The order for the writ of prohibition may be made absolute ex parte in the first instance on special circumstances being shown, in the discretion of the Court or judge (Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 71).

Form of Writ of Prohibition.-The form of writ of prohibition contained in the Appendix to the Crown Office Rules, 1906 (Form 39), is as follows:

WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

EDWARD THE SEVENTH, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, to [the keepers of Our peace and Our justices assigned to hear and determine divers crimes, trespasses and other offences committed within Our county of ; or otherwise describe the Court as the case may be and add the party to be prohibited], greeting. Whereas We have been given to understand that you, the said ċjustices have entered an appeal by A. B. against, etc.]. And that the has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the said by reason that [here state facts showing want of jurisdiction]. We therefore hereby prohibit you from further proceeding in the said

said

Witness, Richard Everard, Baron Alverstone, at the Royal Courts of Justice, London, the day of in the year of Our

Lord one thousand nine hundred and
This writ was issued by, etc.

The rules as to the preparation, testing, and issuing of the writ of prohibition are the same as in the case of mandamus (see MANDAMUS).

Stay of Proceedings.-The grant by the High Court or by any judge of an order or summons to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue to any County Court is, if so directed, to operate as a stay of proceedings in the action or matter to which the same relates until the determination of an order or summons, or until the High Court or a judge thereof otherwise order; and the County Court judge is from time to time to adjourn the trial of such action or matter to such day as he may think fit, until such determination or until such order be made; but if a copy of such order or summons is not served by the party who obtained it on the opposite party and on the registrar two clear days before the day fixed for the trial of the action or matter, the judge may in his discretion order the party who obtained the order or summons to pay all the costs of the day, or so much thereof as he thinks fit, unless the High Court or a judge thereof have made some order respecting costs (County Court Act, 1888, s. 129).

Appeal.-Before the modern system of appeal was introduced, in cases where the writ of prohibition had been issued without due cause, a writ termed a consultation might have been granted. A consultation was a writ in the nature of a writ of procedendo, ordering the inferior Court to proceed with the cause notwithstanding the prohibition; it was introduced by the Statutum de Consultatione of the reign of Edward I., and although originally applicable only to the Ecclesiastical Courts, it was extended to all Courts of inferior jurisdiction. For further information as to the old writ of consultation, see Registrum Brevium, 1634, pp. 44-58; Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, tit.

"Writ of Consultation," pp. 50 et seq.; Comyns, Dig., tit. "Prohibition " (K), "Consultation."

Under the earlier practice there was no appeal, and the party asking for prohibition could move for prohibition in one Court, and if refused he could renew his application in another Court, and so go from Court to Court, as in the case of the other prerogative writs. Now, however, by the Judicature Act of 1873, s. 19, a right to appeal from every order or judgment of the High Court is given, consequently the reason for the multiplication of applications to co-ordinate Courts is gone, there being a right to appeal from the first refusal to grant the writ (see per Esher, M.R., The Recepta, [1893] P. (C. A.), at p. 261). An appeal lies from the decision of a Divisional Court granting a prohibition to a County Court (see Burton v. Titmarsh, 1880, 49 L. J. Q. B. 573). And it has been held that an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a refusal to grant a writ of prohibition, notwithstanding sec. 132 of the County Courts Act, 1888, which only applies to proceedings in the High Court, and prevents an application to another judge of the High Court or to another Divisional Court when the first judge or Court has refused to grant the writ (ibid., [1893] P. (C. A.) 255; see also Lister v. Wood, 1889, 23 Q. B. D. (C. A.) 229). A further appeal lies from the decision of the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords (see APPEALS).

Order 58 of the R. S. C., 1883, as to appeals applies to all civil proceedings on the Crown side, including prohibition (see Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 216).

The County Courts Act, 1888, s. 132, provides that when the High Court or a judge thereof have refused to grant a prohibition to a County Court no other Court or judge may grant such writ; but that provision is not to affect the right of appealing from the decision of the judge of the High Court to the High Court itself, or to prevent a second application being made for such writ to the High Court or a judge thereof on grounds different from those on which the first application was founded.

Costs. With regard to the jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division to give costs on an order for a prohibition, it has been held that the right to grant prohibition, not being a jurisdiction belonging exclusively to the Crown side of the King's Bench Division, but the Court of Exchequer, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Chancery also having had concurrent jurisdiction and power to inhibit inferior tribunals, the High Court in making a rule absolute for a prohibition without pleadings may make an order for costs (see R. v. The Justices of the County of London and the London County Council, [1894] 1 Q. B. (C. A.) 458; see also Wallace v. Allen, 1875, L. R. 10 C. P. 607; R. v. Midland Rly. Co., 1887, 19 Q. B. D. 540; Great Western Rly. Co. v. Waterford and Limerick Rly. Co., 1881, 17 Ch. D. (C. A.) 493).

