HARRISON, LEONARD WILLIAM, Watlington, corn merchant. Ct. King's Lynn. Oct. 10. HARVEY, CHARLES, late Waterloo, Lancs, tailor. Ct. Liverpool. Oct. 13. HARRISON, ALFRED (trading as Alfred Harrison and Sons), Sheffield, button hook manufacturer. Ct. Sheffield. Oct. 15. HOWELL, VICTOR CLAUDE, Docking, grocer. Ct. Norwich. Oct. 15. York. Oct. 14. IREDALE, THOMAS, Witton Gilbert, grocer. Ct. Durham. Oct. 14. Ct. Ct. High Court. Oct. 13. LEE, THEOPHILUS, Bradford, motor garage proprietor. Ct. Bradford. Oct. 13. MARTIN, JOHN BIRCH, Bishop Auckland, doctor. Ct. Durham. Oct. 14. MAY, HARRY, Stretford, yarn salesman. Ct. Salford. Oct. 13. MIDWOOD, JOE, Kirkheaton, carting agent. Ct. Huddersfield. Oct. 15. MUIR, WILLIAM CHARLES NEWMAN, Cardiff, builder. Ct. Cardiff. Oct. 14. NEGROPONTE, ELEANOR ISABEL, Portsmouth, married woman. Oct. 1. Ct. Portsmouth. NICHOLLS, WILLIAM (trading as T. Way and Son), Edgware-rd, tailor. Ct. High Court. Oct. 13. RASMUSSEN, CARL CHRISTIAN, late Cleethorpes, marine engineer. Ct. Great Grimsby. Oct. 14. REES, LLEWELLYN, Britton Ferry, tinworker. Ct. Neath and Port Talbot. Oct. 15. ROBINSON, THOMAS, Grange-over-Sands, grocer. Ct. Barrow-in-Furness and Ulverston. Oct. 14. SECRETAN, NORMAN, Gracechurch-st. Ct. High Court. Oct. 13. SHARMAN, HARRY, Óakington, farmer. Ct. Cambridge. Oct. 14. SMITH, SIDNEY ROBERT ELLIS, Great Yarmouth, plumber. Ct. Great Yarmouth. Oct. 13. SPAIN, ISAAC WILLIAM, Sunderland, boatbuilder. Ct. Sunderland. Oct. 15. STROUD, PHILIP, Bournemouth, estate agent. Ct. Poole and Bournemouth. Oct. 14. TAYLOR, ALFRED, Goldthorpe, late haulage contractor. Ct. Sheffield. Oct. 13. TOWNLEY, MARY JANE, Manchester, greengrocer. Ct. Manchester. Oct. 14. TRAUGOTT, MAURICE (trading as M. Morris), Chatsworth-rd, Lower Clapton, draper. Ct. High Court. Oct. 13. WALL, THOMAS BERNARD (described in Rec. Order as T. B. Wall), late Poona, India, Captain in the Royal Fusiliers. Ct. High Court. Oct. 9. WHALLEY, RICHARD, Blackburn, carting agent. Ct. Blackburn and Clitheroe. Oct. 15. WALLACE, WILLIAM, Hinckley, confectioner. Ct. Leicester. Oct. 13. WHITE, HAROLD KELSALL, Southport, motor engineer. Ct. Liverpool. Oct. 14. WAKEFIELD, THOMAS WILLIAM, Macclesfield, ladies' outfitter. Ct. Macclesfield. Oct. 13. WOOLLEY, WILLIAM EDWARD, Weston, clothier. Ct. Wolverhampton. Oct. 14. Amended notice substituted for that in Gazette, Oct. 7. JOHNSON, EDWARD (described in Rec. Order as E. Johnson), Swansea. Ct. Swansea. Oct. 2. Amended notice substituted for that in Gazette, Oct. 10. DEAN, SARAH ANN, Huddersfield, caterer. Ct. Huddersfield. Oct. 6. and Porth. Oct. 18. Ct. Pontypridd, Ystradfodwg BIRDS, GEORGE, Heaton Park, corn dealer. Ct. Salford. Oct. 17. BUTLER, ALFRED JAMES AGARD, Bures. Ct. Colchester. Oct. 11. CASS, JAMES, Great Grimsby, confectioner. Ct. Great Grimsby. Oct. 17. CASSIDY, JOHN FRANCIS (described in Rec. Order as John F. Cassidy), Carlyle Club, Piccadilly. Ct. High Court. Oct. 16. CORNELL, HENRY Matthew (described in Rec. Order as H. M. Cornell), late West CHAPMAN, HARRY, Brentwood, baker. Ct. Chelmsford. Oct. 16. DUNKERLEY, George FollioTT, Sheffield, accountant. Ct. Sheffield. Oct. 15. EDMUNDS, JAMES HENRY, Ipswich, butcher. Ct. Ipswich. Oct. 13. FAITHFULL, GILBERT, North Boarhunt, market gardener. Ct. Portsmouth. Oct. 15. FISHER, LOUISA (trading as Thornton and Wrigley), Uppermill, tailor. Ct. Oldham. Oct. 15. FLOWER, SAMUEL ALBERT, Wood Green, cabinet maker. Ct. Edmonton. Oct. 15. GALLAFANT, ARTHUR WILLIAM, Middlesbrough, coal merchant. Ct. Middlesbrough. Oct. 16. GRANVILLE-BELL, GEORGE, Reading. Ct. Reading. Oct. 17. HARRIS, ALBERT (trading and described in Rec. Order as A. Harris and Co.), Orford-rd, Walthamstow, manufacturing confectioner. Ct. High Court. Oct. 15. HERBERT, GEORGE HENRY, late Neeld-parade, Wembley, domiciled Englishman. Ct. High Court. Oct. 18. HEAFIELD, FREDERICK WILLIAM, Birmingham, clerk. Ct. Birmingham. Ct. Oldham. Oct. 14. Oct. 10. JONES, RACHEL MARY (trading as B. M. Jones and Co.), Glanamman, draper. Ct. Carmarthen. Oct. 18. LENTON, JOHN PERCY, late Clipstone, caterer. Ct. Nottingham. Oct. 16. MCLEOD, CHRISTOPHER ATKINSON, Thornaby-on-Tees, grocer. Ct. Stockton-onTees. Oct. 18. MARCH, WILLIAM JOHN HENRY (described in Rec. Order as Henry March), Tothillst, Westminster. Ct. High Court. Oct. 15. NEWTON, ALICE MAUD, Mountain Ash, general dealer. Ct. Aberdare and Mountain Ash. Oct. 16. PARKER, THEOPHILUS (trading as Fairdayles), Horwich, cabinet maker. Ct. Bolton. Oct. 16. PEARLMAN, ROBERT BENJAMIN (sued as R. B. Pearlman), Carlton House, Regentst, cigar merchant. Ct. High Court. Oct. 17. RATCLIFFE, ERNEST ALBERT (described in Rec. Order as Ernest A. Ratcliffe), Leadenhall-st. Ct. High Court. Oct. 16. REAVEY, MARY JANE, late Addison-grdns, West Kensington. Ct. High Court. Oct. 16. ROWE, WILLIAM (described in Rec. Order as W. Rowe and Co.), New Bridge-st, paper merchants. Ct. High Court. Oct. 17. RICHARDS, JOHN EDWIN, Llandudno, fruiterer. Ct. Bangor. Oct. 13. ROBERTS, GEORGE ARTHUR, Ellesmere, produce merchant. Ct. Wrexham. RUTTER, BARNET JAMES, Brixham, motor engineer. Ct. Plymouth. Oct. 17. SANDERSON, WILLIAM JOHN, Crown-ct, Chancery-la, merchant. Ct. High Court. Oct. 16. SARVENT, JAMES (described in Rec. Order as J. Sarvent, trading as Laboratory of Hair Culture), Red Lion-st, High Holborn. Ct. High Court. Oct. 16. SNEAD, PERCY, Birmingham, confectioner. Ct. Birmingham. Oct. 16. WALKER, CHARLES FREDERICK, Spilsby, late hairdresser. Ct. Boston. Oct. 14. WARD, JOSEPH EDWARD, East Croydon, builder. Ct. Croydon. Oct. 18. WEATHERSTON, DAVID SLOAN, Middlesbrough, cashier. Ct. Middlesbrough. Oct. 16. WHITTINGTON, CHARLES FRANK LEWIS, Litcham, smallholder. Ct. Norwich. Oct. 17. WHITE, GEORGE, late Stanton Hill, butcher. Ct. Nottingham. Oct. 17. WILLIAMS, ALLAN BOWYER, Peterchurch, haulage contractor. Ct. Hereford. Oct. 17. WILLIAMS, WILLIAM ROBERT, Wilson-st, steel merchant. Ct. High Court. Oct. 16. Amended notice substituted for that in Gazette, June 17. WARDEN, WALTER JOHN (described in Rec. Order as J. Warden), Lexington-st, builder. Ct. High Court. June 13. ADJUDICATIONS ANNULLED. GAZETTE, OCT. 17. DAVID, A. J., late Llanelly, tobacconist. Ct. Carmarthen. Oct. 2. ORDER ANNULLING, REVOKING, OR RESCINDING ORDER. BARRELL, JAMES HENRY, Birmingham, estate agent. Ct. Birmingham. Oct. 9. (Rec. Order July 24 rescinded.) BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS BIRTH. CAVE. On the 14th inst., at 69, Pont-street, to Betty and Edward Cave, a MCBARNET ST. AUBYN.-On the 10th inst., at the Guards' Chapel, Donald Victor BAGOTT. On the 13th inst., at 3, Essex-court, Temple, William Henry Bagott, GREY.-On the 13th inst., at 6, Roland-gardens, S.W., Arthur Grey, C.I.E., late LAKE. On the 9th inst., at Dawlish, William James Lake, of 61, Carey-street, Lincoln's-inn, aged 68. LIDGEY.-On the 8th inst., at Mundesley-on-Sea, Charles Albert Lidgey, of 1, New-square, Lincoln's-inn. 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The copyright of all contributions (including reports paid for) shall belong to the proprietors of the LAW TIMES, together with the right of republication in any form they may think desirable. Apart from any express agreement that may be made, contributions are only received and considered on these conditions. THE LAW AND THE LAWYERS Company Limited v. Groom). Nothing in the policy The General Election ONE of the matters that contributed to the electoral results of this week was the interference by the executive with the exercise of judicial or semijudicial functions. The sequel to the O'Dwyer libel action, and the stifling of the Campbell prosecution, which directly brought about the dissolution, were instances of the almost cynical disregard shown by responsible Ministers towards the administration of the law. As we have stated many times in these columns, the great majority of citizens strongly resent indirect attacks on the Bench for political purposes, and consider that the law should be free from all matters of party politics. We hope that the history of the Communist prosecution and its subsequent withdrawal will be probed to the bottom, and that the country will enter upon that period of tranquillity it so sorely needs for the recovery and extension of business, untrammelled by the disturbance of continual general elections. Re-insurers and Costs AFFIRMING a decision of the late Mr. Justice Bailhache, the Court of Appeal has held that a re-insurer is not liable for costs incurred by the original insurers in defending successfully an action on the original policy: (Scottish Metropolitan Assurance provided for the payment in question, and although underwriters have paid such costs under certain circumstances, no practice of this kind could be proved. There being no express or implied contract to paythe Court declining to include legal costs in the sue and labour clause-the plaintiffs failed. At the time the original decision was given we pointed out that, having regard to the fact that it is equally in the interest of the re-insurers for the original insurers to dispute a claim in a proper case, legal liability for a share of the legal costs incurred should be provided for by the policy. We believe that this course is to be taken, and a clause of this description could be easily drafted. Habitual Criminals ONCE again the Court of Criminal Appeal has had to call attention to the powers and duties of judges when imposing a sentence of preventive detention under the Prevention of Crime Act 1908. In Rex v. Norman (131 L. T. Rep. 29) it was laid down that the question whether a person is a habitual criminal is