Law Lecture at King's College.-Abstracts of Recent Statutes.

by that attendance only, that competent knowledge of a practical nature can be acquired. Practical knowledge has, indeed, been too often put forward in a more promising light than it deserves. It has been made, like the actio of the orator, the first, the second, and the third thing needful. Not that I should be disposed to quarrel with any degree of importance which may be given to it, provided only the value of the far more important knowledge of principles be not postponed to it. It is an acquaintance with the principles of the law which can alone constitute the sound lawyer; without it a knowledge of the practice of any particular branch of the law is of little use. Practical knowledge, to be effective, must be built upon the foundation of knowledge of principles.

"It is precisely this knowledge of principles which the chambers of the practitioner are ill calculated, may I not say, are incompetent?— to supply. I am well aware, that from time to time attempts have been made by different gentlemen, to afford to their pupils the additional advantages of a course of lectures in their chambers. And well have those gentlemen deserved,

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student. It also comprises some general reflections on the nature of our system of jurisprudence, and the changes which are in progress under the various Commissions of Inquiry into the state of the law. From the following passage, we may reckon Mr. Spurrier as an opponent of the scheme of Codification.

"It was once the passing fancy of the day, that, amongst other advantages to be derived from a system of codification, it would tend to remove this reproach [of the number of our law books]. But the example of France has shown us, that, under circumstances far more favourable to the experiment than our own added a new and more extensive library of law country happily exhibits, a new code has only to the old collection of law books, to which it has rather increased than diminished the necessity of continual reference."

STAGE AND HACKNEY CARRIAGES.

3 & 4 W. 4. CAP. 48.

The 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 120,a regulated the number of passengers allowed to be carried on the outside of any stage carriage, and the distribution or placing or manner of carrying them, and required a separate division or space to be allotted for luggage on the top or roof of the stage.

I will not say of their pupils only, but of the ABSTRACTS OF RECENT STATUTES. profession and, may I not add? of the public. But such attempts, highly useful as they are, are not of a nature to supply the want of preparation of which I have been speaking. In the first place, it is to be remembered that they are made by particular individuals only; they are not adopted by all: even in those instances where the lectures have been commenced successfully, many reasons, amongst others, the probable increasing avocations of the lecturer, and the limited number of the pupils, too often concur to render their continuance uncertain. Again, the lectures will probably, if not necessarily, be confined to the particular branch of the law to which the practice of the lecturer has relation. Without doubt, the institution of such lectures will always be found highly useful; and I, for one, rejoice in their existence, as a proof, at once, of the increasing demand for what I will venture to term a better quality of legal education, and of the readiness of individual practitioners to lend their aid in meeting that demand. But the usefulness will be confined, and perhaps it will not be too much to say that it will be rendered more effective, in proportion as it is confined,-to affording to the student, who is acquainting himself with the practice in one particular branch of the law, a knowledge of the principles more immediately applicable to that branch, and on which the practical part of it is founded. The student will still have to seek the means of gaining a competent knowledge of our law and its principles, generally, and as it were in the outline, before he can effectually avail himself of the particular lectures of the private practitioner, even where they may be open to him."

This is repealed by the present act; but the former act remains in force, by which a penalty is inflicted for conveying a greater number of passengers on the outside than is specified in the license (§ 1).

The following are the enactments in lieu of the clauses repealed :

Stage carriages with four wheels or more, the top or roof of which shall not be more than eight feet and nine inches from the ground, and the bearing of which on the ground shall not be less than four feet six inches from the centre of the track of the right or off wheel to the centre of the track of the left or near wheel, if such carriage shall be licensed to carry any number not more than nine passengers, shall be allowed to carry not more than five outside; and if licensed to carry more than nine and not more than twelve, shall be allowed to carry not more than eight outside; and if licensed to carry more than twelve and not more than fifteen, shall be allowed to carry not more than eleven outside;

a See analysis of the act, vol. 5. p.

86.