Under the County Courts Act, 1888, s. 130, where a writ of prohibition has been granted to a County Court by the High Court or a judge thereof on an ex parte application, the party who obtained it must lodge it with the registrar, and give notice to the opposite party that it has issued two clear days before the day fixed for the trial of the action or matter to which it relates, otherwise the judge may, in his discretion, order the party who obtained the writ to pay all the costs of the day, or so much thereof as he shall think fit, unless the High Court or a judge thereof has made some order respecting such costs.

Order 65 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883 (Costs), as far as it is applicable, applies to all civil proceedings on the Crown side, and Order 65 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883 (Costs), special and general regulations. Rule 27, as far as it is applicable, applies to all proceedings on the Crown side (Crown Office Rules, 1906, rr. 261, 262).

66

[Authorities.-Coke, Institutes, pt. ii., tit. "Articuli Cleri; Registrum Brevium," 1634, tit. "Prohibitiones;" Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, tit. Prohibition;" Comyn's Digest, tit. "Prohibition;" Bacon, Abridgment, tit. "Prohibition;" Burn, Ecclesiastical Law, 9th ed., 1842, tit. "Prohibition;" Lloyd, Law of Prohibition, 1849; Shortt on Informations, Mandamus and Prohibition, 1887; Short and Mellor, Crown Office Practice, 2nd ed., 1908.]

Pro indiviso.-For an undivided part; a phrase used in reference to lands, the occupation of which is joint-tenancy, in coparcenary, or in common (Cowel).

Projecting Signs.-By sec. 69 of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 34, it is enacted that the "commissioners may give notice to the occupier of any house or building to remove or alter any porch, shed, projecting window, step, cellar, cellar door or window, sign, sign-post, sign-iron, show-board, window, shutter, wall, gate or fence, or any other obstruction or projection erected or placed, after the passing of the special Act, against or in front of any house or building within the limits of the special Act, and which is an obstruction to the safe and convenient passage along any street; and such occupier shall, within fourteen days after the service of such notice upon him, remove such obstruction, or alter the same in such manner as shall have been directed by the commissioners, and in default thereof shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings; and the commissioners in such case may remove such obstruction or projection, and the expense of such removal shall be paid by the occupier so making default, and shall be recoverable as damages; provided always that, except in the case in which such obstructions or projections were made or put up by the occupier, such occupier shall be entitled to deduct the expense of removing the same from the rent payable by him to the owner of the house or building." The provisions of the Act with respect to the removal of obstructions are incorporated in sec. 160 of the Public Health Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55. Similar powers are given under the Metropolitan Management Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, ss. 119, 120.

The local authority are not obliged to give notice to the owner or occupier before requiring him to remove a projection, but if he objects to their order, his proper course is to apply to the local authority to be heard and lay his objections before them (A.-G. v. Hooper, [1893] 3 Ch. 483). See also Goldstraw v. Duckworth, 1880, 5 Q. B. D. 275, in which it was decided that where it was forbidden to have projections in front of any building over or upon the pavement, the enactment did not apply to projections from the front of a building which were too high up to interfere with free passage along the footpath. A prohibition against hanging out meat" or other matter or thing whatsoever" was held not to apply to a reflector permanently attached to the building (Winsborrow v. London Joint Stock Bank, 1903, 88 L. T. 803; 1 L. G. R. 531).

An iron pole placed through a slightly opened window and bolted within, and bearing a flag or canvas advertisement hanging over the street is a "projecting sign" (Goldstraw v. Jones, 1906, 96 L. T. 30; 4 L. G. R. 1176).

The person who occupies a house abutting on the highway has a duty towards the public to keep in proper repair all things projecting from his house which are capable of causing harm should they fall (Tarry v. Ashton, 1876, 1 Q. B. D. 314).

The owner of a house may possess an easement entitling him to have a sign-board fixed to an adjoining house (Moody v. Steggles, 1879, 12 Ch. D. 261).

Projecting Structure.-The London Building Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii. s. 73, lays down rules concerning the projections from buildings, re-enacting 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, s. 26. Unless the council consent to alterations the rules laid down in the section must be observed. The nature of these rules is very technical, and if any deviation from the prescribed conditions is desired plans must be submitted to the council. See London County Council Building Regulations (November 8, 1904), II. (10); Emden's Building Statutes, 1907 ed., p. 648.

