tions, the fees of solicitor and counsel, and the expenses of any witnesses shall be allowed and paid in the same manner as the expenses of a prosecution in cases of indictment for felony.

3 Edw. 7, c. 38. The above rule is subject to any rules under the Act, and any regulations as to rates and scales of payment which may be made by one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State. A table of special rates and regulations will be found in the Appendix.

RULE 281.-If a private prosecutor on any information (with the exception of an information for defamatory libel)-(a) does not proceed to trial within a year after issue joined; (b) causes a nolle prosequi to be entered; or if the defendant is acquitted at the trial (unless the judge certifies that there was a reasonable cause for the information), the Court, on motion for the same, may award the defendant his costs to the amount of the recognizances entered into by the prosecutor on filing the information.

This is the effect of Rules 49 and 50 of C. O. R. 1886.

The mode of obtaining such costs is for the defendant to take out an order of course to tax the whole costs (C. O. R. 252), and upon obtaining the master's allocatur, he is entitled to so much as equals the amount of the recognizances, viz., 50l., if they amount to so much (Short & Mellor, C. O. Pr. p. 275). And see as to information generally, Chapter XV., infra.

RULE 282.-In the case of an information for libel by a private prosecutor, the defendant is entitled on acquittal (even if the judge certifies that there was reasonable cause for exhibiting the information (R. v. Latimer, 15 Q. B. 1077)), to the whole of the costs sustained by him, including the costs properly incurred by him previously to the filing of the information (R. v. Steel, 1 Q. B. D. 482), and is not limited to the amount of the prosecutor's recognizances (C. O. R. 50, 1886; see Rule 281, supra).

Also, if a defendant justifies and fails to prove his plea, the

prosecutor shall be entitled to recover from him the costs sustained by reason of such plea.

RULE 283.-If a defendant is acquitted on an information ex officio, or if a nolle prosequi is entered, he is not entitled to costs.

Hullock, 557. The rule is that the Crown neither receives nor pays costs on an ex officio information.

RULE 284.-By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 55, s. 5, rules and regulations as to the rates or scales of costs may be made by a Secretary of State.

The main regulations are those of June 14th, 1904, and these, with the regulations made on March 6th, 1857, February 9th, 1858, February 14th, 1863, February 27th and December 21st, 1895, and September 7th, 1896, are to be found in the Appendix.

It is perhaps, strictly, scarcely necessary to give any regulations other than those of June 14th, 1904, but as these regulations, intended to supersede all other regulations, do not seem to be absolutely comprehensive, I think it safer to give all.

RULE 285.-The amount of the costs having been ascertained by the taxing master in accordance with the specified rules and regulations, an order is given by him to the person concerned, upon the treasurer of the appropriate county, riding or district, and such treasurer is required to pay the same at sight to the person or his authorized agent.

The taxing master at assizes is the clerk of the assize, or one of his subordinates, at quarter sessions the clerk of the peace; and the Court of King's Bench has no jurisdiction to review the taxation by the clerk of assize of the costs of an indictment for libel on the Crown side at the assizes (R. v. Newhouse, 1 B. C. C. 129; 22 L. J. Q. B. 125); and this would apply mutatis mutandis to a taxation by a clerk of the peace.

In an ordinary case the solicitor for the prosecution (or defence) takes his account to the official, who then and there taxes and gives an order for the payment of the amount certified due; the solicitor then takes it to the treasurer and gets the money. If

the treasurer refuses to pay he may be indicted, but mandamus will not lie (R. v. Jeyes, 3 A. & E. 416; and see R. v. Jones, 9 C. & P. 401).

At the Central Criminal Court the expenses of prosecutor and witnesses are paid by the treasurer of the county in which the accused would have been tried but for the statutes 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, s. 12, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 16, s. 13. As to the power of the Court to order the expenses of witnesses for the defence to be paid when there has been an acquittal, and the trial has been obtained at the Court by the Crown, see sects. 25, 26.

The payment of expenses of criminal trials as between boroughs and counties is regulated (mainly) by 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 25; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 55, ss. 19, 23; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 169; and 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, ss. 25, 32, 38, 67.

A detailed consideration of the provisions of these statutes would be outside the scope of this work.

