(cited by Vaughan Williams, L. J., in Att.-Gen. v. De Préville, [1900] 1 Q. B. 223, at p. 231; 69 L. J. Q. B. 283, at p. 288).

"The general canon of construction is stated in Reg. v. Barclay [(1881), 8 Q. B. D. 306, at p. 312; 51 L. J. M. C. 27] by Field, J., who says: It is a very well established rule for the construction of statutes that, if they impose a charge on the subject, they must be strictly construed as against the party in whose favour the charge is imposed.'"-Davies v. Evans (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 238, at p. 242; 51 L. J. M. C. 132, at p. 136, Grove, J.

"The second rule is that, where the words occur in a statute imposing taxation throughout the three kingdoms, they should be construed so as to make the incidence of the taxation alike in all three kingdoms. This was considered in Lord Saltoun v. Lord Advocate [(1860), 3 Macq. 659].”—The Queen v. Commissioners of Income Tax (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 296, at p. 310; 58 L. J. Q. B. 196, at p. 201, Fry, L. J.

"Acts of Parliament which impose legacy duty, like all other Taxing Acts, are to be read strictly; that is to say, they are not to be extended so as to have the effect of imposing on the subject a tax which Parliament has not clearly made him pay. Those principles are perfectly familiar."—In re J. Thorley, [1891] 2 Ch. 613, at p. 623; 60 L. J. Ch. 537, at p. 538, Lindley, L. J.

"This is an Income Tax Act, and what is intended to be taxed is income. And when I say 'what is intended to be taxed,' I mean what is the intention of the Act as expressed in its provisions, because in a Taxing Act it is impossible, I believe, to assume any intention-any governing purpose in the Act-to do more than take such tax as the statute imposes. In various cases the principle of construction of a Taxing Act has been referred to in various forms, but I believe they may be all reduced to thisthat, inasmuch as you have no right to assume that there is any governing object which a Taxing Act is intended to attain other than that which it has expressed by making such and such objects the intended subject for taxation, you must see whether a tax is expressly imposed. Cases, therefore, under the Taxing Acts always resolve themselves into a question whether or not the words of the Act have reached the alleged subject of taxation. Lord Wensleydale said, in In re Micklethwait (1855), 11 Ex. 452, at p. 456; 25 L. J. Ex. 19, at p. 21: 'It is a well-established rule, that the subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that

purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words."—Tennant v. Smith, [1892] A. C. 150, at p. 154; 61 L. J. P. C. 11, at p. 13, Lord Halsbury, L. C. (quoted by A. L. Smith, L. J., in Att.-Gen. v. Beech, [1898] 2 Q. B. 147, at p. 150; 67 L. J. Q. B. 585, at p. 587; and by Stirling, L. J., in Att.-Gen. v. Selborne (Earl of). [1902] 1 K. B. 388, at p. 399; 71 L. J. K. B. 289, at p. 297).

"It has been often said by judges of very great experience that, in construing Acts relating to the revenue, the popular sense of words rather than their strict legal meaning should be looked at, and the reason for that is obvious. The object of Taxing Acts has nothing to do with the strict legal meaning of words, unless the words used are words of art, such as words which describe an estate in real property, or technical terms peculiar to English law."-Smelting Company of Australia v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1896] 2 Q. B. 179, at p. 184; 65 L. J. Q. B. 513, at p. 514, Pollock, B.

"It is stated in Maxwell on Statutes, 1st ed. (1875), p. 259, that 'statutes which impose pecuniary burdens are subject to the rule of strict construction. It is a well settled rule of law that all charges upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, because in some degree they operate as penalties. The subject is not to be taxed unless the language by which the tax is imposed is perfectly clear and free from doubt.' For this proposition several decisions and dicta are cited, and there is no doubt as to its being a correct statement of the law. Of course the learned author does not mean to say that where the plain language of a statute imposes a tax or duty, any Court is to construe it according to any other principle than they would apply to the construction of another statute."-Clifford v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1896] 2 Q. B. 187, at pp. 192, 193; 65 L. J. Q. B. 582, at p. 585, Pollock, B.

"The first point we have to consider is this: That the object of the Finance Act [1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30)] is to levy upon all property, real or personal, settled or not settled, estate duty. The time at which that duty is to be payable is fixed, and fixed with reference to the death of a person who has been the owner of, or has enjoyed, the property in question. That being so, we start with a proposition which is not included in the ordinary common law principle (as it is admitted on both sides, and as we have it laid down again and again, especially by Lord Westbury); these

Acts are not to be construed in accordance with the ordinary language of conveyancers, or in accordance with what is supposed to give effect to the principles upon which conveyancers would act; they are to be construed, as indeed all other Acts are, with a view to carrying out what is supposed to be the intention of the Act and its provisions, as expressed by the language used."—Att.-Gen. v. Beech, [1897] 2 Q. B. 535, at p. 539; 66 L. J. Q. B. 800, at p. 801, Pollock, B.

