already established a particular construction."-Doe d. Ellis v. Owens (1842), 10 M. & W. 514, at p. 521; 12 L. J. Ex. 53, at p. 56, Parke, B.

"The difficulty arises from the vague manner in which the legislature has expressed its meaning; and, therefore, when once a construction has been put upon such a clause [2nd section of the Pilotage Act, 1825 (6 Geo. IV. c. 125)] by a judicial decision, that ought of itself to be a sufficient authority for our adopting the same construction."-Williams v. Newton (1845), 14 M. & W. 747, at p. 757; 15 L. J. Ex. 11, at p. 16, Rolfe, B.

"It is therefore of considerable importance to ascertain what has been deemed to be the legal import and meaning of them [the words beyond the seas'], because if it shall appear that they have long been used in a sense which may not improperly be called technical, and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature in that sense long prior to the statute 21 James I. c. 16 [The Limitation Act, 1623], the rule of construction of statutes will require that the words in the statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of them."-Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy (1851-2), 8 Moore, P. C. C. 4, at p. 20; 5 Moore, Ind. App. 234, at p. 250, Sir John Jervis, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

"Where once certain words in an Act of Parliament have received a judicial construction in one of the superior Courts, and the legislature has repeated them without any alteration in a subsequent statute, I conceive that the legislature must be taken to have used them according to the meaning which a Court of competent jurisdiction has given them."-Ex parte Campbell (1870), L. R. 5 Ch. 703, at p. 706, James, L. J.

66

Assuming that a judge thinks the construction to be clear one way, but a series of authorities is produced, being decisions of judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction the other way, there must be a time at which the judge is bound by them. If one authority were produced to me, and my own opinion were the other way, I would not follow that authority; but if the authorities are numerous, I admit that I must be bound. On that point the case of In re Newman's Settled Estates [(1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 681; 43 L. J. Ch. 702] is an authority.”—In re Bethlem Hospital (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 457, at pp. 459, 460; 44 L. J. Ch. 406, at p. 407, Jessel, M. R.

"What is the meaning of a first and true inventor? To ascertain its meaning, you must have recourse, no doubt, to various decisions given on the statute (21 Jac. I. c. 3 (1623)), which is very nearly three hundred years old. It is not for a judge of the present day to give his meaning as to what should be attributed to the words of the statute. He must take the construction put on the statute to be of the same effect, as guiding him to a correct decision, as if that construction had been enacted as part of the statute."-Plimpton v. Malcolmson (1876), 3 Ch. D. 531, at p. 555; 45 L. J. Ch. 505, at pp. 506, 507, Jessel, M. R. (cited by Stirling, J., in In re Avery's Patent (1887), 36 Ch. D. 307, at p. 317; 56 L. J. Ch. 586, at p. 591).

"If an Act of Parliament uses the same language which was used in a former Act of Parliament referring to the same subject, and passed with the same purpose, and for the same object, the safe and well-known rule of construction is to assume that the legislature, when using well-known words upon which there have been well-known decisions, uses those words in the sense which the decisions have attached to them."-Greaves v. Tofield (1880), 14 Ch. D. 563, at p. 571; 50 L. J. Ch. 118, at p. 119, James, L. J.

"It is a well-known rule or canon of construction that in construing an Act of Parliament one ought to take into account. the state of the law and of judicial decisions at the time the Act is passed."— Yorkshire Insurance Co. v. Clayton (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 421, at p. 426; 51 L. J. Q. B. 82, at p. 85, Brett, L. J.

"I have no occasion to do more than repeat the observations I have very often made, that I think it leads to great mischief, when an Act of Parliament is plain and clear, for judges to refer to decisions on older Acts, and then say they cannot distinguish sufficiently the new Act from the old, and that, therefore, the decisions are binding. Of course, you may look at them with a view of seeing what the interpretation is, but I prefer to read the modern Act, find out what its meaning is, and if it is plain, to act according to its plain construction, without troubling myself with the decisions of the Courts on earlier Acts, the provisions of which are not the same." -Hack v. London Provident Building Society (Feb. 24th, 1883), 23 Ch. D. 103, at p. 112; 52 L. J. Ch. 541, at p. 542, Jessel, M. R. (See also Ex parte Griffith (Feb. 15th, 1883), 23 Ch. D. 69; 52 L. J. Ch. 717.)

"The legislature have reproduced words upon which the case of Maude v. Lowley (No. 1) [ (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 165; 43 L. J.

C. P. 103] was decided, and they must be taken to have known the interpretation that had been put upon them in that case. Clark v. Wallond (1×83), 52 L. J. Q. B. 320, at p. 322, Mathew, J. "I think the proper course is to read the section of the Act [sect. 8 of Bills of Sale Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31)], and to ascertain its meaning, and not to trouble ourselves about decisions upon the former Act. Any other course would be apt to lead us astray. If the later Act can clearly have only one meaning we ought to give effect to it accordingly. If, instead of doing that, we compare it with the former Act, and say that it differs from it only to such and such an extent, and then consider the decisions upon the former Act, we might in that way go back to half-a-dozen older Acts, and after considering the decisions on them, we might at last arrive at a conclusion exactly contrary to the later Act."-Ex parte Blaiberg (March 8th, 1883), 23 Ch. D. 254, at p. 258; 52 L. J. Ch. 461, at p. 463, Jessel, M. R.