By a general rule of all the Courts, Mich. T. 3 W. 4, reg. 12, it is ordered, that "in case the time for pleading to any declaration, or for answering any pleading, shall not have The following observations are submitted in expired before the 10th Aug. in any year, the answer to the communication of a Convey-party called on to plead, reply, &c., shall have aneing Counsel.

Selections from Correspondence.-Law of Attorneys, No. XI.

the same number of days for that purpose after the 24th day of October, as if the declaration or preceding pleading had been delivered or filed on the 24th day of October."

In "Bradstock v. Wilson," the case to which I allude, the time for pleading to the declaration expired on the 24th July; the defendant obtained several orders for time to plead, the last of which expired on the 12th August. On the 15th, judgment, for want of a plea (defendant neglecting to take out another summons for time,) was signed, under the impression, that as the original time for pleading to the declaration had expired before the 10th day of August, it could not by any construction be said to come within the above cited rule; but the Court decided otherwise, saying, that the office for receiving pleas was by intendment of law, if not so in point of fact, closed between the 10th August and 24th October, and therefore set aside the judgment, but without costs. T. W. H.

ON THE DOUBTS RELATING TO THE DOWER
ACT.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer.
Sir,

LAW OF ATTORNEYS.
No. XI.

NEGLIGENCE.

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WE have before collected the cases on the subject of what will be considered negligence on the part of an attorney towards his client. The following case may be added to those :

A., a complainant in Chancery, employed B. as his solicitor, during whose employment an irregular order to dismiss the bill on a certain day, unless publication passed, was obtained; before that day arrived C. was appointed the solicitor of A., and the bill having been dismissed because no step was taken by C., an action was commenced against him for negligence, which was held to be maintainable, because he could have conformed with the order, or should, within the time, have moved to vacate it on a motion for a new trial.

Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., said, I am of opinion that there should be no new trial in this case. The complaint made by the plaintiff in his declaration is, that the replication filed by Sylvester In the letter I wrote to you on this subject on the 4th of May was not followed up by the (ante, p. 45), I endeavoured to state my opi- defendant Cole; and that by reason of his negnion in as few words as possible. I am afraid lect to proceed, in obedience to the order of that has been the cause of my being misunder- the 5th of May, the plaintiff's bill was disstood, as otherwise I think your correspondent missed, and certain costs and charges thereby Pe does not treat me fairly. He entirely incurred. It is said, in answer to this, that throws overboard (ante, p. 70) the proviso at the motion to dismiss the bill was, according the end of the 1st section of the 3 & 4 W. 4, to the existing practice of the Court, premac. 74, and assumes "that the 77th section of ture; and, therefore, that the order made upon that statute does relate to dower," and that the that motion was irregular; but, as the order word "estate," in that section, does mean was a subsisting order, the defendant was “any interest, charge, lien, or incumbrance." bound, either to conform to it, or, if aware of It was precisely that which I meant to deny; the irregularity, he might have applied to and I think Pe should first make that vacate that order. If he did not think proper foundation secure before he raises his super- to make that application, he was bound to act structure. The construction which P—— ein conformity with the order; and I cannot puts upon the two statutes together, seems to say that he was not guilty of gross negligence be this-that the wife may, if she please, bar in omitting to take such steps, within the time her own dower, under the Fines and Reco-limited by the order, as would have prevented veries Act; but if she ride restive and don't choose to do it, then the husband may do it in defiance of her. Can any thing be more absurd? It seems to me worse than sending a congé d'elire to a dean and chapter, accompanied by the statutes of præmunire. I would ask Pe this question. Is the husband to have power to defeat the wife's dower, without first applying to her to bar it herself? If not, I am afraid we shall want a "Judge of Conciliation" to settle the inatrimonial squabbles which the two statutes will give rise to. If he is to have that power, where was the "use" of the enactment regarding dower in the Fines and Recoveries Act? I am now, of course, putting the case only of women married after the 1st Jan. next. In conclusion, I beg to inform your correspondent G. G. (ante, p. 71), that he will find the proposition of the gentleman alluded to by me, set out at length in the letter of your correspondent P--e, which immediately precedes his. J. C.

the dismissal of the bill. But it is then said, that, although it might have been the defendant's duty to act in obedience to the order; yet, that the action cannot be maintained, because the plaintiff could have obtained no advantage if he had proceeded further in the suit. The contrary, however, appears, as he was entitled to a part of the prayer of his bill, and to his costs in respect of that part, out of the general fund; and there is no ground for saying that this would have been no advantage. It is clear that Cole was retained to conduct the cause. All the evidence is one way upon that point; and I therefore think, that no grounds have been laid to induce the Court to grant a new trial.

