Lord Brougham. (Cited by Kennedy, J., in Davidsson v. Hill, [1901] 2 K. B. 606, at p. 612; 70 L. J. K. B. 788, at p. 791.)

"It being the plain and obvious rule in construing the Acts of any legislature that the legislature of each independent country must be supposed to deal with those subject-matters which are within its own control and jurisdiction. As Dr. Lushington expresses it in the case of The Zollverein [(1856), 2 Jur. N. S. 429; 1 Sw. 96, at p. 98]: 'In looking to an Act of Parliament with reference to such a question as I am now discussing, viz., as to whether it is intended to apply to foreigners or not, I should, in endeavouring to ascertain the construction of the Act, always bear in mind the power of the British legislature; for it is never to be presumed, unless the words are so clear that there can, by no possibility, be a mistake, that the British legislature exceeded that power which, according to the law of the whole world, properly belonged to it. The power of this country is to legislate for its own subjects all over the world, and as to foreigners within its jurisdiction, but no further."-Cope v. Doherty (1858), 4 K. & J. 367, at p. 375; 27 L. J. Ch. 600, at p. 601, Sir W. Page Wood, V.-C.

"I have always recognized the full force of this objection, that the British Parliament has no proper authority to legislate for foreigners out of its jurisdiction; and I especially did so in the case of The Zollverein [(1856), 2 Jur. N. S. 429; 1 Sw. 96, at p. 98]. No statute ought, therefore, to be held to apply to foreigners with respect to transactions out of British jurisdiction, unless the words of the statute are perfectly clear; but I never said that, if it pleased the British Parliament to make such laws as to foreigners out of the jurisdiction, courts of justice must not execute them; indeed, I said the direct contrary."-The Amalia (1863), 32 L. J. Ad. 191, at p. 193, Dr. Lushington.

"Where the language of a statute is general, and may include foreigners or not, the true canon of construction is to assume that the legislature has not so enacted as to violate the rights of other nations."-The Queen v. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63, at p. 210; 46 L. J. M. C. 17, at p. 88, Cockburn, C. J.

"It appears to me that the whole question is governed by the broad, general, universal principle that English legislation, unless the contrary is expressly enacted, or so plainly implied, as to make it the duty of an English Court to give effect to an English statute, is applicable only to English subjects, or to foreigners

who, by coming into this country, whether for a long or a short time, have made themselves during that time subject to English jurisdiction. Every foreigner who comes into this country, for however limited a time, is, during his residence here within the allegiance of the sovereign, entitled to the protection of the sovereign and subject to all the laws of the sovereign. But, if a foreigner remains abroad, if he has never come into this country at all, it seems to me impossible to imagine that the English legislature could have ever intended to make such a man subject to particular English legislation.”—Ex parte Blain (1879), 12 Ch. D. 522, at p. 526, James, L. J.

"The governing principle is, that all legislation is primâ facie territorial, that is to say, that the legislation of any country binds its own subjects and the subjects of other countries who, for the time, bring themselves within the allegiance of the legislating power. The English legislature has a right to make a bankruptcy statute which shall bind all its own subjects, and any foreigner who for the time is in England, and does something there which the statute forbids. As long as he is in England he is under the allegiance of the Queen of England, and in the power of the English legislature. Therefore, it has been held, that if a foreigner, though not domiciled or permanently resident in this country, comes into England, and does, or omits to do, some act in England which the English legislature has declared to be an act of bankruptcy, then, by reason of that act of bankruptcy, done or suffered in England, he may be made a bankrupt in England. But, upon the ground of the limited power of the legislature of England to legislate, all the authorities have held that it is necessary that the act of bankruptcy should have been committed in England, if the person against whom the statute is invoked is a foreigner who is not domiciled in England."—Ibid., at p. 528, Brett, L. J.

"All we have to do is to interpret an Act of Parliament which uses a general word ['debtor'], and we have to say how that word is limited, when of necessity there must be some limitation. I take it the limitation is this, that all laws of the English Parliament must be territorial-territorial in this sense, that they apply to, and bind, all subjects of the Crown who come within the fair interpretation of them, and also all aliens who come to this country, and who, during the time they are here, do any act which, on a fair interpretation of the statute as regards them, comes within its provisions. Of course it is not necessary that a person to be sub

ject to an English Act should be domiciled here. If he is resident here temporarily, and does an act which comes within the intent and purview of a statute, he, as regards that statute, as does every alien who comes here in regard to all the laws of this realm, submits himself to the law, and must be dealt with accordingly. As regards an Englishman, a subject of the British Crown, it is not necessary that he should be here, if he has done that which the Act of Parliament says shall give jurisdiction, because he is bound by the Act, by reason of his being a British subject, though, of course, in the case of a British subject not resident here, it may be a question on the construction of the Act of Parliament whether that which, if he had been resident here, would have brought him within the Act, has that effect when he is not resident here. As regards a British subject, whether he is here or not, he can be made bankrupt, if the Act of Parliament has declared that, in the events which have happened, he can be made bankrupt. But, as regards foreigners, there is, primâ facie, no right to bind them if they are not here."-Ex parte Blain (1879), 12 Ch. D. 522, at pp. 531, 532, Cotton, L. J. (See also In re Pearson, [1892] 2 Q. B. 263; 61 L. J. Q. B. 585, where several of the above quotations in Ex parte Blain were cited.)

