Sense and Meaning, how collected.

The sense and meaning of an instrument should be collected from the terms used therein.

The terms of an instrument are to be understood (in the first place) in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, (in the second place) in any peculiar sense they may have acquired in trade, &c., (in the third place) in any special and peculiar sense pointed out by the context.

"The same rule of construction which applies to all other instruments applies equally to this instrument of a policy of insurance, viz., that it is to be construed according to its sense and meaning, as collected in the first place from the terms used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have generally, in respect of the subjectmatter, as by the known usage of trade, or the like, acquired a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense of the same words; or unless the context evidently points out that they must, in the particular instance, and in order to effectuate the immediate intention of the parties to that contract, be understood in some special and peculiar sense."-Robertson v. French (1803), 4 East, 180, at p. 135, Lord Ellenborough, delivering the judgment of the Court. [Cited by Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Hunter v. Leathley (1830), 10 B. & C. 858, at p. 871, and by Erle, C. J., in Carr v. Montefiore (1864), 5 B. & S. 408, at pp. 428, 429; 33 L. J. Q. B. 256, at p. 258; and quoted with approval by Bowen, L. J., in Hart v. Standard Marine Insurance Co. (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 499, at pp. 501, 502; 58 L. J. Q. B. 284, at p. 286, and cited by Lord Halsbury in Glynn v. Margitson & Co., [1893] A. C. 351, at p. 358; 62 L. J. Q. B. 466, at pp. 469, 470.]

"It is a true rule of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of an instrument may be collected ex antecedentibus et consequentibus; every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done."-Barton v. Fitzgerald (1812), 15 East, 530, at p. 541, Lord Ellenborough, C. J.

"The question in this, and other cases of construction of written instruments is, not what was the intention of the parties, but what is the meaning of the words they have used."-Rickman v. Carstairs (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 651, at p. 663, Lord Denman, C. J. "It is unquestionable that the object of all expositions of

written instruments must be to ascertain the expressed meaning or intention of the writer, the expressed meaning being equivalent to the intention; . . . . It is not allowable . . . to adduce any evidence, however strong, to prove an unexpressed intention, varying from that which the words used import. This may be open, no doubt, to the remark, that, although we profess to be exploring the intention of the writer, we may be led in many cases to decide contrary to what can scarcely be doubted to have been the intention, rejecting evidence which may be more satisfactory in the particular instance to prove it. The answer is, that the interpreters have to deal with the written expression of the writer's intention, and Courts of law to carry into effect what he has written, not what it may be surmised, on however probable grounds, that he intended only to have written."-Shore v. Wilson (1842), 9 Cl. & F. 355, at pp. 525, 526; 5 Scott, 958, at pp. 1001, 1002, Coleridge, J.

"I apprehend it is a sovereign rule in the construction of all written documents to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the instrument itself, and to give effect, if possible, to every word, or at all events to every provision."-Hayne v. Cummings (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 421, at p. 427, Byles, J.

"We have been referred to a passage in Cicero, which is said to give the rule for construing an English statute. To my mind, to quote Cicero for such a purpose is too ambitious. I am disposed

to follow the rule of construction which was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke, and that is quite far enough for me to go back. They said that in construing instruments you must have regard not to the presumed intention of the parties, but to the meaning of the words which they have used."-Er parte Chick, In re Meredith (1879), 11 Ch. D. 731, at pp. 738, 739, Brett, L. J.

"It is to be remembered that what the Courts have to do in construing all written documents is to reach the meaning of the parties through the words they have used."-Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. Hamilton, Fraser & Co. (1887), 12 App. Cas. 484, at p. 490; 56 L. J. Q. B. 626, at p. 628, Lord Halsbury, L. C.

"For myself, I am prepared to look at the instrument such as it is; to see the language that is used in it; to look at the whole of the document, and not to part of it; and having looked at the whole of the document, to see (if I can) through the instrument what was the mind of the testator.

Those are general principles

for the construction of all instruments-and to that extent it may be said that they are canons of construction."-In re Jodrell (1890), 44 Ch. D. 590, at p. 605; 59 L. J. Ch. 538, at p. 542, Lord Halsbury, L. C.

Primary Meaning.

The primary meaning of the words must be taken, conclusively, to be that in which the writer used it and conclusively to state the writer's intention.