always one of fact for the jury in each case, and the person charged is entitled to tender evidence to show that he is not, at the material time, a habitual criminal. Equally, even when the jury have found the person to be a habitual criminal, the judge is not bound to pass a sentence of preventive detention (Rex v. Paul, post, p. 352). The words of sect. 10 (1) are clear. The person charged must be convicted on indictment of a crime; must be found by the jury to be a habitual criminal; and the court must have considered a sentence of penal servitude appropriate. Then the court, "if of opinion that by reason of his criminal habits and mode of life it is expedient for the protection of the public that the offender should be kept in detention for a lengthened period of years, may pass a further sentence" of preventive detention. Just as a jury must be satisfied by evidence, so the judge should satisfy his mind, by hearing all there is to be said on behalf of the convicted person, before he exercises the undoubted discretion given by the statute. COUNCILLORS AND CONTRACTS WHEN the late Mr. Justice Bailhache gave his decision in the case of Lapish v. Braithwaite a judgment that has aroused much discussion in local government circles-we had considerable doubt as to its accuracy. Therefore we are not surprised that the Court of Appeal by a majority has overruled him, although such a great authority as Lord Justice Atkin dissented. The material facts are short. Mr. Braithwaite was an alderman of the city of Leeds and also managing director and a large shareholder in a limited company which had a contract with the corporation running at the time when he acted as alderman. Mr. Braithwaite received a fixed salary; the correspondence leading to the contract was conducted by the secretary of the company; the managing director witnessed the affixing of the company's seal to the contract; but there was no evidence that he took any active part in the negotiation, preparation, or supervision of the performance of the contract, beyond that which a managing director might be presumed to take in the ordinary discharge of his duties. The point that arose was whether Mr. Braithwaite was disqualified from acting as alderman by sect. 12 (1) of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 which provides : A person shall be disqualified for being elected and for being a councillor, if and while he (c) has directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any contract or employment with, by, or on behalf of the council. and if so, whether he was relieved by sub-sect. 2 which says: But a person shall not be so disqualified, or be deemed to have any share or interest in such a contract or employment, by reason only of his having any share or interest in (a) any lease, sale, or purchase of land. or any agreement for the same; or (b) any agreement for the loan of money, or any security for the payment of money only; or (c) any newspaper in which any advertisements relating to the affairs of the borough or council is inserted; or (d) any company which contracts with the council for lighting or supplying with water or insuring against fire any part of the borough; or (e) any railway company, or any company incorporated by Act of Parliament or Royal Charter, or under the Companies Act 1862. Taking the section as its stands, by sub-sect. (1) a person is disqualified who directly or indirectly has any share or interest in a contract with the council, but by sub-sect. (2) a person is not to be deemed to have any share or interest in such a contract-and so disqualified-by reason only of his having any share or interest in a company incorporated under the Companies Acts. In the first place, therefore, the person must have a share or interest in the contract, but the mere fact that he has a share or interest in a limited company which has a contract with the council is not to make him a person having a share or interest in the contract. Again, the words "share or interest" cannot be synonymous, and the phrase must have the same meaning in both sub-sections, although applied to the contract on the one hand and the company on the other. It must be taken that the Legislature, at the time of the passing of the Act of 1882, was well aware of the constitution of limited companies and of the fact that they could only act through their directors and officials. Unless the whole personnel of a company having a contract with the council were to be disqualified from taking any part in local government, it was necessary to exempt from disqualification, not only shareholders, but those members of the company's executive who were merely acting in that capacity. If this was the intention, the aptness of the words "by reason only" is at once apparent, for every official of the