I desire to record my conviction that this change in the mode of recording them cannot affect the rule which treated the title of the Act, the marginal notes, and the punctuation, not as forming part of the Act, but merely as temporanea expositio. The Act, when passed, must be looked at just as if it were still entered upon a Roll, which it may be again if Parliament should be pleased so to order; in which case it would be without these appendages, which, though useful as a guide to a hasty inquirer, ought not to be relied upon in construing an Act of Parliament."-Ibid., at pp. 521, 522; L. J., at p. 232, Willes, J.

"This view is borne out by the marginal note; and I may mention that the marginal notes of Acts of Parliament now appear on the Rolls of Parliament, and consequently form part of the Acts; and in fact are so clearly so, that I have known them to be the subject of motion and amendment in Parliament.”—In re Venour's Settled Estates (1876), 2 Ch. D. 522, at p. 525; 45 L. J. Ch. 409, at p. 411, Jessel, M. R. (This dictum was questioned in Att.-Gen. v. Great Eastern Rail. Co. (1879), 11 Ch. D. 449, at pp. 460, 461, 465.)

"The dictum in that case [In re Venour's Settled Estates (1876), 2 Ch. D. 522, at p. 525; 45 L. J. Ch. 499] is not strictly correct. I have since ascertained that the practice is so uncertain as to the marginal notes that it cannot be laid down that they are always on the Roll."-Sutton v. Sutton (1882), 22 Ch. D. 511, at p. 513; 52 L. J. Ch. 333, at p. 334, Jessel, M. R.

Punctuation and Brackets.

Punctuation and brackets form no part of a statute, and those in the printed copies ought not to be relied on.

"By putting stops, or using the parenthesis, as pointed out by the plaintiff's counsel, it becomes perfectly clear; and we know that no stops are ever inserted in Acts of Parliament, or in deeds; but the courts of law, in construing them, must read them with such stops as will give effect to the whole."-Doe d. Willis v. Martin (1790), 4 T. R. 39, at p. 65, Lord Kenyon, C. J.

"It seems that in the Rolls of Parliament the words are never punctuated."-Barrow v. Wadkin (No. 2) (1857), 24 Beav. 327, at p. 330; 27 L. J. Ch. 129, at p. 139, Sir John Romilly, M. R. "On the Parliament Roll there is no punctuation, and we there

fore are not bound by that in the printed copies."-Stephenson v. Taylor (1861), 1 B. & S. 101, at p. 106; 30 L. J. M. C. 145, at p. 147, Cockburn, C. J.

"To my mind, however, it is perfectly clear that in an Act of Parliament there are no such things as brackets any more than there are such things as stops."—Duke of Devonshire v. O'Connor (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 468, at p. 478; 59 L. J. Q. B. 206, at p. 213, Lord Esher, M. R.

Sections.

A section of a statute shall have effect as a substantive enactment without introductory words.

A section of a statute is to be construed literally unless some other section cuts down its meaning, or the section itself is repugnant to the purview of the statute.

Lord Brougham's Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 21) [10th June, 1850].

Sect. 2. "All Acts shall be divided into sections, if there be more enactments than one, which sections shall be deemed to be substantive enactments, without any introductory words." (Repealed 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 41.)

"Every clause in an enactment is an Act of Parliament.". Att.-Gen. v. Lamplough (1878), 3 Ex. D. 214, at p. 220, Cleasby, B.

Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63) [30th August, 1889].

Sect. 8. "Every section of an Act shall have effect [on and after 1st January, 1890], as a substantive enactment without introductory words."

"Now anyone who contends that a section of an Act of Parliament is not to be read literally must be able to show one of two things, either that there is some other section which cuts down its meaning, or else that the section itself is repugnant to the general purview of the Act."-Nuth v. Tamplin (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 247, at p. 253; 51 L. J. Q. B. 177, at p. 180, Jessel, M. R.

Proviso to Section.

A proviso must be construed with reference to the precedin g parts of the clause to which it is appended as subordinate to the

main clause.

Where the proviso of a statute is directly repugnant to the purview of it, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers. If a substantive enactment in a former statute is repealed, that which comes by way of proviso upon it is impliedly repealed.

"Our decision is conformable with the doctrine laid down in Attorney-General v. The Chelsea Waterworks Co. [(1731), Fitzgibbon, 195]; there it was resolved that where the proviso of an Act of Parliament is directly repugnant to the purview of it, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers."--The King v. The Justices of Middlesex (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 818, at p. 821, Lord Tenterden, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

A proviso "must be construed with reference to the pre ceding parts of the clause to which it is appended."-Er parte Partington (1844), 6 Q. B. 649, at p. 653; 14 L. J. Q. B. 57, at p. 60, Lord Denman, C. J.