RULE 286. The expenses of the prosecution of offences committed in the Admiralty jurisdiction are to be paid by the county in which the trial takes place, and all sums so paid are to be repaid to the county by the Treasury.

57 & 58 Vict. c. 60.

RULE 287.-Guardians may, out of the funds under their control, pay the costs of prosecution under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101; 28 & 29 Vict. c. 59, s. 9; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 73; 57 & 58 Vict. c. 41, s. 21.

RULE 288. Where a company is being wound up by a Court or subject to the supervision of a Court, and such Court orders the prosecution of any director, officer, or member, it may also order the costs and expenses of the prosecution to be paid out of the assets of the company; and where a company is being wound up voluntarily, and the Court has sanctioned such a prosecution, the costs shall be payable out of the assets of the company, in priority to all other liabilities.

25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, ss. 167, 168.

CHAPTER XIV.

RESTITUTION TO ACCUSED AND PROSECUTORS-REWARDS

AND COMPENSATION.

RULE 289.-On the application of an accused, the Court will order property taken from him by a constable to be delivered to him, unless it is connected with the offence with which he is charged (R. v. Kinsey, 7 C. & P. 447), or is required as evidence (R. v. Lushington, (1894) 1 Q. B. 420), or is either the property actually stolen, or the produce

of it.

R. v. Barnett, 3 C. & P. 600; R. v. Burgess, 7 C. & P. 488; R. v. Mooney, 7 C. & P. 515.

The principle of the rule is well illustrated in R. v. Burgess (supra), where a prisoner was indicted for uttering two forged promissory notes, one for 297. and another for 261. When called upon to plead, he applied to the judge to order twenty-eight sovereigns found on him when apprehended to be restored to him. There was ground for supposing that 267. of the sum found was the proceeds of the alleged forged note for that amount, and the judge therefore ordered that 27. only should be given back to him.

RULE 290.-A Court before which a conviction under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100 (see R. v. Jones, 14 Cox, 528), has taken place (Walker v. London Corporation, 38 L. J. M. C. 107; 20 L. T. 604; 11 Cox, 280), for an offence amounting in law to larceny (Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459; R. v. Russett, (1892) 2 Q. B. 312; Helby v. Matthews, (1895) App. Cas. 571; Payne v. Wilson, (1895) 2 Q. B. 537; Kirkham v. Gill, (1897) 1 Q. B. 201;

56 & 57 Vict. c. 7, s. 24), on an indictment preferred by the owner of the stolen property or his executor or administrator, or by the Director of Public Prosecutions with the assistance of the owner or his executors or administrators (42 & 43 Vict. c. 22, s. 7), may, in its discretion (R. v. Ford, 11 Cox, 320), summarily order restitution of the property (not being current coin passed as such to an innocent person: Moss v. Hancock, (1899) 2 Q. B. 111; 68 L. J. Q. B. 657; 80 L. T. 693; 47 W. R. 698; 19 Cox, 324; 63 J. P. 517), identified at the trial as being the subject-matter of the offence (R. v. Goldsmith, 12 Cox, 594; R. v. Smith, 12 Cox, 597), or the proceeds of such property (R. v. Justices of Central Criminal Court, 18 Q. B. D. 314; 56 L. J. M. C. 25; 35 W. R. 243; 56 L. T. 35; 16 Cox, 196; but see R. v. Rolfe, 52 J. P. 823, where the Court refused to order the delivery up of pawntickets supposed to represent the goods stolen), to the owner.

Provided that no such order may be made against— (a) A person or corporation liable to discharge any valuable security, and who has in fact bona fide discharged such security.

(b) A holder in due course of a negotiable instrument (see as to this, Miller v. Race, 1 Smith, L. C. 10th ed. 447; 1 Burr. 452; Chichester v. Hill, 52 L. J. Q. B. 150; 15 Cox, 258). (c) Any trustee, merchant, attorney, factor, broker, or other agent entrusted with the possession of goods or documents of title to goods, convicted of any misdemeanour under the Larceny Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100, as amended by 56 & 57 Vict. c. 7, s. 24).

By the Factors Act, 1889, any sale, pledge or other disposition of goods made by a mercantile agent, who with the consent of the owner is in possession thereof, and in the ordinary course of business, to a person taking in good faith and without notice of the fraud, is sufficient in law to vest the property in that person.