Interpretation by reference to Practice.

“While it is true that we have no right to construe the Act itself [Revenue Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 14)] by the practice which has taken place under that Act, it is equally true that we are entitled to construe that Act, not only upon the actual words used, but with reference to the practice which had grown up and was existing at the time when that Act was passed." - Yewens v. Noakes (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 530, at p. 535; 50 L. J. Q. B. 132, at p. 135, Thesiger, L. J.

"I am sensible of the inconvenience of disturbing a course of practice [as to a maritime lien on a ship for disbursements] which has continued for such a length of time [since 1863], and which has been sanctioned by such high authority [Sir Robert Phillimore, Sir James Hannen, and Butt, J.]. But if it is really founded upon an erroneous construction of an Act of Parliament, there is no principle which precludes your lordships from correcting the error."-Hamilton v. Baker (1889), 14 App. Cas. 209, at p. 222; 58 L. J. P. 57, at p. 62, Lord Macnaghten.

"When you find legislation following a continuous practice, and repeating the very words on which that practice was founded, it may perhaps fairly be inferred that the legislature in re-enacting the statute intended those words to be understood in their received meaning. And perhaps it might be argued that the inference grows stronger with each successive re-enactment. However, as the point was not dealt with at the Bar, I forbear to express any opinion upon it."-Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531, at p. 591; 61 L. J. Q. B. 265, at p. 294, Lord Macnaghten (cited by Joyce, J., in London County Council v. South Metropolitan Gas Co., [1903] 2 Ch. 532, at p. 538; 72 L. J Ch. 536, at p. 538).

"Cases have been cited to show that sometimes you are not only entitled but bound, where you have Acts of Parliament passed in reference to a matter on which there has been a continuity of Acts of Parliament in succession running on the same lines, to take into consideration the previous practice. The strongest case probably of all those which were cited is that of Yewens v. Noakes (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 530; 50 L. J. Q. B. 132. . . . . .. That, undoubtedly, is a strong authority for saying that such a practice may, in the case that Thesiger, L. J., described, be taken into

B.

BB

consideration in construing the later Act of Parliament; and I do not propose to depart from or whittle down that proposition in any degree. But what does the lord justice mean? Does he mean that you are to have regard to every practice by persons who have a statutory duty thrown upon them, and who for a long period have neglected to perform that which, according to the natural construction of the words of their Act of Parliament, would be their duty? I think not. I do not think he means to say that one is always to impute to the legislature a knowledge of that neglect of duty by those who have had a statutory obligation thrown upon them. If, then, it is not always that this imputation is to be made, when is it to be made? I think it is to be made in those cases in which it is reasonable to impute such a knowledge to the legislature. A case in which it very usually has been done is this very often in an antecedent or earlier Act in similar frame upon the same subject-matter, the very question of the interpretation of a particular section, or of particular words, in the Act has come into Court for decision, and the Court has put a construction upon the words of that earlier Act; and then, in the later Act, the legislature uses identical words. It could not, in such a case at all events, be supposed, however doubtful the construction of those words might be, that the legislature passed the subsequent Act without knowledge of the previous decision upon the same words in the earlier and similar Act. Then take again the case which was actually before the Court-Yewens v. Noakes (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 530; 50 L. J. Q. B. 132. That was a case in which the knowledge which was sought to be imputed to the legislature was the practice of a public department in respect of inhabited house duty. One can quite understand that the practice of public departments might be supposed to be within the knowledge of the legislature, but I do not think we ought to carry that so far as to say that in the present case the legislature must have had within their knowledge and view the practice of the gas examiners as to holding no tests upon Sundays."-London County Council v. South Metropolitan Gas Co., [1904] 1 Ch. 76, at pp. 81-83; 73 L. J. Ch. 136, at p. 140, Vaughan Williams, L. J.

Interpretation by reference to Rules.

"We are of opinion that, where the construction of the Act is ambiguous and doubtful on any point, recourse may be had to the

rules which have been made by the Lord Chancellor under the authority of the Act, and if we find that in the rules any particular construction has been put on the Act, that it is our duty to adopt and follow that construction."-Ex parte Wier (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 875, at p. 879, Sir G. Mellish, L. J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

"Before looking at the earlier legislation, as we have the right to do, we have the assistance of the County Court Rules, which, though they have not the validity of an enactment, are a contemporaneous exposition of the law by persons of authority."Millett v. Ballard, [1904] 2 K. B. 593, at p. 598; 73 L. J. K. B. 989, at p. 991, Collins, M. R.

