applicable to the first man; for it is acknowledged by Dr. Harris that Adam "only potentially answered to the description given in the sections of this chapter," (p. 175). There is required, we would suggest, a more distinct and frequent recognition of the argument which it is the professed design of the work to illustrate, and a more explicit summing up of the proofs advanced from time to time, and especially at the close, so that the reader may clearly see whither he has been led. We bring forward this defect the more prominently because we feel sure that a more frequent recurrence to the principles on which the whole is rested, and an occasional pause and review of the position to which the reader has advanced, would materially increase both the intelligibility and the interest of the work to most readers, and that Dr. Harris would thereby place his views in a more favourable and more effective position before them. Such is a succinct, and as far as we | instance carried much further than is are able to give it, a connected account of the subjects treated of in the volume before us. It will perhaps be thought that the contents of the successive chapters as we have stated them seem to have in many cases but little bearing one on the other. Perhaps this is the case, but we are inclined to think that the reader of the work itself would not see in it any greater degree of consecutiveness, and very probably much less, until he had for himself made out a general scheme of the whole, such as we have traced above. This want of apparent consecutiveness we take to be a characteristic of the work. And this defect seems to us to arise in part from the multiplication of laws, all of which are placed on the same level, and discussed separately, so that their connection one with another is not distinctly seen; and in part from the mode in which the illustration of these laws is carried out, inasmuch as the attention of the reader is frequently turned away from the relation which the phenomena have to the law they are intended to illustrate, and is fixed entirely upon the examination of the phenomena in and for themselves. The chapter which treats on Progression is a striking instance of this fault. This chapter is divided into nine sections, and occupies not less than one third of the volume. In it the whole nature of man as an intellectual, emotional, and moral being is discussed, and we are led onward in this discussion until we quite forget the bearing it has upon the argument. We do not say that this treatise on mental philosophy (for such it is) does not belong to the subject, but undoubtedly it leads the reader to lose sight for the time at least of the general argument, and thus renders the clear understanding of the whole far more difficult than it might otherwise be, especially since the discussion is in this It is obviously impossible that we should follow the whole course of the argument which the treatise presents to us. We must, therefore, select two or three points for a few further remarks. The account which Dr. Harris gives of man's mental nature to which we have just referred, is well worthy of perusal; and though we cannot profess to agree with every particular, we most cordially avow our conviction that in its main points his analysis is correct, and that it is conducted with great skill. We may select as an illustration of Dr. Harris's mode of discussion his remarks on conscience, both because of their intrinsic value, and because the fact that man is in himself a moral agent, that apart from all outward revelation he is a law to himself, and responsible for his conduct-can never be too often or too strongly insisted on. The will with which man is endowed, Dr. Harris shows, lays the foundation for his responsibility. Man can do what he wills, and must consequently have, in order to his being a manifestation of the divine character, some faculty by which he should know how to regulate his voluntary actions according to the divine will. That power he has. It is conscience, the power or faculty in man which not only discriminates actions as right and wrong, but which involves a feeling of approbation or disapprobation of every voluntary act considered as belonging to one of these two classes. That "man universally recognizes a moral quality in actions," and that there is no valid objection against the existence of this power from its supposed want of universality or uniformity, Dr. Harris well shows: “The same action may be viewed in different lights-as clever or foolish, seasonable or unseasonable, polite or uncourteous. But besides this, the mind is capable of recognising in it a quality which no terms can express but those of right or wrong. And this distinction is universal. When once the idea is developed in the mind, it is never entirely lost. The same mind cannot regard the same quality of an action as right and wrong, just and unjust, at the same time. The two ideas resist every attempt at such commutation. Their objects may change with circumstances, but their nature never. Even the professional infanticide of a barbarous clime pursues his horrid calling, not as wrong, but right-not merely as a right (the noun instead of the adjective, with which it is often confounded,) acquired by custom or law; but as being, for certain supposed reasons, adjectively right. And the criminal whose life may appear to have been spent in a laborious endeavour to confound the distinction between right and wrong, confidently calculates, when called to trial, on justice; he assumes, that is, that the sentiment of right and wrong is common to man, wrong, terms designating a quality or distinction in actions which man universally recognises. "This view of conscience answers, by antici pation, the supposed objection to the universality of conscience, that the moral judgments of men widely differ respecting the same actions. Had we represented conscience as a faculty divinely empowered to divide all external actions into two classes, and to pronounce infallibly that every action of the one class was right, and every action of the other class wrong, our statement would have been liable to the objection. But regarded as the faculty which recognises a tion to its universality. Many of the very moral quality in actions, we know of no exceppractices erroneously adduced to prove the nonexistence of conscience in certain parties, are the expedients ignorantly resorted to in the India did not strangle their human victims behope of appeasing its remorse. The Thugs of and that which he demands is right. If he is to be punished, he assumes that justice is something anterior to punishment, and he demands to be punished according to justice. Indeed, the ideas of reward and punishment invariably pre-suppose the ideas of merit and demerit, and these again pre-suppose the ideas of right and VOL. XII.