"It is unquestionably within the competence of Parliament, when imposing a tax, to modify or abrogate for the purpose of the Act any rule of law or equity which otherwise would be applicable to the subject-matter. Whether it has done so or not must always be a question of the true construction of the particular statute under consideration. The right, and indeed the only, method of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature from the language and provisions of the Act itself. In construing a statute, regard must be had to the ordinary rules of law applicable to the subject-matter, and these rules must prevail, except in so far as the statute shows that they are to be disregarded; and the burden of showing that they are to be disregarded rests upon those who seek to maintain that proposition. It is incumbent on the Crown, when claiming the tax, to make out affirmatively that the case falls within the statute. The principles applicable to the interpretation of a Taxing Act are laid down by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Halsbury) in the passage already cited (Tennant v. Smith, [1892] A. C. 150, at p. 154; 61 L. J. P. C. 11, at p. 13). You must see that the tax is expressly imposed; the subject is not to be taxed without clear words, and the Act, like every other Act, must be read according to the natural construction of the words.' -Att.-Gen. v. Beech, [1898] 2 Q. B. 147, at p. 155; 67 L. J. Q. B. 585, at p. 590, Chitty, L. J.

"It has been said, and I agree, that the tax is not to be regarded as imposed unless the words in the statute are clear."-Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Tod, [1898] A. C. 399, at p. 414; 67 L. J. P. C. 42, at p. 46, Lord Herschell.

"I would observe that the art of interpreting statutes of this character-statutes which impose taxation-cannot be considered an exact science; it is rather a practical art, and the questions which arise cannot be dealt with as though they were simple questions to be settled upon principles of common law.”—Swayne

v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1899] 1 Q. B. 335, at p. 344, Wills, J.

"I see no reason why special canons of construction should be applied to any Act of Parliament, and I know of no authority for saying that a Taxing Act is to be construed differently from any other Act. The duty of the Court is, in my opinion, in all cases the same, whether the Act to be construed relates to taxation or to any other subject; namely, to give effect to the intention of the legislature as that intention is to be gathered from the language employed, having regard to the context in connection with which it is employed. The Court must no doubt ascertain the subjectmatter to which the particular tax is by the statute intended to be applied, but when once that is ascertained it is not open to the Court to narrow or whittle down the operation of the Act by seeming considerations of hardship or of business convenience or the like. Courts have to give effect to what the legislature has said.”—Att.-Gen. v. Carlton Bank, [1899] 2 Q. B. 158, at p. 164; 68 L. J. Q. B. 788, at pp. 791, 792, Lord Russell, C. J. (cited by Farwell, J., in City of London Electric Lighting Co. v. Mayor, &c. of London (1900), 82 L. T. 530, at p. 532).

"The truth is that, when you are dealing with a question of this sort, and endeavouring to find out whether a thing [a bicycle] is taxable or not under Acts of this character, the first thing to do is to find out whether there is anything which corresponds in the ordinary and natural course of meaning to the language which the legislature at the particular time used in making the things mentioned in such Acts the subject of taxation. I do not think it is a question merely of words whether the thing sought to be made taxable was called a coach or not; if it was intended to fill the functions of a carriage according to the description given in the original Act. I quite agree that the mere fact that it was called by a different name from those enumerated in the Act would not matter, because the language would have been used by the legis lature in a sense which everybody could understand, and which would comprehend the particular thing although it might be called by another name."-Simpson v. Teignmouth and Shaldon Bridge Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 405, at pp. 411, 412; 72 L. J. K. B. 204, at p. 206, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.

"It is a wholesome principle which has often been recognised, that Taxing Acts must be reasonably clear and precise as to the subjects which are intended to be taxed."-Horan v. Hayhoe,

[1904] 1 K. B. 288, at p. 290; 73 L. J. K. B. 133, at p. 135, Lord Alverstone, C. J.

Penal Statutes.

Rules.

A penal statute is to be interpreted, like any other instrument, according to the fair common-sense meaning of the language used.

Penal statutes should be construed strictly so that no cases shall be held to be reached by them but such as are within both the spirit and letter of such laws.

If there are two possible interpretations of a penal clause in a statute, one which would mitigate and the other which would aggravate the penalty, we ought to adopt that which will impose the smaller sum.

If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, it must be adopted.

If the words are merely equally capable of an interpretation that would, and one that would not, inflict the penalty, the latter must prevail.

"The freedom of our Constitution will not permit that in criminal cases a power should be lodged in any judge to construe the law otherwise than according to the letter. This caution, while it admirably protects the public liberty, can never bear hard upon individuals. A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer less. The laws cannot be restrained by partiality to inflict a penalty beyond what the letter will warrant; but, in cases where the letter induces any apparent hardship, the Crown has the power to pardon."-1 Bl. Com. p. 92. It is not true that the Court, in the exposition of penal statutes, are to narrow the construction. We are to look to the words in the first instance, and, where they are plain, we are to decide on them. If they are doubtful, we are then to have recourse to the subject-matter; but, at all events, it is only a secondary rule."-The King v. Hodnett (1786), 1 T. R. 96, at p. 101, Buller, J.

66

"We must not extend a penal law to other cases than those intended by the legislature, even though we think they come