highly extravagant. Leges humanæ nascuntur, vivunt, et moriuntur (Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 25 a). The legal wisdom of the past and present must yield to the legal wisdom of the future.

My arrangement of the subject-matter is intended to facilitate a discriminative and comparative view and to aid the memory. My solicitude and endeavour have been to base the classification on the dentifying process of similarities and diversities by seizing the pervading resemblances.

Contracts in writing or print are intended to express the will of the parties thereto, and seem to me to be the most important class of all instruments to be dealt with, not only as covering all or nearly all of the remaining subjects of this work, but as having probably existed prior to them all. I therefore make the rules of interpretation of the genus "contracts" form Part III.

Deeds by reason of their solemnity form a very important and special kind of contract (and conveyance) needing separate special rules. The rules of interpretation relating to "Deeds" naturally follow next in Part IV.

Mercantile Contracts embrace contracts, both under seal or under hand only, which relate to trade and commerce: further special rules are therefore needed with regard to them and form Part V. For convenience the various kinds of mercantile contracts are dealt with in alphabetical order.

Miscellaneous Instruments that form several separate and distinct classes and each of which requires special and distinct sets of rules of interpretation form Part VI., and these also are arranged in alphabetical order for convenience of reference.

Statutes of the realm that express the will of the legislature are of far higher importance than the last wills and testaments of private individuals; accordingly I deal with the rules regulating their interpretation next in Part VII.

Wills of private individuals as they express their last wishes very fitly occupy the final Part VIII.

The above general arrangement of the main subjects is also convenient as being itself alphabetical, and the juxtaposition and order of the subjects afford opportunities of comparative study. Each subject is in its turn sub-divided into heads that are arranged in what I deem to be the natural order for considering them,

which is, speaking broadly, that of the usual order of the formal parts of the various instruments. Any deficiency of my classification is, I trust, made up for by numerous cross references, an ample table of contents, and a full index whereby the reader is enabled to find the various items of information he may seek with a minimum expenditure of time and trouble.

This work is mainly made up of the very best authoritative judicial and curial statements culled from first-class recognised reports. Such statements are moreover given in ipsissimis verbis of the reports, and often amount to very able theses, dissertations or expositions by most eminent and learned judges, as well being memorable paragraphs by eloquent judges. The quotations are given in chronological order, thus generally exhibiting the history and development of the particular rule or rules at a glance. Occasionally it may at first sight seem that too many quotations are given to establish or elucidate some particular rule. The fact that the particular rule with its application was so often discussed before the Courts and confirmed or enlarged upon by the judges and found reported in the reports is a sufficient excuse, I hope, for such redundancy, as it indicates the great importance attached to the rule and its final general acceptance by the profession.

The origin of some rules, in some cases centuries old, is, unfortunately, often lost in obscurity. The growth, however, of a rule is often traceable in the chronological quotations even up to the last word of reported progress. The application of a rule and its modern use are in general both well illustrated by the cases from which the more recent quotations are taken. I have always tried to avoid the fatal doctrine of Ex uno disce omnes, yet it will sometimes be found that though a single quotation pithily sums up the outcome of many previously decided cases and judicial dicta, it may yet have to go through a further probationary period.

The intertwining and overlapping of the various branches of Law dealt with in the compass of this book has made the subject of legal interpretation a peculiarly difficult one to deal with.

Cardinal rules, be it ever remembered, are for general guidance only, and not of universal and absolute obligation or application.

CARDINAL RULES

OF

LEGAL INTERPRETATION.

Part I.-CASE LAW.

SECTION I.

SOURCES OF THE ENGLISH LAW.

"Leges humanæ nascuntur, vivunt, et moriuntur."-Calvin's
Case, 7 Co. 25a.

"Hale, C. J., said the sources of the English law are as

undiscoverable as the sources of the Nile, and although in our day

such a phrase cannot be appropriately used, it was true in Hale's

time."-Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant, [1901] A. C. 240, at

p. 245; 70 L. J. K. B. 662, at p. 64, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.

Text-Books.

Text-books, though valuable as reference books, are not accepted

as authorities in courts of justice.