Bayley, B.-I am of the same opinion. I think that the question as to the retainer was properly put to the jury, as it involved in it a question of time prior to the 2d of May; and that there was sufficient evidence of a retainer before that time, when the bill was, in

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Barristers called.—Attorneys to be admitted in Hilary Term.

point of fact, dismissed, to warrant the finding of the jury. There is another question, which is a question of law. It is said, that the order was an order irregularly obtained, and, consequently, that the defendant was not bound to obey it. The order, however, was, in fact, made by the Court; and we are at liberty to assume that Henson and Cole did not know it was irregular; as, whether they did or not, it was in existence, and required the plaintiffs to proceed, at the peril of the bill being dismissed with costs. The disobedience of the order is that of which the present plaintiff complains, and is that from which he has received a damage. It is said, that disobedience to an irregular order does not entitle the plaintiff to recover, and that the defendant did all he could, by the subsequent applications to restore the cause. This is not so; because he should have applied to vacate the order, instead of acting upon it, and suffering the period of time to elapse during which he could object to its validity. The defendant's disobedience then produced a damage to the plaintiff; and there is nothing in this case to take away any right he has to recover in respect thereof. Heathcote v. Wilkinson will not interfere with this decision; there, the question was, whether the negligence of the attorney in not delivering particulars of set-off, precluded him from giving evidence of an item which turned out not to be properly a matter of set-off, but which the defendant was entitled to insist upon the allowance of, under the general issue; and therefore no damage legally resulted to the plaintiff in consequence of the neglect of the attorney to deliver particulars of set-off.

Frankland v. Cole, 2 C. & J. 590.-And see Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738. Montriou v. Jefferys, 1 Ry. & Moo. 317. Reece v. Rigby, 4 B. & Ald. 202.

BARRISTERS CALLED.

Michaelmas Term, 1833.

Lincoln's Inn.

Granville John Penn, Esq.
Thomas Bond, Esq.
Eric Rudd, jun., Esq.
John Lewis, Esq.

William Jameson Dewdney, Esq.
Henry Maddock, Esq.

Francis Joseph Gourdez Walford, Esq.
George Arkwright, Esq.
Peter Laurie, Esq.

Charles R. Littledale, Esq.

Inner Temple.

Thomas Moulden Sherwood, Esq.
Charles Hance, Esq.
William Ramshay, Esq.
George Garnett, Esq.
William Shaw, Esq.
William Patrick Grant, Esq.
William Kennedy Bayley, Esq.
Thomas Hare, Esq.
Charles Webster, Esq.
Edward Eyre Williams, Esq.
Henry Udall, Esq.
Joseph Trotman, Esq.
Honorable Henry Spencer Law.
William Lloyd Birkbeck, Esq.
Middle Temple.

John Sealy, Esq.
Alfred Griffin, Esq.
Henry Richard Coyne, Esq.
George Lister, Esq.
Henry Charles Sirr, Esq.
Gray's Inn.

William Crawford, Esq.
James Fremeillon, Esq.
Rowland Gibson, Esq.

Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor; Rolls; King's Bench.

SUPERIOR COURTS.

Lord Chancellor.

DUTY OF A RECEIVER.

The Lord Chancellor, again observing upon the motion against Mr. Newton, the receiver in this case, said he had looked into the affidavits carefully with a view to put an end to the litigation. He found that, although Lord Eldon had, in compassion to a receiver in one case, directed a reference to the master as to the state of the accounts, yet the receiver was ultimately compelled to pay the money into Court. The appearance of the pass-book kept by Mr. Newton warranted a like reference in his case, and he (the Lord Chancellor) would frame an inquiry in such a way as would put an end to the dispute.

