even said to have profited by them. But there is no convicting evidence of this. Prevost was the direct superior officer of both Baynes and Yeo, for his commission made him commander-in-chief by sea as well as land, and it was not till 1814 that the Admiralty took charge of their own detachments on the Lakes. He was present, but, according to his own orders, not in actual command; a way that weak men have. The flotilla and transports were off their objective on the 28th, but were becalmed too soon. The attack was postponed till daylight on the 29th. There was some confusion in the dark, and instead of landing on the shore side of Horse Island, which was really a peninsula, the troops landed on the seaward side and had to fight their way in. They soon routed the 500 militia and began to press back the regulars, who were about equal in numbers to themselves. They set fire to the barracks, and the Americans fired their own warehouses and Chauncey's new ship. Victory seemed certain, when Prevost either ordered or approved the order for a retreat. The official report was written by Baynes and approved by a general order which he signed. But Prevost made the excuses to Bathurst; and probably made the mistakes that made the excuses advisable. The want of co-operation between fleet and army, the want of artillery, and the inadequate numbers of the attacking force were all alleged. But if the fleet could not co-operate, why was the landing made at all? And if the force was inadequate, why was it not either increased or used for some better purpose? There were no sudden surprises sprung on Prevost at Sackett's Harbour. The American general, Jacob Brown, though a good fighter, was no genius; and he had only arrived there himself the day before. The intelligence service was not so bad as not to have given Prevost warning of what he had to expect; and every motive of military policy urged him to strike hard or not at all. CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS ON THE NIAGARA FRONTIER: STONEY CREEK AND BEAVER DAMS. 1813 S TONEY CREEK.-York, Fort George, and Sackett's on Lake Ontario. Good use had been made of superior forces and British mistakes. The American loss had been small, especially when compared with that of the British, who could ill afford to lose even an equal number. Only 150 men, as against 500 British, was the price of taking Fort George. Dearborn had then pursued Vincent, with the intention of driving a wedge in between him and Procter. So far, so good. But lack of local and general cohesion soon turned the tables. The plan of campaign had already been spoilt by not striking at Kingston, by not holding York, and by not co-ordinating the Lake Ontario attacks with those on Lake Erie. Moreover, all these attacks together were not co-ordinated with the combined operations against Montreal, which themselves broke down for want of cohesion between their disunited parts. Dearborn did not follow up his success at Fort George on the 27th of May with sufficient vigour. Vincent was at Burlington two days later; and it was not till another week had passed that Chandler and Winder arrived at Stoney Creek with a force of 3000 Americans designed to push in either between Vincent and the West or Vincent and York. Meanwhile Chauncey had returned to Sackett's Harbour and had found that after the destruction wrought there he was inferior in strength to Yeo. He then decided not to risk a battle till his new ship was ready. So Dearborn was left on the Niagara peninsula with his right exposed to the lake, where he had no fighting force afloat. The mistake of leaving Kingston untouched and Sackett's Harbour open became more apparent every day. Besides, there was no Prevost at the western end of the lake to make things easy for an old and obsolescent man like Dearborn. The Americans took up a good position at Stoney Creek to pass the night of the 5th and 6th of June. The main road ran parallel to the lake from one to two miles off. The camp was made on the crest of a low, zigzagging bluff, which was nowhere more than twenty-five feet high, and which looked like the bank of a stream that had shrunk away from it. The top was clear, and so was the lower ground for some distance in front. The right rested on a mile-wide swamp, running down to the lake. The left ended at Burlington Heights, which ran all the way from Queenston to Burlington. Moderate precaution ought to have made the position safe. But the Americans thought more of attack than of defence; and they were probably conscious of having twice failed to destroy a beaten enemy, first at York and then at Fort George, though they had superior land forces and overwhelming sea forces at both places. This was forcibly pointed out to them by their Secretary of War later on. Just before dark, Harvey, Vincent's deputy-adjutantgeneral, had reconnoitred the enemy with some light troops and formed the plan of a night surprise. Vincent approved; and the selected force paraded half an hour before midnight, 704 firelocks" strong, according to Vincent's own statement. Harvey was in command; and the men were drawn from the 8th and 49th, Brock's two old regiments. The night was unusually dark; and all went well till the men were forming up for the attack at a distance of 300 yards. Then someone fired his musket; others followed; there was some cheering; and the whole enterprise threatened to come to an untimely end. But Harvey and the officers ran along the line and re-formed the men quickly; while Major Plenderleith of the 49th, taking a handful of his regiment with him, charged straight at the American centre and rushed the guns that were just opening fire. The confusion that followed this gallant and well-calculated charge held the Americans to their ground and prevented them from forming up in line to receive Harvey's assault, which was quickly delivered with excellent effect. The British were now well in hand. They never fired another shot, but charged up the bluff with a cheer and used nothing but the bayonet. Chandler and Winder ran forward to see what was happening and were both taken prisoners. The fight continued, handto-hand, for some time, swaying to and fro. But the Americans, being surprised, never managed to get into proper formation. They gave ground more and more, abandoned their guns, broke up, and fell back. They lost only 200 men as against 250 British. But though they lost only one in fifteen of their total while the British lost one in three of the men actually engaged the moral effect on the American army was that of a decisive defeat. At dawn the Americans broke camp and retreated to Forty Mile Creek, where they spent a very disorganised day, having lost their generals, their guns, and their stores. They had no rest, either, as Yeo came up on the evening of the day after, the 7th, and bombarded them on the morning of the 8th. He took their supply boats and threatened their right at the same time as their left was threatened by Indians on the Heights; while Vincent, whom Yeo had reinforced, began to close in on their rear. They again retreated, and continued to do so till they came near the guns of Fort George. Vincent soon had 1000 new effectives: 250 of the 8th, who had been brought across the lake by Yeo, and 750 of the 104th, or New Brunswick Regiment, who had made a notable winter march on snowshoes all the way through the woods from Fredericton to Quebec. This march was the same feat that Harvey had performed in his anxiety to get to the front. Harvey was one of the best British officers during the war; and he, as Vincent generously acknowledged, was the true hero of Stoney Creek. He afterwards distinguished himself at Chrystler's Farm and elsewhere in Canada as well as at Waterloo. He ended a noble career of public service as governor of Nova Scotia, where he died in 1852. 2. BEAVER DAMS.-Another excellent leader in the minor operations of war was present at Stoney Creek in the person of Lieutenant Fitzgibbon of the 49th. He was cool, quickwitted, and adventurous. His little force of fighting scouts was composed chiefly of those men who are better in battle than in barracks. Most of them were Irish and spoke Erse, like Fitzgibbon himself. He got on well with the Indians, who were under the son of the great chief Joseph Brant; and he and the Indians became so troublesome to the Americans on the Canadian side of the Niagara that a plan was made to dislodge him and break up the nest of British scouts altogether. The British advanced posts were under Colonel Bisshopp, another excellent and enterprising young officer. Bisshopp had his base on Twenty Mile Creek, whence the main road went on to Fort George and the inland road to Beaver Dams, St. David's, and Queenston. The advanced post towards Fort George was between Twelve and Ten Mile Creeks and was under Major De Haren of the 104th. The corresponding post inland was at De Cou's house in Thorold, a mile and a half short of the Beaver Dams proper. The Americans were based on the Niagara between Queenston and Fort George, with a few small outposts pushed a little way inland. It was about seventeen miles from Fitzgibbon's post to Fort George by the road through St. David's and Queenston. Queenston was only ten miles from him, along the crest of |