or that of others) given evidence of his good character, or has sought to establish by crossexamination a good character (R. v. Gadbury, 8 C. & P. 676; R. v. Shrimpton, 2 Den. C. C. 319; 21 L. J. M. C. 37), and is on his trial for (a) A felony not punishable with death,

when evidence may be given that he has previously been convicted of felony (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 111); (b) An offence under the Larceny Act, 1861, when evidence may be given that he has previously been convicted of an offence under that Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 116);

(c) An offence under the Coinage Act, 1861, and previous Coinage Acts,— when evidence may be given that he has previously been convicted of an offence under those Acts (24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 37).

(2.) When it is necessary to show guilty knowledge, intention, or design, evidence of the commission by the accused of other similar offences to that charged in the indictment may, in the discretion of the Court, be given.

The application of this rule is of extreme difficulty, and therefore I append a number of cases with the object of showing how it has been applied.

In addition to this, I may recall a trial (unreported, I believe) which took place at the Glamorganshire Assizes in 1890. A policeman was charged with mayhem. He had gouged out the eye of his superior officer. The prosecution tendered evidence to show that previously to this outrage the accused had threatened the prosecutor with bodily violence. Coleridge, L. C. J., refused to admit the evidence, although it was urged that the defence being that the injury done was the result of accident and not intentional, such evidence was relevant.

R. v. Foster (Dears. C. C. 456; 24 L. J. M. C. 134), where it was held that on an indictment for uttering counterfeit coin, in order

to prove a guilty knowledge, evidence may be given of a subsequent uttering by the prisoner of counterfeit coin of a different denomination to that mentioned in the indictment.

R. v. Francis (L. R. 2 C. C. R. 128; 43 L. J. M. C. 97; 12 Cox, 612), where it was held that on an indictment for attempting to obtain money by falsely pretending that a certain ring was a diamond ring, evidence could be admitted to show that previously to the alleged false pretence a similar false pretence was made to other people.

R. v. Gray (4 F. & F. 1098), where it was held that on a trial for arson with intent to defraud an insurance company, evidence that the prisoner had made claims on two other insurance companies in respect of fires which had occurred in two other houses which he had occupied previously and in succession, could be given in order to show that the fire which formed the subject of the trial was the result of design and not of accident.

R. v. Geering (18 L. J. M. C. 215), where, on an indictment against a prisoner for the murder of her husband by arsenic in September, 1848, evidence was tendered by the prosecution of arsenic having been taken by the prisoner's two sons, one of whom died in December and the other in May subsequently; and also by a third son, who took arsenic in the April following, but did not die. Proof was given of a similarity of symptoms in the four cases. Evidence was also tendered that the prisoner lived in the same house with her husband and sons, and that she prepared their tea and cooked their victuals and distributed them to the four parties. It was held that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of proving, first, that the deceased husband actually died of arsenic; secondly, that his death was not accidental, and that it was not inadmissible by reason of its tendency to prove or create a suspicion of a subsequent felony. (See also R. v. Neill Cream, Sessions Papers, C. C. C., vol. 116, p. 1451.)

In Makin v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales (L. R. (1894) App. Cas. 57; 63 L. J. P. C. 41; 6 R. 373; 69 L. T. 778; 58 J. P. 143; 17 Cox, 704), it was laid down that evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment is not admissible, unless upon the issue whether the acts charged against the accused were designed or accidental, or unless to rebut a defence otherwise open to him.

In R. v. Ollis (1900, 2 Q. B. 758; 69 L. J. Q. B. 918; 83 L. T. 251; 49 W. R. 76; 64 J. P. 618) a prisoner was acquitted on a charge of obtaining a cheque by false pretences. He was then tried on a second indictment charging him with obtaining from other persons three sums of money on three cheques which had been dishonoured. To prove guilty knowledge, the prosecutor in the first case was called, and gave the same evidence as in the first case. It was held that the evidence was rightly admitted.

On the trial of a charge of wilful murder of an infant entrusted to the prisoner to adopt (for a pecuniary consideration inadequate to the support of the child for more than a very limited time), and whose body was found buried in the garden of prisoner's house, evidence was rightly admitted to prove that other children had been so adopted and other bodies of children so found (Makin v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales, supra).

