A statute is the will of the legislature enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal and commons in Parliament assembled.

"Although the original or authentic transcripts of Acts of Parliament are not before the time of Henry III. (1216), and many that were in his time are perished and lost, yet certainly such there were; and many of those things that we now take for common law were undoubtedly Acts of Parliament, though now not to be found of record."-Hale's Hist. of Com. Law (published in 1713), p. 89.

"The statute law is the will of the legislature in writing; the common law is nothing else but statutes worn out by time; all our law began by consent of the legislature, and whether it is now law by usage or writing, it is the same thing."-Collins v. Blantern (1767), 2 Wilson, 347, at p. 348, Wilmot, C. J.

"Statute law and common law both originally flowed from the same fountain, the legislature."-Ib., at p. 351.

All

"The statute law is the will of the legislature in writing; the common law is nothing else but statutes worn out by time. our law began by consent of the legislature; and whether it is now law by usage or writing is the same thing. For many of those things that we now take for common law were undoubtedly Acts of Parliament, though not now to be found on record. Indeed, our lawyers have made a distinction between statutes themselves; they have distinguished between statutes made before the time of legal memory-viz., 1 Ric. I. (1189)-and those made since. The former are considered as part of the common law-the leges non scriptæ; for notwithstanding copies of them may be found, their provisions obtain at this day, not as Acts of Parliament, but by immemorial usage and custom. The latter, or those since time of memory, are again distinguished; those from 1 Ric. I. (1189) to Edw. III. (1326) are called antiqua statuta; and all subsequent statutes are called nova statuta.”—Bac. Abr., 7th ed., 1832, Vol. VII., p. 431.

"A statute is a written law, made by the King, with the advice and consent of the two Houses of Parliament.”—Ibid.

"It is said that the last will of a party is to be favourably construed, because the testator is inops consilii. That we cannot say of the legislature, but we may say that it is 'magnas inter opes inops.'"-Surtees v. Ellison (1829), 9 B. & C. 750, at pp. 752, 753, Lord Tenterden, C. J.

"The ground on which the Courts have declared a testator's will void for uncertainty really is that the testator was inops consilii, and it would be impossible for me to apply such a consideration as that to the legislature of this country."-Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., [1900] 2 Ch. 352, at p. 361; 69 L. J. Ch. 850, at p. 855, Farwell, J.

Canons and Rules of Interpretation.

"The subjects of this country are bound to construe rightly the statute law of the land; it is not competent to them to aver in a court of justice that they have mistaken the law; it is a plea which no court of justice is at liberty to receive."-The Charlotta (1814), 1 Dods. Adm. 387, at p. 392, Sir W. Scott.

See also post, p. 372.

Statutes must be interpreted according to well recognized rules of

interpretation.

"We must construe Acts of Parliament according to the well recognized rules of construction."-Fletcher v. Hudson (1880), 5 Ex. D. 287, at p. 293; 49 L. J. Ex. 793, at p. 796, Brett, L. J.

"I should like to say a word or two as to the rules which are binding on all Courts in regard to the construction of statutes as well as of all other instruments. Whatever may have been the case in times past, in modern times those rules have become perfectly well settled. They have become much more limited as regards the power of the Courts, and at the same time so well recognized as to be binding on this Court and all other Courts."Ex parte Walton (1881), 17 Ch. D. 746, at p. 750; 50 L. J. Ch. 657, at pp. 658, 659, Jessel, M. R.

"I am disposed as much as any one to venerate the old canons for interpretation of statutes, sanctioned by the acquiescence of ages, as aids to us in the solving of ambiguities, and relieving us from doubts."-Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 8 App. Cas. 354, at p. 384; 52 L. J. Q. B. 505, at p. 521, Lord Fitzgerald.

"The rules of construction of statutes are very like those which apply to the construction of other documents, especially as regards one crucial rule, viz., that, if it is possible, the words of a statute must be construed so as to give a sensible meaning to them. The words ought to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat."Curtis v. Stovin (Feb. 1, 1889), 22 Q. B. D. 513, at p. 517; 58 L. J. Q. B. 174, at p. 175, Bowen, L. J.