"Where a series of decisions of inferior Courts have put a construction on an Act of Parliament, and have made a law which men follow in their daily dealings, it has been held, even by the House of Lords, that it is better to adhere to the course of the decisions than to reverse them, because of the mischief which would result from such a proceeding. Of course that requires two things-antiquity of decision, and the practice of mankind in conducting their affairs."-Ex parte Willey, In re Wright (March 15th, 1883), 23 Ch. D. 118, at pp. 127, 128; 52 L. J. Ch. 546, at p. 548, Jessel, M. R.

"We ought in general, in construing an Act of Parliament, to assume that the legislature knows the existing state of the law.”— Young & Co. v. Mayor, &c. of Royal Leamington Spa (June 5th, 1883), 8 App. Cas. 517, at p. 526; 52 L. J. Q. B. 713, at p. 718, Lord Blackburn.

"When there are ambiguous expressions in an Act passed one or two centuries ago, it may be legitimate to refer to the construction put upon these expressions throughout a long course of years, by the unanimous consent of all parties interested, as evidencing what must presumably have been the intention of the legislature at that remote period. But I feel bound to construe a recent statute according to its own terms, when these are brought into controversy, and not according to the views which interested parties may have hitherto taken; and in determining the true import of such a statute, it appears to me to be quite immaterial to

consider whether it was passed in 1858 or in 1883."-Trustees of Clyde Navigation v. Laird (1883), 8 App. Cas. 658, at p. 673, Lord Watson (cited by Farwell, L. J., in Goldsmiths' Co. v. Wyatt, [1907] 1 K. B. 95, at p. 107; 76 L. J. K. B. 166, at p. 170).

"Where cases have been decided on particular forms of words in Courts, and Acts of Parliament use those forms of words which have received judicial construction, in the absence of anything in the Acts showing that the legislature did not mean to use the words in the sense attributed to them by the Courts, the presumption is that Parliament did so use them."-Barlow v. Teal (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 403, at p. 405; 54 L. J. Q. B. 400, Lord Coleridge, C. J.

"The question for our consideration is, what is the true meaning of the language which the legislature has employed? Cases on the construction of other Acts or instruments generally give very little help to the Court, but if there is any principle laid down by them we ought not to disregard them in considering a different Act or instrument."-Reid v. Reid (1886), 31 Ch. D. 402, at p. 405; 55 L. J. Ch. 294, at p. 296, Cotton, L. J.

"In the first place we have been told that a series of decisions on this section has gone far to establish the rights under it; but looking at the conflict which has taken place in the Courts of first instance, it appears to me impossible to say that there is any course of decisions which can in any way bind, or which ought seriously to influence this Court, although of course we shall always look with the greatest possible respect on the reasons for which the judges of first instance have come to their conclusions."-Ibid., at p. 410; L. J., at p. 299, Fry, L. J.

“We cannot use the interpretation of one statute in construing another not made with the same intent."-The Queen v. Commissioners of Income Tax (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 296, at p. 307; 58 L. J. Q. B. 196, at p. 199, Lord Esher, M. R.

"There is thus distinct authority, forty-seven years old, and so far as I know, not questioned, but acted on and treated as binding, and though it may appear a technical point, I should hesitate to do anything to disturb a rule laid down about the Statute of Frauds and acted on for so long."-Lucas v. Dixon (Jan. 17th, 1889), 22 Q. B. D. 357, at p. 362; 58 L. J. Q. B. 161, at p. 164, Bowen, L. J.

"The appellants challenge the decision in The Mary Ann (1865), L. R. 1 A. & E. 8; 35 L J. Adm. 6, and the course of practice which has followed it. The respondent contends that the decision

was right. But whether it was right or not, he says that it is too late now even for this House to interfere. I am sensible of the inconvenience of disturbing a course of practice [as to the maritime lien on a ship for disbursements] which has continued unchallenged for such a length of time [since 1863], and which has been sanctioned by such high authority [Sir Robert Phillimore, Sir James Hannen, and Butt, JJ.]. But if it is really founded upon an erroneous construction of an Act of Parliament, there is no principle which precludes your lordships from correcting the error. To hold that

the matter is not open to review would be to give the effect of legislation to a decision contrary to the intention of the legislature, merely because it has happened, for some reason or other, to remain unchallenged for a certain length of time."-Hamilton v. Baker (May 27th, 1889), 14 App. Cas. 209, at pp. 221, 222; 58 L. J. P. 57, at p. 62, Lord Macnaghten.

"The legislature in 1842 must be taken to have used the words ['full cost'] with knowledge of the judicial interpretation which had been put on them, and to have intended to use them in the sense thus given to them."-Avery v. Wood, [1891] 3 Ch. 115, at p. 118; 61 L. J. Ch. 75, at p. 76, Fry, L. J.

"There is a well-known principle of construction sanctioned, if sanction were necessary, by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Greaves v. Tofield [(1880), 14 Ch. D. 563; 50 L. J. Ch. 118], that where the legislature uses in an Act a legal term which has received judicial interpretation, it must be assumed that the term is used in the sense in which it has been judicially interpreted."Jay v. Johnstone (1892), [1893] 1 Q. B. 25, at p. 28; 62 L. J. Q. B. 128, at p. 130, Lord Coleridge, C. J.

"If the legislature in one Act have used language which is admittedly ambiguous, and in a subsequent Act have used language which proceeds upon the hypothesis that a particular interpretation is to be placed upon the earlier Act, I think the judges have no choice but to read the two Acts together, and to say that the legislature have acted as their own interpreters of the earlier Act." -Att.-Gen. v. Clarkson, [1900] 1 Q. B. 156, at p. 165; 69 L. J. Q. B. 81, at p. 86, Sir F. II. Jeune.

(See also "Long-standing Decisions," ante, p. 20, and dicta contained in "Decisions," ante, p. 28.)