"I believe the authorities to be numerous and clear (too numerous and clear to make it convenient or necessary to cite them) that where language is used in a deed which in its primary meaning is unambiguous, and in which that meaning is not excluded by the context, and is sensible with reference to the extrinsic circumstances in which the writer was placed at the time of writing, such primary meaning must be taken, conclusively, to be that in which the writer used it; such meaning, in that case, conclusively states the writer's intention, and no evidence is receivable to show that in fact the writer used it in any other sense, or had any other intention. This rule, as I state it, requires perhaps two explanatory observations: the first, that if the language be technical or scientific, and it is used in a matter relating to the art or science to which it belongs, its technical or scientific must be considered its primary meaning; the second, that by sensible with reference to the extrinsic circumstances' is not meant that the extrinsic circumstances make it more or less reasonable or probable is what the writer should have intended; it is enough if those circumstances do not exclude it, that is, deprive the words of all reasonable application according to such primary meaning."

"In proportion as we are removed from the period in which an author writes, we become less certain of the meaning of the words he uses; we are not sure that at that period the primary meaning of the words was the same as now, for by the primary is not meant the etymological, but that which the ordinary usage of society affixes to it. We are also equally uncertain whether at that period the words did not bear a technical or conventional sense, and whether they were not so used by the writer."-Shore v. Wilson (1840), 9 Cl. & F. 355, at pp. 525-527; 5 Scott, 958, at pp. 1001-1003, Coleridge, J,

"In my view, the principle upon which words are to be construed in instruments is very plain. Where there is a popular and common word used in an instrument, that word must be construed prima facie in its popular and common sense. If it is a word of a technical or legal character it must be construed according to its technical or legal meaning. If it is a word which is of a technical and scientific character, then it must be construed according to that which is its primary meaning, namely, its technical and scientific meaning. But before you can give evidence of the secondary meaning of a word you must satisfy the Court, from the instrument itself, or from the circumstances of the case, that the word ought to be construed, not in its popular or primary signification, but according to its secondary intention."-Holt & Co. v. Collyer (181), 16 Ch. D. 718, at p. 720; 50 L. J. Ch. 311, at p. 312, Fry, J.

"Doubtless there are cases in which, when in the instrument itself, whether a will or a contract or a statute, evidences may be discovered of the general intention of the framer and of the general meaning, or what has been called the governing sense, in which the words or the provisions are to be understood, you may occasionally modify the language which you have to construe with reference to that general intention which has been so ascertained.” -Vestry of St. John, Hampstead v. Cotton (1886), 12 App. Cas. 1, at p. 6; 56 L. J. Q. B. 225, at p. 226, Lord Halsbury, L. C.

"The Wills Act in terms says that a devise of real estate shall be construed in a certain way, unless the contrary intention appears. That, of course, must be a question of what is the intention as exhibited by the written words, looking at the whole instrument together, which is a principle which, I take it, is not confined in that respect to wills, but applies to any other instrument whatever whereby people signify their intentions."-Crumpe v. Crumpe, [1900] A. C. 127, at p. 130; 69 L. J. P. C. 7, at p. 9, Earl of Halsbury, L. C.

"It is therefore a question of construction in each case, to which the ordinary rules of construction apply, namely, that words must bear their ordinary primary meaning unless the context of the instrument read as a whole, or surrounding contemporaneous circumstances, show that the secondary meaning expresses the real intention of the parties, or unless the words are used in connection with some place, trade, or the like, in which they have acquired the secondary meaning as their customary meaning quoad hoc.

This is a question of fact which (unless so often proved as to be judicially recognised) has to be proved by evidence."-Bruner v. Moore, [1904] 1 Ch. 305, at p. 310; 73 L. J. Ch. 377, at p. 379, Farwell, J.

General Words.

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.--3 Inst. cap. 21, p. 76.

General words are primâ facie to be taken in their usual sense. General words are limited by the object and intent of the instrument as ascertained from the instrument itself.

"Our decision depends, as it appears to me, upon an ancient and well-established principle of construction, of which Leduc v. Ward (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 475; 57 L. J. Q. B. 379, is one of the most recent illustrations. I think that principle of construction is not confined to this class of documents [Bills of lading], but is applicable to all documents. This principle is applicable wherever specific words are used to express the main object and intent of the instrument, and in some other parts general words are used which in their utmost generality would be inconsistent with and destructive of the main object of the contract. When the Court in dealing with a contract or document of any kind finds that difficulty it always, so far as I know, follows this principle, that the general words must be limited so that they shall be consistent with, and shall not defeat the main object of the contracting parties."Margetson v. Glynn, [1892] 1 Q. B. 337, at p. 344; 61 L. J. Q. B. 186, at p. 190, Fry, L. J.

Ejusdem Generis Doctrine.

General words following specific words are primâ facie to be taken in their usual sense, unless the reasonable construction of the instrument requires them to be used in a sense limited to things ejusdem generis with those which have been specifically mentioned before.

"Two rules of construction now firmly established as part of our law may be considered as limiting those words " ["losses and misfortunes"]. "One is that words, however general, may be limited with respect to the subject-matter in relation to which they are used. The other is that general words may be restricted to the