Selections from Correspondence, No. XLV. 363 compel attendance of jurors, with power to in- | recovered, viz. twenty years arrears, and not flict fines for non-attendance. 9. The sheriff to hold a special county court for the election. If election not determined on the view, then to proceed to take a poll. Commencement and duration of poll-two days, from 9 till 5. 10. Poll clerks to be appointed and sworn, and inspector of poll clerk. The electors to be sworn. 11. Punishment for perjury. 12. Expenses of sheriff, &c. to be paid by the candidates. 13. Coroner incapacitated from acting professionally in prosecutions where he shall have sat as coroner in the same case. 14. Every inquest to be held before any coroner, shall be held in open court, and the evidence of the witnesses and the charge and direction of the coroner shall be delivered in, and all the proceedings shall be carried on in open court, save the deliberation of the jury, if they think fit to retire. 15. Act not to extend to Ireland or Scotland. SELECTIONS FROM CORRESPONDENCE. No. XLV. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOR RENT. To the Editor of the Legal Observer. Mr. Editor,-Having been out of town till to-day, I did not before see the last communication of your correspondent P-—e, on the subject of the limitation of actions for rent. P- -e observes, " 1st, that he is not aware that it (the stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 42,) contains any clause limiting the arreurs of rent to be recovered: sect. 3 limits the time within which the action must be brought to recover any rent at all, but not the arrears that may be recovered in such action." The words of the section (3) alluded to are, "the said actions of debt for rent upon any indenture of demise, or covenant or debt, or any bond, or other specialty, &c. within ten years after the end of the present session, or within twenty years after the cause of such action or suits, but not after." It is almost unnecessary to offer any remarks on the words above quoted, or upon the opinion of your correspondent, that this exception does not limit the arrears of rent to be recovered. I presume it is to be admitted, that all rent, which has become due and is unpaid, is rent in arrear; and that for such rent à cause of action arises. When therefore the statute enacts, that actions shall be brought within twenty years (I omit the other period to prevent confusion) after the cause of action, does it not limit the arrears of rent which may be twenty-two or twenty-five years? With respect to the dictum of your correspondent, that no more than six years rent, whether reserved by deed or not, can now be recovered in any action :-I would merely observe, that even supposing your correspondent correct in his interpretation of the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, and that the legislature intended indirectly and by implication to place simple contract debts, and monies reserved by specialty on the same footing, (which to me is incredible) yet, as the law amendment act passed subsequently, its provisions, if they are inconsistent with those of the previously passed statute, must prevail. PRIOR. ELECTION LAW.-Corporations aggregate. Corporations sole may vote for a member of Parliament; but whether corporations aggregate can or cannot vote as a corporation, does not appear ever to have come under the consideration of the Courts. It would seem that corporations aggregate cannot vote, as the act of voting is a personal act, and all the old acts, as well as the Reform Act, speak of male persons only as being entitled to vote. Independent of this, oaths may be, and very often are, required to be taken by the elector, and a corporation aggregate cannot take an oath. Nor does it seem possible for a corporation aggregate to vote by deputy, (their secretary for instance) as voting by proxy is out of the question. The question whether an individual member of a corporation can vote in respect of lands of which the corporation is seised, has repeatedly come under consideration. It has been decided that a master of the Westminster School, who was appointed by the dean and chapter, and thus became a member of the also entitled ex officio to a house, part of the corporation, who received a stipend, and was corporate estates, could not vote. See 2 Peckwell, 113. But in some public companies (the New River Company, for instance,) the shares are deemed real property, and the proprietors have a vote in respect of each share. In most of the acts of parliament, however, incorporating public companies, the shares are declared personal property; and where this is the case, there does not appear to be any question that no proprietor can vote. The same difficulties which arise to prevent corporations aggregate from voting in respect of real property, of which the corporation is seised, for å knight of the shire, seem to exist with reference to their voting in respect of occupancy for a burgess. A. B. 364 On the new Bankruptcy Court Bill.