Farrall v. Hilditch (1859), 5 C. B. N. S. 840, at p. 853; 28 L. J. C. P. 221, at p. 223; Williams, J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

"With respect to the authority of Keble, we cannot refrain from referring to the highly valuable and interesting work of Mr. J. W. Wallace, of Philadelphia, The Reporters,' 3rd ed. pp. 207, 208, from which it appears that more is to be said for the character of this reporter, as a 'tolerable historian of the law,' than, from the remarks made upon him from time to time, might have been supposed."-Farrall v. Hilditch (1859), 5 C. B. N. S. 840, at p. 855; 28 L. J. C. P. 221, at p. 224, Williams, J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

Leonard (1540-1615).

"Now Leonard is well known to have been a very accurate reporter."-Duke of Sutherland v. Heathcote, [1892] 1 Ch. 475, at p. 485; 61 L. J. Ch. 248, at p. 251, Lindley, L. J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

Levinz (1660-1697).

"Levinz, though a good lawyer, was sometimes a very careless reporter."-Tomkyns v. Ladbroke (1754), 2 Ves. Sen. 591, at p. 595, Lord Hardwicke, L. C.

Modern Cases in Law and Equity (1669-1732).

"A miserably bad book, entitled 'Modern Cases in Law and Equity.'"-1 Burr. 386 (marginal note).

"The Court treated that book with the contempt it deserves; and they all agreed that the case was wrong (sic) stated there. (I mean the old edition of that book.)"-3 Burr. 1327 (marginal note).

12 Mod. is not a book of any authority."-The King v. Lyme Regis (1779), Doug. 80, at p. 83, Buller, J.

Peere Williams (1695-1735).

"The bench, the bar, and the public in general, are much obliged to him (Mr. Cox) for his very valuable edition of those very valuable reports [Peere Williams]."-Woods v. Huntingford (1796), 3 Ves. Jun. 128, at p. 129, Sir R. P. Arden, M. R.

"It [Pierpoint v. Lord Cheney (1718), 1 P. Wms. 488] is most accurately reported, as most of the cases are, in Peere Williams."

Clinton v. Seymour (1799), 4 Ves. 440, at p. 464, Sir R. P. Arden, M. R.

Plowden (1550-1580).

"Most accurate of all reporters."-Harg. Co. Litt. 23.

Saunders (1666-1673).

"That excellent book the Reports of Saunders."-Browning v. Wright (1799), 2 B. & P. 13, at p. 23, Lord Eldon, C. J.

Starkie (1815-1822).

"The high reputation of the reporter (Starkie).”—Malpas v. The London and South Western Rail. Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 336, at p. 339, Willes, J.

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Strange (1716-1749).

Strange, who is a faithful reporter.”—Lynall v. Longbothom (1756), 2 Wils. 36, at p. 38, Willes, C. J.

Vernon (1681-1720).

"I am very sorry to find that the reports of so able a man should be so imperfect, and come out in this manner."-Boycot v. Cotton (1738), 1 Atk. 552, at p. 556, Hardwicke, L. C.

"It must be remembered that Mr. Vernon, who was a most learned lawyer, did not publish his own reports, and is believed to have made the notes, which were published after his death, as memoranda merely for his own use."-In re Willatts, Willatts v. Artley, [1905] 1 Ch. 378, at p. 383; 74 L. J. Ch. 269, at p. 271, Farwell, J.

Winch (1621-1625).

"The cases in Winch are well reported."-Troward v. Cailland (1795), 6 T. R. 439, at p. 441, Lord Kenyon, C. J.

Nisi Prius Reports.

Campbell (1808-1816).

"It is utterly impossible for any judge, whatever his learning and abilities may be, to decide at once rightly upon every point which comes before him at Nisi Prius; and whoever looks through Campbell's Reports will be greatly surprised to see, among such

an immense number of questions, many of them of the most important kind, which came before that noble and learned judge, not that there are mistakes, but that he is in by far the most of the cases so wonderfully right, beyond the proportion of any other judges."-Fentum v. Pocock (1813), 5 Taunt. 192, at p. 195, Mansfield, C. J.

"Such decisions at nisi prius as had the good fortune to be reported by Lord Campbell are admittedly of high authority."Sharman v. Mason, [1899] 2 Q. B. 679, at p. 689; 69 L. J. Q. B. 3, at p. 7, Darling, J.

Espinasse (1793—1807) and Carrington and Payne (1823-1841).