-FOURTH SERIES. cause they believed murder to be an innocent act; but under the notion that they were offering an acceptable sacrifice to Kalee, the goddess of destruction, and that the strangled victim went directly to Paradise. The most degraded of mankind are found to recognise a moral quality in actions, however mistaken they may be, owing to their perverted judgments, in its specific selection. "Granting the universality of conscience, the want of uniformity in its decisions may be objected to, as greatly detracting from its value. To which we reply, first, that perfect objective uniformity amidst an endless variety of disturbing influences could only be secured by investing conscience with a dictatorial power destructive of all responsibility. Secondly, the moral differences which actually obtain among men, relate, not so much to whether a certain action shall be regarded as virtuous or vicious, as to whether one of two qualities, of which both are admitted to be right, may not be sacrificed to the other. Thus, when theft was publicly taught and rewarded in Sparta, it was not because honesty was not deemed a virtue, but because patriotism was deemed a greater virtue, and therefore the dexterous robbery of an enemy was honoured at the price of honesty, as a service rendered to the state. Nor, thirdly, is the extinction of conscience to be inferred from the spectacle of a multitude of men madly rushing into the same crime, any more than the non-existence of the passions is to be inferred from their subjection to control. Their moral judgment respecting it may be one with our own, when the judgment shall be allowed to speak; even if their present impetuosity of conduct is not to be interpreted as an attempt to silence the present uneasiness of their con 51 science. Nor, fourthly, is anything other than | harmonize with it as well as our emotional. If the temporary perversion of conscience to be Dr. Harris proceeds to illustrate the different theories of virtue which have been propounded by ethical writers, and proves that our notion of morality is derived neither from arbitrary legislation, nor from intellectual intuition, nor from the exercise of the judgment, nor from the principle of association, nor from a feeling of our own interest, nor from utility; but that "the moral quality | of actions is taken cognizance of by an original susceptibility or independent faculty of the mind.”—(p. 155.) In a subsequent part of the volume he shows, very impressively, how all these different theories lead to the same practical result, and all combine to prove that man is made for virtue, and that his nature thus harmonizes with the divine nature. the selfist contends that the good of self is the only principle of virtue, this, at least, indicates that our sensitive nature has been made coincident with the laws of morality. If the utilitarian contends that only the useful is virtuous, this implies that we are under the economy of a Being who has made our duty and our welfare to coincide. Or if it be affirmed that the will of God is the ultimate foundation of right, this obviously implies that obedience and happiness are relative terms. We have seen, indeed, that the true basis of morality is distinct from the exercise of mere will; that it has an independent existence anterior to law, and of which law is only the proclamation; that it had an eternal preexistence in the character of the Godhead. But all these differing views conspire to show, at least, how essentially the laws of morality are inwrought into man's nature, into every part of it; how entirely the man in the breast,' answers to the objective economy on high; and how truly the human character is formed on the model of the Divine, and in order to its manifestation. God and man are, in this sense, relative terms."-pp. 336, 337. We see, then, that Dr. Harris lays a broad and deep foundation for man's accountability; and thus for his liability to punishment in case he should violate the laws of his own nature and of God. But the question may probably here occur, how is the fact of his actual violation of God's law shown to be consistent with Dr. Harris's scheme? Does his argument find a place for, or does it even allow of, the introduction of evil into the creation, except, indeed, by making evil not only the appropriate but the intended and necessary means of exhibiting the divine glory? The "Perhaps there is nothing which more convincingly shows that the nature of man is great and ultimate end of creation is arranged on a plan, and that that plan harmo- the manifestation of God's all-sufficiency; nizes with the great objective plan which and according to Dr. Harris's whole includes everything, than the various grounds argument, that all-sufficiency is exhiassigned by different writers as the basis of bited in such manner as that we can, moral obligation. If one affirms, for instance, that morality is founded on the emotions, it to some extent, determine or, at least, form a probable conjecture, what will indicates the fact that the whole of our emotional nature is harmonized with all the re-be the general character of each sucquirements of morality. If another contends cessive manifestation of it. It is on that it is obligatory because it is agreeable to this ground that we are led, we may even say compelled, to believe, accord reason and the nature of things, this only shows that our intellectual nature is made to ing to Dr. Harris, that the simple attribute of Power will be first manifested; then in addition Wisdom, then Goodness, and at length Holiness. Now according to the law which Dr. Harris lays down, there must still be progression-there must be, after a greater or less interval of time, the display of some other attribute; and if, as Dr. Harris suggests in the quotation already given, that attribute be Mercy, how are we to escape the conclusion that sin was needful in order to the carrying out of the design of creation; in other words, that if there be a creation, there must be sin; inasmuch as the work once begun must be carried on, so as to exhibit the Divine all-sufficiency in every way in which it can be required to be shown. We are far from saying that sin is not permitted for wise and holy purposes, and, indeed, are quite ready to maintain that if it could not have been made subservient, in some way, to the display of the divine glory, it would never have been permitted. Yet