company has an "interest" in the company, indirect though it may be. The two expressions to be borne in mind are the disqualifying one of "share or interest in any contract" and the exempting one of "by reason only of any share or interest in any company." Therefore, if any person has any share or interest in a contract beyond that which arises only from having a share or interest in a company, that person is disqualified. Two passages in the judgment of Lord Justice Bankes illustrate these propositions. He said: A managing director, who is also a shareholder, has indirectly an interest in the contract made between his company and a council because he is a shareholder. As managing director merely he has no share in the contract. Has he an interest in the contract? On the one hand, it is said that if the answer is in the negative the door is opened to just the sort of influences which it is the object of the statute to remove. On the other hand, it is said that if you construe "interest in a contract as including the part which a managing director plays in relation to the contract, where are you going to stop, and where can you draw the line? Every responsible official of the company who has been concerned in the negotiating or drafting of the contract, or in supervising the carrying of it out after it has been made, has just as much an interest in that sense in the contract as the managing director, and very possibly a greater interest. and again: I do not think the expression "interest in a contract," as used first of all in the Act of 1835 and reproduced in sect. 12, sub-sect. (1), of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, includes such an interest as a paid official of an incorporated company necessarily takes in a contract by reason of the fact that it was part of his duty to make the contract and to superintend the execution of it, and that as such paid official he is interested in the success of the company, and for this purpose I cannot draw a distinction between a managing director and any other salaried official whose duties may require him to make and supervise contracts on behalf of his principal. One can well imagine many cases in which a shareholder or an official of a company would have a share or interest in a contract not by reason only of his having a share or interest in a company, and in such a case he would be disqualified by sect. 12 (1). The interest of course must be more than a sentimental one; it must be pecuniary or material: (see England v. Inglis, 123 L. T. Rep. 576; (1920) 2 K. B. 636), The disqualifications attaching to members of corporations, borough councils, and county councils, are governed by this sect. 12 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, but it is interesting to compare sect. 46 of the Local Government Act 1894 which deals with disqualifications for parish and district councils and for boards of guardians. That section provides : (1) A person shall be disqualified for being elected or being a member or chairman of a council of a parish or of a district other than a borough or of a board of guardians if he (e) is concerned in any bargain or contract entered into with the council or board, or participates in the profit of such bargain or contract or of any work done under the authority of the council or board. (2) Provided that a person shall not be disqualified for being elected or being a member or chairman of any such council or board by reason of being interested-(a) in the sale or lease of any lands or in any loan of money to the council or board, or in any contract with the council for the supply from land, of which he is owner or occupier, of stone, gravel, or other materials for making or repairing highways or bridges, or in the transport of materials for the repair of roads or bridges in his own immediate neighbourhood; or (b) in any newspaper in which any advertisement relating to the affairs of the council or board is inserted; or (c) in any contract with the council or board as a shareholder in any joint stock company; but he shall not vote at any meeting of the council or board on any question in which such company are interested, except that in the case of a water company or other company established for the carrying on of works of a like public nature, this prohibition may be dispensed with by the county council. It will be noticed that the words in the disqualifying portion of the section "is concerned in any bargain or contract" (1894), take the place of "has any share or interest in any contract (1882), and although different, the principle aimed at is the same. But in the exempting portion—the phrase" by reason of being interested in any contract with the council or board as shareholder in any joint stock company (1894) is considerably narrower than "by reason only of his having any share or interest in any company" (1882). We have approached the case of Lapish v. Braithwaite solely from the point of view of the construction of a section which imposes penalties for its breach. In this particular case no charge of impropriety was or could be made, but it has brought into prominence the effect that the development of company law may have upon local government. The maintenance of purity in local administration is paramount, and as was pointed out by Lord Justice Lindley in Nutton v. Wilson (22 Q. B. Div. 744) the object of sections of this kind is obviously "to prevent the conflict between interest and duty that might otherwise inevitably arise." But on the other hand it is interesting to notice in the earlier legislation, the exempting clause only related to public companies in the narrow sense of those that controlled water, light, railways and the like. Then the exemption was extended to companies incorporated by Act, Charter, or under the Companies Act. In the view of Lord Justice Bankes "The necessary inference from the historical survey of the legislation seems to be that the Legislature recognised that, having regard to municipal life, to the importance of securing the services of the prominent persons in a municipality as members of the local authority, and to the conditions affecting businesses and business people in the municipalities, it was necessary, in spite of the opportunities which might be given for malpractices, to relax to a very considerable extent the stringency of the original disqualifying provisions.' This no doubt is so, although a move in the opposite direction was made in 1894, but having regard to the development of one-man and private companies, it would seem that the time has arrived for a reconsideration of the position by the Legislature. It may be that, without some exemption, it would be impossible to obtain the services of those whose presence is eminently desirable on local councils. If so, and the general ruling of the majority of the Court of Appeal is correct, the general public should be adequately protected against malpractices and corruption by the words in the exempting clause "by reason only.' RES IPSA LOQUITUR: A NOVEL ALTHOUGH the maxim Res ipsa loquitur is one of the most familiar doctrines of the law of negligence, very little discussion exists as to the nature of the rule and its place in our general system of the common law. It is usually considered by text-book writers, and probably correctly, that the principle really belongs to adjective, not substantive law: like the rules of estoppel, it is in its essence really a rule governing the requirements and effect of proof. In other words, if a sack of flour, carried by a porter, bursts and scatters its contents over bystanders with destructive effects on their garments, the law will presume without further evidence that the sack was defective and that the defect was resultant from the negligence of the person responsible for its proximity to the injured parties : this presumption is the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. But it is only a præsumptio facti, and therefore it is rebuttable by some adequate explanation of the defect or the catastrophe, which is inconsistent with the assumption that its controller has been guilty of negligence. Examples of this presumption and its legal consequences are always interesting and instructive. The latest of these appears to be afforded by Mr. Justice McCardie's decision in Gayler and Pope Limited v. B. Davies and Son Limited (131 L. T. Rep. 507; (1924) 2 K. B. 75), although that learned judge did not directly base his view on this familiar maxim. The doctrine to be laid down, however, is clearly an extension of the principle to a new sphere of circumstances in which it had not hitherto been decided to be applicable. A brief note of the facts, then, must precede our comment on the principle. The plaintiffs were drapers who occupied business premises in Marylebone. The defendants, who supplied milk to customers by means of a pony and van, had sent out their vehicle about 6 a.m. one winter morning. While milk was being delivered at a house some little distance away from the van, and those in charge of it were out of sight round a corner, the pony dashed through the drapers' plate-glass window and did damage. The drapers sued the milk company for negligence, and were met with a denial of any absence of reasonable care on the defendants' part or that of their servants. The learned judge, however, held that the bolting of a pony and van unattended on a highway is primâ facie evidence of negligence; in other words, he applied to the case the rule of Res ipsa loquitur, for he further held, first, that the mere presence of an unattended animal