construction upon an Act of Parliament which does not relate, or profess to relate, to some particular subject of art or science, we should understand the words in the Act in the same way as they are understood in the common language of mankind."-Rex v. Winstanley (1831), 1 Cr. & J. 434, at p. 444, Lord Tenterden, C. J.

"It seems to me, first that words of popular meaning must be taken in their popular sense unless there is something in the context to alter it; and secondly, that if a word in its popular sense, and read in an ordinary way, is capable of two constructions, it is wise to adopt such a construction as is based upon the assumption that Parliament merely intended to give so much power as was necessary for carrying out the objects of the Act."Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 904, at pp. 919, 920; 53 L. J. Q. B. 449, at p. 457, Bowen, L. J.

(See also post, p. 351, "Statutes " in pari materiâ, and post, p. 433, Legislative Expositions.")

Technical Language.

Primâ facie technical words must have their technical meaning given to them, unless the contrary manifestly appears.

"When the legislature uses technical language in its statutes, it is supposed to attach to it its technical meaning, unless the contrary manifestly appears. That is the rule of construction of technical expressions, even when occurring in a will."-Burton v. Reevell (1847), 16 M. & W. 307, at p. 309; 16 L. J. Ex. 85, at p. 86, Parke, B. (cited by Fry, L. J., in The Queen v. Commissioners of Income Tax (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 296, at p. 309; 58 L. J. Q. B. 196, at p. 201).

"Prima facie it appears to me that the rule applies, that technical words must have their technical meaning given to them, unless you can find something in the context to overrule them."-Laird v. Briggs (1881), 19 Ch. D. 22, at p. 34, Jessel, M. R.

"It seems to me that when you have to construe a technical expression introduced into the legal vocabulary by a series of statutes forming one code, you naturally turn to the code for light and help. And the key to the true meaning of the expression will, I think, be found in the latest development of legislation rather than in its earliest effort."-Lord Advocate v. Stewart, [1902] A. C. 344, at p. 351; 71 L. J. P. C. 66, at p. 68, Lord Macnaghten.

"It was strenuously argued by the defendants' counsel that we ought not to deal with the construction of the Finance Acts in a strict technical manner, but that, clearing our heads of the technicalities of conveyancing and the terms of art used by conveyancers, we should approach the matters involved from the point of view-I will not say of the man in the street, but of an ordinary well-educated English gentleman not a lawyer. I do not think, however, that that suggestion must be carried too far; for, after all, the Acts have been framed by draftsmen acquainted with conveyancing terms, and they must, in the nature of things, be addressed to a large extent to a section of the public familiar with those terms; and I do not think that it would be right or possible, in dealing with the provisions of the Finance Acts, to ignore altogether the technicalities of conveyancing, and to disengage one's mind entirely from all acquaintance with the technical terms which conveyancers use, and in which likewise to some extent the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament couch the provisions which they frame."-Att.-Gen. v. Glossop, [1907] 1 K. B. 163, at pp. 172, 173; 76 L. J. K. B. 199, at p. 205, Collins, M. R.

Legal Sense.

"In general, the words of an Act of Parliament are to be understood in the sense in which they are commonly understood, unless there be anything requiring the legal sense to be adopted."-The King v. Townrow (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 465, at p. 479, Parke, J.

"In construing an Act of Parliament, I apprehend every word must be understood according to the legal meaning, unless it shall appear from the context that the legislature has used it in a popular or more enlarged sense; that is the general rule; but in a penal enactment, where you depart from the ordinary meaning of the words used, the intention of the legislature that those words should be understood in a more large or popular sense must plainly appear."-Stephenson v. Higginson (1852), 3 H. L. Cas. 638, at p. 686, Lord Truro.

"It always requires the strong compulsion of other words in an Act to induce the Court to alter the ordinary meaning of a well-known legal term."-The Queen v. Slator (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 267, at p. 272; 51 L. J. Q. B. 246, at p. 248, Denman, J.

"On the whole, therefore, it appears that, at the date of the passing of the Act of 1875 [the Conspiracy and Protection of

Property Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 86)], the legislature had already in an earlier statute defined what it meant by seamen, that the explanation of their exclusion from the later Act must be sought in the fact that they were already the subject of special enactments giving another remedy for some of the matters included in the later statute, and that no ground of reason or common sense can be found for excluding from the operation of the Act in question the whole class of seafaring men not actually engaged in sea service."—Reg. v. Lynch, [1898] 1 Q. B. 61, at p. 66; 67 L. J. Q. B. 59, at p. 62, Lord Russell, C. J.

Superfluous Words.

"A settled canon of construction, namely, that a statute ought to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. (Bac. Abr., tit. Statute I. sub-s. 2.)"-The Queen v. Bishop of Oxford (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 245, at p. 261; 48 L. J. Q. B. 609, at p. 620, Cockburn, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court (Cockburn, C. J., Field and Manisty, JJ.).

