New Right, Obligation, Duty or Liability and its Remedy Prohibitory Statutes Legislative Exposition Explanatory Statutes ... Mandatory Statutes-Directory or Imperative Fiscal, Taxing and Charging Statutes Penal Statutes Mode of enforcing Statutes Cumulative Statutes Accumulative Penalties Accumulative Damages Same Offence with different Punishments Avoiding Statutes Obsolete and Obsolescent Statutes : : PAGE 414 424 425 425 427 429 431 433 433 434 434 436 443 447 Retrospective and Prospective Statutes. Nova constitutio, futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis. 2 Inst. 292. Statutes are not to be interpreted so as to have a retrospective operation, unless they contain clear and express words to that effect, or the object, subject-matter or context shows a contrary intention. A larger retrospective effect should not be given to a statute which is to some extent intended to be retrospective than that which it can plainly be seen the legislature meant. The consequence of holding a statute not to be retrospective are to be looked at. Where the words of a statute admit of two interpretations you are not to interpret them so as to produce a retrospective effect, or impose disabilities not existing at the passing of the statute; but if the statute is expressed in language that is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be interpreted as prospective only. "The general principle, however, that a statute is not to be construed so as to have retrospective operation, is a just one; for persons ought not to have their rights affected by laws passed subsequently."-Thompson v. Lack (1846), 3 C. B. 540, at p. 551; 16 L. J. C. P. 75, at pp. 77, 78, Wilde, C. J. "The general rule on this subject is stated by Lord Coke, in the Second Institute, 292, in his Commentary on the Statute of Gloucester. Nora constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis,' and the principle is one of such obvious convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the construction of statutes, unless in cases where there is something on the face of the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant it to operate retrospectively."-Moon v. Durden (1848), 2 Ex. 22, at p. 33, Rolfe, B. "But it is, as Lord Coke says, 'a rule and law of Parliament that regularly, nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis. This rule, which is, in effect, that enactments in a statute are generally to be construed to be prospective, and intended to regulate the future conduct of persons, is deeply founded in good sense and strict justice, and has been acted upon in many cases. . But this rule, which is one of construction only, will certainly yield to the intention of the legislature; and the question in this and in every other similar case is, whether that intention has been sufficiently expressed."-Ibid., at p. 42, Parke, B. "We must, however, enter upon the consideration of it [the Bankruptcy Law Consolidation Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106)] with a due regard to the well-known principle that statutes are not to be held to operate retrospectively unless they contain express words to that effect. Sometimes, no doubt, the legislature find it expedient to give a retrospective operation to an Act to a considerable extent; but then care ought to be taken to express that intention in clear and unambiguous language."-Marsh v. Higgins (1850), 9 C. B. 551, at p. 567; 19 L. J. C. P. 297, at p. 300, Wilde, C. J. "Unless there be something in the language, context, or objects of an Act of Parliament showing a contrary intention, the duty and practice of Courts of justice is to presume, in conformity with the adage of Lord Coke, that the legislature enacts prospectively and not retrospectively. There may, however, be acts that are evidently on the face of them, by their language and subjectmatter, intended to be retrospective; and when such is the case, the maxim of Lord Coke must give way."-Kerr v. The Marquis of Ailsa (1854), 1 Macq. 736, at p. 737, Lord Cranworth. "I take it to be a clear rule of law that the language of a statute is primâ facie to be construed as prospective only. This is according to the legal maxim, Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis."-Vansittart v. Taylor (1855), 4 E. & B. 910, at p. 914; 24 L. J. Q. B. 198, at p. 199, Parke, B. "Lord Coke's well-known canon: Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis.' That is the ordinary rule as to the interpretation of all legislative enactments, and is to be observed unless there be something in the terms of a particular enactment to prevent its operation."-Jackson v. Woolley (1858), 8 E. & B. 778, at p. 787; 27 L. J. Q. B. 448, at p. 449, Williams, J. "Nothing but clear and express words will give a retrospective effect to a statute. It would be a most dangerous construction to give a retrospective effect to a statute by implication."— Young v. Hughes (1859), 28 L. J. Ex. 161, at p. 164; 4 H. & N. 76, at pp. 83, 84, Pollock, C. B. "Those whose duty it is to administer the law very properly guard against giving to an Act of Parliament a retrospective operation, unless the intention of the legislature that it should be so construed is expressed in clear, plain and unambiguous language, because it manifestly shocks one's sense of justice that an act legal at the time of doing it should be made unlawful by some new enactment. Modern legislation has almost entirely removed that blemish from the law; and wherever it is possible to put upon an Act of Parliament a construction not retrospective, the Courts will always adopt that construction.”