Summary proceedings may be taken under sec. 166 of the Act.

As to projecting cornices, see the cases cited (in the notes to sec. 73 of the Act) in Emden, supra, p. 508.

What is a "structure" is a question of fact (London County Council v. Illuminated Advertisement Co., 1904, 68 J. P., at p. 446). See also Hull v. London County Council, [1901] 1 Q. B. 580, and note (s) in Emden, supra, p. 489.

Projection.-See PROJECTING SIGNS and PROJECTING STRUC

TURE.

Prolixity.-See PLEADINGS, Under the Judicature Acts, III.

Prolocutor.-An officer (bearing, it will be noted, a designation in Latin form similar to that of the Speaker in House of Commons) chosen from among themselves by the members of the Lower House of Convocation to represent or relate their opinions and resolutions to the Upper House, and thence also called Referendarius; he also (like the Speaker in the Commons) presides in the Lower House. A candidate has sometimes been recommended by the archbishop, whose order or leave is always given before the election, and the newly-elected prolocutor has to be presented for confirmation by the archbishops and bishops. A prolocutor must be elected at the beginning of every sitting of Convocation, and if a vacancy occurs in the office during the sitting, a new one must be elected. The prolocutor may appoint a deputy or deputies to act in his absence, but the archbishop must approve the appointment, and it is said that the leave of the Upper House ought to be obtained before it is made. See also CONVOCA

TION.

[Authority.-Phillimore's Eccl. Law, 2nd ed.]

Prolongation (or Extension) of Patents.-See

PATENTS.

Promise.-See CONTRACT.

Promissory Note. - Definitions — Stamp.—A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money, to, or to the order of, a specified person, or to bearer. This definition is sec. 83 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, from which the sections referred to below are also taken. Such a promise to pay to the maker's own order becomes a promissory note only when it is indorsed by the maker (s. 83 (2)). The note may contain also a pledge of a collateral security, and authority to sell or dispose of the pledge (s. 83 (3); Venables v. Baring, [1892] 3 Ch. 527, cited under NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT); but an instrument promising anything else in addition to payment of money is not a promissory note (Follett v. Moore, 1849, 4 Ex. Rep. 410; see also Mortgage Corporation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1888, 21 Q. B. D. 352). An instrument, otherwise in proper form, has been held not to be a promissory note because it contained a term as to giving time to sureties (Kirkwood v. Smith, [1896] 1 Q. B. 582). An instrument in the form of a bill of exchange without a drawee, accepted by the drawer, was treated as a promissory note in Peto v. Reynolds, 1854, 9 Ex. Rep. 410. See further, the definition of a bill of exchange,

Vol. II. p. 202.

A promissory note may be payable "after sight," i.e. exhibition to the maker for payment (Holmes v. Kerrison, 1810, 2 Taun. 323), or by instalments (ss. 9, 14).

A note may be made by two or more makers, and so as to make them jointly, or jointly and severally, liable. If it runs, "I promise to pay, and is signed by two or more, the makers are jointly and severally liable (s. 85). If a condition be attached to such a note "that no time given to, or security taken from, or composition or arrangement entered into with either party hereto shall prejudice the rights of the holder to proceed against any other party," this does not deprive the instrument of its character as a promissory note within the meaning of the Act (Kirkwood v. Carroll, [1903] 1 K. B. 531).

An inland promissory note is one which is, or on the face of it purports to be, both made and payable within the British Islands. Any other note is a foreign note (s. 83 (4); and NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, Foreign Indorsement).

The Stamp Act, 1891, s. 33, for the purposes of that Act gives a wider definition to the name "promissory note," viz. " any document or writing (except a BANK NOTE) containing a promise to pay any sum of money," and whether simply or out of a particular fund, or upon a condition or contingency. This means an instrument containing substantially a promise to pay, and nothing else, and, therefore, does not include a contract of which a promise to pay money is only one term (Mortgage Corporation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, supra; Brown & Co. v. The Commissioners, [1895] 2 Q. B. 598), or a debenture, though unsecured (British India Steam Navigation Co. v. The Commissioners, 1881, 7 Q. B. D. 165), or an American railway bond (Brown v. The Commissioners, supra), or a marketable security "though capable of coming within the definition of a promissory note" (Speyer v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1907, 23 T. L. R. 145). In Thomson v. Bell, 1894, 22 Court of Session (4th ser.), 16, the opinion is given that nothing can be a promissory note