on the highway is not in itself negligence on the part of its owner; and, secondly, that it is open to the owner to explain, if he can, that the bolting of the animal was due to some other cause than his negligence or that of his servants. The " bolting" only creates a presumption, and can be explained away. Before arriving at this statement of the legal position, however, the court had to consider and reject a much more sweeping theory of the owner's liability in such circumstances. It was suggested for the plaintiffs that the owner of horses or cattle which are on or near a highway, and which do damage to third parties, is responsible in law for such damage apart altogether from actual negligence. This doctrine has been based on a number of grounds which are considered in such important cases as Goodwyn v. Cheveley (1859, 4 H. & N. 631), Tillett v. Ward (47 L, T. Rep. 547; 1882, 10 Q. B. Div. 17), and River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (35 L. T. Rep. 118; 1877, 2 App. Cas. 734). One suggested ground is that the owner of an animal is responsible for its trespasses, much as a husband is liable for his wife's torts; this is obviously an argument based on false analogy. Another view is that animals, even if tame, when placed on a highway amid its artificial stimuli and excitations become nervous, and therefore dangerous, things, which the owner must keep at his peril; but this ingenious theory cannot be reconciled with the established doctrine that proof of scienter is necessary to establish responsibility for the bite of a tame dog; it has never been suggested that this rule does not apply when the dog happens to be on a highway. Still another suggested ground is that the bringing of any animal upon a highway is essentially a nuisance or obstruction of the highway, which is authorised only so long as the animal is in fact prevented from interfering with others, but becomes unauthorised-a species of nuisance ab initio-if and when the animal in fact interferes with the property or person of other lawful users of the highway; if such persons are injured, they can recover in trespass on the case as parties who have suffered special damage from a public nuisance. Some such theory is not obscurely suggested by dicta of very learned judges in Ellis v. Loftus Iron Company (81 L. T. Rep. 488; 1874, L. R. 10 C. P. 10), Cox v. Burbidge (1863, 13 C. N. (N. S.) 430), and Manton v. Brocklebank (129 L. T. Rep. 135; 1923, 2 K. B. 212). To overrule, at least by implication, this long line of wellknown cases required a great deal of courage on the part of the learned judge; but probably most practitioners will agree with him in preferring the view carefully stated in Pollock on Torts, in the following terms: "The rule does not apply to damage done by cattle straying off a highway, on which they are being lawfully driven; in such case the owner is liable only on proof of negligence, and the law is the same for a town street as for a country road": (ibid., 12th edit., p. 504). This rule is in accordance with the decisions of Goodwyn v. Cheveley (sup.) and Tillett v. Ward (sup.). In the latter case, which of course is familiar to every practitioner, a farmer's servant was driving his ox along a street: it entered a shop and did damage. The servant had been guilty of no negligence, and his master was held not to be responsible for the trespass of the ox since there had been no negligence. These two cases, on the whole, have succeeded in commanding pretty general assent among experienced lawyers for the proposition that the mere trespasses of an animal on a highway are not of themselves trespasses for which the owner is liable; there must be some further act of negligence to support the liability in tort. But the judicial opinion which had most effect in the inducement of Mr. Justice McCardie's view, he himself states, is not the judgment in either of those leading cases, but a dictum of Lord Blackburn's, not quoted in the text-books on torts, to be found in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (sup., at p. 767). He considered the dictum to be so informative and important that he quoted it in his judgment in full. It runs thus: "The common law, I think, is as follows: Property adjoining to a spot on which the public have a right to carry on traffic is liable to be injured by that traffic. In this respect there is no difference between a shop, the railings or windows of which may be broken by a carriage on the road, and a pier adjoining to a harbour or a navigable river or the sea, which is liable to be injured by a ship. In either case the owner of the injured property must bear his own loss, unless he can establish that some third person is in fault and liable to make it good. And he does not establish this against a person