carry A parcel was delivered at Penzance, to the West Cornwall Railway Company, addressed to a person at Wolverhampton, "per first steamer from Hayle." The Company's railway only extends from Penzance to Truro; but their practice is to send goods for Bristol, or places above it, to a sea port called Hayle, and there deliver them to the steam-boats; and to send parcels for Bristol, or places above it to Truro, and there deliver them to other carriers, who them from Truro to Plymouth (for which distance there is no railway), and from Plymouth they are sent by railway to Wolverhampton. The Company carried the parcel by their railway to Hayle, where they delivered it to a steam-boat, by which it was conveyed to Bristol and from thence by railway to Wolverhampton. The goods in the parcel having been damaged after the delivery to the steam-boat.-Held, that, under these circumstances, a jury might infer a contract by the Company, as common carriers, to carry the whole distance from Penzance to Wolverhampton; and, consequently, that they were liable for the damage to the goods. Also, that it is not ultra vires for the Company to carry beyond their own line by sea or by coach. Casan (2). Railway and Canal Traffic Act, The plaintiff brought three horses to the cattle station of the defendants' railway at Liverpool to be forwarded by a cattle truck to York. The defendants' servant provided a truck for the purpose, which, to all external appearance, and so far as the servant knew, was sufficient for the purpose. The plaintiff signed a ticket, which contained the following memorandum:-"This ticket is issued subject to the owner's undertaking all risks of conveyance, loading and unloading whatsoever; as the Company will not be responsible for any injury or damage (howsoever caused) occurring to live stock of any description travelling upon the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, or in their vehicles." The truck proved (as the fact was) to be insufficient for the carriage of the horses; and a hole was made in the bottom of it on the journey, by which the horses were injured. Twopence a mile for hire was charged, being the regular charge for conveyance in open trucks, under tickets in the above form, from the cattle station. Fourpence per mile was the charge for horses forwarded from the passenger station in "horse boxes," under similar tickets. Held: First, that the condition was reasonable: secondly, that it protected the defendants from liability in respect of the defect in the truck. M Manus v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 693 (3). Duty after Refusal of Consignee to Accept Goods. Where goods are tendered by a carrier to the consignee who refuses to pay the carriage, whereupon the carrier refuses to deliver the goods, it is the duty of the carrier to retain the goods at their place of destination, at least for a reasonable time, and during that time to await any directions from, if not to communicate with the consignee: So held Per Pollock, C. B., Martin, B., and Channell, B.; Bramwell, B., dissentiente. supposing their duty qua carriers ended with the tender of the goods. Bramwell, B., dissentiente. Per Bramwell, B., that assuming the act of the South Devon Railway Company was the defendants' act, the defendants were not responsible, inasmuch as they had performed their duty by carrying and tendering the parcel, and that upon the refusal of the consignee to receive it, the defendants had a right to send it back to London. Also that the defendants were not responsible for the act of the South Devon Railway Company. Crouch v. The Great Western Railway Company, 491 (4). Duty of after Refusal of Consignee to Accept Goods-Liability for Damage arising from Imperfect Packing. Where goods have been tendered by a carrier to a consignee and refused by him, there is no rule of law that the carrier must give notice of such refusal to the consignor: he is only bound to do what is reasonable. Semble, that whether the circumstances of the case make it reasonable that the carrier should give such notice, is a question for the jury. The plaintiff delivered in London, to the defendants, a railway Company, a parcel directed to the plaintiff's agent at Plymouth. The defendants' railway terminates at Bristol from whence they forwarded the parcel to Plymouth by the South Devon Railway. The parcel was tendered by a servant of that Company to the consignee at Plymouth who refused to pay the amount demanded for carriage, whereupon the servant took the parcel away. The next day the consignee went to the office of the South Devon Railway and demanded the parcel and tendered the amount of carriage, when he was told that the parcel had been returned to London, but though he made repeated applications at the office in London, the parcel never was delivered. The jury having found that the tender was made within a reasonable time and that the parcel