Proposals. See CONTRACT, Vol. III. p. 533. The term is also used in law in the sense of "suggestions," e.g. the right of the next-ofkin to bring in "proposals" for committees of the persons and estates of lunatics.

Proprietary Chapels.—Unconsecrated proprietary chapels are anomalies unknown to the ecclesiastical constitution of England, having no parochial rights or relation to the parochial organisation, and are of comparatively recent introduction. But with the facilities available for forming new parishes under the numerous Church Building Acts-ranging in date from 1818 to 1884-the erection of such chapels is now of rare occurrence. No minister can officiate in any such proprietary chapel without obtaining the bishop's licence, which may be revoked at any time, and cannot be granted without the consent of the incumbent of the parish (Hodgson v. Dillon, 1840, 2 Curt. 388); and although the incumbent cannot revoke his consent once given, a new incumbent can object to the licence, and prohibit the minister from officiating further (Richards v. Fincher, 1874, L. B. 4 Ad. & Ec. 255). The bishop has no authority over such chapels (ibid.); and the proprietor may refuse to admit anyone, even the churchwarden of the parish, during divine service (Bosanquet v. Heath, 1860, 3 L. T. 290); but in the absence of proof of consecration, or of an agreement between incumbent, patron, and ordinary, no parochial duties, other than the performance of divine service for those who attend the chapel, can be performed by the minister; and he has no right to the alms received at the holy communion, or to any other money except pew rents (Moysey v. Hillcoat, 1828, 2 Hag. Ec. 30; and see Trebec v. Keith, 1742, 2 Atk. 498; 26 E. R. 700). Such a chapel may, at the will of the proprietors, be shut up, and, if unconsecrated, be converted to secular uses (Moysey v. Hillcoat, ubi supra).

See also article PUBLIC CHAPELS, and as to building new churches, see ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS.

By 26 & 27 Vict. c. 82, 1863, the bishop of a Welsh-speaking diocese in Wales may, on the application of ten or more inhabitants, license for a term not exceeding two years a building as a chapel for the performance of divine service in English, and also a minister nominated by the incumbent to officiate therein; the applicants undertaking to provide the building and minister, and to pay all expenses. If the incumbent refuse to nominate, or in case of any other disagreement about the minister or services, the bishop may nominate, subject to an appeal to the archbishop. The building is not to be a parochial chapel without the incumbent's consent, and the minister is not to have power to perform any pastoral functions other than those specified in his licence; and the rights of the incumbent as regards banns, marriages, funerals, and offertories are to remain unaffected. See also WALES.

[Authority.-Phillimore's Eccl. Law, 2nd ed.]

Proprietary Medicines.-See EXCISE, Vol. V. p. 450.

Proprietate probanda, Writ of.-A writ which used to be directed to the sheriff, requiring him to inquire whether goods distrained were the property of the plaintiff, or of the person claiming them. This writ issued when to a writ of replevin the sheriff returned as his reason for not executing it, that some third person claimed a property in the goods distrained. The object of this writ is now obtained by means of a summons to interplead.

VOL. XII.

3

Proprietor.-In a sale of land, the requirements of the Statute of Frauds are complied with if in the contract the vendor is described as "owner," "proprietor," "mortgagee," or by some equivalent term, though he is not named. But the terms "friend," "client" of a named person, or "solicitor to the vendor," are not sufficient, the reason being that the former description is a statement of a matter of fact, as to which there can be perfect certainty, and none of the dangers struck at by the Statute of Frauds can arise (Jarrett v. Hunter, 1886, 56 L. J. Ch. 141). Where on the sale of real estate by auction, the particulars state that the property is put up for sale by "the proprietor," and no further description of the vendor is given in the particulars or conditions, there is a sufficient description of the vendor within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds (Sale v. Lambert, 1874, 43 L. J. Ch. 470; and Rossiter v. Miller, 1878, 48 L. J. Ch. 10). Where a person was described as "a trustee selling under a trust for sale," the description was held to be sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (Catling v. King, 1877, 46 L. J. Ch. 384). Where a purchaser objected to the description of a vendor as "legal personal representative of L. D.," the vendor not being at the date of the contract L. D.'s legal personal representative, although he subsequently became so, it was held that the objection failed; that the latent ambiguity being raised by parol evidence could be got rid of by parol evidence, and that there was a valid contract. It was also held that the Statute of Frauds, if relied on, must be pleaded (Towle v. Topham, 1877, 37 L. T. 308. See also Bourdillon v. Collins, 1871, 19 W. R. 556; Hood v. Lord Barrington, 1868, L. R. 6 Eq. 218; Potter v. Duffield, 1874, 43 L. J. Ch. 472; Commins v. Scott, 1875, 44 L. J. Ch. 563).