merely by showing that he is the owner of the carriage or ship which did the mischief, for the owner incurs no liability merely because he is the owner." In other words, the owner of property-other than dangerous property or animals ferocis naturæ, of course-is not liable for the mere trespasses of his property, be it animate like horses and dogs or inanimate like carriages and ships. Absence of reasonable care on his part, or that of his servants, must be shown in order to fix him with legal liability. While rejecting, however, the contention on behalf of the plaintiffs that the owner of an animal on a highway is responsible for its trespasses, Mr. Justice McCardie equally rejected the doctrine that in all cases strict proof of negligence on the part of that owner must be established by the injured party. On the contrary, he held that in certain circumstances the law will presume negligence, and therefore hold the owner liable unless he can explain these circumstances away. When an animal is (1) on a highway, and (2) unattended at the moment, and (3) bolts, the court-applying, it is submitted, the rule of Res ipsa loquitur—will presume that the bolting of the animal was due to the owner's negligence. The latter may then prove, if he can do so, that this result was not due to his negligence, e.g., he might show that his servant left the animal for a moment in order to save the life of a drowning child, or he might show that the "bolting" of the unattended animal was due to some "Act of God" which would equally have caused an animal in proper charge to bolt. But the onus probandi of this refutation is upon him. Unless and until he satisfies it he must be held guilty of negligence, and therefore liable for the animal's tortious conduct. THE CONVEYANCER Vendor and Purchaser-"Rent and Profits of the Land" 66 THE question who is entitled to the rents and profits of land, as between vendor and purchaser, is not always an easy one. It may be taken, as a general rule, that a purchaser is entitled to the rents and profits as from the day fixed for completion. The point came before the Court of Appeal, in the recent case of Tombs v. Turvey (131 L. T. Rep. 330)— a case under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 28), s. 48, and the Agriculture Act 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 76), s. 18. The appellant was the tenant of an agricultural holding, under a tenancy which expired on the 29th Sept. 1922. In May 1922 the landlord contracted to sell the holding, subject to the tenancy, to the respondent. The completion was to take place on the 29th Sept., but in fact it took place on the 2nd Nov. 1922. The contract contained a general condition that the rents, profits, or possession, of the property should be received or retained, and the outgoings discharged, by the vendor up to the time appointed for completion, and that current rents should be apportioned. A special condition of sale provided that for the purpose of this general condition any rent payable on the 29th Sept. was to be deemed "current rent," and was to be payable by the purchaser on completion. After the expiration of the tenancy, the purchaser as ' landlord " made a claim against the tenant for dilapidations; and the tenant counterclaimed against the purchaser for compensation. It was held by the Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the County Court judge) that the purchaser was not, at the date of the expiration of the tenancy, the landlord," within the meaning of sect. 48 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908. On the facts of that case the point seems reasonably clear. As pointed out by Lord Justice Bankes, in the course of his judgment, "there may be three ways in which a person may claim to be entitled to rent from another; he may claim to be entitled in law, or in equity, or under sect. 10 of the Conveyancing Act 1881." That section provides, in effect, that rent, and the benefit of the lessee's covenants, and the right of re-entry, are to run with the reversion, notwithstanding the severance thereof, and to be recoverable by the person entitled to the income of the whole, or part, of the land leased. It may be mentioned incidentally that a purchaser would not be entitled to sue for arrears of rent which had become due before the conveyance to him, unless they were expressly assigned (see Redman on Landlord and Tenant, 7th edit., p. 706); but under sect. 2 of the Conveyancing Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 37) he would have a right to enforce any condition of re-entry, notwithstanding the conveyance was executed after the condition of re-entry or forfeiture had become enforceable, provided the conveyance was executed after the commencement of that Act. It is suggested in Wolstenholme's 66 |