v. Exch. of Pleas, by the order of the Court?] It does not follow, because 1840. she has obtained the reference to taxation, that she is to JEFFERSON be subject to the costs of it, unless the words of the statute WARRINGTON. are sufficient to comprehend the case. She is not the client, but only his representative. It has been decided that the executor of an attorney is not liable, under the same clause, to pay the costs of the taxation where more than a sixth is taken off: Weston v. Pool (a). Crompton, contrà, was not called upon. PARKE, B.-The statute gives the Court power to refer the bill for taxation on the application of "the party or parties chargeable by such bill;" and when it afterwards speaks of the costs being paid, according to the event of the taxation, by the attorney or the client, the word "client" is evidently synonymous with the words "party chargeable." Here the executrix applied as the party chargeable by the bill, to have it referred to taxation. ALDERSON, B.-The case of the executor of an attorney differs; he is not the person who makes out the bill, and ought not to be held responsible for the act of another person. So here, if it had been the testator who had made the application to tax, the executrix ought not to have been held liable. But the "client" clearly means the "party chargeable," with the bill, which in this case was the executrix. Rule absolute. (a) 2 Stra. 1056. DOE d. KINDERSLEY and Others v. JOHN HUGHES and ELIZABETH HUGHES. Exch. of Pleas, 1840. house and land from year to year, the land February, the from the 2nd of house, &c., from the 1st of May. February, 1838, notice to quit On the 16th of a was served on EJECTMENT to recover a house and lands in the county A tenant held a of Denbigh. The declaration contained three demises, all dated 3rd of May, 1839; the first by R. T. Kindersley and A. Chambers; the second by A. Chambers alone; the third by H. W. Seton and A. Chambers. At the trial before Lord Denman, C. J., at the last Denbighshire Assizes, it appeared that the premises in question were a farm (the extent of it did not appear) part of a considerable estate vested in trustees for the benefit of a Miss Shipley, which had been occupied by the defendants for many years as tenants from year to year. The actual period of the commencement of their tenancy was not shewn; but it was proved to be the usage of the estate, that the tenants should enter upon the lands on the 2nd of February, and upon the house and outbuildings on the 1st of May. On the 16th of February, 1838, the following notice to quit was given to the defendants : "As agent for and on behalf of your landlords, Henry Wilmot Seton and Alexander Chambers, trustees of Miss A. L. Shipley, I hereby give you notice to quit and deliver up the farm, lands, and premises which you hold under them, at the end of your present year's holding thereof. Dated this 16th day of February, 1838. "J. V. Horne, This notice was served by the clerk of Mr. Horne, who at the time explained the nature of it to the defendant, John Hughes (he being an illiterate man), and told him that his time for quitting would be in the spring of the following year. The clerk stated that Mr. Horne had authority to receive the rents and manage the estates, and that he (the witness) had on one occasion, four years ago, him, requiring him to quit and deliver up the farm at the end of his present year's holding:-Held, that this was a good notice to determine the tenancy in the spring of 1839; it not being shewn on the part of the tenant that the land was not the principal subject of the holding. A notice to quit, given by a person authorized by one of several lessors, joint-tenants, determines the tenancy as to all. 1840. DOE d. v. HUGHES. Exch. of Pleas, let a small farm. Mr. Horne was also called, and stated, that about the end of 1836 or the beginning of 1837, he was in London to settle his accounts with the trustees, (the KINDERSLEY then trustees being Messrs. Seton and Chambers) and there saw Mr. Seton, and informed him that some of the farms were kept in bad repair, and that the defendants' was one upon which Mr. Seton directed him to give notices to quit in all such cases. In June, 1838, Mr. Seton ceased to be a trustee, and he and Mr. Chambers conveyed their estate to Messrs. Kindersley and Chambers. It was contended for the defendants, first, that the notice to quit was insufficient on the face of it, inasmuch as it was to quit at the end of the defendant's present year's holding, i. e., in May, 1838, for which it was too late, and that it could not operate to determine the tenancy at the end of a subsequent year; secondly, that there was no evidence of authority from the trustees to Mr. Horne to determine the tenancy. The Lord Chief Justice reserved both points, and a verdict passed for the plaintiff, leave being given to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. Welsby now moved accordingly.