was sent back to London before a reasonable time had elapsed. Held: Per Pollock, C. B., Martin, B., and Channell, B., that the defendants were responsible for the act of the South Devon Company, and that the sending the parcel to To Remove Cause from County Court London at the time they did, followed by the nondelivery of it to the plaintiff, upon or subsequent to the several applications, afforded sufficient evidence of a breach of duty by the defendants in not taking care of the parcel for the plaintiff, even A carrier is not responsible for leakage arising from an imperfection in the bung of a cask entrusted to him to be carried, and not caused by part. Hudson and Others v. Baxenany negligence or omission on his dale and Others, CERTIORARI. -Practice. 575 On an application by a defendant for a certiorari to remove from a County Court a cause in which the demand is over 207., the Court does not make it a condition that the 892 CHELTENHAM, &c. CHURCH BUILDING ACTS. defendant, if successful, shall have [ shall go to the informer and the no more costs than would have been remainder to the Local Board of The cause was tried and allowed in the County Court. Ex Health.” parte The Great Western Railway a verdict found for the plaintiff. Company, 557 CHELTENHAM IMPROVE- Action for Penalty against Party A declaration, in a qui tam action, stated that the plaintiff and defendant were candidates for the office of Commissioner under the Cheltenham Improvement Act, 1852: that the plaintiff would have been elected, but that the majority of votes was in favour of the defendant, who was thereupon elected and acted as such Commissioner without being duly qualified: whereby the plaintiff was aggrieved as a ratepayer, voter, and resident within the borough, and also as such candidate. The Cheltenham Improvement Act, 1852, incorporates section 15 of the Commissioners Clauses Act, 1847, which enacts that every person who shall act as a Commissioner without being duly qualified shall "be liable to a penalty of 501., and such penalty may be recovered by any person.' The Cheltenham Improvement Act, 1852, also incorporates section 133 of the Public Health Act, 1848, which enacts that no proceedings for the recovery of any penalty under that Act shall be taken "by any person other than by a party grieved, or the Local Board of Health in whose district the offence is committed, without the consent of the Attorney General; and if the application of the penalty be not otherwise provided for, one-half thereof Held: First, that the plaintiff was not a "party grieved" by the defendant acting as such Commis sioner. Secondly, that the declaration was not authorized by section 15 of the Commissioners Clauses Act, 1847, and, under section 133 of the Public Health Act, it was bad in arrest of judgment, inasmuch as (the plaintiff not being a party grieved) it ought to have alleged the consent of the Attorney General. Thirdly, that although the want of CHAPELRY, DISTRICT. CHARTER-PARTY. 755 CHURCH BUILDING ACTS. Division of Parishes-District Chapelry-Who is entitled to Fees arising at Chapel. In the year 1810, a chapel was purchased for the purpose of being consecrated as a chapel of ease in the parish of A. The chapel was consecrated under the provisions of a deed, dated the 25th August, 1810, by which the parish clerk and sexton were to be entitled to the fees for christenings, burials and marriages in the chapel and cemetery thereof, power to that effect contained in the special case. Llewellyn v. Proprie tors of the Swansea Canal Navigation, 516 (2). Sect. 50-Production of Docu ments. as if they had taken place in the mother church. By an order of her Majesty in council, of the 2nd August, 1853, the chapel was created a district chapelry under the 16th section of the 59 Geo. 3, c. 134. By the 10th section of that Act, when any parish shall be divided under the provisions of the 58 Geo. section of the Common Law ProAn application, under the 50th 3, c. 45, or this Act, all fees belong-cedure Act, 1854, for an order that ing to the parish clerk or sexton the opposite party answer on affirespectively of any such parish, davit, stating what documents he which shall thereafter arise "in any has in his possession relating to the district or division of any parish divided" under the provisions of the matters in dispute, &c., will not be be recoverable by the clerks and for the applicant. 58 Geo. 3, c. 45, shall belong to and granted where it is not shewn that sextons of each of the divisions of the parish to which they shall be assigned. The plaintiff, who was clerk and sexton of the parish of A., having brought an action for money had and received, against the defendant, the clerk and sexton of the chapel, for the fees received by him for christenings, burials, and marriages in the chapel.