By the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, s. 1, "the word 'proprietor' shall mean and include as well the sole proprietor of any newspaper, as also in the case of a divided proprietorship the persons who, as partners or otherwise, represent and are responsible for any share or interest in the newspaper as between themselves and the persons in like manner representing or responsible for the other shares or interests therein, and no other person."

By the Patents and Designs Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII. c. 29, s. 93, "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, proprietor of a new and original design

...

(a) Where the author of a design, for good consideration, executes the work for some other person, means the person for whom the design is so executed; and

(b) Where any person acquires the design or the right to apply the design to any article, either exclusively of any other person or otherwise, means in the respect and to the extent in and to which the design or right has been so acquired, the person by whom the design or right. is so acquired; and

(c) In any other case, means the author of the design; and where the property in, or the right to apply, the design has devolved from the original proprietor upon any other person, includes that other person."

Pro rata Freight.-See FREIGHT.

Prorogation.-The act of bringing a session of Parliament to an end. Prorogation quashes all proceedings except impeachments and appeals to the House of Lords. See PARLIAMENT, Vol. X., at p. 318.

Prosecution.-The term "prosecution" is now used as signifying the procedure for obtaining the adjudication of a Court of justice with respect to acts and omissions punishable by criminal or penal sanction; as "action" describes the procedure for obtaining civil remedies for the alleged infraction of civil rights.

There is not in England any complete system whereby the Crown or any public department undertakes all prosecutions; and subject to certain statutory exceptions, it is the right of any private person to set the criminal law in motion without the assistance of the Crown or any officer of the executive in the following cases, and in some others, the sanction or consent of the Attorney-General is necessary prior to the institution of a prosecution or at an early stage in the proceedings. Offences under the Explosives Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 3, s. 7; the Official Secrets Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 52, s. 7; the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 69, s. 4; the Moneylenders Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51, s. 2; the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII. c. 34, s. 2; and in cases of prosecution of a fraudulent trustee under an express covenant, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 80, or for concealment of title-deeds, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 24. The Crown may intervene in any prosecution through the law officers or the DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, to take over the prosecutions (Prosecution of Offences Acts, 1878 and 1908), or the Attorney-General may stop it by entering a NOLLE PROSEQUI.

The Prosecution of Offences Acts of 1878 and 1884 were amended in 1908 by separating the office of Public Prosecutor from that of Solicitor of the Treasury, and directing that the regulations under the Acts should empower the Public Prosecutor to take action in cases of importance or difficulty, or otherwise requiring his intervention (s. 2).

In the early history of the common law the distinction between civil and criminal remedies were not very clearly marked; and individuals injured by serious crime or their nearest relatives were able to proceed by way of APPEAL OF FELONY. On the gradual disuse and final abolition of such appeals, the theory was developed that it was the right if not the duty of the subject to prosecute on behalf of the Crown for any criminal offence; and in the case of larceny, the owner of the stolen property was given a special inducement by obtaining a right to restitution of the goods on conviction of the thief.

In cases of treason or felony there appears to be an absolute duty incumbent on any person who knows or has strong reason to suspect the commission of an offence, to inform officers of the law of the fact or suspicion. See MISPRISION. And to stifle or compound a prosecution for such offences is misprision of treason or felony, or a misdemeanor corresponding to THEFT BOTE. See HUSH MONEY.

In the case of misdemeanor the duty to inform is not absolute; to compound a misdemeanor, while not criminal, unless it amounts to a conspiracy to defeat or pervert justice, is so far illegal that an agreement made on the composition is not enforceable (Vint v. Windhill Local Board, 1890, 45 Ch. D. 351).

Under the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1878, it is the duty of justices' clerks to inform the public prosecutor of all cases in which a prosecution is abandoned (see DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS).

Indictable Offences.-There are three modes of instituting a prosecution for an indictable offence :—

1. The original method, which is still occasionally followed, is for

the prosecutor to prepare a bill of indictment, and to send it, indorsed with the names of the witnesses to be called in support of it, before the grand jury for the Court of Assize or Quarter Sessions which has jurisdiction to try the charge. If a true bill is found, the person accused is either arrested on a BENCH WARRANT issued by the Court, or upon a warrant issued by a justice of the peace (on production to him of a certificate of the finding of the indictment), and on arrest is committed to prison to await his trial or held to bail to appear and take his trial (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 3).