-First, the written notice to quit was insufficient. None of the cases have gone so far as to say that a notice in these terms can be applied to a subsequent year. In Doe d. Williams v. Smith (a), where the tenancy commenced on the same days as in the present case, a notice given on the 28th of October, 1833, to quit both land and house "at the expiration of half a year from this notice, or at such other time or times as your present year's holding of the premises, or of any part thereof respectively shall expire after the expiration of half a year from this notice," was held sufficient to determine the tenancy in the spring of 1835; but that was by reason of the latter words, which rendered it impossible that the te (a) 5 Ad. & Ell. 350. 1840. DOE d. บ. HUGHES. nant should be misled, and the Court therefore rejected Exch. of Pleas, the word "present" as surplusage. But here the only words are "at the end of your present year's holding." Now, at the time of the service of this notice, the current KINDERSLEY year was that which would expire on the 1st May, in the same year; and the insufficiency of the written notice cannot be helped by the parol contemporaneous statement of the party serving it. [Lord Abinger, C. B.-The year then running was that which had commenced on the 2nd of February preceding.] That is on the assumption that the land was the principal subject of the demise, and the house, &c., only the accessory; but there was no evidence from which to infer that. [Parke, B.-Did you ask that that question should be left to the jury?] No-it was for the plaintiff to have given evidence on the subject. [Parke, B. In that case, Doe d. Heapy v. Howard (a) is an express authority against you: it was there held, that it is a question for the jury, which is the principal and which the accessorial subject of demise, in order for the Judge to decide whether the notice for the whole was given in time; and that, if the party against whom he decides does not desire him to leave that question to the jury, it must be taken that he acquiesces in the fact assumed by him as the ground of his decision.] Secondly, that there was no proof that Horne had a sufficient authority from the trustees to determine the tenancy. A notice to quit, given by a third party, professing to be an agent for joint-tenants, is not good, unless his act be ratified before the service of the notice: Doe d. Mann v. Walters (b). [Parke, B.-Here the party was previously authorized by one of the trustees: that is the same as if that trustee had given the notice and Doe d. Aslin v. Summersett (c), is an express authority that a notice to quit by (a) 11 East, 498. (b) 10 B. & C. 626. (c) 1 B. & Adol. 135. 1840. Exch. of Pleas, one of several joint-tenants, purporting to be given on behalf of them all, is good for all, because the tenant holds the premises only so long as he and they all shall agree.] DOE d. KINDERSLEY v. PER CURIAM— HUGHES. Rule refused. Where application is made to set aside proceedings for irregularity after eight days, but within the eight days a similar application had GOREN V. TUTE. HUMFREY had obtained a rule for setting aside the copy and service of the writ of summons in this cause, on the ground that the defendant's place of abode was not set forth in the writ according to the form prescribed by the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Will. 4, c. 39. The writ was served on the 24th of October. The learned counsel stated, been unsuccess- that on the 31st, an application was made to Gurney, B., Judge at cham- at chambers, to set aside the service; but the learned Judge declined to interfere. On the 2nd of November, the present rule was moved for; but there was no affidavit to shew what had taken place at chambers. fully made to a bers, the Court cannot take no tice of such application at chambers, unless it be shewn on affidavit, even though the Judge, be- Corrie shewed cause, and objected that as the Court could know nothing of the application at chambers, unless it was regularly brought before them by affidavit, the present application appeared as the only one that had been made on the subject, and was therefore too late, being after the expiration of eight days from the service of the writ. GURNEY, B., being present in Court, stated that the application had been made to him as above mentioned; and Humfrey, in support of the rule, contended that the presence of the learned Judge in Court, certifying the fact, was sufficient, and likened it to the case of a Judge's order, which it never was necessary to verify by affidavit. |