we shrink from the thought that it is in such manner needful, as that the undertaking to create involved the necessity of its existence. Dr. Harris would repudiate this notion as much as we do. But we ask, Is it not involved in the position he assumes, that we are in some degree capable of judging what will be the successive manifestations of the divine character? Nay, still further, we cannot but feel that Dr. Harris does to some extent, though unintentionally, take this ground in his examination of the question. In his chapter on Change he asks, Will man fall? and goes on to point out several grounds of antecedent conjecture that he will. These grounds are, first, "the fact that man came into a system of things which was already subject to a law of change." Secondly, "Some members of another race of intelligent beings had actually fallen. Thirdly, Freedom implies the power 66 and possibility of sinning." Fourthly "The same fearful possibility is pointed at by the susceptibilities of penitence, endurance, and compassion, which his nature encloses." And, fifthly, "It might have been surmised that the sinful invasion of moral government as newly set up in this world would form a grand occasion for the display of the divine all-sufficiency." But to the first of these grounds of antecedent conjecture it may be replied, as Dr. Harris intimates, that we might rather anticipate change for the better than for the worse, if the system is one of progression. As to the second, surely the fall of one race might be judged antecedently a sufficient infraction of the laws of the Supreme Ruler, and why should not this be the occasion of such a display of the divine all-sufficiency as the fifth conjecture points at? Freedom, it is further said, implies the power of sinning; but it implies also the power and possibility of yielding the highest, that is, an intelligent, obedience to the divine commands, and which might we think most probable antecedently in the creation of a holy and gracious God? The susceptibilities of our nature can hardly be brought as the ground of antecedent conjecture, without the admission, which Dr. Harris is unwilling to make, that provision was actually made by the Creator for man to become a sinner. Let us not be understood as charging on Dr. Harris views which he We himself disowns. are urging merely what seem to us the legitimate consequences of his views; and we are compelled to think that his general scheme has given to his remarks a colouring which misrepresents the view he really holds on this awful subject; at least, his exposition of the matter has given us this feeling. It may, indeed, be said that the points on which we have been animadverting are merely grounds of antecedent conjecture, not bute of mercy may or must form part of the divine manifestation, that same reason we have for believing that evil may or must exist, since mercy cannot be manifested until sin has come into the creation. We know as a matter of fact, that evil does exist, and that mercy has been manifested. The contingency-if it were a contingency,-has been converted into certainty. The fact of the existence of evil then seems to place Dr. Harris in this dilemma. Either the existence of mercy as a part of the divine manifestation could be reasoned out before hand, and then the probability. But we reply, Have we any right to form such antecedent conjectures with regard to any part of the dominions of Him who hates all sin ? Or, apart from the awful reality, could such conjectures possibly be entertained? Does not the very mention of them seem to imply some degree of antecedent probability that man will sin-is made to sin? That Dr. Harris repudiates such a consequence is not an answer to our objection, if it fairly belong to the scheme itself. The argument is shortly this,—the origination of creatures was, it is admitted, a purely spontaneous act on the part of the Cre-existence of sin as giving occasion for ator. But, according to Dr. Harris, his determination to display his all-sufficiency, involved, or, we may say, necessitated, a constantly progressive manifestation of his divine attributes. Mercy, then, as being an attribute of the divine character, must at some period be exhibited; and in order to allow place for its exhibition there must be sin. On such principles we see not how the consequence can be avoided, that sin must exist somewhere in the creation. It is only due to Dr. Harris to say that he himself protests against such a conclusion, at least, as regards man. "Not indeed," he says with reference to the antecedent conjecture that sin would be a grand occasion for the display of the divine all-suffi ciency; "not, indeed, that the bare possibility of sin would be converted into a necessity expressly to afford such an occasion; but that the evil would not be arbitrarily prevented; and that it might not have been conceivable how, except on the hypothesis of some such change, any new occasion would arise for a further development of the Divine resources."—pp.356, 357. But we still ask, does not the admission contained in the sentence we have put in italics nullify the protest. Let it be remembered that Dr. Harris's argument is built on laws of divine manifestation recognized by us a priori, that is, before we look at the manifestation itself. Now, whatever reason we have for expecting a priori that the attri mercy, must be capable of being in like manner reasoned out, and consequently forms part of the divine plan; or the existence of sin forms no part of the divine plan, and therefore could not be reasoned out a priori, and then, neither can the manifestation of mercy,—its antidote. It makes no difference whether the result of our a priori reasonings be certainty or mere probability. It is, therefore, no answer to our objection, that the laws are merely tentative and provisional. They are laid down with whatever degree of probability "a priori," and the conclusion is evolved from them deductively. But the manifestation of mercy, presupposes the existence of sin, and consequently there is the same degree of a priori” probability, be it greater or less, that evil must exist as that mercy must be manifested. If we take the first part of this dilemma, how do we escape from the conclusion that sin is necessary, and therefore that God is its Author? If we take the second, the a priori argument is abandoned. In the review of Dr. Harris's former volume, we noticed by anticipation the difficulty which the existence of evil seemed to put in the way of his argument. It will be seen by our present remarks, that we do not think that difficulty has been overcome. |