Page images
PDF
EPUB

consolidation.

pletion of the task. By degrees the emperor's authority was established from the confines of Kansuh to Kashgar and Yarkand, and Chinese garrisons were stationed in touch with the Russian outposts in the region of the Pamirs (December 1877). There remained only the north-eastern province of Kuldja, occupied by Russia, but under a promise made in 1871 to restore it when China was in a position to maintain order. This promise Russia was now called upon to redeem. It is probable that, in making this promise, Russia calculated that the day was far distant when China would be in a position to fulfil the condition; at all events she showed no desire to comply with the request. China despatched Chung-how, a Manchu of the highest rank, who had been notoriously concerned in the Tientsin massacre of 1871, to St Petersburg to negotiate a settlement. After some months of discussion a document was signed, (September 1879), termed the treaty of Livadia, whereby China recovered, not indeed Imperial the whole, but a considerable portion of the disputed territory, on her paying to Russia five million roubles as the cost of occupation. At first sight it was considered by Western diplomatists that, having regard to the small amount of pressure he could bring to bear, Chung-how had acquitted himself, of his mission rather well. The treaty was, however, received with a storm of indignation in China. Li HungChang and Tso Tsung-tang took up the cry. Chung-how was placed under arrest as soon as he returned. Memorials poured in from all sides denouncing the treaty and its author. Foremost among these was one by Chang Chih-tung, then occupying a subordinate post in the Hanlin, who has since become the most distinguished of the viceroys, and is actually governor-general of Hupeh and Hunan. Its publication raised him at once into eminence. He demonstrated seriatim the objections to the treaty, chief of which was that, under guise of trading facilities, it opened a way for the military aggression of Russia from the west, and he wound up with declaring, "If we do not alter this treaty we are not worthy to be called a nation." Prince Chun, the emperor's father, came into prominence at this juncture as an advocate for war, and under these combined influences the unfortunate Chung-how was tried and condemned to death (3rd March 1880). For some months warlike preparations went on, and the outbreak of hostilities was imminent. In the end calmer counsels prevailed; the foreign ministers interceded for Chunghow, and he was first reprieved and finally released. Li HungChang, though he had been one of the first to raise the storm, became alarmed at the near prospect of war, for which he well knew China was unprepared, and threw in his voice with Prince Kung on the side of peace. A visit from General Gordon, and the sound, though probably unpalatable, advice which he gave, weighed in the same direction. It was decided to send the Marquis Tseng, who in the meantime had become minister in London, to Russia to negotiate a new treaty. With more adroitness he avoided his predecessor's mistakes, and produced a treaty which, though not very materially different from the old, inasmuch as it still left Russia in possession of part of the Ili valley, pleased everybody, and was universally accepted. This was ratified 19th August 1881. The Chinese Government could now contemplate with satisfaction the complete recovery of the whole extensive dominions which had at any time owned the imperial sway. The regions directly administered by the officers of the emperor extended from the borders of Siberia on the north to Annam and Burma on the south, and from the Pacific Ocean on the east to Kashgar and Yarkand on the west. But even that did not complete the tale, for outside these boundaries there was a fringe of tributary nations which still kept up the ancient forms of allegiance, and which more or less acknowledged the dominion of the central kingdom. As most of China's subsequent misfortunes have been in connexion with one or other of these tributary states, a brief notice may here be permitted of the actual relationship subsisting at this date. The principal tributary nations then were Korea, Liuchiu, Annam, Burma, and Nepaul. The dynastic records enumerate several others, including even England, Lord Macartney's mission of 1793 having been gravely described as bringing tribute, but these were more or less accidental. The tie which bound these states to their suzerain was of the loosest description. China accepted their homage with calm superiority, but conceived herself to be under no reciprocal obligation. It was usual for the kings, on succession, to seek investiture, which consisted in the grant of a patent and a seal, but even that was not invariably insisted on. In any case, it was no part of the duty of China to keep the king on his throne. If his subjects chose to depose him and set up another, they might do so, and she received a successful usurper and bestowed a new patent and a new seal with the same nonchalance as she had manifested to his predecessor. This happened more than once in Annam.