An indictment thus presented is termed a voluntary indictment, the prosecutor being under no bond or recognisance to prosecute. It is forbidden as to all offences which have been brought within the provisions of the VEXATIOUS INDICTMENTS Acts, and is now rarely resorted to except in the case of indictments for common law nuisance by non-repair or obstruction of a highway, public bridge, or a navigable river, which are criminal in form only, and have been made civil for purposes of evidence and appeal by the Evidence Act, 1877, 40 & 41 Vict. c. 14, s. 1, and the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII. c. 23, s. 20 (3), or other indictments or proceedings instituted to try or enforce a civil right fall within the Act of 1877 as to evidence. Where prosecutions are undertaken by the direction of the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General, or by the permission of a judge of the High Court, or by the direction of a competent Court, as in the case of perjury or offences against bankruptcy or electoral law, it is open to the prosecution to proceed by voluntary indictment.

2. Prosecutions for misdemeanor may be instituted in the High Court (King's Bench Division) by ex officio information at the instance of the Attorney-General, or by criminal information filed by leave of the Court. This procedure is now rarely used (see Short and Mellor, Crown Practice, 2nd ed.; Archbold, Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 142).

3. The mode of prosecution now almost invariably used is to take the person accused in the first instance before one or more justices, who hold a preliminary inquiry into the matters alleged against him.

Prosecutions for treason and misprision and treason felony are very rare, and are in practice only undertaken at the instance of the law officers of the Crown.

In the case of charges of felony, arrest being possible without warrant, it is usual for the prosecutor, or the police on his request, to arrest the accused, and take him with all convenient speed before a justice of the peace for the district in which he is arrested. When justices are not sitting, it is the practice to take the accused to a police station and charge him there, and then to detain him in custody or admit him to BAIL, and to bring him before a justice or petty sessional Court as soon as practicable.

In all cases of indictable offences the prosecutor may adopt the procedure prescribed by the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, i.e. he may lay an information before a justice and obtain from him a warrant for the arrest of the accused, or a summons requiring his appearance at a time and place named, to answer the charge. The warrant or summons must be under the hand and seal of the issuing justice. The information need not be in writing or on oath, unless a warrant is asked for in the first instance; but where the defendant does not appear to a summons properly served, a warrant is issued on proof of service by oath (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, ss. 1, 2, 8, 9; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49). In the City of London

it is the practice to require a sworn information in writing on all applications for process in indictable cases, and any justice may insist on it wherever he thinks proper.

Warrants can, but summonses cannot, be issued and executed on a Sunday (29 Chas. II. c. 7, s. 6; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 4). The mode of executing warrants of arrest has been dealt with under ARREST.

A summons must be personally served by a constable, or left at the last or most usual place of abode of the defendant with an adult person (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, ss. 9, 12). It may be effected anywhere in England or Wales, and, after indorsement, in Scotland or Ireland (44 & 45 Vict. c. 24).

When the person accused of an indictable offence is before a justice, whether on arrest, with or without warrant, or on summons, the justice, irrespective of the question where the offence was committed, may hold an inquiry to determine whether the accused should or should not be committed for trial.

:

The procedure on the inquiry is as follows:

The charge is stated to the accused, and counsel or solicitor for the prosecution or the prosecutor may open the facts. In certain special cases, officers of local authorities and factory inspectors are allowed to conduct cases in which they are not the actual prosecutors. The evidence for the prosecution is then taken on oath, subject to cross-examination by the accused or his counsel or solicitor, and is reduced into writing, and read over to and signed by the witness, when it becomes a deposition. The accused is then asked by the magistrate whether he has anything to say, and cautioned (see CAUTION), and asked if he has witnesses to call, or wishes to make a statement, or to give evidence on his own behalf (see the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36; R. v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q. B. 77).

The evidence for the defence is then taken like that for the prosecution, and the unsworn statement, if any, of the defendant written down.

The inquiry may be adjourned from time to time, and the accused committed to prison or admitted to bail; but a remand in custody must not be for over eight days, except with a view to deciding whether the case shall be dealt with summarily.

In the case of those indictable offences which can be dealt with summarily, a petty sessional Court, after taking the necessary steps to ascertain whether it is legal or expedient to take this course, proceeds under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts (q.v.).

In the case of those offences which are ordinarily the subject of summary jurisdiction, but may be dealt with on indictment at the election of the accused, the justices must, as a condition of their jurisdiction to deal summarily with the case, inform the accused of his right to elect to be tried on indictment (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 17); and if he so elects, the subsequent proceedings are as for an indictable offence (R. v. Cockshott, [1898] 1 Q. B. 582).

On the completion of the preliminary inquiry, the justice determines whether there is or is not, on the evidence before him, a reasonable probability of the guilt of the accused. If he thinks there is, he commits the accused to prison to await his trial, or puts him on a recognisance of bail to take his trial, and binds over the prosecutor and the witnesses for the prosecution or defence, other than those to character only, to attend the Court of trial. If he thinks there is no case, he