"The English Parliament cannot be supposed, merely by reason of its having used general words, to be intending to do that which is against the comity of nations. It is true that if we come to the conclusion that this has been intentionally done, we must carry out the law and leave to the government of the country the task of answering objections, but unless that is perfectly clear we ought to limit the words so as to make them reasonable and proper."Colquhoun v. Brooks (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 52, at pp. 57, 58, Lord Esher, M. R.

"It seems to me that, unless Parliament expressly declares otherwise, in which case, even if it should go beyond its own. rights as regards the comity of nations, the Courts of this country must obey the enactment, the proper construction to be put on general words used in an English Act of Parliament is, that Parliament was dealing only with such persons or things as are within the general words and also within its proper jurisdiction, and that we ought to assume that Parliament (unless it expressly declares otherwise) when it uses general words is only dealing with persons or things over which it has properly jurisdiction."

Colquhoun v. Heddon (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 129, at pp. 134, 135; 59 L. J. Q. B. 465, at p. 467, Lord Esher, M. R.

"First, I should like to make some observations with regard to the rules of construction applicable to statutes such as this [The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 90)]. It may be said generally that the area within which a statute is to operate, and the persons against whom it is to operate, are to be gathered from the language and purview of the particular statute. But there may be suggested some general rules-for instance, if there be nothing which points to a contrary intention, the statute will be taken to apply only to the United Kingdom. But whether it be confined in its operation to the United Kingdom, or whether, as is the case here, it be applied to the whole of the Queen's dominions, it will be taken to apply to all the persons in the United Kingdom or in the Queen's dominions, as the case may be, including foreigners who during their residence there owe temporary allegiance to her Majesty. And according to its context, it may be taken to apply to the Queen's subjects everywhere, whether within the Queen's dominions or without. One other general canon of construction is this-That if any construction otherwise be possible, an Act will not be construed as applying to foreigners in respect to acts done by them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting. That is a rule based on international law by which one sovereign power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own territory."-The Queen v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q. B. 425, at p. 430; 65 L. J. M. C. 218, at p. 224, Lord Russell, C. J.

"It is a principle of our law that Acts of Parliament do not apply to aliens, at least if they be not even temporarily resident in this country, unless the language of the statute expressly refer to them."-Adam v. British and Foreign Steamship Co., [1898] 2 Q. B. 430, at p. 432; 67 L. J. Q. B. 844, at p. 845, Darling, J. (dissented from by Kennedy, J., in Davidsson v. Hill, [1901] 2 K. B. 606, at p. 611; 70 L. J. K. B. 788, at p. 790).

"It appears to me, under all the circumstances and looking at the subject-matter, more reasonable to hold that Parliament did intend to confer the benefit of this legislation (The Fatal Accidents Acts, 1846 and 1864) upon foreigners as well as upon subjects, and certainly that as against an English wrong-doer the foreigner has a right to maintain his action under the statutes in

question."-Davidsson v. Hill, [1901] 2 K. B. 606, at p. 614; 70 L. J. K. B. 788, at p. 792, Kennedy, J.

"Now, primâ facie the legislation of a country is territorial. Its acts are intended to apply to matters occurring within the realm and not beyond it, and this principle applies more especially to acts that are penal in their character. It is true that the language of an enactment or the nature of the subject-matter may indicate an intention to the contrary, but otherwise the primâ facie presumption holds and the statute applies only to acts within the realm.”—Moulis v. Owen, [1907] 1 K. B. 746, at p. 764; 76 L. J. K. B. 396, at p. 406, Fletcher Moulton, L. J.

Statutes affecting Colonies or India.

The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 63), s. 1: "An Act of Parliament, or any provision thereof, shall, in construing this Act, be said to extend to any colony when it is made applicable to such colony by the express words or necessary intendment of any Act of Parliament."

(See the above Act set out in extenso in the Appendix.)

A confirmed statute of the local legislature lawfully constituted, whether in a settled or conquered colony, has, as to matters within its competence and the limits of its jurisdiction, the operation and force of sovereign legislation, though subject to be controlled by the Imperial Parliament.

Colonial and Indian legislatures have powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created them, and they can do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe those powers. But, when acting within those limits, they are not in any sense agents or delegates of or acting under any mandate from the Imperial Parliament, but have plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of the Imperial Parliament itself.

"There is even greater reason for holding sacred the prerogative of the Crown to constitute a local legislature in the case of a settled colony, where the inhabitants are entitled to be governed by English law, than in that of a conquered colony, where it is only by grace of the Crown that the privilege of self-government is allowed,