Subject-matter.

"There is a rule for the construction of statutes which is well expressed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of the Statutes [Ch. 2, s. 1], In interpreting a statute it is to be borne in mind at the outset that language is always used secundum subjectam materiam, and that it must therefore be understood in the sense which best harmonises with the subject-matter.'"-Bank of India v. Wilson (1877), 3 Ex. D. 108, at p. 119; 47 L. J. Ex. 153, at p. 158, Pollock, B.

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Whenever you have to construe a statute or document, you do not construe it according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject-matter with regard to which they are used, unless there is something which obliges you to read them in a sense which is not their ordinary sense in the English language as so applied. That, I take it, is the cardinal rule."-Lion Insurance Association v. Tucker (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 176, at p. 186; 53 L. J. Q. B. 185, at p. 189, Brett, M. R.

"An Act of Parliament is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of the words in the English language as applied to the subject-matter, unless there is some very strong ground, derived from the context, or reason why it should not be so construed."―Hornsey Local Board v. Monarch Investment Building Society (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 1, at p. 5; 59 L. J. Q. B. 105, at p. 106, Lord Esher, M. R.

"In construing a statute regard must be had to the ordinary rules of law applicable to the subject-matter, and these rules must prevail, except in so far as the statute shows that they are to be disregarded; and the burden of showing that they are to be disregarded rests upon those who seek to maintain that proposition." -Att.-Gen. v. Beech, [1898] 2 Q. B. 147, at p. 155; 67 L. J. Q. B. 585, at p. 590, Chitty, L. J.

Objects.

The intention depends upon the object for which the statute was made as collected from the language employed.

The manifest intention of a statute must not be defeated by too literal an adhesion to its precise language.

"We must construe this statute by what appears to have been the intention of the legislature. But we must ascertain that

intention from the words of the statute, and not from any general inferences to be drawn from the nature of the objects dealt with by the statute."-Fordyce v. Bridges (1847), 1 H. L. Cas. 1, at p. 4, Lord Brougham.

"In all cases the intention of the legislature must depend to a great extent upon the particular object of the statute that has to be construed."-The Queen v. Justices of Surrey (1869), L. R. 5 Q. B. 87, at p. 93; 39 L. J. M. C. 49, at p. 53, Hannen, J.

"In construing Acts of Parliament, we must look at what was the object of the legislature."-Brown v. Great Western Rail. Co. (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 744, at p. 751, Field, J.

"All statutes are to be construed by the Courts so as to give effect to the intention which is expressed by the words used in the statute. But that is not to be discovered by considering those words in the abstract, but by inquiring what is the intention expressed by those words used in a statute with reference to the subject-matter and for the object with which that statute was made; it being a question to be determined by the Court, and a very important one, what was the object for which it appears that the statute was made."-Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883), 8 App. Cas. 354, at p. 372; 52 L. J. Q. B. 505, at p. 515, Lord Blackburn.

"It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law. It may be necessary for a Court of justice to come to such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify it except necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used."-Salmon v. Duncombe (1886), 11 App. Cas. 627, at p. 634; 55 L. J. P. C. 69, at p. 73, Lord Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

"I am satisfied that we have nothing to do with the general object of the enactment if the words used are clear; they are clear here, and we ought not to enter upon a refined consideration of the question whether they carry out the object of the statute."Crofts v. Taylor (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 524, at p. 528; 56 L. J. M. C. 137, at p. 140, Huddleston, B.

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'My Lords, it seems to me that in order to determine the effect of legislation one must look at the object which it had in view.” Baumwoll Manufactur von Carl Scheibler v. Furness, [1893] A. C. 8, at p. 20, Lord Herschell, L. C.

"This is well put in Maxwell on Statutes, especially at p. 29, 3rd edition, 1896, where it is said that, in order to arrive at the real meaning of a statute, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope, and object of the whole Act."Smelting Company of Australia v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1896] 2 Q. B. 179, at p. 184; 65 L. J. Q. B. 513, at p. 514, Pollock, B.

"Acts of Parliament ought, like wills or other documents, to be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished by them, so far as it can be collected from the language employed: see Harrison v. Blackburn (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 678, at pp. 690— 693; and Campbell v. Prescott (1808), 15 Ves. 500, at p. 503."Hawke v. Dunn, [1897] 1 Q. B. 579, at p. 586; 66 L. J. Q. B. 364, at p. 369, Hawkins, J.

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'In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 3rd edition, p. 319, the principle of construction is laid down in these terms: 'Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence'; and for that proposition several authorities are cited. In Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886), 11 App. Cas. 627, at p. 634; 55 L. J. P. C. 69, at p. 73], Lord Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, says: 'It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law.' This case is a good instance of the principle that the manifest intention of a statute must not be defeated by too literal an adhesion to its precise language.”—-Rex v. Vasey, [1905] 2 K. B. 748, at pp. 750, 751; 75 L. J. K. B. 19, at p. 21, Lord Alverstone, C. J.

