manifest injustice."-Plumstead Board of Works v. Spackman (July 12th, 1884), 13 Q. B. D. 878, at p. 887; 53 L. J. M. C. 142, at p. 145, Brett, M. R.

"Is there, then, any general rule of construction applicable to such a provision which enables us to limit the meaning of the words so as to prevent the defendant from doing what he seeks to do? I find in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 1st ed. 1875, p. 184, in a section headed, 'Construction against impairing obligations, or permitting advantage from one's own wrong,' the principle resulting from the various authorities there collected expressed as follows:-'On the general principle of avoiding injustice and absurdity, any construction would be rejected, if escape from it were possible, which enabled a person to defeat a statute or impair the obligation of his contract by his own act, or otherwise to profit by his own wrong.' Of this the author gives many instances."-Gowan v. Wright (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 201, at p. 204; 56 L. J. Q. B. 131, at p. 132, Lord Esher, M. R.

"A very strong case of injustice arising from giving the language of an Act of Parliament its natural meaning must be made out before the Court will construe a section in a way contrary to the natural meaning of the language used."-In re Hall (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 137, at pp. 141, 142; 57 L. J. Q. B. 494, at p. 496, Cave, J.

"In this proviso [Bankruptcy (Discharge and Closure) Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 66), s. 2, sub-ss. 1, 3] the legislature have used language of the widest kind-'in all cases'-so wide that, if its full grammatical meaning be given to it, the proviso will produce injustice so enormous that the mind of any reasonable man must revolt from it. When the language of the legislature construed literally involves such consequences, the Court has over and over again acted upon the view that the legislature could not have intended to produce a result which would be palpably unjust, and would revolt the mind of any reasonable man unless they have manifested that intention by express words. The Court will not infer such an intention from the use of merely general words. Some limit must, therefore, be put upon the words of the proviso, and they must be limited with reference to the subject-matter which is treated of."-In re Brocklebank (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 461, at pp. 462, 463; 58 L. J. Q. B. 375, at p. 376, Lord Esher, M. R.

Interpretation by Reference.

Several Acts to be read or interpreted as One.

That clause [that two Acts are to be read as one] is frequently inserted in modern Acts of Parliament; but if the two Acts be in pari materiâ, the construction would be the same without it."Waterlow v. Dobson (1857), 27 L. J. Q. B. 55, Lord Campbell, C. J.

"We must assume, then, that Robert V. Mather in this nomination paper is a misnomer. Is it one which is cured by sect. 142 of the Municipal Corporations Act [5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76]? The 13th section of the Municipal Elections Act, 1875 [38 & 39 Vict. c. 40], incorporates the former Act, but unfortunately it does so in these words: This Act shall, as far as consistent with the tenor thereof, be construed as one with the Act 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76, and the Acts amending the same,' &c. It does not say that the provision in sect. 142 of the former Act shall be extended to the later Act, but merely that it shall be construed as one with it. These terms do not seem to me to extend the operation of the amending section in the earlier Act to a document which had no existence then, and therefore could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature."-Mather v. Brown (1876), 1 C. P. D. 596, at p. 601; 45 L. J. C. P. 547, at p. 549, Lord Coleridge, C. J.

"It is to be observed that those two Acts (Canadian) are to be read together by the express provision of the 7th and concluding section of the amending Act; and therefore we must construe every part of each of them as if it had been contained in one Act, unless there is some manifest discrepancy, making it necessary to hold that the later Act has to some extent modified something found in the earlier Act."-Canada Southern Rail. Co. v. International Bridge Co. (1883), 8 App. Cas. 723, at p. 727, Earl of Selborne, L. C., delivering the judgment of their lordships.

(See also post, p. 375, "General Incorporating Clauses.")

Statutes in Pari Materia.

Where there are different statutes in pari materiâ, though made at different times, or even expired or repealed, and not referring to each other, and though using different language, they shall be taken and interpreted together as one system and as explanatory of each other.

Whatever has been determined in the interpretation of one of several statutes in pari materiâ is a sound rule of interpretation for the others.

"Where there are different statutes in pari materiâ, though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other. So, in the laws concerning church leases and those concerning bankrupts. And so also I consider, all the statutes providing for the poor, as one system relative to that subject."-The King v. Loxdale (1758), 1 Burr. 445, at p. 447, Lord Mansfield, C. J. (cited by Farwell, L. J., in Goldsmiths' Company v. Wyatt, [1907] 1 K. B. 95, at p. 105; 76 L. J. K. B. 166, at p. 169).

"Both statutes are made in pari materiâ, and whatever has been determined in the construction of one of them, is a sound rule of construction for the other."-Rex v. Mason (1788), 2 T. R. 581, at p. 586, Buller, J.

