. 10), sec. 226-Public Health Act (49 Vic. No. 18), s.s. 140, 168-Ap¡ cals from summary convictions (19 Vic. No. 10), Codlin Moth Act 1887-sub. s. 16. Hore e. Bellette 7. sec. 14, 20 (51 Vic. No. 31). Appeal from decision of Magistrates under Stated Cases Act (24 Vic. No. 5). Costs-Security for-plaintiff out of Hill v. Thompson 55. jurisdiction must give security-Australasian (Federal) Judgment Act 1881. Watson v. Ritchie and Others

206.

301

Rabbit Destruction Act 1887 (51 Vic. No. 32 ss. 5, 6, 7, and 20). Stated case under 24 Vic. No. 5---As to

power of Governor in-Council to vary original Proclamation---In proceedings instituted by Collector to recover payment of a tax under sec. 20 of Rabbit Act, evidence is admissible to show that the Board which appointed him Collector was not duly elected, although such section directs that "it shall be lawful for any Collector to sue for and recover such contribution." Barwick r. Betts 118.

-Real and Personal Estates Duties Act (43 Vict. No. 12) ss. 34 46 and Schedule A. and Real and Personal Estates Duties Amendment Act (45 Vic. No. 11). Lamb v. Westbrook 283.

-Small Debts Act (51 Vic. No. 23) s 133 and Schedule 2-CostsCosts as between party and party to be taxed on account claimed unless Court orders to the contrary. Tyler r. McArdle 283.

-Will-Execution- Signature at foot of first page not on last page -1 Vic. c. 26 s. 9 & 16 Vic. No. 4Application for probate of whole of the document. The signature to a will, required by the Wills Act must be at the foot or end of that which the deceased intended to execute as his will. In the Goods of Thomas Sheehan 208,

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