-Parliamentary Returns.--Superior Courts. ON THE NEW BANKRUPTCY and employing its own professional adCOURT BILL. visers? One thing seems clear, that the Court's expenses (which there is power given to the bill to increase, by employing more clerks) exceed the representations and calculations originally made; and that a gcneral, sweeping power is sought, to tax the suitors, by using their money to make up the deficiency, instead of either reducing the establishment, or raising fees adequate to its support, and carrying any profit that can fairly be made of the suitors' money to the public account. P. S. T. PARLIAMENTARY RETURNS. THIS Bill purports to direct an investment The truth is that, as regards both Chancery, Exchequer, and Bankruptcy money, the honest, correct, parliamentary, and constitutional course would be, that all money paid in should go to the Treasury of the country, and bear interest on the public books at a fair rate of interest, thus forming a peculiar and distinct stock or debt, the specific money being paid out again when wanted. Thus an end would be put to the buying and selling of stock, brokerage, fluctuation, dead money, &c. The salaries of the Judges, &c. would then be voted by Parliament regularly; every suitor's money would bear a regular interest, without fluctuation by rise or fall of funds or Exchequer bills; and all savings would go, as they ought, to the credit of the purse of the nation. Allow me to enquire also, what the clause for paying the expenses of the act means? Are not these bills public measures, conducted by the Treasury? Is the Bankruptcy Court a private suitor to Parliament, soliciting a bill for its particular interests, CHANCERY BUSINESS. The following is an account, abridged from business decided in the Court of Chancery the Return to the House of Commons, of the during the last three years. Causes } Exceptions Cause Petitions 234 tions con- SUPERIOR COURTS. Lord Chancellor's Court. PRACTICE.-ORDERS OF COURSE ON PETITION. taxation. A motion was made to discharge an order of the Rolls, for referring to the Master a solicitor's course, made upon petition to the Master of bill of costs for taxation. Two objections were made to the motion:-First, that this Court could not discharge on motion an order made by the Master of the Rolls on petition:-Secondly, that this Court could not discharge an order of course made at the Rolls, but that the application to discharge it ought to be made at the Rolls, and then, if the order was made adverse, the course was to come here by appeal to reverse it. These objections were Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor; Equity Exchequer. 365 raised by Mr. Bethell, and the matter stood | make a rule to that effect. The unfrequency over for inquiry as to the practice. Mr. Pepys and Mr. Dixon, on a subsequent day, renewed the motion; and in support of it they cited two cases, in one of which, viz. Bishop v. Wilis. Lord Hardwicke said, "it is not the course of the Court to move to discharge those orders on petition made on hearing counsel on both sides. On petition ex parte indeed, it is done every day." The present oader was made on petition ex parte, and, inpependent of the authority of Lord Hardwicke, in the case cited, it was the constant and notorious practice of this Court to discharge such orders. The objection was never heard of before this. The other case is Clinton v. Pardon, which is very like the present case: an order being there made on petition at the Rolls for refusing an attorney's bill for taxation, it was discharged on motion by Lord Eldon. b Mr. Bethell.-Lord Eldon's attention was not called to the point in that case. The object of contention there was on another point. As to the case decided by Lord Hardwicke, that is an authority against this motion. Lord Hardwicke there added to what is already cited to the Court-" I do not say there may not be such a case, but I know no instance of it where made by the Lord Chancellor. How it is when made by the Master of the Rolls, I know not." The Court is to bear in mind that this was an order to refer a solicitor's bill for taxation, and that the Master of the Rolls has | original jurisdiction. The objection to the motion is confined to the facts: a motion of this sort should be discharged in the same recorded authority on which it is made. | of such motions shewed that the Bar had the same view of it that the Judges of the Court had entertained. His Lordship was ready to hear the motion. Eastwood v. Glenton, at Westminster and Lincoln's Inn, February, 1834. Equity Exchequer. PRACTICE.