Text-books do not make law, but they show more or less whether a principle has been generally accepted by the profession. Passages from text-books judicially affirmed may be cited as

authority.

"There are also other authors, to whom great veneration and respect is paid by the students of the common law, such as Glanvil and Bracton, Britton and Fleta, Hengham and Littleton, Statham, Brooke, Fitzherbert and Staundforde, with some others of ancient date; whose treatises are cited as authority, and are evidence that cases have formerly happened in which such and such points were determined, which are now become settled and first principles."1 Bl. Com. p. 72.

"When we see the authority of so great a writer (Lord Coke) not only uncontradicted, but adopted in all the digests and textbooks, we can scarcely err if we adhere to his opinion."-Strother v. Hutchinson (1837), 4 Bing. N. C. 83, at pp. 89, 90, Tindal, C. J.

"Lord Redesdale's Treatise (Mitford, Pleadings) has been referred to. But however valuable his treatise may be, it is much more satisfactory when we have, from the same eminent judge, his opinion declared in the exercise of his judicial duties."-Foley v. Hill (1848), 2 H. L. C. 28, at p. 38, Lord Cottenham, C.

"Chief Baron Comyns, whose great work (Comyns' Digest), stands high in the estimation of the profession, and who is the universal referee for almost every proposition."—Heelis v. Blain (1864), 18 C. B. N. S. 90, at p. 108; 34 L. J. C. P. 88, at p. 92, Erle, C. J.

"Looking also to the expressions of text-writers as evidencing the constant practice of the profession."-Alexander v. Kirkpatrick (1874), L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 397, at p. 400, Lord Cairns, L. C.

"The law upon this subject is stated in the observations of a text-writer cited by Lord Justice Bramwell. But I prefer taking the law as it is laid down by Lord Justice Turner in a well-known case, which gave rise to a considerable amount of discussion."Garnett v. Bradley (1878), 3 App. Cas. 944, at p. 950, Lord Hatherley.

"I read these passages from a text-book (Dart on the Law of Vendors and Purchasers, 5th ed.), as showing the view taken of

the law by the profession."-In re Turner and Skelton (1879), 13 Ch. D. 130, at p. 132; 49 L. J. Ch. 114, at p. 115, Jessel, M. R. "There is one notion often expressed with regard to works written or revised by authors on the Bench, which seems to me in part at least erroneous, the notion, I mean, that they possess a quasi-judicial authority. It is hardly enough remembered how different are the circumstances under which a book is written and a judgment pronounced, or how much the weight and value of the latter are due to the discussions at the bar which precede the judgment."-Fry on Specific Performance (1881), 2nd ed. p. v.

"There is only one other point to be considered-what do the text-books say? It is always very important when you want to know whether a rule of law, however erroneous, has been established, to see whether it has been accepted by the profession, and although the text-books do not make law they show more or less whether a principle has been generally accepted."—Henty v. Wrey (1882), 21 Ch. D. 332, at p. 348; 53 L. J. Ch. 667, at p. 675, Jessel, M. R.

"I will read from a book of my own, not because I have any undue confidence in my own work, but because in it I stated what I considered to be the law after a careful study of it-a more careful study than I could profess to give to it again at this moment." -Reg. v. Endacott, C. C. C., Times, Nov. 2nd, 1887, Stephen, J.

"The argument, however, has been almost entirely rested upon one passage in the work of Lord Justice Fry on Specific Performance. It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret which I believe every judge on the bench shares, that text-books are more and more quoted in Court-I mean, of course, text-books by living authors-and some judges have gone so far as to say that they shall not be quoted. In the preface to this very book we have a warning against it by the learned author. I cannot forbear from quoting the words: There is one notion often expressed with regard to works written or revised by authors on the bench, which seems to me in part at least erroneous; the notion, I mean, that they possess a quasi-judicial authority,' and then he gives a reason which must commend itself to all students why that notion is erroneous."-Union Bank v. Munster (1887), 37 Ch. D. 51, at p. 54; 57 L. J. Ch. 124, at p. 126, Kekewich, J.

"This case has been excellently argued. I do not postpone giving my judgment, for I hope that, while the cases which have