as to create new disabilities or obligations, or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time when the Act comes into force, Mr. Compton-Smith would have been entitled to succeed; but when no new disability or obligation has been created by the statute, but it only alters the time within which proceedings may be taken, it may be held to apply to offences completed before the statute was passed. That is the case here. This statute [the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904 (4 Edw. VII. c. 15, s. 7)] does not alter the character of the offence, or take away any defence which was formerly open to the prisoner. It is a mere matter of procedure, and according to all the authorities it is therefore retrospective."-Rex v. Chandra Dharma, [1905] 2 K. B. 335, at pp. 338, 339; 74 L. J. K. B. 450, at p. 451, Lord Alverstone, C. J.

Consolidation Order.

66 "An order for consolidation, which is intended to deal with the future procedure in the actions which are consolidated, in my judgment ought not in principle to be construed as altering the rights of parties under orders already made in one or other of the actions consolidated."-Bake v. French, [1907] 1 Ch. 428, at p. 436; 76 L. J. Ch. 299, at p. 302, Parker, J.

Declaratory Statutes.

Statutes are "declaratory [of the common law] where the old custom of the kingdom is almost fallen into disuse, or become disputable in which case the Parliament has thought proper in perpetuum rei testimonium, and for avoiding all doubts and difficulties, to declare what the common law is and ever hath been."-1 Bl. Com. 86.

"The case of Attorney-General v. Hertford [(1849), 3 Ex. 670; 18 L. J. Ex. 332] in the Court of Exchequer, is a strong authority that, if an Act is in its nature a declaratory Act, the argument that it must not be construed so as to take away previous rights is not applicable."-Att.-Gen. v. Theobald (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 557, at pp. 559, 560, Pollock, B.

"A declaratory act means to declare the law, or to declare that which has always been the law, and there having been doubts

which have arisen, Parliament declares what the law is, and enacts that it shall continue what it then is."-Jones v. Bennett (1890), 63 L. T. 705, at p. 708, Lord Coleridge, C. J.

Statutory Fictions.

The limits and purposes of a statutory fiction are to be carefully ascertained.

"Where the legislature provides that something is to be deemed other than it is, we must be careful to see within what bounds and for what purpose it is to be so deemed."-Gover's Case (1875), 1 Ch. D. 182, at pp. 188, 189; 45 L. J. Ch. 83, at p. 90, James, L. J.

"When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to."-Ex parte Walton (1881), 17 Ch. D. 746, at p. 756; 50 L. J. Ch. 657, at p. 662, James, L. J. (cited by Earl Cairns in Hill v. East and West India Dock Co. (1884), 9 App. Cas. 448, at p. 456; 53 L. J. Ch. 842, at p. 845).

(See also "Interpretation Clauses," ante, p. 301, meaning of expression "shall be deemed.")

Inconsistent Statutes - Repugnancy.

Where there are two inconsistent enactments, it must be seen if
one cannot be read as a qualification of the other.

If two inconsistent statutes be passed at different times, the last is
to be obeyed, as it speaks the last intention of the makers.
If two sections in the same Act are repugnant, the latter of the
tico sections must prevail.

Where the proviso of a statute is directly repugnant to the purview
of it, the proviso shall stand and be held to be a repeal of the
purview.

"Our decision is conformable with the doctrine laid down in The Attorney-General v. The Chelsea Waterworks Co. [(1731), Fitzgibbon, 195]: there it was resolved that where the proviso of an

Act of Parliament is directly repugnant to the purview of it, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers."- The King v. The Justices of Middlesex (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 818, at p. 821, Lord Tenterden, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

"If two inconsistent Acts be passed at different times, the last is to be obeyed, and if obedience cannot be observed without derogating from the first, it is the first which must give way. Every Act of Parliament must be considered with reference to the state of law subsisting when it came into operation, and when it is to be applied; it cannot otherwise be rationally construed. Every Act is made either for the purpose of making a change in the law, or for the purpose of better declaring the law, and its operation is not to be impeded by the mere fact that it is inconsistent with some previous enactment."-The Dean, &c. of Ely v. Bliss (1842), 5 Beav. 574, at p. 582; 11 L. J. Ch. 351, at p. 354, Lord Langdale, M. R.

"If the two sections are repugnant, the known rule is that the last must prevail."—Wood v. Riley (1867), L. R. 3 C. P. 26, at p. 27, Keating, J.

