'Being a rule of construction, it is to be followed only when the testator has not expressed his own intention, has not given any other guide to the Court which has to consider his will."—In re Coward, Coward v. Larkman (1887), 57 L. T. 285, at p. 287, Cotton, L. J.

"All rules of construction are simply rules to be applied where there is no definite expression of intention in the instrument. If there is, you do not want any rule of construction. Even when it has been laid down as a rule that certain words have a particular meaning, still, if there is any expression in the will which shows that the testator intended to use them in a different sense, we must give them the meaning which he has shown that he intended. them to bear. Rules of construction are only intended to aid us where there is ambiguity, and not to enable us to get rid of the express words of the testator if expressed in clear language. This view is supported by the observations of Lord Halsbury in Leader v. Duffey [(1888), 13 App. Cas. 294, at p. 301; 58 L. J. P. C. 13, at p. 16], where he said that it was the duty of the Court to construe the words of the instrument with such help as could be obtained from the instrument, and not to look at rules of construction as positive rules to which effect must be given even where the testator has expressed a different intention."In re Hamlet, Stephen v. Cunningham (1888), 39 Ch. D. 426, at pp. 434, 435; 58 L. J. Ch. 242, at pp. 246, 247, Cotton, L. J.

"I must apply any established rule of construction which has been adopted by the Court."-Kirby-Smith v. Parnell, [Feb. 5, 6, 1903] 1 Ch. 483, at p. 490; 72 L. J. Ch. 468, at p. 470, Buckley, J.

"My lords, I confess I approach the interpretation of a will with the greatest possible hesitation as to adopting any supposed fixed rule for its construction. If I can read the language of the instrument in its ordinary and natural sense, I do not want any rule of construction; and if I cannot, why, then I think one must read the whole instrument as well as one can, and conclude what really its effect is intended to be by looking at the instrument as a whole. I protest against the notion that any canon of construction entitles you to indulge your imagination and go into what the testator would have said if he had thought of it.”— Inderwick v. Tatchell, [March 10, 1903] A. C. 120, at p. 122; 72 L. J. Ch. 393, at p. 394, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.

"When I have the honour of presiding in this Court and am called upon to determine cases upon the construction of wills, I frequently find that I am prevented by some rule of construction. from deciding in accordance with that which I believe to be the real intention of the testator."—In re Ravensworth, [1905] 2 Ch. 1, at p. 5; 74 L. J. Ch. 353, at p. 353, Lord Alverstone, C. J.

"I have attempted to do in this case what I have very often done before in giving judgment upon the subject of a will. My intention is, if I can, to construe the will which is before us itself and give the natural meaning to the words and the sentences therein contained. I believe that half the difficulties have arisen by adopting some words that learned judges have used on another occasion with reference to another will as if it was a canon of construction for all wills."-Gorringe v. Mahlstedt, [1907] A. C. 225, at p. 226; 76 L. J. Ch. 527, at p. 528, Earl of Halsbury.

Artificial Rules.

A will—especially one of personal property-ought to be interpreted according to the rules of interpretation applicable to all documents (see ante, pp. 55-86), and not according to artificial rules which have been carried too far.

A will of real property in which well-known technical words and phrases are used ought to be construed according to the established technical meaning of such words and phrases. (See also post, p. 548, "Technical Words and Expressions.")

"I agree with the late Master of the Rolls (Sir George Jessel) that the artificial rules which have been laid down for the construction of wills have been carried too far, and that a will, especially one of personal property, ought to be construed according to the rules of construction applicable to all documents, and not according to such artificial rules. What I am saying does not apply to wills of real property, in which well-known technical phrases as to realty are used, and where, therefore, such will should be construed according to the established technical meaning of such words of art."—In re Bedson's Trusts (1885), 28 Ch. D. 523, at p. 525; 54 L. J. Ch. 644, at pp. 645, 646, Brett, M. R.

Comity of Nations.

The comity of nations is, and ever must be, uncertain, and cannot

be reduced to any certain rule.

"There is indeed great truth in the remarks which have been judicially promulgated on this subject by a learned Court. When so many men of great talents and learning are thus found to fail in fixing certain principles, we are forced to conclude that they have failed, not from want of ability, but because the matter was not susceptible of being settled on certain principles. They have attempted to go too far, to define and fix that which cannot, in the nature of things, be defined and fixed. They seem to have forgotten that they wrote on a question which touched the comity of nations, and that that comity is, and ever must be, uncertain; that it must necessarily depend on a variety of circumstances which cannot be reduced to any certain rule; that no nation will suffer the laws of another to interfere with her own to the injury of her citizens; that whether they do or not must depend on the condition of the country in which the foreign law is sought to be enforced, the particular nature of her legislation, her policy, and the character of her institutions; that in the conflict of laws it must often be a matter of doubt which should prevail; and that, whenever a doubt does exist, the Court, which decides, will prefer the laws of its own country to that of the stranger.'"-Story on the Conflict of Laws, s. 28 (cited by Farwell, J., in In re Johnson, Roberts v. Attorney-General, [1903] 1 Ch. 821, at pp. 829, 830; 72 L. J. Ch. 682, at pp. 684, 685).

