Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation

Moore, Trafford v. Maconochie (1888), 39 Ch. D. 116, at p. 125; 57 L. J. Ch. 321, at p. 325, Kay, J.

"The rule is thus stated by Mr. Jarman (4th ed., Vol. 2, p. 12; 5th ed., pp. 852, 853): 'But with respect to legacies out of personal estate, the Civil Law, which in this respect has been adopted by Courts of Equity, differs in some respects from the Common Law in its treatment of conditions precedent; the rule of the Civil Law being that where a condition precedent is originally impossible, or is made so by the act or default of the testator, or is illegal as involving malum prohibitum, the bequest is absolute, just as if the condition had been subsequent. But where the performance of the condition is the sole motive of the bequest, or its impossibility was unknown to the testator, or the condition which was possible in its creation has since become impossible by the act of God, or where it is illegal as involving malum in se, in these cases the Civil agrees with the Common Law in holding both gift and condition void.' According to English law, if a condition subsequent which is to defeat an estate is against the policy of the law, the gift is absolute, but if the illegal condition is precedent there is no gift."—In re Moore, Trafford v. Maconochie (1888), 39 Ch. D. 116, at pp. 128, 129; 57 L. J. Ch. 936, at p. 937, Cotton, L. J.

"Upon the authorities cited to us, it seems to me to be clear law that, in a devise of real estate with a condition, where the intention of the testator, as evidenced by the words he has used, is more consistent with the inference that he intended the condition to be a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent, then, if the words are capable of admitting both constructions, the Court ought to hold the condition to be a condition subsequent." -In re Greemrood, Goodhart v. Woodhead, [1903] 1 Ch. 749, at p. 755; 72 L. J. Ch. 281, at p. 283, Collins, M. R.

"As it is a condition subsequent and impossible, the result is that it is not a condition with which he [the devisee] is bound to comply in order to retain the estate."-In re Croxon, [1904] 1 Ch. 252, at p 259; 73 L. J. Ch. 170, at p. 172, Kekewich, J.

"The phrase most frequently used in argument was 'public policy,' but, following the example of many eminent judges, I prefer the policy of the law."-In re Hope Johnstone, [1904] 1 Ch. 470, at p. 474; 73 L. J. Ch. 321, at p. 322, Kekewich, J. "Policy of the law ought not, I think, to be pressed into the service of highly improbable contingencies. In this I am supported

by the opinions of many of the judges who advised the House of Lords in Egerton v. Earl Brownlow (1853), 4 H. L. C. 1; 23 L. J. Ch. 348. The House decided the particular case before them adversely to the opinions of the majority of the judges, but those opinions are nevertheless entitled to great weight in the consideration of the question what is against the policy of the law, and of the application of the principle to special facts."-In re Hope Johnstone, [1904] 1 Ch. 470, at pp. 478, 479; 73 L. J. Ch. 321, at p. 324, Kekewich, J.

"When questions arise as to conditions or provisions being void as being against the public good or against public policy, great caution is necessary in considering them; at different times very different views have been ascertained as to what is injurious to the public."-In re Beard, [1908] 1 Ch. 383, at p. 386; 77 L. J. Ch. 265, at p. 266, Swinfen Eady, J.

Period for Performance of Condition.

Upon consideration of the authorities, I have come to the conclusion that if a condition be one to be performed by the devisee personally, not at a particular time, but in effect at any time he pleases, and not requiring the intervention or concurrence of any other person, no period being expressly allowed or limited for its performance which may possibly outlast the life of the devisee (as, e.g., twelve months after coming into possession and the like), the period for the performance of the condition is naturally and necessarily the life of the devisee and no longer, and the condition is not complied with, in fact is broken, if the devisee dies without having performed it."-In re Greenwood, Goodhart v. Woodhead, [1902] 2 Ch. 198, at pp. 204, 205; 71 L. J. Ch. 579, at p. 583, Joyce, J.

Substituted Legacies.

"Being a substituted legacy, it is therefore prima facie subject to the same incidents and conditions as the original legacy. This rule of construction is established by a long line of authorities."— In re Joseph, Pain v. Joseph, [1908] 1 Ch. 599, at p. 602; 77 L. J. Ch. 309, at p. 311, Eve, J.