Intention unconnected with Purpose of Statute...

Statutes conferring Powers on Public Bodies or Companies

382

382

Statutes interfering with Private Property, Rights, Titles, or Interests 392

Judicial and other Notice of Statutes.

Judicial notice must be taken of public statutes. Every statute (including local and personal statutes and private statutes) passed after 1850 is a public statute, and must be judicially noticed unless the contrary is expressed by the statute.

English subjects are bound to interpret rightly the statute law of the land.

"Nota reader, the rule of the law is, that of general statutes the judges ought to take notice, although they be not pleaded, otherwise of special or particular statutes; and for the better understanding of your books on this point, and which shall be said in judgment of law statutum generale, and which is statutum speciale, it is to be known that generale dicitur a genere, et speciale a specie; and there are genus, species, et individua.” —2 Coke, p. 472, Part IV. 76 a ((1597), Holland's Case).

"Statutes are either general or special, public or private. A general or public Act is an universal rule, that regards the whole community; and of this the courts of law are bound to take notice judicially and ex officio; without the statute being particularly pleaded, or formally set forth by the party who claims an advantage under it. Special or private Acts are rather exceptions than rules, being those which only operate upon particular persons, and private concerns: such as the Romans entitled senatûs decreta, in contradistinction to the senatûs consulta, which regarded the whole community and of these (which are not promulgated with the same notoriety as the former) the judges are not bound to take notice, unless they be formally shown and pleaded."-1 Bl. Comm. 85.

"The history of the law, with regard to the proof of private Acts of Parliament, is this: originally, they were required to be proved by a copy examined with the Parliament Roll. To avoid this inconvenience, a clause was usually inserted, declaring a copy printed by the King's printer should be evidence. It was then objected, that in such cases, it was necessary to prove that the Act produced was, in fact, printed by the King's printer; and to meet this objection, the present form of clause was adopted [viz., that the Act should be deemed and taken to be a public Act, and should be taken notice of as such by all judges, &c., without being specially pleaded]."— Woodward v. Cotton (1834), 1 Cr. M. & R. 44, at pp. 47, 48, Lord Lyndhurst, C. B.

"The judge is theoretically bound to take judicial notice of all Acts of Parliament; that is, he is bound theoretically to know the contents of them, and to be aware that there is no such Act of Parliament. I say 'theoretically,' but practically the judge requires attention to be called to the particular statute, and the clauses and sections of it that bear upon the matter in hand. But he is bound to take judicial notice of all Acts of Parliament."Chilton v. Corporation of London (1878), 7 Ch. D. 735, at p. 740; 47 L. J. Ch. 433, at p. 437, Jessel, M. R.

Lord Brougham's Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 21)—

Sect. 7. "Be it enacted that every Act made after the commencement of this Act shall be deemed and taken to be a public Act, and shall be judicially taken notice of as such, unless the contrary be expressly provided and declared by such Act." (Commenced and took effect on 4th February, 1851. Repealed by Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 41. Re-enacted by 52 & 5 Vict. c. 63, ss. 9 and 39.)

Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63)—

Sect. 9. "Every Act passed after the year 1850, whether before or after the commencement of this Act [1st January, 1890], shall be a public Act, and shall be judicially noticed as such, unless the contrary is expressly provided by the Act."

Sect. 39. "In this Act the expression 'Act' shall include a local and personal Act and a private Act."

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Ignorantia juris non excusat.-1 Co. 177.

The subjects of this country are bound to construe rightly the statute law of the land."-The Charlotta (1814), 1 Dods. Adm. 387, at p. 392, Sir W. Scott.

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Everyone is bound to know the law."-Cooper v. Simmons (1862), 7 H. & N. 707, at p. 717, Pollock, C. B.

"It is said Ignorantia juris haud excusat,' but in that maxim the word 'jus' is used in the sense of denoting general law, the ordinary law of the country. But when the word 'jus' is used in the sense of denoting a private right, that maxim has no application."-Cooper v. Phibbs (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 149, at p. 170, Lord Westbury (cited by Stirling, J., in Alleard v. Walker, [1896] 2 Ch. 369, at p. 381; 65 L. J. Ch. 660, at p. 665).