Delafosse v. Crawshay, Nov. 16, 1833.

Parker. In the placitum to

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Torrington an annuity of 4007., which was to cease if she should marry a second husband. He afterwards added a codicil, but did not alter the provision made for his lady; nor did he, either in his will or codicil, take notice of the deed executed in 1814. A question, therefore, arose on the will, and was now brought in an amicable suit before the Court; it was whether the testator intended that his lady should have two annuities, or that the latter was in satisfaction of that covenanted for by the marriage settlement.

Mr. Bickersteth and Mr. Wray, in behalf of Lady Torrington, submitted that there was no ambiguity in the words of the will, and that it clearly conferred a second annuity of a like amount. It recited and confirmed the provisions of the settlement, and then gave an annuity of 4007, with this restriction, however, that it was to cease on the lady's second marriage, which condition was not expressed or even suggested by the provision of the settle

the report of this case, p. 59, ante, read "im-ment. An annuity so conditioned could not posing the obligation," instead of " the objection to elect," &c.

Ralls Court.

WILL.-CONSTRUCTION.

be in satisfaction of that provided by the cove

nant in the settlement.

Mr. Pemberton, for the present Viscount Torrington, urged that the provision by the will was substituted for and in satisfaction of the annuity covenanted for. The equal amount of the sums showed the intention of the testadouble provision of such an amount to his lady or, who could not be supposed to make at

A husband, in pursuance of marriage articles, charges his estates with an annuity for his wife as a jointure and in lieu of dower. By his will he confirms the settle-out of an estate of very limited yearly income. ment, and, without noticing the deed of charge, gives an annuity of like amount to his widow. Held, that this latter is in addition to and not in satisfaction of the former annuity.

the language and recital in the will clearly The Master of the Rolls was of opinion that warranted the construction in favour of a double annuity. The covenant in the settlement was carried into effect by an independent deed in 1814, according to the understanding By indentures of settlement made in 1811, and with the consent of all parties. The proprevious to and in contemplation of marriage vision made by that deed was not superseded between Captain Byng and his then intended by the will, but a second annuity of the same wife, a sum of 8,000l., advanced partly by amount was added. This must be the legal himself and partly by the lady's father, was construction of the will, although it may be vested in the purchase of three per cent. con- that the testator did not intend it. The quessolidated bank annuities, in the names of trus-tion having been raised in an amicable way tees, to permit the husband, from and after between parties so nearly related and on the the marriage, to receive the dividends and best terms with each other, they would, no interest during his life, with remainder to the doubt, come to an arrangement among themwife for her life, if she should survive her hus-selves. band; and from the death of the survivor, the principal was to go to the children of the mar. 1833. riage. By a covenant in the same indentures, Captain Byng bound himself that in case he should succeed to the title and estates of Viscount Torrington, (to which he was then heir presumptive) he would charge the estates with an annuity of 400/. for his lady, in lieu of Where dower. He did succeed to the title and estates in 1814, and executed a deed charging the estates with the said annuity, to be paid to Lady Torrington from and after his own decease, as long as she should remain a widow. His lordship, by his will, dated in 1830, reciting and confirming the marriage settlement, directed the trustees to whom he devised his estates, to raise and pay half-yearly to Lady

a Vide ante, p. 46.

Douce v. Lord Torrington.-November 13,

Court of King's Bench.
[Before the four Judges.]

DECEIT.-BREACH OF CONTRACT.

a party will not be liable, although he

does not fulfil his contract.

This was an action for deceit, in the description of a vessel called the Louisa Ogilvie, which had been purchased by the defendant of the plaintiff for 1,3007., with an alleged warranty that she was copper fastened, which proved to be incorrect. At the trial before the Lord Chief Justice, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, damages 1207., on the ground that there had been a breach of the warranty;