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L. J. M. C. 99, at p. 100, Cockburn, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court (Cockburn, C. J., Bovill, C. J., Kelly, C. B.; Martin, Bramwell, Channell, Pigott and Cleasby, BB.; Willes, Byles, Blackburn, Mellor, Lush, Hannen, Grove and Quain, JJ.). 'As long ago as Heydon's Case [(1584), 2 Coke Rep. p. 18, Part III. 7b], Lord Coke says, that it was resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered :

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"1st. What was the common law before the making of the

Act?

"2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

"3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and ap

pointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth? and "4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy' (cited by Blackburn, J., in Peek v. North Staffordshire Rail. Co. (1863), 10 H. L. Cas. 473, at p. 492; 32 L. J. Q. B. 241, at p. 245, and also in The Queen v. Castro (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 350, at pp. 360, 361; 43 L. J. Q. B. 105, at p. 110).

But it is to be borne in mind that the office of the judges is not to legislate, but to declare the expressed intention of the legislature, even if that intention appears to the Court injudicious; and I believe that it is not disputed, that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the golden rule is right."-River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877), 2 App. Cas. 743, at p. 764; 47 L. J. Q. B. 193, at p. 203, Lord Blackburn. (See post, p. 302.)

"Among the things which have passed into canons of construction recorded in Heydon's Case (1584), 3 Rep. 18, Part III. 7 b, we are to see what was the law before the Act was passed, and what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided, what remedy Parliament appointed, and the reason of the remedy."-Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. ComptrollerGeneral of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, [1898] A. C. 571, at p. 573; 67 L. J. Ch. 628, at p. 630, Earl of Halsbury, L. C. "As it was put in Heydon's Case (1584), 3 Rep. 7 a, which Lord Halsbury cited in Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comp

troller-General of Patents, [1898] A. C. 571, at p. 573; 67 L. J. 628, at p. 630, 'We are to see what was the law before the Act was passed, and what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided, what remedy Parliament appointed, and the reason of the remedy.' That is a general way of stating it; but no doubt one is entitled to put one's self in the position of the legislature at the time the Act was passed in order to see what was the state of knowledge, what were the circumstances brought before the legislature, and what it was the legislature was aiming at."-Attorney-General v. Metropolitan Electric Supply Co., Ltd., [1905] 1 Ch. 24, at p. 31; 74 L. J. Ch. 145, at p. 150, Farwell, J.

(See also, post, p. 336, "Effect on Common Law.")

Intention.

The expressed intention of the makers of the statute is to be observed.

The intention is to be gathered from the words used in their ordinary sense, as applied to the subject-matter, if the words used are not clear, then according to the objects, collected from the cause and necessity and from the circumstances, of the statute.

It is customary to consider what was the exact state of the law and other matters of the kind at the time the statute was passed.

The policy of a statute is not a safe guide in interpreting it. Where the words are doubtful historical investigation may be resorted to.

The reports of commissioners are not to control the interpretation of statutes.

Debates in Parliament are not to be regarded.

"In Acts of Parliament which are to be construed according to the intent and meaning of the makers of them, the original intent and meaning is to be observed."-6 Coke, p. 138, Part XI. 73 b.

"The rule is, that where a general intention is expressed, and the Act expresses also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception."-Churchill v. Crease (1828), 5 Bing. 177, at p. 180, Best, C. J.

"The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver."-The Sussex Peerage Case (1844), 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, at p. 143, Tindal, C. J. (cited by Sir Montague E. Smith in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Cargo ex "Argos" (1872), L. R. 5 P. C. 134, at p. 153).

"I need not say, that I can know nothing of the intention of the Act, except from the words in which it is expressed, applied to the facts existing at the time."-Logan v. Courtown (Earl) (1851), 13 Beav. 22. at p. 29; 20 L. J. Ch. 347, at p. 355, Lord Langdale, M. R.

