in any degree, a knowledge of the true political system of Europe during this time. You will see it in its primitive principles, in the constitutions of governments, the situations of countries, their national and true interests, the characters and the religion of people, and other permanent circumstances. You will trace it through all its fluctuations, and observe how the objects vary seldom, but the means perpetually, according to the different characters of princes and of those who govern, the different abilities of those who serve, the course of accidents, and a multitude of other irregular and contingent circumstances. The particular periods into which the whole period should be divided, in my opinion, are these. 1. From the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century. 2. From thence to the Pyrenean treaty. 3. From Ethence down to the present time.

Your lordship will find this division as apt and as proper, relatively to the particular histories of England, France, Spain, and Germany, the principal nations concerned, as it is relatively to the general history of Europe.

The death of Queen Elizabeth, and the accession of King James I., made a vast alteration in the government of our nation at home, and in her conduct abroad, about the end of the first of these periods. The wars that religion occasioned, and ambition fomented, in France, through the reigns of Francis II., Charles IX., Henry III., and a part of Henry IV., ended; and the furies of the league were crushed by this great prince, about the same time. Philip II. of Spain marks this period likewise by his death, and by the exhausted condition in which he left the monarchy he governed: which took the lead no longer in disturbing the peace of mankind, but acted a second part in abetting the bigotry and ambition of Ferdinand II. and III. The thirty years war that devastated Germany did not begin till the eighteenth year of the seventeenth century, but the seeds of it were sowing some time before, and even at the end of the sixteenth. Ferdinand I. and Maximilian had shown much lenity and moderation in the disputes and troubles that arose on account of religion. Under Rodolphus and Matthias, as the succession of their cousin Ferdinand approached, the fires that were covered began to smoke and to sparkle; and if the war did not begin with this century, the preparation for it and the expectation of it did.

The second period ends in 1660, the year of the restoration of Charles II. to the throne of England; when our civil wars and all the disorders which Cromwell's usurpation had produced were over; and is a remarkable point of time, with respect to our country. It is no less remarkable with respect to Germany, Spain, and France.

As to Germany; the ambitious projects of the German branch of Austria had been entirely defeated, the peace of the empire had been restored, and almost a new constitution formed, or an old one revived,

62 INDEPENDENCE OF HOLLAND ACKNOWLEDGED BY SPAIN.

by the treaties of Westphalia; nay the imperial eagle was not only fallen, but her wings were clipped.

As to Spain: the Spanish branch was fallen as low twelve years afterwards, that is in the year one thousand six hundred and sixty. Philip II. left his successors a ruined monarchy. He left them something worse: he left them his example and his principles of government, founded in ambition, in pride, in ignorance, in bigotry, and all the pedantry of state. I have read somewhere or other, that the war of the Low-countries alone cost him, by his own confession, five hundred and sixty-four millions, a prodigious sum in what species soever he reckoned. Philip III. and Philip IV. followed his example and his principles of government, at home and abroad. At home, there was much form, but no good order, no economy nor wisdom of policy in the state. The church continued to devour the state, and that monster the inquisition to dispeople the country, even more than perpetual war, and all the numerous colonies that Spain had sent to the West Indies; for your lordship will find that Philip III. drove more than 900,000 Moriscoes out of his dominions by one edict, with such circumstances of inhumanity in the execution of it, as Spaniards alone could exercise, and that tribunal, who had provoked this unhappy race to revolt, could alone approve. Abroad, the conduct of these princes was directed by the same wild spirit of ambition; rash in undertaking though slow to execute, and obstinate in pursuing though unable to succeed, they opened a new sluice to let out the little life and vigour that remained in their monarchy. Philip II. is said to have been piqued against his uncle Ferdinand, for refusing to yield the empire to him on the abdication of Charles V. Certain it is, that as much as he loved to disturb the peace of mankind, and to meddle in every quarrel that had the appearance of supporting the Roman, and oppressing every other church, he meddled little in the affairs of Germany. But Ferdinand and Maximilian dead, and the offspring of Maximilian extinct, the kings of Spain espoused the interests of the other branch of their family, entertained remote views of ambition in favour of their own branch, even on that side, and made all the enterprises of Ferdinand of Gratz, both before and after his elevation to the empire, the common cause of the house of Austria. What completed their ruin was this: they knew not how to lose, nor when to yield. They acknowledged the independency of the Dutch commonwealth, and became the allies of their ancient subjects at the treaty of Munster; but they would not forego their usurped claim on Portugal, and they persisted to carry on singly the war against France. Thus they were reduced to such a lowness of power as can hardly be paralleled in any other case; and Philip IV. was obliged at last to conclude a peace, on terms repugnant to his inclination, to that of his people, to the interest of Spain, and to that of all Europe, in the Pyrenean treaty.

As to France: this era of the entire fall of the Spanish power is likewise that from which we may reckon that France grew as formidable as we have seen her to her neighbours in power and pretensions. Henry IV. meditated great designs, and prepared to act a great part in Europe in the very beginning of this period, when Ravaillac stabbed him. His designs died with him, and are rather guessed at than known; for surely those which his historian Perefixe and the compilers of Sully's memorials ascribe to him, of a Christian commonwealth, divided into fifteen states, and of a senate to decide all differences, and to maintain this new constitution of Europe, are too chimerical to have been really his; but his general design of abasing the house of Austria, and establishing the superior power in that of Bourbon, was taken up about twenty years after his death by Richelieu, and was pursued by him and by Mazarin with so much ability and success, that it was effected entirely by the treaties of Westphalia and by the Pyrenean treaty; that is, at the end of the second of those periods I have presumed to propose to your lordship.

