Meaning of "Sheriff Clerk, etc.," in Scotch Acts.

"Sect. 7. In every Act relating to Scotland, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act [1st January, 1890], unless the contrary intention appears

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"The expression sheriff clerk' shall include steward clerk;

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"The expressionsshire,' sheriffdom,' and county shall include any stewartry in Scotland."

Interpretation Clauses.

An interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain.

An interpretation clause should be taken as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the subject-matter and circumstances require that it should be so comprehended. An interpretation clause is an aid to the interpretation of the statute in which they occur, and cannot affect the construction of other statutes, prior or subsequent.

"An interpretation clause is . . . . not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, nor as strictly defining what the meaning of a word must be under all circumstances. We rather think that it merely declares what persons may be comprehended within that term, where the circumstances require that they should."-Reg. v. Cambridgeshire (1838), 7 A. & E. 480, at p. 491, Lord Denman, C. J.

"With regard to all these interpretation clauses, I understand them to define the meaning, supposing there is nothing else in the Act which is opposed to the particular interpretation. When a concise term is used, which is to include many other subjects besides the actual thing designated by the word, it must always be used with due regard to the true, proper and legitimate construction of the Act.”—Midland Rail. Co. v. Ambergate, Nottingham and Boston and Eastern Junction Rail. Co. (1853), 10 Hare, 359, at p. 369, Turner, V.-C.

"These interpretation clauses are often the parts of the Act most difficult to be understood."-Evelyn v. Whichcord (1858), El. Bl. & El. 126, at p. 133; 27 L. J. M. C. 211, at p. 214, Crompton, J.

"Even for the purpose of the Act of Parliament [Bills of Sale

Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36)] it appears to me that the interpretation clause does no more than say, that where you find in the Act those words 'personal chattels' they shall, unless there be something repugnant in the context, or in the sense, include fixtures. What operation upon fixtures so covered by the expression 'personal chattels' the Act may have, must depend upon its particular provisions, and that interpretation clause can have no influence whatever upon the present question, nor can anything else in that statute, if it be true, as seems admitted at the Bar, that this is not a case legislated for in any other way by that statute." – Meux v. Jacobs (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 481, at pp. 493, 494; 44 L. J. Ch. 481, at p. 486, Lord Selborne.

"Except in mathematics, it is difficult to frame exhaustive definitions of words; they must be construed with reference to the subject-matter to which they are applied."—Wakefield Local Board v. Lee (1876), 1 Ex. D. 336, at p. 343, Grove, J.

"I think an interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain.”—The Queen v. Pearce (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 386, at p. 389; 49 L. J. M. C. 81, at p. 82, Lush, J.

"Definition clauses, as they are now termed, are nothing more than interpretation clauses, which is the older and, I think, the better name for them. They They are aids to the interpretation of the statute in which they occur, and cannot affect the construction of other statutes, prior or subsequent. In some modern statutes these definitions have a very wide scope, and include subjects and things which have very little in common with the word defined. According to a recent Act of Parliament, a ship is identified with a factory for the purposes of the Act, but it would not follow that other statutes relating to shipping are to be applied to factories. Indeed, the usual form of such clauses is that 'in this Act' the words quoted shall have the meanings assigned to them."-Lord Advocate v. Sprot's Trustees (1901), 3 F. 440, at pp. 444, 445, Lord M'Laren.

Meaning of Expression.

"Shall include."

"An interpretation clause of this kind ['shall apply to and include'] is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary,

popular, and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable; but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing in the context or the subject-matter to the contrary, to be applied to some things to which it would not ordinarily be applicable."-Robinson v. Local Board of Barton-Eccles (1883), 8 App. Cas. 798, at p. 801; 53 L. J. Ch. 226, at p. 227, Earl of Selborne, L. C.

"The word include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include,' and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions."-Dilworth v. Commissioners of Stamps, [1899] A. C. 99, at pp. 105, 106; 65 L. J. P. C. 1, at p. 4, Lord Watson delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

"Shall be deemed."