"The Master of the Rolls [Lord Esher] has relied on a general canon of construction with regard to Acts of Parliament. I must say for myself that I have always thought it difficult to lay down beforehand canons of construction by reference to which the objects of future statutes are to be defined. It has always seemed to me that it is safer to abstain from imposing with regard to Acts of Parliament any further canons of construction than those applicable to all documents."-Lamplugh v. Norton (Feb. 21, 1889), 22 Q.B.D. 452, at p. 459; 58 L.J. Q. B. 279, at p. 282, Bowen, L. J.

Regard must be had to the rules of law applicable to the subject

matter.

"In construing a statute regard must be had to the ordinary rules of law applicable to the subject-matter, and these rules must

prevail, except in so far as the statute shows that they are to be disregarded; and the burden of showing that they are to be disregarded rests upon those who seek to maintain that proposition." -Att.-Gen. v. Beech, [1898] 2 Q. B. 147, at p. 155; 67 L. J. Q. B. 585, at p. 590, Chitty, L. J.

Statutes are primâ facie Territorial.

All English legislation is primâ facie territorial.

English statutes primâ facie apply to and bind all English subjects of the realm within the English dominions.

English statutes primâ facie apply to and bind all foreigners within English jurisdiction.

English statutes, where their language is general and may include foreigners or not, are assumed not to be so enacted as to violate the rights of other nations.

English statutes are not intended to do what is against the comity of nations.

The area within which an English statute is to operate, and the persons against whom it is to operate, are to be gathered from the language and purview of the particular statute.

If any interpretation otherwise be possible, an English statute will not be interpreted as applying to foreigners in respect to acts done by them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting.

"If the meaning of an act is doubtful, it is a reason for not putting a particular interpretation upon it that would violate the comity of nations."—Leroux v. Brown (1852), 22 L. J. C. P. 1, at p. 3, Maule, J.

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Every Act of Parliament must be understood to have the words within the dominions' inserted in it. An attempt was once made to make dealing in slaves a felony in every part of the world; but the opinion of all the legal authorities was, that an English Act of Parliament was binding within the realm of England only. If, indeed, the Act of Parliament had stated that all British subjects were to be bound, as is the case in some of the slave-dealing Acts, or as is the case in the Royal Marriage Act with respect to the descendants of George the Second, there the case is different; but where the enactment is general, as in the

present case, it does not extend beyond the English dominions.". Rosseter v. Cahlmann (1853), 22 L. J. Ex. 128, at p. 129, Pollock, C.B.

"It is clear that the legislature has no power over any persons except its own subjects, that is, persons natural-born subjects, or resident, or whilst they are within the limits of the kingdom. The legislature can impose no duties except on them; and when legislating for the benefit of persons must primâ facie be construed to mean the benefit of those who owe obedience to our laws, and whose interests the legislature is under a correlative obligation to protect."-Jefferys v. Boosey (1854), 4 H. L. Cas. 815, at p. 926; 24 L. J. Ex. 81, at p. 93, Parke, B. (cited by Lord Halsbury, L. C., delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Macleod v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales, [1891] A. C. 455, at p. 458; 60 L. J. P. C. 55, at p. 57).

"Statutes must be understood in general to apply to those only who owe obedience to the laws, and whose interests it is the duty of the legislature to protect. Natural-born subjects, and persons domiciled or resident within the kingdom, owe obedience to the laws of the kingdom, and are within the benefits conferred by the legislature; but no duty can be imposed upon aliens resident abroad, and with them the legislature of this country has no concern, either to protect their interests or to control their rights." -Jefferys v. Boosey, ibid., at p. 946; L. J., at p. 95, Jervis, C. J.

“Primâ facie, the legislature of this country must be taken to make laws for its own subjects exclusively. . . . But when I say that the legislature must primâ facie be taken to legislate only for its own subjects, I must be taken to include under the word 'subjects' all persons who are within the Queen's dominions, and who thus owe to her a temporary allegiance."-Ibid., at p. 955; L. J., at p. 99, Lord Cranworth, L. C.

"Generally, we must assume that the legislature confines its enactments to its own subjects, over whom it has authority, and to whom it owes a duty in return for their obedience. Nothing is more clear than that it may also extend its provisions to foreigners in certain cases, and may, without express words, make it appear that such is the intendment of those provisions. But the presumption is rather against the extension, and the proof of it is rather upon those who would maintain such to be the meaning of the enactments."-Ibid., at p. 970; L. J., at pp. 103, 104,