When the third, in which we now are, will end, and what circumstances will mark the end of it, I know not; but this I know, that the great events and revolutions, which have happened in the course of it, interest us still more nearly than those of the two precedent periods. I intended to have drawn up an elenchus or summary of the three, but I doubted on further reflection, whether my memory would enable me to do it with exactness enough; and I saw that if I was able to do it, the deduction would be immeasurably long. Something of this kind however, it may be reasonable to attempt, in speaking of the last period; which may hereafter occasion a further trouble to your lordship. But to give you some breathing time, I will postpone it at present.

LETTER VII.

A sketch of the state and history of Europe from the Pyrenean treaty in 1659 to the year 1688.

THE first observation I shall make on this third period of modern history is, that as the ambition of Charles V., who united the whole formidable power of Austria in himself, and the restless temper, the cruelty and bigotry of Philip II., were principally objects of the attention and solicitude of the councils of Europe, in the first of these periods; and as the ambition of Ferdinand II. and III., who aimed at nothing less than extirpating the Protestant interest, and under that pretence subduing the liberties of Germany, were objects of the same kind in the second; so an opposition to the growing power of France,

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LEWIS XIV., RICHELIEU, AND MAZARIN.

or to speak more properly to the exorbitant ambition of the house of Bourbon, has been the principal affair of Europe, during the greatest part of the present period. The design of aspiring to universal monarchy was imputed to Charles V., as soon as he began to give proofs of his ambition and capacity. The same design was imputed to Lewis XIV. as soon as he began to feel his own strength, and the weakness of his neighbours. Neither of these princes was induced, I believe, by the flattery of his courtiers, or the apprehensions of his adversaries, to entertain so chimerical a design as this would have been, even in that false sense wherein the word universal is so often understood; and I mistake very much if either of them was of a character, or in circumstances, to undertake it. Both of them had strong desires to raise their families higher, and to extend their dominions farther; but neither of them had that bold and adventurous ambition which makes a conqueror and a hero. These apprehensions however were given wisely, and taken usefully. They cannot be given nor taken too soon when such powers as these arise; because when such powers as these are besieged as it were early, by the common policy and watchfulness of their neighbours, each of them may in his turn of strength sally forth, and gain a little ground; but none of them will be able to push their conquests far, and much less to consummate the entire projects of their ambition. Besides the occasional opposition that was given to Charles V. by our Henry VIII., according to the different moods of humour he was in; by the popes, according to the several turns of their private interest; and by the princes of Germany, according to the occasions or pretences that religion or civil liberty furnished; he had from his first setting out a rival and an enemy in Francis I., who did not maintain his cause in forma pauperis, if I may use such an expression; as we have seen the house of Austria sue, in our days, for dominion at the gate of every palace in Europe. Francis I. was the principal in his own quarrels, paid his own armies, fought his own battles; and though his valour alone did not hinder Charles V. from subduing all Europe, as Bayle, a better philologer than politician, somewhere asserts, but a multitude of other circumstances easily to be traced in history; yet he contributed by his victories, and even by his defeats, to waste the strength and check the course of that growing power. Lewis XIV. had no rival of this kind in the house of Austria, nor indeed any enemy of this importance to combat, till the Prince of Orange became King of Great Britain; and he had great advantages in many other respects, which it is necessary to consider in order to make a true judgment on the affairs of Europe from the year 1660. You will discover the first of these advantages, and such as were productive of all the rest, in the conduct of Richelieu and of Mazarin. Richelieu formed the great design, and laid the foundations; Mazarin pursued the design, and raised the

superstructure. If I do not deceive myself extremely, there are few passages in history that deserve your lordship's attention more than the conduct that the first and greatest of these ministers held, in laying the foundations I speak of. You will observe how he helped to embroil affairs on every side, and to keep the house of Austria at bay as it were; how he entered into the quarrels of Italy against Spain, into that concerning the Valteline, and that concerning the succession of Mantua; without engaging so deep as to divert him from another great object of his policy, subduing Rochelle and disarming the Huguenots. You will observe how he turned himself, after this was done, to stop the progress of Ferdinand in Germany. Whilst Spain fomented discontents at the court and disorders in the kingdom of France, by all possible means, even by taking engagements with the Duke of Rohan, and for supporting the Protestants, Richelieu abetted the same interest in Germany against Ferdinand and in the Low Countries against Spain. The emperor was become almost the master in Germany. Christian IV., king of Denmark, had been at the head of a league, wherein the United Provinces, Sweden, and Lower Saxony entered to oppose his progress; but Christian had been defeated by Tilly and Valstein, and obliged to conclude a treaty at Lubeck, where Ferdinand gave him the law. It was then that Gustavus Adolphus, with whom Richelieu made an alliance, entered into this war and soon turned the fortune of it. The French minister had not yet engaged his master openly in the war; but when the Dutch grew impatient and threatened to renew their truce with Spain, unless France declared; when the King of Sweden was killed, and the battle of Nordlingen lost; when Saxony had turned again to the side of the emperor, and Brandenburg and so many others had followed this example, that Hesse almost alone persisted in the Swedish alliance; then Richelieu engaged his master, and profited of every circumstance which the conjuncture afforded, to engage him with advantage. For first he had a double advantage by engaging so late; that of coming fresh into the quarrel against a wearied and almost exhausted enemy; and that of yielding to the impatience of his friends, who pressed by their necessities and by the want they had of France, gave this minister an opportunity of laying those claims and establishing those pretensions, in all his treaties with Holland, Sweden, and the princes and states of the empire, on which he had projected the future aggrandizement of France. The manner in which he engaged, and the air that he gave to his engagement, were advantages of the second sort, advantages of reputation and credit; yet were these of no small moment in the course of the war, and operated strongly in favour of France as he designed they should, even after his death, and at and after the treaties of Westphalia. He varnished ambition with the most plausible and popular pretences. The Elector of Treves had put