Att.-Gen. v. Metropolitan Electric Supply Co., Ltd., [1905] 1 Ch. 24, at p. 31; 74 L. J. Ch. 145, at p. 150, Farwell, J.

"In interpreting an Act of Parliament you are entitled, and in many cases bound, to look to the state of the law at the date of the passing of the Act-not only the common law, but the law as it then stood under previous statutes-in order properly to interpret the statute in question. These may be considered to form part of the surrounding circumstances under which the legislature passed it, and in the case of a statute, just as in the case of every other document, you are entitled to look at the surrounding circumstances at the date of its coming into existence, though the extent to which you are allowed to use them in the construction of the document is a wholly different question."-Macmillan & Co. v. Dent, [1907] 1 Ch. 107, at p. 120; 76 L. J. Ch. 136, at p. 145, Fletcher Moulton, L. J.

Policy.
Policy of the Law.

"I do not understand what right a Court of justice has to entertain an opinion of a positive law, upon any ground of political expediency. I have always been at a loss to conceive upon what ground a Court of justice was entitled so to act. The legislature is to decide upon political expediency; and if it has made a law which is not politically expedient, the proper way of disposing of that law is by an Act of the legislature, and not by the decision of a Court of justice."-The Queensberry Leases (1819), 1 Bligh, H. L. 339, at p. 497, Lord Redesdale.

"I think, where the meaning of a statute is plain and clear, we have nothing to do with its policy or impolicy, its justice or injustice, its being framed according to our views of right, or the contrary. If the meaning of the language used by the legislature be plain and clear, we have nothing to do but to obey it—to administer it as we find it; and I think to take a different course is to abandon the office of judge, and to assume the province of legislation." Miller v. Salomons (19th April, 1852), 7 Ex. 475, at p. 560; 21 L. J. Ex. 161, at p. 197, Pollock, C. B.

"We must be careful that we do not abridge the rights conferred on suitors by common or statute law, while we are acting merely on views of policy and expediency, with respect to which different

judges may form different opinions."-Cobbett v. Hudson (3rd Nov. 1852), 1 Ell. & Bl. 11, at p. 12; 22 L. J. Q. B. 11, at p. 13, Lord Campbell, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court (Lord Campbell, C. J., Coleridge, J., Wightman, J., and Erle, J.).

"The general words of a statute are not to be so construed as to alter the previous policy of the law, unless no sense or meaning can be applied to those words consistently with the intention of preserving the existing policy untouched. This principle

of construction, as a general proposition, cannot be disputed.". Minet v. Leman (1855), 20 Beav. 269, at p. 278; 24 L. J. Ch. 545, at pp. 547, 548, Sir John Romilly, M. R.

"It is never (as it seems to me) very safe ground, in the construction of a statute, to give weight to views of its policy, which are themselves open to doubt and controversy."-Municipal Building Society v. Kent (1884), 9 App. Cas. 260, at p. 273; 53 L. J. Q. B. 290, at p. 298, Earl of Selborne, L. C.

Public Policy.

"In treating of various branches of the law, learned persons have analysed the sources of the law, and have sometimes expressed their opinion that such and such a provision is bad because it is contrary to public policy; and I deny that any Court can invent a new head of public policy; so a contract for marriage brokerage, the creation of a perpetuity, a contract in restraint of trade, a gaming or wagering contract, or, what is relevant here, the assisting of the King's enemies, are all undoubtedly unlawful things; and you say that it is because they are contrary to public policy they are unlawful; but it is because these things have been either enacted or assumed to be by the common law unlawful, and not because a judge or Court have a right to declare that such and such things are in his or their view contrary to public policy. Of course, in the application of the principles here insisted on, it is inevitable that the particular case must be decided by a judge; he must find the facts, and he must decide whether the facts so found do or do not come within the principles which I have endeavoured to describe—that is, a principle of public policy, recognised by the law, which the suggested contract is infringing, or is supposed to infringe.”—Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd., [1902] A. C. 484, at pp. 491, 492; 71 L. J. K. B. 857, at p. 861, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.

"The phrase most frequently used in argument was 'public policy'; but, following the example of many eminent judges, I prefer the policy of the law.""-In re Hope Johnstone, [1904] 1 Ch. 470, at p. 474; 73 L. J. Ch. 321, at p. 322, Kekewich, J.

History.

"We have not to do with the history of the words, unless the words in the statute are doubtful, and require historical investigation to explain them. If the words are really and fairly doubtful, then, according to well-known legal principles, and principles of common sense, historical investigation may be used for the purpose of clearing away the doubt which the phraseology of the statute creates."-The Queen v. Most (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 244, at p. 251; 50 L. J. M. C. 113, at p. 116, Lord Coleridge, C. J.

"It is useless to enter into an inquiry with regard to the history of an enactment, and any supposed defect in the former legislation on the subject which it was intended to cure, in cases where the words of the enactment are clear. It is only material to enter into such an inquiry where the words of an enactment are ambiguous and capable of two meanings in order to determine which of the two meanings was intended."-The Queen v. Bishop of London (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 213, at pp. 224, 225; 59 L. J. Q. B. 169, at p. 172, Lord Esher, M. R.

