made use of to control the enactments themselves where they are expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. But it has been well

said that the preamble is a key to the statute, and that it affords a clue to the scope of the Act; these statements, however, are subordinate to the settled rule above referred to."-Ibid., at p. 299; L. J., at p. 631, Chitty, L. J.

"It does not follow that because large words are used in a preamble everything to which they can be referred is within the scope of the Act. They may be useful to a limited extent in helping to interpret doubtful passages or phrases in the Act, but they do not extend its provisions or its scope beyond what the enacting parts of the Act contain, and it is necessary, therefore, to see what the Act does provide for."-Kennaird v. Cory & Son, [1898] 2 Q. B. 578, at p. 584; 67 L. J. Q. B. 809, at p. 811, Wills, J.

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"Two propositions are quite clear-one that a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, and another that, if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment."-Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co., [1899] A. C. 143, at p. 157; 68 L. J. Q. B. 392, at p. 396, Earl of Halsbury, L. C. Undoubtedly,'-I quote from Chitty, L. J.'s judgment, words with which I cordially agree it is a settled rule that the preamble cannot be made use of to control the enactments themselves where they are expressed in clear and unambiguous terms.' But the preamble is a key to the statute, and affords a clue to the scope of the statute when the words, construed by themselves without the aid of the preamble, are fairly capable of more than one meaning. There is, however, another rule or warning which cannot be too often repeated, that you must not create or imagine an ambiguity in order to bring in the aid of the preamble or recital. To do so would in many cases frustrate the enactment and defeat the general intention of the legislature." —Ibid., at p. 185; L. J., at pp. 410, 411, Lord Davey.

"Doubtless the contents of a preamble of an Act of Parliament cannot for any purpose control the actual clear provision of the statute; but if the wording of the statute gives rise to doubts as to its proper construction, the preamble can be and ought to be referred to in order to arrive at the proper construction to be put upon the enacting portion of the statute. Upon this subject I fully accept the dictum of Lord Tenterden in Halton v. Cove

(1830), 1 B. & A. 538, at p. 558 [see supra].”—Ibid., at pp. 192, 193; L. J., at p. 414, Lord James of Hereford.

"But it appears to me that, although it may be true that a preamble may be a guide to the general objects of the statute, Copyright Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45), it undoubtedly is unquestioned law that it can neither restrict nor limit express enactment."- Walter v. Lane, [1900] A. C. 539, at p. 548; 69 L. J. Ch. 699, at p. 704, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.

"Of course the preamble may be looked at, and ought to be looked at, as a guide to any construction which is doubtful, or to decide between two constructions which may be put upon the words."-Hill v. Pannifer, [1904] 1 K. B. 811, at pp. 815, 816; 73 L. J. K. B. 556, at p. 558, Lord Alverstone, C. J.

Recitals.

Mere recitals, either of law or fact, in a statute are not conclusive. Where the enacting part is clear and unambiguous, it is not controlled by the recitals.

Where the enacting part is ambiguous, it may be explained by the recitals.

"A mere recital in an Act of Parliament, either of fact or law, is not conclusive; and we are at liberty to consider the fact or the law to be different from the statement of the recital."-Reg. v. Haughton (1853), 1 El. & Bl. 501, at p. 16; 22 L. J. M. C. 89, at p. 94, Lord Campbell, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

"A recital in an Act will not bind those who are not within its enacting part."-Edinburgh and Glasgow Rail. Co. v. Linlithgow (1859), 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 691, at p. 704, Lord Truro, L. C.

"The legislature has itself here [the Charitable Uses Act, 1735 (9 Geo. 2, c. 36)] declared the object of the legislation, and what the mischief was which was intended to be remedied. This recital is, therefore, of much importance in construing the rest of the statute, though it will not justify the rejection of any enactment, though going beyond the object disclosed in the recital, if we find an intention to enact it expressed, nor the insertion of any enactment which we cannot find expressed in the enacting part, though we may think such an enactment required."-Jeffries v. Alexander

(1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 594, at p. 624; 31 L. J. Ch. 9, at p. 14, Blackburn, J.

"Now no doubt it is well established, as a rule in the construction of statutes, that where the enacting part is clear and unambiguous, you are not to control it by a reference to the recitals; but where the enacting part is ambiguous, you may explain it by reference to the recitals."-Bentley v. Rotherham and Kimberworth Local Board of Health (1876), 4 Ch. D. 588, at p. 592; 46 L. J. Ch. 284, at p. 285, Jessel, M. R.

"The object of the Act [the Administration of Estates Act, 1869-Hinde Palmer's Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 46)] is to abolish the distinction between specialty and simple contract debts, and the recital of the Act is that that alone is the object. I must, therefore, read the enactment as corresponding with the express recital of its object; and if I find words that may be carried further, I must read them with reference to the mischief intended to be remedied, and to the express recital of the Act."-Crowder v. Stewart (1880), 16 Ch. D. 368, at p. 370; 50 L. J. Ch. 136, at p. 138, Malins, V.-C.