"As has been well said in an American case of Hilton v. Guyot [quoted in Muir on Conflict of Laws, p. 6], ' Comity is neither matter of absolute obligation nor of mere curtesy and goodwill. It is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.' I cannot think that I should have due regard to such rights if I were to abrogate our own ordinary rules simply for the sake of securing uniformity with the views taken of those rules by another country."-In re Johnson, Roberts v. Attorney-General, [1903] 1 Ch. 821, at p. 829; 72 L. J. Ch. 682, at p. 684, Farwell, J.

Testator's Domicil.

(a) A domicil is the relation which the law creates between an
individual and a country whereby the man attracts to
himself the municipal law and customs of that country.
(b) No man is without a domicil of origin, i.e., the domicil of
his father if the child be legitimate, or the domicil of his
mother if illegitimate.

(c) There may be a domicil of origin, i.e., of birth, or a domicil

of choice, i.e., the choice of a permanent residence in a new country, that is, not his country of origin. Where a domicil of origin is proved, it lies upon the person who asserts a change of domicil to establish it.

(d) The domicil of origin may be extinguished by act of law, as on marriage (in the case of a woman), exile for life, or sentence of death, but it cannot be destroyed by the will and act of the party.

(e) The domicil of origin clings and adheres to the subject of it, and prevails until an actual change is made by which the personal status of another domicil is acquired, whereupon the domicil of origin remains in abeyance during the continuance of the domicil of choice.

(f) In order to acquire a new domicil a man must have a fixed intention or determination to strip himself of his nationality, or in other words to renounce his birth-right in the place of his original domicil.

(g) The domicil of origin revives and exists whenever there is no other domicil.

(h) A domicil of choice cannot exist in a country where the law refuses to recognize a domicil of choice.

(i) To the Court of the testator's domicil belongs the interpretation of his will.

(k) The law of the domicil at the time of the testator's death is in

general the law governing his will unless there is any reason, from the nature of the will or otherwise, to suppose that the testator made it with reference to the law of some other country.

"Their lordships, however, do not wish to intimate any doubt that the law of the domicil at the time of the death is the governing law (see Story, Conflict of Laws, s. 473), nor any that

the statute 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26 (the Wills Act, 1837) applies only to wills of those persons who continue to have an English domicil, and are consequently regulated by the English law."-Bremer v. Freeman (1857), 10 Moore, P. C. 306, at p. 359; 1 Deane, Ecc. Rep. 192, Lord Wensleydale, in delivering the judgment of the Court (cited by Stirling, J., in In re Price, Tomlin v. Latter, [1900] 1 Ch. 442, at p. 451; 69 L. J. Ch. 225, at pp. 229, 230).

“Circumstances may be so strong as to lead irresistibly to the inference that a person does mean quatenus in illo exuere patriam. But that is not a presumption at which we ought easily to arrive, more especially in modern times, when the facilities for travelling, and the various inducements for pleasure, for curiosity, or for economy, so frequently lead persons to make temporary residences out of their native country."-Whicker v. Hume (1858), 7 H. L. Cas. 124, at p. 159, Lord Cranworth.

"To the Court of the domicil belongs the interpretation and construction of the will of the testator. To determine who are the next of kin or heirs of the personal estate of the testator, is the prerogative of the judge of the domicil. In short, the Court of the domicil is the forum concursus to which the legatees under the will of a testator, or the parties entitled to the distribution of the estate of an intestate, are required to resort. To these general rules must be added a remark on the great danger and inexpediency of the Court of a foreign country taking upon itself the task of interpreting the will of a testator, which is written, not in the language of that country, but in the language of the country of the domicil. I entirely adopt upon this point the opinion of Lord Lyndhurst in advising your lordships in the case of Trotter v. Trotter [(1828), 4 Bligh, N. S. 502].”—Enohin v. Wylie (1862), 10 H. L. Cas. 1, at pp. 13, 14; 31 L. J. Ch. 402, at p. 405, Lord Westbury, L. C.

"In order to acquire a new domicil, a man must intend quatenus in illo exuere patriam."-Moorhouse v. Lord (1863), 10 H. L. Cas. 272, at p. 283; 32 L. J. Ch. 295, at p. 298, Lord Cranworth.

"The will must be construed according to the law of the testator's domicil. That is a proposition for which I need refer to no authorities. It is enough to say, that nearly all of them are mentioned in the text and notes of the well-known work of Mr. Justice Story, who lays down the rule in these terms [Conflict of Laws, 7th ed.