Such was the attitude which China still maintained when foreign nations first began to come into contact with these tributary states. She did not recognize that the position of suzerain involved responsibilities as well as rights, and to this non

[ocr errors][ocr errors]

perception are to be attributed all the vagaries of her diplomacy and the complications in which she became involved. Korea was the first of the dependencies to come into notice. In 1866 some Roman Catholic missionaries were murdered, and about the same time an American vessel was burnt in one of the rivers and her crew murdered. China refused satisfaction, both to France and America, and suffered reprisals to be made on Korea without protest. America and Japan both desired to conclude commercial treaties for the opening up of Korea, and proposed to negotiate with China. China refused and referred them to the Korean GovernKorea and ment direct, saying she was not wont to interfere in Japan. the affairs of her vassal states. As a result Japan concluded a treaty in 1876, in which the independence of Korea was expressly recognized. This was allowed to pass without protest, but as other nations proceeded to conclude treaties on the same terms China began to perceive her mistake, and endeavoured to tack on to each a declaration by the king that he was in fact a tributary-a declaration, however, which was quietly ignored. Japan, however, was the only Power with which controversy immediately arose. In 1882 a faction fight, which had long been smouldering, broke out, headed by the king's father, the Tai Won Kun, in the course of which the Japanese legation was attacked and the whole Japanese colony had to flee for their lives. China sent troops, and by adroitly kidnapping the Tai Won Kun, order was for a time restored. The Japanese legation was replaced, but under the protection of a strong body of Japanese troops. Further revolutions and riots followed, in which the troops of the two countries took sides, and there was imminent danger of war. To obviate this risk, it was agreed in 1885 between Count Ito and Li Hung-Chang that both sides should withdraw their troops, the king being advised to engage officers of a third state to put his army on such a footing as would maintain order, and each undertook to give the other notice, should it be found necessary to send troops again. In this way a modus vivendi was established which lasted till the events which preIceded the outbreak of war in 1894. Chinese influence continued predominant, but the unhappy kingdom was constantly disturbed by faction.

We can only glance briefly at the domestic affairs of China during the period 1875-82. The years 1877-78 were marked by a famine in Shansi and Shantung, which for duration and intensity has probably never been equalled. For two successive seasons the crops failed. The population affected numbered 30 to 40 millions, the districts lay far from the coast, there was no water communication, and the roads were unfit for wheeled vehicles. Transport broke down, pack animals were not to be had, and sheer starvation stared the unfortunate people in the face. It was computed that 12 or 13 millions perished. It was hoped that this lamentable loss of life, due mainly to defective communications, would induce the Chinese Government to listen to proposals for railway construction, but even this argument had no effect. The fate of the experimental line at Shanghai has been already mentioned. The Russian scare had, however, taught the Chinese the value of telegraphs, and in 1881 the first line was laid from Tientsin to Shanghai. Further construction was continued without intermission from this date. A beginning also was made in naval affairs. The arsenal at Foochow was turning out small composite gunboats, a training ship was bought and put under the command of a British officer. Several armoured cruisers were ordered from Armstrong, and some progress was made with the fortifications of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei. Forts were also built and guns mounted at Foochow, Shanghai, Canton, and other vulnerable points. Money for these purposes was abundantly supplied by the customs duties on foreign trade, and China had learnt that at need she could borrow from the foreign banks on the security of this revenue. In all the elements of material strength she had grown enormously within the previous ten years, and her prestige had grown even more, for she was believed to be very much stronger than she really was.