Headings.

Headings may sometimes be usefully referred to to determine the sense of any doubtful expression in a section ranged under a particular heading.

"In different parts of the Act [Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18)] there are to be found classes of enactments applicable to some special object. Such enactments are in many instances preceded by a heading, special no doubt in one sense, as addressed to the object or purpose, but, where not otherwise provided for, general in its application to the enactments passed to accomplish the object. These various headings are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes, or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself. They may be read, I think, not only as explaining the sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to, to explain its enactments, but as affording, as it appears to me, a better key to the constructions of the sections which follow than might be afforded by a mere preamble."—Eastern Counties and the London

and Blackwall Railway Companies v. Marriage (1860), 9 H. L. Cas. 32, at p. 41; 31 L. J. Ex. 73, at p. 77, Channell, B.

"The sections of the Railways Clauses Act are, as your Lordships know, arranged in order under different heads, which indicate the general object of the provisions immediately following; and these may be usefully referred to, to determine the sense of any doubtful expression in a section ranged under a particular heading.". Hammersmith, &c. Rail. Co. v. Brand (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 171, at p. 203; 38 L. J. Q. B. 265, at p. 277, Lord Chelmsford.

"The frame of the Lands Clauses Act shows that it is even dangerous to trust to the headings which occur at the commencement of these fasciculi of clauses for the purpose of restraining or confining the natural operation of the words which you find in the various clauses under those headings. . . . . I think that the headings of these clauses are not to be relied upon-and many other instances might be given of the same kind inside the clauses themselves-showing, just in the same way that an Act of Parliament often goes beyond the preamble, that provisions have been introduced in the progress of the clauses going somewhat beyond the short and summary definition in the heading of the clauses. In fact, one of these Acts of Parliament shows that these short headings were introduced merely to ear-mark a set of clauses, and to afford a short and summary way by which they might be introduced, by reference, as enactments into other Acts of Parliament."—Ibid., at pp. 216, 217; L. J., at pp. 283, 284, Lord Cairns.

"I cannot come to the conclusion that the heading of a series of sections introduced into an Act of Parliament is not to be considered as part of the Act: I think that that word 'appeal' at the head of the section may properly be considered as part, and used for the purpose of construing any doubtful matter in the sections under that heading."-The Queen v. Local Government Board (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 309, at p. 321; 52 L. J. M. C. 4, at p. 10, Brett, L. J.

"The heading offices' is not such a heading as could be grammatically read into any of the sections which follow. It seems to their Lordships to have been inserted for the purpose of convenience of reference, and not intended to control the interpretation of the clauses which follow. It may be, indeed, that the fact of a clause being found in a certain group may in some cases possibly throw some light upon its meaning."-Union Steamship Company of New

Zealand v. Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners (1884), 9 App. Cas. 365, at p. 369; 53 L. J. P. C. 59, at p. 61, Sir Robert P. Collier, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

(See also Inglis v. Robertson, [1898] A. C. 616, at p. 630; 67 L. J. P. C. 108, at p. 114, Lord Herschell.)

"This clause is the last of a fasciculus, of which the heading is 'Track, &c., and Railways,' and, as was held in Hammersmith Rail. Co. v. Brand [(1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 171; 38 L. J. Q. B. 265], such a heading is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of the clauses ranged under it, unless the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation."-Toronto Corporation v. Toronto Railway, [1907] A. C. 315, at p. 324; 76 L. J. P. C. 57, at p. 60, Lord Collins (delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Atkinson, Lord Collins and Sir Arthur Wilson).

Marginal Notes.

Marginal notes ought not to be relied on in interpreting a statute. "A marginal note is no part of the statute.”—Bryan v. Child (1850), 19 L. J. Ex. 264, at p. 265, Pollock, C. B.

"At the time when that Act [the Alehouse Act, 1828 (9 Geo. IV. c. 61)] passed, the Parliament Roll had no marginal notes, or punctuation, nor were the statutes separated into sections. We cannot, therefore, look at the marginal note for an exposition of the meaning of the section. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the marginal notes could ever be used in the construction of Acts of Parliament, seeing they are not put there by the legislature or assented to by them."-Claydon v. Green (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 511, at p. 519; 37 L. J. C. P. 226, at p. 230, Bovill, C. J.

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Something has been said about the marginal note to sect. 4 of the 9 Geo. IV. c. 61. I wish to say a word upon that subject. It appears from Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. I. p. 183, that, formerly, at one stage of the Bill in Parliament it was ordered to be ingrossed upon one or more Rolls of Parliament. That practice seems to have continued down to the session of 1849, when it was discontinued, without, however, any statute being passed to warrant it. [See May's Parliamentary Practice, 3rd ed. 382.] Since that time, the only record of the proceedings of Parliament,-the important proceedings of the highest tribunal of the Kingdom,is to be found in the copy printed by the Queen's printer. But