"The Act [Public Libraries Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 53)] takes its rise, in respect of this exemption, from Sir Robert Peel's Income Tax Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 35). It is quite legitimate to refer to the history of that period to understand what was the subject-matter with which the legislature was then dealing.". Mayor, &c. of Manchester v. McAdam, [1896] A. C. 500, at p. 504; 65 L. J. Q. B. 672, at p. 674, Lord Halsbury, L. C.

"It has, indeed, been argued that the history of the legislation and of the facts which gave rise to the enactment [Betting Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119)], may in view of the preamble affect the construction of the Act itself; but though I do not deny that such topics may usefully be employed to interpret the meaning of a statute, they do not, in my view, afford conclusive argument here."-Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co., [1899] A. C. 143, at p. 157; 68 L. J. Q. B. 392, at p. 396, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.

"In construing sect. 3 of the Act of 1833 [Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42)], as indeed in construing any

other statutory enactment, regard must be had not only to the words used, but to the history of the Act, and the reasons which led to its being passed. You must look at the mischief which had to be cured as well as the cure provided."-Thomson v. Clanmorris (Lord), [1900] 1 Ch. 718, at p. 725; 69 L. J. Ch. 337, at p. 340, Lindley, M. R.

Report of Commissioners.

"We are not at liberty to infer the intention of the legislature from any other evidence than the construction of the Act itself; and indeed, if we were allowed to draw any inference from the comparison between the language of the report [the Report of the Real Property Commissioners (cited by Lord Denman in his judgment in Fellowes v. Clay (1843), 4 Q. B. 313, at p. 356 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 202, at p. 218)] and that of the legislature, the more legal inference would be, that the marked distinction, observable between the two, could not have been the result of accident, but must have been advised and intentional."-Salkeld v. Johnson (1846), 2 C. B. 749, at p. 757, Tindal, C. J.

"We shall not, therefore, refer to the report of the Real Property Commissioners, published shortly before the passing of this Act, and to which it is supposed to have owed its origin, in order to explain its meaning; not conceiving that we can legitimately do so, however strongly we may believe that it was introduced in order to carry into effect their recommendation to establish a new Statute of Limitations for tithes."-Salkeld v. Johnson (1848), 2 Ex. 256, at p. 273; 18 L. J. Ex. 89, at p. 92, Pollock, C. B., delivering the judgment of the Court (Pollock, C. B., Parke, B., Alderson, B., and Platt, B.).

"The report of commissioners is no legitimate ground for arriving at the construction of a statute."-Martin v. Hemming (1854), 24 L. J. Ex. 3, at p. 5, Pollock, C. B.

"No doubt that is so, although in a very important case as to the construction of Lord Tenterden's Act with respect to tithes, Lord Denman, in his judgment, relied upon the Report of the Real Property Commissioners. [See Fellowes v. Clay (1843), 4 Q. B. 313, at p. 356; 12 L. J. Q. B. 202, at p. 218].”—Ibid., Parke, B. "I find nothing in the language of the Act itself, to show such an intention, and I cannot, for the purpose of construing it, look at the intention expressed by the commissioners. [The Report of

the Chancery Commissioners had been referred to.]"-Ewart v. Williams (1854), 3 Drew. 21, at p. 24, Kindersley, V.-C.

"We next proceed to consider the purpose of the statute as a whole. On the purview of it, especially when looked at by the light of the report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commissioners, which preceded it, and of the preamble."-The Queen v. Bishop of Oxford (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 245, at p. 264; 48 L. J. Q. B. 609, at p. 622, Cockburn, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court (Cockburn, C. J., Field and Manisty, JJ.).

Debate in Parliament.

"We are not, however, concerned with what Parliament intended, but simply with what it has said in the statute. The statute is clear, and the parliamentary history of a statute is wisely inadmissible to explain it, if it is not."-The Queen v. Hertford College (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 693, at p. 707; 47 L. J. Q. B. 649, at p. 658, Lord Coleridge, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

"It has been regretted in the House of Lords that the Court of Appeal had allowed such a reference [to the Lord Chancellor's speech relating to the Church Discipline Act] to be made in Reg. v. Bishop of Oxford [(1879), 4 Q. B. D. 525, at p. 535; 48 L. J. Q. B. 609, at pp. 633, 634].”—South Eastern Rail. Co. v. Railway Commissioners (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 201, at p. 203, Selborne, L. C.

"We must construe Acts of Parliament as they are, without regard to consequences, except in those cases where the words used are so ambiguous that they may be construed in two senses, and even then we must not regard what happened in Parliament.". Richards v. McBride (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 119, at p. 123; 51 L. J. M. C. 15, Grove, J.

"We cannot allow them [the speeches of members of the Government, including Lord Cairns', L. C., in introducing the Bill, and the Journals of the House of Lords and the House of Commons] to be referred to as a guide to the true construction of the Act [The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 86)], whatever their historical interest may be." -J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins (December 20, 1898), [1899] 1 Ch. 255, at p. 264; 68 L. J. Ch. 146, at p. 148, Lindley, M. R.

"It is well established that nothing said in Parliament can be referred to in a court of law as to the meaning of an Act, and