"The several Statutes of Limitations being all in pari materiâ ought to receive a uniform construction, notwithstanding any slight variations of the phrase, the object and intention being the same.' -Murray v. East India Co. (1821), 5 B. & Ald. 204, at p. 215, Abbott, C. J.

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Although it has been repealed, still, upon a question of construction arising upon a subsequent statute on the same branch of the law, it may be legitimate to refer to the former Act. Lord Mansfield, in the case of The King v. Loxdale [(1758), 1 Burr. 445, at p. 447], thus lays down the rule-'Where there are different statutes in pari materiâ, though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other.' [And Lord Mansfield added, 'So, in the laws concerning church leases; and those concerning bankrupts. And so also I consider, all the statutes providing for the poor, as one system

relative to that subject.']"-Ex parte Copeland (1852), 2 D. M. & G. 914, at p. 920; 22 L. J. Bank. 17, at p. 21, Knight Bruce, L. J.

"Where an Act of Parliament has received a judicial construction putting a certain meaning on its words, and the legislature in a subsequent Act in pari materiâ uses the same words, there is a presumption that the legislature used those words intending to express the meaning which it knew had been put upon the same words before; and unless there is something to rebut that presumption, the Act should be so construed, even if the words were such that they might originally have been construed otherwise.". Mersey Docks v. Cameron (1865), 11 H. L. Cas. 443, at pp. 480, 481; 35 L. J. M. C. 1, at pp. 15, 16, Blackburn, J., reading the opinion of the majority of the judges.

"I think, too, that we are entitled to consider the subsequent legislation in pari materiâ; for where two statutes dealing with the same subject-matter use different language, it is an acknowledged rule of construction that one may be looked at as a guide to the construction of the other."-Dickenson v. Fletcher (1873), L. R. 9 C. P. 1, at pp. 7, 8; 43 L. J. M. C. 25, Brett, J.

"It is a clear rule of construction that, where you find a construction has been put upon words in a former Act, which is in pari materia with the one under consideration, and when you find. that the same words are used in the later Act as in the former, you must apply the same construction to the later Act."-Hodgson v. Bell (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 525, at p. 528; 59 L. J. Q. B. 231, at p. 232, Lord Esher, M. R.

"In construing the words in the present case, the Court has a right to look to the surrounding circumstances-to the facts which must have been known to the legislature when the statute was passed-above all, to the language of the class of statutes of which this is one. I think, also, that the same rule of noscitur a sociis applies in another form, because the previous five or six exemptions, which this exemption immediately follows, are all exemptions having relation to documents drawn by public officers when dealing with public money."-Committee of London Clearing Bankers v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1896] 1 Q. B. 222, at pp. 227, 228, Wright, J.

(See also post, p. 362, "Decisions on Statutes.")

Consolidation of Statutes.

It is legitimate in the interpretation of a consolidating statute to refer to the previous state of the law for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legislature.

The same effect ought to be given to the provisions of a consolidating statute that does not profess to amend or alter the provisions of the statutes consolidated as was given to those of the statutes for which it was substituted.

Where there are ambiguous expressions in a consolidating statute regard may be had to the previous statutes in pari materiâ for the purpose of interpreting those ambiguous expressions. "Now the circumstances under which this Act [The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104)] was passed, and the preamble of the Act in fact resolve themselves into one question. Preamble of the Act there is none beyond the recital that it is expedient to amend and consolidate the Acts relating to merchant shipping.' Therefore the circumstances under which it was passed are exactly narrated in the preamble. The Act was passed with the intention of consolidating and amending (which opens a little wider the question as to the law) the Acts relating to merchant shipping. With reference to the subject of consolidation and amendment, it is a question always of grave difficulty, and it has especially been felt to be so by those who have had to deal with the subject of the consolidation of the statutes in general, and who have had to consider how far the object they have in view is to be attained by a process of mere consolidation, and how far amendments should be allowed. What will be the effect of introducing the identical words of a former statute, but denuded of the preamble which has hitherto formed in some degree a key to its construction? What, again, will be the effect of combining the words introduced from a former statute with other clauses introduced by way of consolidation into the new statute, and which may have the effect of attaching to the words of the earlier Acts a construction entirely different from that which has hitherto prevailed upon these very words as they stand in their original context? In consolidating various statutes— the Statute of Uses, for instance, and many others which have been the subject of numerous judicial interpretations-one sees at once the extreme difficulties to which such processes would give rise."Cope v. Doherty (1858), 4 K. & J. 367, at p. 376; 27 L. J. Ch. 600,

B.

A A