Surrounding Circumstances-State of Law-Extrinsic Evidence.

"Every Act of Parliament must be considered with reference to the state of the law subsisting when it came into operation, and when it is to be applied; it cannot otherwise be rationally construed. Every Act is made, either for the purpose of making a

change in the law, or for the purpose of better declaring the law, and its operation is not to be impeded by the mere fact that it is inconsistent with some previous enactment."-The Dean, &c. of Ely v. Bliss (1842), 5 Beav. 574, at p. 582; 11 L. J. Ch. 351, at p. 354, Lord Langdale, M. R.

"It is by no means an inconvenient mode of construing statutes, to presume that the legislature was aware of the state of the law at the time they passed."-Jones v. Brown (1848), 2 Ex. 329, at p. 332; 17 L. J. Ex. 163, at p. 165, Pollock, C. B.

"It has ever been held that, to construe aright an ancient statute, regard must be had to the general state of the law and of public sentiment at the time it passed."-Me William v. Adams (1852), 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 120, at p. 137, Lord Truro.

"I apprehend that, in construing an Act of Parliament, a deed, will, or whatever other instrument may have to be construed by the Court, I have a right to look at all the circumstances which the parties to the instrument, whether a testator, a donor, or the legislature, who are executing a solemn act, had before them at the time, and were themselves contemplating, as proved, not of course by any extrinsic evidence, but by evidence afforded by the instruments themselves, and also such matters as can be proved by extrinsic evidence to have been the circumstances which surrounded them, and which may have affected the conclusion at which they have arrived. Such a mode of construing an Act of Parliament has been not unfrequently resorted to. It is customary to consider what was the exact state of the law and other matters of the kind at the time when a particular Act was passed."Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Powis (1853), Kay, 186, at p. 207, Sir W. Page Wood, V.-C.

"In construing any act of the legislature, the verbal construction of the particular section in question, if it be plain and simple, must govern the Court in arriving at its conclusion. If there be any degree of doubt or difficulty upon the wording of the particular section in question, the Court is entitled to look, first at the circumstances attending the passing of the Act, next, at the preamble, as far as it affords any indication which may serve as a key to the interpretation of the Act, and then, I may add, to the whole purport and scope of the Act, to be collected from its various clauses, other than the particular clause the meaning of which is in dispute."-Cope v. Doherty (1858), 4 K. & J. 367, at p. 374; 27 L. J. Ch. 600, at p. 601, Sir W. Page Wood, V.-C.

"Three canons of construction seem applicable in this case. First, that the statute is to be construed, if possible, according to the ordinary grammatical construction of the phraseology used in it. Secondly, if there be doubt as to the construction, or if a construction according to strict grammar would lead to a manifestly unreasonable or absurd conclusion, the statute must be considered with regard to the state of the law at the time when it was enacted."-Gover's Case (1875), 1 Ch. D. 182, at p. 198; 45 L. J. Ch. 83, at p. 93, Brett, J.

"It is a well-known rule or canon of construction that in construing an Act of Parliament one ought to take into account the state of the law and of judicial decisions at the time the Act is passed."-Yorkshire Insurance Co. v. Clayton (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 421, at p. 426; 51 L. J. Q. B. 82, at p. 85, Brett, L. J.

"We ought in general, in construing an Act of Parliament, to assume that the legislature knows the existing state of the law."Young & Co. v. Mayor, &c. of Royal Leamington Spa (1883), 8 App. Cas. 517, at p. 526; 52 L. J. Q. B. 713, at p. 718, Lord Blackburn.

"In order to construe the section we are entitled to consider the state of the law at the time it was passed."-Phillipps v. Rees (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 17, at p. 20; 59 L. J. Q. B. 1, at p. 3, Lord Esher, M. R.

"In order to construe an Act of Parliament, it was laid down long ago in Heydon's Case [(15×4), 2 Coke, Rep. p. 18, Part III. 7 b] that one of the most material things to consider is the state of the law before the Act, and the defect in that law which the Act was intended to remedy."-Pelton Brothers v. Harrison, [1891] 2 Q. B. 422, at p. 424; 60 L. J. Q. B. 742, at p. 743, Kay, L. J., reading the judgment of the Court.

"In order properly to interpret any statute it is as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's Case (1584), 2 Rep. 7 b, to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief." In re Mayfair Property Co., [1898] 2 Ch. 28, at p. 35; 67 L. J. Ch. 337, at p. 340, Lindley, M. R.

"No doubt one is entitled to put one's self in the position of the legislature at the time the Act was passed in order to see what was the state of knowledge, what were the circumstances brought before the legislature, and what it was the legislature was aiming at.".