-COSTS. It is irregular to issue a subpœna for payment of costs of a co-defendant, which are ordered by the decree in the cause to be paid. Mr. Wakefield moved to set aside, on the ground of irregularity, a subpoena, calling upon the defendant to pay a sum of 7771. 168. 9d. the amount of a bill of costs, paid by the plaintiff to Mr. Philip Taylor, a defendant, as against whom the bill was dismissed with costs. When the decree in the cause was pronounced, it was thereby ordered, that the costs of Taylor should be taxed forthwith, and paid by the plaintiff, and that as soon as they were so paid, they should be repaid to him by the defendant Attwood; that was the usual course. The plaintiff, after paying the costs, issued a subpœna, calling upon Mr. Attwood to repay the amount to him. The irregularity was the calling on the defendant to repay costs by a writ of subpoena, when such repayment was distinctly provided for by the decree in the cause. The clerk in the Seal Office would not have sealed the writ, if he had been aware of the circumstances. The Lord Chief Baron.-Undoubtedly, if the decree ordered that a sum should be paid, such payment should only be enforced under that decree. I do not see why that part of the decree, which relates to the payment of costs, should be understood differently from any other part relating to any other description of payment. Mr. Wigram, for the plaintiff.-The question is, whether these costs are not part of the plaintiff's costs; and if so, whether they ought not to be recovered in the usual way; the practice of the Court was favourable to the course adopted. The Lord Chief Baron.-Was the question raised in that case, he should be glad to know what the practice of the Court was. The Lord Chancellor postponed his judgment, saying, he would confer with the Muster of the Rolls and Vice Chancellor on the point of practice. On a subsequent day, his Lordship said, the order made in Bishop v. Willis did not apply to this case. In the case of Clinton v. Pardon, the order was obtained on the suppression of the fact that the former order was obtained on petition. His Lordship found a case in Mr. Swanston's Reports, (vol. 1, p. 194, in the notes,) in which an order of course obtained on petition at the Rolls, for time to plead, answer, or demur, after demurrer overruled, was discharged on motion by Lord Eldon, who held that there should be a special application to obtain time to answer after demurrer. This was in the way of appeal from an order made of course; there was every reason for making such appeals to the Court, which granted the order of course; The Lord Chief Baron.-Let a certificate be but still the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-procured from such of the officers of this Chancellor agreed with his Lordship, that there is authority in this Court to hear and determine such orders, even made on petition and not on motion. Although they all agreed that the jurisdiction was so, still they came to the understanding that it was inconvenient to exercise it; but they doubted whether they should a 2 Ves. sen. 112. b 1 Turn. & Russ. 301. Mr. Wigram was not aware the question was raised. The opinion of the Master was, that the regular course was to proceed by subpana. In the Court of Chancery, the practice was to issue a writ of subpœna in such cases. Court as were not engaged in the cause, as to the practice of this Court in such cases. Should there be no precedent here, I shall enquire what is the practice of the Court of Chancery, and I will adopt it in this Court. Let all proceedings in the case be stayed in the meantime. That certificate was produced on a subsequent day. It stated that the course adopted in this case was not in strict accordance with 366 Superior Courts: Exchequer. the practice in Chancery; but to the certificate was appended an opinion of the officer, that the terms in the decree justified the departure complained of. Mr. Wakefield, insisted that the certificate was favourable to his application; and as his Lordship did not refer the matter to the clerks in Chancery for the construction of his own decree, he trusted that the addendum to their certificate would not be attended to. Mr. Wigram, having been heard on the other side, the Lord Chief Baron, having taken time to consider the matter, pronounced his decision on the next day. His opinion was, that the course adopted by the plaintiff was not regular, and consequently, the subpoena should be set aside. The plaintiff was only to have the costs in question from the defendant, on his shewing that he had paid them to Philip Taylor; and as there was no matter on the record to shew that they had been so paid, he could not allow such a summary proceeding as that of attachment, in the face of so palpable a blot in the proceedings. The subpoena must be set aside for irregularity. Mr. Wigram. Your Lordship does not of course decide against our right to recover these costs by separate subpæna. plea had been demanded, judgment signed, In support of the rule, it was contended judgment was not signed till the 5th of November. It was not sworn that there was a mistake about the bills; it was not even sworn that the 201. bill is due; and Is. 6d. is added for noting, not being recoverable. That made the debt above 207., and prevented an application to have the cause tried before the sheriff. The real debt ought to have been indorsed, otherwise the defendant may be misled, as he swears he was: he ought therefore to be relieved from all the costs except those of the writ. Bayley, B.