"It is a well-known rule in the construction of statutes that, if a substantive enactment in a former Act is repealed, that which comes by way of proviso upon it is impliedly repealed also."Horsnail v. Bruce (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 378, at p. 385; 42 C. P. 140, at p. 143, Bovill, C. J.

L. J.

"When one finds a proviso to the section, the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso."-Lullins v. Treasurer of Surrey (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 170, at p. 173; 49 Q. B. 257, at p. 259, Lush, J.

L. J.

When the previous part of a section is doubtful as to its scope, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation; but when not so, a proviso cannot imply by law the existence of words of which there is no trace in the previous part.

is a

"Now, no doubt, a proviso may assist in determining which of two reasonable constructions of the clause upon which it proviso ought to be adopted; but it can hardly give to that clause

an entirely different meaning from that which, standing alone, it would bear. At any rate, such a controlling force can only be attributed to a proviso when it can be demonstrated to be entirely meaningless on any other supposition.”—Guardians of West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society, [1897] 1 Ch. 335, at p. 358; 66 L. J. Ch. 199, at p. 208, Rigby, L. J.

"That a proviso could be so read as to suggest that the previous part of the section of which it is a proviso should imply by law the existence of words there of which there is not a trace in the previous words of the section itself. My Lords, that certainly would be a very serious invasion upon any rule of construction by which any document, whether an Act of Parliament or anything else, has ever been construed, and I should be very much averse indeed to lend any countenance to such a mode of construing a proviso." West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society, [1897] A. C. 647, at pp. 651, 652; 66 L. J. Ch. 726, at p. 728, Lord Halsbury, L. C.

"Of course a proviso may be used to guide you in the selection. of one or other of two possible constructions of the words to be found in the enactment, and show when there is doubt about its scope, when it may reasonably admit of doubt as to its having this scope or that, which is the proper view to take of it; but to find in it an enacting provision which enables something to be done which is not to be found in the enactment itself on any reasonable construction of it, simply because otherwise the proviso would be meaningless and senseless, would, as I have said, be in the highest degree dangerous. And for this reason: one knows perfectly well that it not infrequently happens that persons are unreasonably apprehensive as to the effect of an enactment when there is really no question of its application to their case; they nevertheless think that some Court may possibly hold that it will apply to their case, and they suggest if it is not intended to be applicable no harm would be done by inserting a proviso to protect them; and, accordingly, a proviso is inserted to guard against the particular case of which a particular person was apprehensive, although the enactment was never intended to apply to his case or to any other similar cases at all. If the construction contended for were adopted the result would be this:-Having put in a proviso which was thought to be needless in order to satisfy certain persons, or a particular class of persons, and allay their fears, you would have the enactment so construed against the intention of the legislature

as to impose a liability upon a number of people who were not so apprehensive, or perhaps were not present, and therefore either did not think it necessary or were not in a position to protect their own interests by a proviso. My Lords, I am satisfied that many instances might be given where provisoes could be found in legislation that are meaningless because they have been put in to allay fears when those fears were absolutely unfounded, and when no proviso at all was necessary to protect the persons at whose instance they were inserted."-Ibid., at pp. 655, 656; L. J., at p. 730, Lord Herschel.

Saving Clause.

"A saving in an Act of Parliament which is repugnant to the body of the Act is void."-1 Coke, p. 118, Part I. 47 a.

"I should have thought it impossible successfully to contend that a saving would give any further right than the party already had."—Arnold v. Mayor of Gravesend (1856), 2 K. & J. 574, at p. 591; 25 L. J. Ch. 776, at p. 591, Sir W. Page Wood, V.-C.

"The insertion of a saving clause is never a safe ground for determining the construction of an Act of Parliament, whether local or general. We all know the anxiety which there is on the part of every one who imagines that his rights may be infringed by the passing of an Act, whether general or local, to procure the insertion of a saving clause to protect them, even where the ordinary rules of construction supersede the necessity of any such protection."--Fitzgerald v. Champneys (1861), 2 J. & H. 31, at p. 59; 30 L. J. Ch. 777, at p. 783, Sir W. Page Wood, V.-C.

Schedules.

A schedule in a statute is as much a part of the statute and as much an enactment as any other part.

If the enacting part and the schedule cannot be made to correspond, the latter must yield to the former.

"We have also to consider the language of the section itself to which the schedule is appended; and if there be any contradiction between the two, which upon fair construction there perhaps will not be found to be, upon ordinary principles, the form, which is made to suit rather the generality of cases than all cases, must give