to give them a meaning which may or may not have been the intention of the legislature."-Ibid., at p. 182; L. J. at p. 140, Rigby, L. J.

"I, of course, recognize the usual rule observed in the construction of Acts of Parliament, that general, following specific, words should be limited to things ejusdem generis with those before enumerated; but this rule of construction must be controlled by another equally general one, that Acts of Parliament ought, like wills or other documents, to be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished by them, so far as it can be collected from the language employed: see Harrison v. Blackburn (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 678, at pp. 690-693, and Campbell v. Prescott (1808), 15 Ves. 500, at p. 503.”—Hawke v. Dunn, [1897] 1 Q. B. 579, at p. 586; 66 L. J. Q. B. 364, at p. 369, Hawkins, J. "I can see no reason why the rule of construction as to the interpretation of general words in a statute following particular or more limited words should not be applied. That rule requires an interpretation of the general words limiting them to matters or things of the same kind, as to the mischief being dealt with, as the previous words; but an interpretation as wide as the limitation just described will admit."-Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co., [1897] 2 Q. B. 242, at pp. 256, 257; 66 L. J. Q. B. 601, at p. 609, Lord Esher, M. R.

"Surely the doctrine of 'noscitur a sociis' or 'ejusdem generis' is applicable here. That doctrine may be thus expressed, namely, where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified."-Ibid., at p. 266; L. J. at p. 614, Lopes, L. J.

66

The rule that, where there are general words following particular and specific words all of one genus, the general words are presumed to be restricted to the same genus as the particular words, is a familar rule of construction. In my judgment, that familiar rule is based upon a principle which applies to the section now before us (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 3). In this section there is a specific proposition followed by the general words' or otherwise.' Now it seems to me that, just as where there are general words following particular words, the general words are presumed to be restricted to the same genus as the particular words; so where there is a specific proposition followed by general words, the general words ought to be presumed, unless there are some words

which lead to a contrary conclusion, to be restricted to the matter that is covered by the specific proposition. The fact is that general words in a section of this sort can hardly avoid being ancillary in their nature. When one looks at a clause like this it is quite plain that the words 'or otherwise' are ancillary to the specific proposition which precedes them, and it seems to me that where there are ancillary words of that sort it is a sound and wholesome rule not to give such a construction to the ancillary words as will wipe out or do away with the specific proposition with which the clause commences."— In re Clark, [1898] 2 Q. B. 330, at pp. 336, 337; 67 L. J. Q. B. 759, at p. 762, Vaughan Williams, L. J.

"A very familiar canon of construction that, where you have a word which may have a general meaning wider than that which was intended by the legislature, when you find it associated with other words which show the category within which it is to come, it is cut down and overridden according to the general proposition which is familiarly described as the ejusdem generis principle."— Ystradyfodwig and Pontypridd Main Sewerage Board v. Bensted, [1907] A. C. 264, at p. 268; 76 L. J. K. B. 876, at p. 878, Earl of Halsbury.

Relative Words.

Semper proximo antecedente refertur: Co. Lit. 30 b.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia:
Noy. Max. 9th ed. p. 4.

Words of reference are in general referred to that to which the
context appears properly to attract to it-to the last sensible
antecedent.

"In those [criminal proceedings], as in all other cases, the question as to the intention of words of reference must depend upon the context."-Thellusson v. Woodford (1799), 4 Ves. 227, at p. 330, Sir R. P. Arden, M. R.

"I adopt the expression of Chief Baron Macdonald in giving the opinions of the judges to this House (House of Lords), in the case of Thellusson v. Woodford (1805), 1 B. & P. N. R. 359, at pp. 392, 393. The Chief Baron is there speaking of a will, but the observation is, I think, equally applicable to a statute. The Chief Baron says that construction is to be adopted which will support the general intent. The grammatical rule of referring qualifying words to the last of the several antecedents, is not even supposed by grammarians themselves to apply, when the general

6

intent of a writer or speaker would be defeated by such a confined application of them. Reason and common-sense revolt at the idea of overlooking the plain intent which is declared in the context, viz., that they' (that is, qualifying words) should be applicable to such classes as require them, and as to the others, to consider them as surplusage.'"-Eastern Counties, &c. Companies v. Marriage (1860), 9 H. L. Cas. 32, at p. 44; 31 L. J. Ex. 73, at p. 78, Channell, B.

(See also "Relative Words," ante, p. 66.)

Same Words in different Parts of a Statute.

Primâ facie the same words must be interpreted in the same sense in the different parts of a statute.

"We disclaim altogether the assumption of any right to assign different meanings to the same words in an Act of Parliament on the ground of a supposed general intention in the Act."-The Queen v. Poor Law Commissioners (1838), 6 A. & E. 56, at p. 68, Lord Denman, C. J.

"It is a sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament or other document.”—Courtauld v. Legh (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 126, at p. 130; 38 L. J. Ex. 45, at p. 49, Cleasby, B.