-Held: First, that the action for money had and received would lie for these fees. Secondly: That this being a "district chapelry," was not within the operation of the 10th section of the 59 Geo. 3, c. 134, and therefore that the plaintiff, as clerk and sexton of the parish, was entitled to the fees arising at the chapel. Roberts V. Aulton, 432 COMMON LAW PROCEDURE (1). Sect. 32-Error on Special Case. By the 32nd section of the ComBy the 32nd section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, error may be brought on the judgment of the Court on a special case in favour of the defendant, notwithstanding that a judgment of nolle prosequi has been entered up in pursuance of a such documents would be evidence Semble, that it is necessary to shew that the documents exist, or at least to identify the particular documents asked for. Thompson and Others v. Robson and Others, 412 (3). Sect. 51-(a) Interrogatories. In an action by the drawer against A. and B., acceptors of a bill of exchange, A. pleaded that the bill was accepted by B. without his knowledge and in fraud of A., with the knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to exhibit interrogatories to A. as to whether there had ever been a partnership between him and B., and if so, as to the business and the particular terms of the partnership. The application was supported by the common affidavits only. - Held, that such questions were too large. Semble, that the inquiry should have been limited to a specific time and place, or to the specific facts from which a partnership might be inferred. Robson v. Crawley and Cook, 766 (b) By Plaintiff in Ejectment. A plaintiff in ejectment, who claims 894 COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1854. as heir at law, has no right, under the 51st section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, to interrogate the person in possession of the land as to what his title is. Horton v. Bott and Another, 249 (4). Sect. 82—Injunction-Practice. An injunction had been obtained restraining the defendants from carrying on certain works so as to be a nuisance to the plaintiffs. Upon a motion for the costs of a rule for an attachment for a breach of it.Held, that the injunction was a continuing injunction, and that it was not necessary to reserve to the plaintiff's leave to renew the motion for an attachment in case of any future breach. De La Rue and Others v. Fortescue and Others, 324 (5). Sect. 83-Equitable Defence. To an action for money lent (the defendant being under terms of trying at the ensuing sittings), the Court refused to allow him to plead, as a defence on equitable grounds, the following pleas :-First, as to 10,000l., parcel, &c.; that the claim of the plaintiffs was in respect of monies advanced by the plaintiffs to the defendant upon security of goods consigned by the defendant to the plaintiffs that at the time of such advancing it was agreed between the plaintiffs and defendant, that the plaintiffs should cause the goods so consigned to be sold on account of the defendant for the best prices. which could be got for the same, and out of the proceeds retain the amount of the monies so advanced: that the plaintiffs might have sold the goods for prices more than sufficient to reimburse them the monies so advanced, but the plaintiffs wrongfully and in violation of the agree ment sold the goods for prices less than the best prices which might have been got for the same, and by reason of such wrongful act the plaintiffs were prevented from reimbursing themselves the amount of the monies so advanced out of the proceeds of the sales.-Secondly, as to the sum of 5,4001., parcel, &c., that the defendant consigned to the plaintiffs divers goods, to be by the plaintiffs sold at New York for certain commission to the plaintiffs on that behalf, at prices not less than the best market price that the plaintiffs not regarding their duty in that behalf wrongfully sold the goods for prices less than the best market price, whereby the defendant sustained losses amounting to 5,4007. : that afterwards it was agreed between the plaintiffs and defendant that they should set off the amount of such losses against so much money as might be due from the defendant to the plaintiffs: that the amount of such losses is equal to the said sum of 5,4001. parcel, &c., which was due from the defendant to the plaintiffs: that the defendant has always been ready and willing to set off the amount of such losses against the said sum of 5,4007. parcel, &c. Quare: Whether the subjectmatter of the pleas afforded any defence on equitable grounds. Atterbury and Others v. Jarvie, 114 (6). Sect. 85-Replication on Equitable Grounds. To a declaration on a policy of insurance on the life of H., conditioned that if H. went out of Europe all claim to any interest in the funds of the society should cease, with a proviso that H. should be at liberty to visit Tangiers, or any other port within the Mediterranean; the defendants pleaded that H. departed |