"When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purpose and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to."-Ex parte Walton (1881), 17 Ch. D. 746, at p. 756; 50 L. J. Ch. 657, at p. 662, James, L. J. (cited with approval by Earl Cairns in Hill v. East and West India Dock Co. (1884), 9 App. Cas. 448, at pp. 455, 456; 53 L. J. Ch. 842, at p. 845).

"The Court is sometimes obliged by the legislature to put an interpretation on a word which it does not ordinarily bear when it has been enacted that something' shall be deemed to be something else.”—Brooks v. Baker and Others, [1906] 1 K. B. 11, p. 15; 75 L. J. K. B. 41, at p. 43, Darling, J.

See also "Statutory Fictions," post, p. 425.

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The Golden Rule.

The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the statute, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity, repugnance and inconsistency, but no further.

"I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with any expressed intention, or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such inconvenience, but no farther."-Warburton v. Loveland (1828), 1 Hudson & B. Irish Cases, 623, at p. 648, Burton, J.

"Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature."- Warburton v. Loveland (1831), 2 D. & Cl. (H. L.) 480, at p. 489 (opinion of the judges, per Tindal, L. C. J.).

"I am not sure whether we shall fulfil the intention of the legislature; it has often happened that we have been unable to do so throughout a series of decisions. Still, the rule of construction which the Court must follow is, to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed, unless a manifest incongruity would result from doing so, or unless the context clearly shows that such a construction would not be the right.". Rex v. Banbury (1834), 1 A. & E. 136, at p. 142, Parke, J.

"It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further."-Becke v. Smith (1836), 2 M. & W. 191, at p. 195; 6 L. J. Ex. 54, at p. 56, Parke, B.

"The rule by which we are to be guided in construing Acts of Parliament is to look at the precise words, and to construe them in their ordinary sense, unless it would lead to any absurdity or

manifest injustice; and if it should, so to vary and modify them as to avoid that which it certainly could not have been the intention of the legislature should be done."-Perry v. Skinner (1837), 2 M. & W. 471, at p. 476, Parke, B. (See also Abley v. Dale (1851), 11 C. B. 378, at p. 391; 20 L. J. C. P. 233, at p. 235, where Jervis, C. J., refers to this rule as the golden rule.)

“The rule of law, I take it, upon the construction of all statutes,

is, whether they be penal or remedial, to construe them according to the plain, literal, and grammatical meaning of the words in which they are expressed, unless that construction leads to a plain and clear contradiction of the apparent purpose of the Act, or to some palpable and evident absurdity.”—Att.-Gen. v. Lockwood (1842), 9 M. & W. 378, at p. 398, Alderson, B.

"It is our duty to construe the statute according to the grammatical meaning of the words, unless some absurdity would ensue from so construing it, or an uniform series of decisions had already established a particular construction."-Doe d. Ellis v. Owens (1842), 10 M. & W. 514, at p. 521; 12 L. J. Ex. 53, at p. 56, Parke, B.

"The view which I take of the case is this: that whatever difficulty there may be in reconciling the cases on questions of this sort, or cases on analogous subjects, the great cardinal rule is that which is pointed out by Mr. Justice Barton, viz., to adhere as closely as possible to the literal meaning of the words. When once you depart from that canon of construction, you are launched into a sea of difficulties which it is difficult to fathom."-Gundry v. Pinniger (March 4, 5, 1852), 1 De G. M. & G. 502, at p. 505; 21 L. J. Ch. 405, at p. 406, Lord Cranworth, L. J.

"It is, however, true, that words which are plain enough in their ordinary sense may, when they would involve any absurdity, or inconsistency, or repugnance to the clear intentions of the legislature, to be collected from the whole of the Act or Acts in pari materiâ to be construed with it, or other legitimate grounds of interpretation, be modified or altered so as to avoid that absurdity, inconsistency, or repugnance, but no further; . . . . for then we may predicate that the words never could have been used by the framers of the law in such a sense." -Miller v. Salomons (April 19, 1852), 7 Ex. 475, at p. 546; 21 L. J. Ex. 161, at p. 191, Parke, B.

"In construing an Act of Parliament, our first business, I conceive, is to examine the words themselves which are used; and, if in these there be no ambiguity, it is seldom desirable to go further;