"I take it also as a general rule in construing statutes that the same words must be primâ facie construed in the same sense in the different parts of the statute."-Spencer v. Metropolitan Board of Works (1882), 22 Ch. D. 142, at p. 149, Chitty, J.

"The first observation to be made on section 33 [of the Metropolitan Street Improvement Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. ccxxxv.)] is, that we ought to find out its meaning, if we can, from the section itself. If we can do that we need not have recourse to the use of the word 'take' in the other sections of the Act. If we cannot, then I agree with the principle which was laid down by Mr. Justice Chitty, that as a general rule a word is to be considered as used throughout an Act of Parliament in the same sense, and that, therefore, we may look through the other sections to see in what sense the word is there used."-Ibid., at p. 162, Jessel, M. R.

"Many instances occur of a departure from the cardinal rule that the same word should always be employed to mean the same thing.”—Thames Conservators v. Smeed, Dean & Co., [1897] 2 Q. B. 334, at p. 346; 66 L. J. Q. B. 716, at p. 723, Chitty, L. J.

Different Words in the same Statute.

Primâ facie the use of different words must be interpreted in the same statute or in statutes dealing with the same subject

matter as indicating a change of meaning.

"Where the legislature in the same sentence uses different words, we must presume that they were used in order to express different ideas."-The King v. Great Bolton (1828), 8 B. & C. 71, at p. 74, Lord Tenterden, C. J.

"More than a hundred years ago Acts of Parliament were very short, and were to be applied to a variety of cases; but now they are very long, and some of them are framed with all the beauties of style to be gathered from the office of the special pleader, and the office of the conveyancer also."-Reg. v. Frost (1840), 9 C. & P. 129, at p. 186, Lord Abinger, C. B.

"It has been a general rule for drawing deeds and other legal documents from the earliest times, which one is taught when one first becomes a pupil to a conveyancer, never to change the form of words unless you are going to change the meaning, and it would be as well if those who are engaged in the preparation of Acts of Parliament would bear in mind that that is the real principle of construction. But in drawing Acts of Parliament, the legislature, as it would seem, to improve the graces of the style, and to avoid using the same words over and over again, constantly change them."-Hadley v. Perks (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 444, at p. 457; 35 L. J. M. C. 177, at p. 180, Blackburn, J.

"The employment of different language in the same Act may, in some cases, help to show that the legislature had in view different objects, but a change in language cannot be relied on as furnishing a general rule of construction, and the weight to be given to such changes must depend on a view of the entire enactments in which they occur, and the degree of ambiguity existing in the language to be construed."-Lawless v. Sullivan (1881), 6 App. Cas. 373, at pp. 382, 383; 50 L. J. P. C. 33, at p. 38, Sir Montague E. Smith, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

"It is a rule of construction that, where in the same Act of Parliament, and in relation to the same subject-matter, different words are used, the Court must see whether the legislature has not made the alteration intentionally, and with some definite purpose; primâ facie, such an alteration would be considered intentional."

Guardians of Parish of Brighton v. Guardians of Strand Union, [1891] 2 Q. B. 156, at p. 167; 60 L. J. M. C. 105, at p. 112, Lord Esher, M. R.

"That form [of a bill of sale in the schedule to the Bills of Sale Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43)] provides that the witness's name, address, and description' shall be given. Former Acts dealing with the same subject-matter spoke of the 'description of the occupation' of the witness. In such a case the canon of construction is that, unless a strong reason to the contrary exists, such an alteration of language on the part of the legislature must be taken to have been intentional."-Sims v. Trollope & Sons, [1897] 1 Q. B. 24, at p. 26; 66 L. J. Q. B. 11, at pp. 12, 13, Lord Esher, M. R.

"So far as relates to the questions raised, the Act [Thames Conservancy Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. clxxxvii.)] is not a specimen of good drafting. It is, on the face of it, not the production of one firm hand; probably many hands took part in the drafting before the Act assumed its final form. Many instances occur of a departure from the cardinal rule that the same word should always be employed to mean the same thing.”—Thames Conservators v. Smeed, Dean & Co., [1897] 2 Q. B. 334, at p. 346; 66 L. J. Q. B. 716, at p. 723, Chitty, L. J.

Phrases in Statutes in pari materia.

"The several Statutes of Limitations being all in pari materiâ ought to receive a uniform construction, notwithstanding any slight variations of phrase, the object and intention being the same."-Murray v. East India Co. (1821), 5 B. & Ald. 204, at p. 215, Abbott, C. J.

Words not relating to any Art or Science Popular Meaning.

"The meaning of particular words in Acts of Parliament, as well as in other instruments, is to be found, not so much in a strict etymological propriety of language, nor even in popular use, as in the subject or occasion on which they are used, and the object which is intended to be attained."-Rex v. Hall (1822), 1 B. & C. 123, at p. 136, Abbott, C. J.

"My lords, I have always thought that, where we are to put a