-Where a wrong sum is indorsed on a writ, it does not give the party an opLord Lyndhurst.-Certainly not; I only de-portunity of paying the debt within eight days cide that your course in issuing a subpoena without fulfilling the requisite forms, was irregular. Mr. Wakefield. Of course my client is to have the costs of his application. Lord Lyndhurst.-Certainly: irregularity in proceedings always subjects the party to costs. Small v. Attwood, at Westminster, November 14th, 1833; and at Gray's Inn, January 16th & 17th, 1834. Exchequer af Pleas. INDORSEMENT.-STAY OF PROCEEDINGS. LACHES.-PARTICULARS. The plaintiff should indorse on his process the real amount of the sum he claims. In this case a rule nisi was obtained to set | aside the interlocutory judgment which had been signed. The defendants had been served with a writ indorsed for 20%. 18. 6d. and interest, debt, and 27. 15s. costs, to which he appeared. When the declaration was delivered, the particulars of demand claimed only 127. 1s. 6d. The affidavit stated, that if the defendant had known that the real debt was only 127. Is. 6d. he should not have entered an appearance, but paid the money. On showing cause, it was stated upon an an affidavit, that the plaintiff held two bills of exchange, accepted by the defendant, one for 201. and another for 127.; that the 127. bill was the one on which the plaintiff was suing. But it was contended that the application was too late. The appearance was on August 26th, and the declaration was delivered on the 20th of October, with a rule to plead; since then a tion. after the service; and if the defendant had come to this Court in proper time, he would have been allowed to pay the debt with the costs of the writ only; but he has not come so early as by the rules of the Court he ought to have done. Proceedings now go on in vacation. By one of the rules it is ordered, that "if the plaintiff omit to insert in the writ any matter required by the act, such writ, &c. may be set aside as irregular, upon application to the Court, or to any Judge." That rule recognized the right to apply to a Judge, Where proceedings are taken at the beginning of the long vacation, it might throw enormous expenses on the other side, if a party could lie by till term. The defendant ought to have applied in a reasonable time after the declaraAs to that, there is a rule that no application to set aside proceedings for irregularity shall be allowed, unless made within a reasonable time, nor if the party applying has taken a fresh step after notice of the irregularity. The declaration was delivered on the 24th of October. The defendant was not bound to make enquiries before declaration, though probably he would have learned how it was; but after declaration, if he had properly made an application to pay the debt and the costs of the writ, any Judge would have granted it. There were eight days before the term, during which he might have applied to a Judge: in term eight days would have been full time to apply. The judgment was regularly signed on the 5th; and on the 6th this application is made, and by that neglect subsequent costs have been incurred. The utmost we can do is to make the rule absolute for paying the debt and costs hitherto incurred in a week: but as to the costs of the application, as no Notes of the Week.—Answers to Queries. 367 mistake is sworn to, I think the plaintiff should | England belonging to Bankrupt's Estates, not have his costs; if the debt and costs are and to apply the Interest thereon in disnot paid within a week, judgment will then be charge of the Expenses of the Court of signed, and this rule discharged without costs. Rule accordingly, Elliston v. Robinson, Bankruptcy, and for the Relief of the Suit M. T. 1833, Exchequer. NOTES OF THE WEEK. ors in the said Court." It has been read a second time, and referred to a Committee. We refer to an article on the subject at p. 364; and if deemed necessary, we shall give an analysis of the provisions of the Bill in our next number. We may probably make some further observations on it, as it certainly appears to us an extraordinary |