See also R. v. Wyatt, (1904) 1 K. B. 188; 73 L. J. K. B. 15; 52 W. R. 285; 68 J. P. 31; 20 Cox, 462.

(3.) Evidence may be given in prosecutions for rape (R. v. Riley, infra), assault with intent to commit a rape (R. v. Clarke, infra), and indecent assault (on females: R. v. Holmes, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 334; 41 L. J. M. C. 12), that the prosecutrix (a) is of a generally bad reputation, and (b) that she has had (previously) sexual connection with the accused at a time. other than that charged in the indictment, if, on being asked in cross-examination, she denies that she had had such connection.

R. v. Clarke (2 Stark. N. P. 241), where Holroyd, J., said: "In the case of an indictment for a rape, evidence that the woman had a bad character previous to the supposed commission of the offence is admissible, but the defendant cannot go into evidence of particular facts. This is the law upon an indictment for rape, and I am of opinion that the same principles apply to the case of an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a rape."

In R. v. Riley (18 Q. B. D. 481; 56 L. J. M. C. 52; 16 Cox, 191), it was held that, on the trial of an indictment charging an assault with intent to commit a rape, if the prosecutrix when

under cross-examination denies having voluntarily had connection with the prisoner prior to the alleged assault, evidence proving such prior connection is admissible on his behalf.

(4.) When bad character of an accused, as evidenced by a previous conviction, is a constituent of the offence charged, evidence may be given of it.

By sect. 7 of the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, it is an offence if, after two previous convictions, an accused is found in a place and in circumstances which suggest the intended commission of a crime.

In R. v. Penfold (1902, 1 K. B. 347; 71 L. J. K. B. 306; 86 L. T. 204; 50 W. R. 671; 66 J. P. 248), the two previous convictions were charged in the indictment and it was objected, on evidence being tendered as to these, that previous convictions should not be given in evidence until the subsequent offence had been proved (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 116, and 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 9). The objection was disallowed, and the Court for Crown Cases Reserved upheld the decision. In giving judgment on the last occasion, Alverstone, L. C. J., said: "The offence here is a statutory offence, and it is not complete unless the particular circumstances, the previous convictions, and the time are all proved, and these necessary ingredients, should there

fore all be given in evidence before the tribunal."

This decision is undoubtedly right, and it furnishes one of the few instances where evidence of a previous conviction charged in an indictment can be given prior to a verdict on the subsequent offence charged in that indictment.

RULE 198. (a) By the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112), "where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given, at any stage of the proceedings, that there was found in the possession of such person, other property stolen, within the preceding period of twelve months," though such property is the subject of another charge (R. v. Jones, 14 Cox, 3), and such

pro

evidence may be taken into consideration for the purpose of showing that such person knew the perty to be stolen, which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against him.

(b) "Where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to

stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, and evidence has been given that the stolen property has been found in his possession, then if such person has within five years immediately preceding been convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty, evidence of such previous conviction may be given at any stage of the proceedings, and may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that the accused knew that the property which was proved to be in his possession was stolen. Provided that not less than seven days' notice in writing shall have been given to the person accused that proof is intended to be given of his previous conviction, and it shall not be necessary for the purposes of this section to charge in the indictment the previous conviction of the person so accused."

The above rule has been to some extent modified by R. v. Carter (12 Q. B. D. 522; 53 L. J. M. C. 96), where, upon the trial of a prisoner for receiving stolen property with a guilty knowledge, it was held that evidence is inadmissible to show, that before the stealing of the property in question the accused had been in possession of other stolen property of a similar character, though and if she had parted with the possession of such other property before the date of the stealing of the property charged in the indictment.

R. v. Drage (14 Cox, 85), where it was held that in order to show guilty knowledge, under 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 19, it is not sufficient merely to prove that "other property stolen within the preceding period of twelve months" had at some time previously been dealt with by the prisoner, but that it must be proved that such other property was found in the possession of the prisoner