Regard must also be had to the intent and meaning of the legislature. The rule upon this subject is well expressed in the case of Stradling v. Morgan (1560), Plowd. 199, at p. 204, in which case it is said, 'That the judges of the law in all times past have so far pursued the intent of the makers of statutes, that they have expounded Acts which were general in words to be but particular, where the intent was particular. From which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance; and those statutes which comprehend all things in the letter, they have expounded to extend but to some things; and those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act, they have interpreted to permit some people to do it; and those which include every person in the letter they have adjudged to reach to some persons only; which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected, sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the Act, sometimes by comparing one part of the Act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances, so that they have ever been guided by the intent of the legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant to reason and good discretion."" -Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855), 6 D. M. & G. 1, at p. 21; 24 L. J. Ch. 332, at p. 338, Turner, L. J. (cited with approval by Lord Hatherley in Garnett v. Bradley (1878), 3 App. Cas. 944, at

pp. 950, 951, and by Lord Blackburn in Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 8 App. Cas. 352, at p. 372; 52 L. J. Q. B. 505, at p. 515).

"I take that case [In re Earl of Berkeley's Will (1874), L. R. 10 Ch. 56] to decide that there is such a thing as construing an Act according to its intent, though not according to its words.". In re Bethlem Hospita! (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 457, at p. 459; 44 L. J. Ch. 406, at p. 407, Jessel, M. R.

"I understand him [Lord Abinger in the case of Ex parte Trafford (1837), 2 Y. & C. Ex. 522] to draw a distinction between the spirit of an Act, or that which a judge conceives to be the spirit of an Act, and the intention, which, though not expressed in precise words, may be gathered from considering the terms of the enactment, and which amounts in fact to a species of construction; he thinks that unless he can find the latter he cannot make the order."-In re Bethlem Hospital (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 457, at pp. 460, 461, Jessel, M. R. (cited by Buckley, J., in In re Gaselee, [1901] 1 Ch 923, at p. 929; 70 L. J. Ch. 441, at p. 443).

"I think, in modern times, much more weight has been given to the natural meaning of the words than was done in the time of Elizabeth; and in some cases in which the old judges have given effect to the general intention as overruling the particular words, a modern Court would have given effect to the particular words as showing that the intention really went further than what was supposed. The Civil Code of Canada, Article 12, well expresses what I think is the principle, and also the qualification which I think must now be put on the older authorities. 'When a law is doubtful or ambiguous, it is to be interpreted so as to fulfil the intention of the legislature, and to attain the object for which it was passed. The preamble, which forms part of the Act, assists in explaining it.' It is upon this principle that it is held, as I think it has always been held, that where a statute was passed for the purpose of repealing and in part re-enacting former statutes, all the statutes in pari materiâ are to be considered; in order to see what it was that the legislature intended to enact in lieu of the repealed enactments. It may appear from the language used that the legislature intended to enact something quite different from the previous law, and where that is the case effect must be given to the intention. But when the words used are such as may either mean that former enactments shall be re-enacted, or that they shall be altered, it is a question for the Court which was the inten

tion."-Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 8 App. Cas. 354, at p. 373; 52 L. J. Q. B. 505, at pp. 515, 516, Lord Blackburn.

"Intention of the legislature' is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication."-Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A. C. 22, at p. 38; 66 L. J. Ch. 35, at p. 44, Lord Watson.

"Turner, L. J., in Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855), 6 D. M. & G. 1, at p. 21; 24 L. J. Ch. 332, at p. 338, and adding his own high authority to that of the judges in Stradling v. Morgan (1560), Plowd. 199, at p. 204, after enforcing the proposition that the intention of the legislature must be regarded, quotes at length the judgment in that case; that the judges have collected the intention, sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the Act. . . . sometimes by foreign circumstances' (thereby meaning extraneous circumstances), 'so that they have ever been guided by the intent of the legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant to reason and good discretion,' and he adds: We have therefore to consider not merely the words of the Act of Parliament, but the intent of the legislature, to be collected from the cause and necessity of the Act being made, from a comparison of its several parts, and from foreign (meaning extraneous) circumstances so far as they can justly be considered to throw light on the subject.' Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877), 2 App. Cas. 743, at p. 763; 47 L. J. Q. B. 193, at p. 203, says: 'In all cases the object is to see what is the intention expressed by the words used. But, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible to know what that intention is without inquiring further, and seeing what the circumstances were with reference to which the words were used, and what was the object appearing from those circumstances, which the person using them had in view.'"- Eastman's Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and TradeMarks, [1898] A. C. 571, at pp. 575, 576; 67 L. J. Ch. 628, at p. 631, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.