"I adhere to an opinion expressed by myself in the House of Lords more than ten years ago in Giles v. Melsom [(1873), L. R. 6 H. L. 24, at p. 33; 42 L. J. C. P. 122, at p. 125], which, unless I am much deceived, I have also heard in substance expressed by great masters of the law, that nothing can be more mischievous than the attempt to wrest words from their proper and legal meaning, only because they are superfluous.'"-Hough v. Windus (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 224, at p. 229; 53 L. J. Q. B. 165, at pp. 167, 168, Lord Coleridge, C. J., reading judgment of Lord Selborne, L. C.

Changing Words.

Where the context shows that a mistake has been made by using one word for another word, the mistake may be corrected.

"There have been frequently cases on the construction of statutes where the Courts have held 'or' to mean 'and,' taking the rest of the sentence in which the word 'or' occurred, the object and intention being prohibition, and the two things prohibited being coupled by the word 'or.'"-Metropolitan Board of Works v. Steed (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 445, at p. 448; 51 L. J. M. C. 22, at p. 24, Grove, J.

B.

Y

"I know no authority for such a proceeding [turning 'or' into 'and'], unless the context makes the necessary meaning of ' 'and,' as in some instances it does; but I believe it is wholly unexampled so to read it when doing so will, upon one construction, entirely alter the meaning of the sentence, unless some other part of the same statute, or the clear intention of it, requires that to be done, as in the case of Fowler v. Padget (1798), 7 T. R. 509. . . . It may, indeed, be doubted whether some of the cases of turning 'or' into 'and,' and vice versâ, have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation."-Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Brothers (1888), 13 App. Cas. 595, at p. 603; 58 L. J. Q. B. 152, at pp. 155, 156, Lord Halsbury, L. C. " and For an instance of the word 66 or, see Staniland Industrial Corn and Provision Society v. Staniland Urban Council, [1906] 1 K. B. 233; 75 L. J. K. B. 190.

read as

"The case comes within the words used by Lord Halsbury in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson (1888), 13 App. Cas. 595, at p. 603; 58 L. J. Q. B. 152, at p. 155, where he said that, in construing a statute, or' could be turned into and' if the context made that the necessary meaning."-Walker v. York Corporation, [1906] 1 K. B. 724, at p. 728; 75 L. J. K. B. 413, at p. 414, Darling, J.

Mistakes.

It must be assumed that the legislature makes no mistakes.

"It is our duty neither to add to nor take from a statute, unless we see good grounds for thinking that the legislature intended something which it has failed precisely to express."-Everett v. Wells (1841), 2 M. & G. 269, at p. 277; 10 L. J. C. P. 81, at p. 84, Tindal, C. J.

"We cannot assume a mistake in an Act of Parliament. If we did so, we should render many Acts uncertain by putting different constructions on them according to our individual conjectures. The draftsman of this Act [Sunday Closing (Wales) Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 61, s. 3)] may have made a mistake. If so, the remedy is for the legislature to amend it. But we must construe Acts of Parliament as they are, without regard to consequences, except in those cases where the words are so ambiguous that they may be construed in two senses, and even then we must not regard what happened in Parliament, but look to what is within the four corners of the Act, and to the grievance intended to be remedied,

or, in penal statutes, to the offence intended to be corrected."Richards v. McBride (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 119, at pp. 122, 123; 51 L. J. M. C. 15, at p. 16, Grove, J.

"That, in fact, the language of an Act of Parliament may be founded on some mistake, and that words may be clumsily used, I do not deny. But I do not think it is competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the legislature has made a mistake. Whatever the real fact may be, I think a Court of law is bound to proceed upon the assumption that the legislature is an ideal person that does not make mistakes. It must be assumed that it has intended what it has said, and, I think, any other view of the mode in which one must approach the interpretation of a statute, would give authority for an interpretation of the language of an Act of Parliament, which would be attended with the most. serious consequences."-Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531, at p. 549; 61 L. J. Q. B. 265, at p. 272, Lord Halsbury, L. C.

Casus Omissus.

"A casus omissus can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws.”—Jones v. Smart (1785), 1 T. R. 44, at p. 52, Buller, J.

"We cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of the Act; we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there."-Crawford v. Spooner (1846), 6 Moore, P. C. 1, at p. 9, Lord Brougham.

"Where the conclusion is merely that there is a casus omissus for which the legislature has not provided, to alter the ordinary rules of interpretation, upon the principle of a duty due to abstract justice, is simply to legislate, and not to interpret.”—Ex parte The Vicar of St. Sepulchre's (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 372, at p. 375, Lord Westbury, L. C.

"It seldom happens that the framer of an Act of Parliament or the legislature has in contemplation all the cases which are likely to arise, and the language therefore seldom fits every possible case. Whenever the case is clearly within the mischief, the words must be read so as to cover the case if by any reasonable construction they can be read so as to cover it, though the words may point more exactly to another case; this must be done rather than make such a case a casus omissus under the statute.”—Scott v. Legg (1876), 2 Ex. D. 39, at pp. 42, 43; 46 L. J. M. C. 117, at