—Midland Rail. Co. v. Pye (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 179, at p. 191; 30 L. J. C. P. 314, at p. 318, Erle, C. J. (cited by Lopes, L. J., in In re School Board Election for Parish of Pulborough, [1894] 1 Q. B. 725, at p. 737; 63 L. J. Q. B. 497, at p. 501, and in Young v. Adams, [1898] A. C. 469, at p. 476; 67 L. J. P. C. 75, at p. 77, Lord Watson, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee). "I think it is a broad principle of construction that, unless the Court sees a clear indication of intention in an Act of Parliament to legislate ex post facto, and to give to the Act the effect of depriving a man of a right which belonged to him at the time of passing the Act, the Court will not give to the Act a retrospective operation. The case of Moon v. Durden [(1848), 2 Ex. 22], which was cited, strongly illustrates that principle."-Evans v. Williams (1865), 2 Dr. & Sm. 324, at p. 329, Sir R. T. Kindersley, V.-C. "Except there be a clear indication either from the subjectmatter or from the wording of a statute, the statute is not to have a retrospective construction. That rule was laid down strongly in Moon v. Durden [(1848), 2 Ex. 22, at p. 33]. . . . . In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, and what it was that the legislature contemplated." -Pardo v. Bingham (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. 735, at pp. 739, 740, Lord Hatherley, L. C. (cited in In re Chapman, [1896] 1 Ch. 323, at pp. 327, 328; 65 L. J. Ch. 170, at p. 172, by Kekewich, J.). "The rule which has obtained in putting a construction upon statutes-that when they are penal in their nature they are not to be construed retrospectively, if the language is capable of having a prospective effect given to it and is not necessarily retrospective." -The Queen v. Vine (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 195, at p. 199; 44 L. J. M. C. 60, at p. 63, Cockburn, C. J. "This [Wine and Beer Amendment Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 29)] is therefore a highly penal enactment. The sound and well-established canon of c ́nstruction is that such an enactment is to be read as prospective, unless a contrary intention be clearly established from the language used."-Ibid. at p. 201; L. J. at p. 64, Lush, J. "It is a general rule that, where a statute is passed altering the law, unless the language is expressly to the contrary, it is taken as intended to apply to a state of facts coming into existence after the Act."-The Queen v. Ipswich Union (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 269, at p. 270; 46 L. J. M. C. 207, at p. 208, Cockburn, C. J. "In the first place, the opinion which was pronounced by Lord Cranworth in the case of Kerr v. The Marquis of Ailsa (1854), 1 Macq. 736, followed up as it has been by similar opinions given by other judges, is decisive to this effect; that unless there is some declared intention of the legislature-clear and unequivocal—or unless there are some circumstances rendering it inevitable that we should take the other view, we ought to presume that an Act is prospective and is not retrospective. It appears to me that the ground of those opinions is very plain indeed."-Gardner v. Lucas (1878), 3 App. Cas. 582, at pp. 600, 601, Lord O'Hagan. "Now, the general rule, not merely of England and Scotland, but I believe of every civilized nation, is expressed in the maxim, B. E E 'Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non præteritis'primâ facie, any new law that is made affects future transactions, not past ones. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the subjectmatter of an Act might be such that, though there were not any express words to show it, it might be retrospective. For instance, I think it is perfectly settled that if the legislature intended to frame a new procedure, that instead of proceeding in this form or that, you should proceed in another and a different way; clearly there bygone transactions are to be sued for and enforced according to the new form of procedure. Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. Then, again, I think that where alterations are made in matters of evidence, certainly upon the reason of the thing, and I think upon the authorities also, those are retrospective, whether civil or criminal. But where the effect would be to alter a transaction already entered into, where it would be to make that valid which was previously invalid-to make an instrument which had no effect at all, and from which the party was at liberty to depart as long as he pleased, binding-I think the prima facie construction of the Act is that it is not to be retrospective, and that it would require strong reasons to show that is not the case."-Ibid. at p. 603, Lord Blackburn. "The question whether an Act of Parliament is retrospective in its operation must be determined by the provisions of the Act itself, bearing in mind that a statute is not to be construed retrospectively, unless it is clear that such was the intention of the legislature."-Quilter v. Mapleson (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 672, at p. 674; 52 L. J. Q. B. 44, at p. 45, Jessel, M. R. "It is a well-known principle of law on the construction of Acts of Parliament, and especially when the rights and liabilities of persons are altered thereby, that they are not to have a retrospective operation unless it is expressly so stated."-Hickson v. Darlow (1883), 23 Ch. D. 690, at p. 692; 52 L. J. Ch. 453, at p. 454, Fry, J. "Prima facie sect. 3 [of Ground Game Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 47)] would be prospective only, that being the general rule of construction of Acts of Parliament, that you are not to interfere with rights unless you find express words, and the operation of that third section would be prospective only."-Allhusen v. Brooking (1884), 26 Ch. D. 559, at p. 564; 53 L. J. Ch. 520, at p. 521, Chitty, J. |