"It is a cardinal principle in the interpretation of a statute that if there are two inconsistent enactments, it must be seen if one cannot be read as a qualification of the other."-Ebbs v. Boulnois (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 479, at p. 484; 44 L. J. Ch. 691, at p. 694, James, L. J. (applied by Charles, J., in Wardens of Cholmeley School, Highgate v. Sewell, [1894] 2 Q. B. 906, at p. 911; 63 L. J. Q. B. 820, at p. 824; and by Lopes, L. J., in Imray v. Oakshette, [1897] 2 Q. B. 218, at p. 223; 66 L. J. Q. B. 544, at p. 547).

"In the first place, it was said that if construed according to their ordinary grammatical construction, they [the words of a section] would practically contradict other sections in a series of Acts of Parliament which apply to burial boards and districts. If it had been found that reading them in their ordinary sense they would contradict some other enactments, but that reading them in a sense in which, though not their ordinary sense, they were reasonably capable of being read, they would not contradict such other enactments, then I agree that they should be read so that all the enactments should be read together without contradicting each other."-The Queen v. Overseers of Tonbridge (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 339, at p. 342; 53 L. J. Q. B. 488, at p. 491, Brett, M. R.

"The usual rule that where there are two public general Acts with inconsistent provisions the later Act prevails, and all the more so if its provision is express and that of the earlier Act is only implied." — In re re Cannings, Ltd., and Middlesex County Council, [1907] 1 K. B. 51, at p. 58; 76 L. J. K. B. 44, at p. 49, Farwell, L. J.

Remedial Statutes.

Definition.

"Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply such defects and abridge such superfluities in the common law as arise either from the general imperfection of all human laws, from change of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised determinations of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause whatsoever; and this being done, either by enlarging the common law where it was too narrow and circumscribed, or by restraining it where it was too lax and luxuriant, hath occasioned another subordinate division of remedial Acts of Parliament into enlarging and restraining statutes."-1 Bl. Com. 86.

Remedial statutes ought to be construed liberally.

"The law will never make an interpretation to advance a private and to destroy the public, but always to advance the public and to prevent every private, which is odious in law in such cases. And, therefore, it is well said in Heydon's Case (1584) in the Third Part of my Reports, f. 7 b. The office of judges is always to make such construction as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief, et pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intention of the makers of the Act pro bono publico.”—6 Coke, p. 139, Part XI., 73 b (cited by Pollock, C. B., in Att.-Gen. v. Walker (1849), 18 L. J. Ex. 179, at p. 184).

"In remedial cases, the construction of statutes is extended to other cases within the reason or the rule of them. But where it is a hard positive law, and the reason is not very plainly to be seen, it ought not to be extended by construction."-Atcheson v. Everitt (1776), Cowp. 382, at p. 391, Lord Mansfield, C. J.

"But it had been properly said that this (9 Will. III. c. 8, s. 8) was a remedial statute, and in advancement of the remedy all was to be done in a way consistent with any construction of it."Johnes v. Johnes (1814), 3 Dow, App. Cas. 1, at p. 15, Lord Eldon, L. C.

"It is by no means unusual in construing a statute to extend the enacting words beyond their natural import and effect, in order to include cases within the same mischief, where the statute is remedial. It is a mode of construction as familiar to every legal person, as expounding the statute by equity.”—Dean and Chapter of York v. Middleburgh (1828), 2 Y. & J. 196, at p. 215, Alexander, C. B.

"I admit that the common distinction between penal and remedial Acts, viz., that the one is to be construed strictly, the other liberally, ought not to be erased from the mind of a judge, yet, whatever be the Act, be it penal, and certainly if remedial, we ought always to look for its true construction. In that respect, there ought to be no distinction between a penal and a remedial statute. If the remedial statute does not extend to the particular matter under consideration, we have no power to legislate so as to extend it.". Nicholson v. Fields (1862), 7 H. & N. 810, at p. 817; 31 L. J. Ex. 233, at p. 235, Pollock, C. B.

"The statute being remedial of a grievance, by amplifying the jurisdiction of the English Court of Admiralty, ought, according to the general rule applicable to such statutes, to be construed liberally, so as to afford the utmost relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow. And the decisions upon it have hitherto proceeded upon this principle of interpretation."-Giovanni Dupueto v. James Wyllie & Co. (1874), L. R. 5 P. C. 482, at p. 492; 43 L. J. Ad. 20, at pp. 23, 24, Sir Montague E. Smith, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

"If the enactment be manifestly intended to be remedial, it must be so construed as to give the most complete remedy which the phraseology will permit."-Gover's Case (1875), 1 Ch. D. 182, at p. 198, Brett, J.

(See also ante, p. 338, "Effect on Pre-existing Rights.")