"Neither reporter [Espinasse and Carrington and Payne] has such a character for intelligence and accuracy as to make it certain that the facts are correctly stated, or that the opinion of the judge was rightly understood."-Readhead v. Midland Rail. Co. (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 412, at p. 437; 36 L. J. Q. B. 181, at p. 194, Blackburn, J.

Judgments.

[N.B. Some judgments are reported by reporters without any revision by the Court who pronounced such judgments; again, judges often write their own judgments, and these are printed in the report. Perhaps the highest praise meted out to any judge who wrote his own judgments is that to Lord Ellenborough by Park, J., in the case next cited. -AUTHOR.]

"I think I may venture to state, without fear of contradiction, that, if ever there existed a judge who luminously and perspicuously stated the grounds of a written judgment, what he did, and what he did not rely upon, that noble, very learned, and excellent person [Lord Ellenborough], was the man; and, therefore, it is impossible ever to mistake his meaning, though you may happen not to come to the same conclusion."-Nind v. Marshall (1819), 1 B. & B. 319, at p. 344, Park, J.

SECTION II.

Legal Relevancy.

The practitioner should exclude the assimilating action of all peculiarities of the case, except the one that would govern its decision before a judge.

"In the suggestions of a practical mind, the identification should always turn upon the relevant circumstances, and overcome other attractions of sameness on irrelevant points. To attain to this characteristic is the end of a practical education, which makes the person familiar with the aspects that serve the ends contemplated. Thus a lawyer in recovering, from his past experience, the precedents and analogies suitable to a case in hand, is impelled by the force of similarity working in his mind; but, of the many peculiarities of the case, he excludes the assimilating action of all except the one that would govern its decision before a judge. His education must serve him in making this discrimination; and if (as may happen) he is by natural temperament keenly alive to this one feature constituting legal relevancy, and indifferent to all other points of interest in the case, he is a born lawyer, just as Newton, with his natural avidity for mathematical relations and indifference to sensuous and poetic effects, was a born natural philosopher, or Milton, by the opposite character, was a born poet. That nature should chance to turn out a legal mind is not singular or surprising, for it is only a variety of the scientific or logical intellect, using verbal forms as the instrument, and implying an obtuseness to all the more popular and interesting features of human life. To secure a vigorous uniformity in dealing with disputes, scientific definitions must be made and equally applied to .the most diversified cases."-Bains' The Senses and the Intellect, 3rd ed. (1868), at pp. 527, 528.

Principles of Decisions...

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Rules of Interpretation and Rules of Law Distinguished
Rule of Law against Principle

18

19

Consistent Decisions-Contradictory Decisions

19

Long-standing Decisions.

Dicta contained in Decisions

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Decisions on Identical Words or Similar Grounds.

Decisions and Judgments affirmed on Different Grounds...

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Decisions are the evidence of what is common law.

"Upon the whole, however, we may take it as a general rule, 'that the decisions of courts of justice are the evidence of what is common law' in the same manner as, in the civil law, what the emperor had once determined was to serve for a guide for the future."-1 Bl. Com. p. 71.

Reason and Spirit of Decisions.

The reason and spirit of cases make law.

"The reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular precedents."-Fisher v. Prince (1763), 3 Burr. 1363, at p. 1364, Lord Mansfield.

Use of Decisions.

The use of decided cases is the establishment of some principle which the Court can follow out in deciding the case before it.

"The principle is the thing which we are to extract from cases, and to apply it in the decision of other cases."-Lord Walpole v. Earl of Cholmondeley (1797), 7 T. R. 138, at p. 148, Lord Kenyon, C. J.

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"It is the principle of the decision by which we are bound, not a mere rule that in exactly the same circumstances we are to arrive at the same conclusions. Therefore to say that the decisions are wrong in point of principle, if that principle was clearly laid down, does not relieve us from the obligation of following the principle of the decision."-Merry v. Nickalls (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 733, at pp. 750, 751; 41 L. J. Ch. 767, at p. 771, Sir W. M. James, L. J. The only use of authorities, or decided cases, is the establishment of some principle which the judge can follow out in deciding the case before him. There is, perhaps, nothing more important in our law than that great respect for the authority of decided cases which is shown by our tribunals. Were it not for that our law would be in a most distressing state of uncertainty; and so strong has that been my view, that where a case had decided a principle, although I myself do not concur in it, and although it has been only the decision of a tribunal of co-ordinate jurisdiction, I have felt bound to follow it when it is of respectable age and