In 1881 the senior regent, the empress Tsu An, was carried off by a sudden attack of heart disease, and the empress Tsu Tsi remained in undivided possession of the supreme power during the remainder of the emperor Kwang Su's minority. Li HungChang, firmly established at Tientsin, within easy reach of the capital, as viceroy of the home province of Chihli and superintendent of northern trade, enjoyed a larger share of his imperial mistress's favour than is often granted by the ruling Manchus to officials of Chinese birth, and in all the graver questions of foreign policy his advice was generally decisive.

While the disputes with Japan were still going on regarding Korea, China found herself involved in a more serious quarrel in respect of another tributary state which lay on the Tongsouthern frontier. By a treaty made between France king and and Annam in 1874, the Red river or Songkoi which, Hanoi. rising in south-western China, flows through the province of Tongking, was opened to trade together with the cities

of Haiphong and Hanoi situated on the delta. The object of the French was then, as it is now, to find a trade route to Yunnan and Szechuen from a base of their own, and it was hoped the Red river would furnish such a route. Tongking at the time, however, was infested with bands of pirates and cut-throats, many of whom were Chinese rebels or ex-rebels who had been driven across the frontier by the suppression of the Yunnan and Taiping rebellions, conspicuous among them being an organization called the Black Flags. The Annamese Government undertook by the treaty to restore order, and France had promised help. Some years having passed without any improvement, France, which meanwhile had kept a small guard at Haiphong, sent reinforcements (1882), nominally to assist the Annamese troops in putting an end to disorder. The Annamese officials, however, declined to receive them as friends, opposed their progress, and the expedition took the form of a military occupation. China, meanwhile, began to take alarm at the near approach of a strong military power to her southern frontier. When the treaty of 1874, which gave France trading privileges, was communicated to her, she seems to have treated it with indifference as she treated the Japanese treaty with Korea, and neither in the one case nor in the other took any steps to see that the provisions were carried out. Now, however, she began to protest, claiming that Annam was a vassal state and under her protection. France took no notice of the protest, declaring that the claim had merely an archæological interest, and that, in any case, China in military affairs was a quantité négligeable. France found, however, that she had undertaken a very serious task in trying to put down the forces of disorder in Tongking. The Black Flags were, it was believed, being aided by money and arms from China, and as time went on, her troops were more and more being confronted with regular Chinese soldiers. Several forts, well within the Tongking frontier, were known to be garrisoned by Chinese troops. Operations continued with more or less success during the winter and spring of 1883-84. Both sides, however, were desirous of an arrangement, and in May 1884 a convention was signed between Li Hung-Chang and a Captain Fournier, who had been commissioned ad hoc, whereby China agreed to withdraw her garrisons and to open her frontiers to trade, France agreeing, on her part, to respect the fiction of Chinese suzerainty, and guarantee the frontier from attack by brigands. The arrangement was satisfactory to both sides, but, strange to say, it was completely frustrated by a series of unfortunate misunderstandings which led to a renewal of hostilities. No date had been fixed in the convention for the evacuation of the Chinese garrisons, and Fournier endeavoured to supplement this by a memorandum to Li Hung-Chang, at the same time announcing the fact to his Government. In pursuance of this arrangement the French troops proceeded to occupy Langson on the date fixed (21st June 1884). The Chinese commandant refused to evacuate, alleging, in a despatch which no one in the French camp was competent to translate, that he had received no orders, and begged for a short delay to enable him to communicate with his superiors. The French commandant ordered an attack, which was repulsed with severe loss. Mutual recriminations ensued, the French declaring the resistance an act of treachery, and the Chinese declaring that the French had broken faith by advancing before the date fixed. The whole question turned on the unfortunate memorandum of Captain Fournier. The Chinese alleged that in deference to Li HungChang's representation, Captain Fournier had agreed to postpone the date of evacuation, and himself erased the original figures and inserted others, attesting the alteration by putting his initials in the margin; and they produced the original document so altered. Captain Fournier affirmed, on his honour, that he had made no alteration, and declared the whole thing an impudent forgery. On whichever side the truth lay, the result was greatly to embitter the feeling on both sides. From Paris there came a demand for a huge indemnity as reparation for the insult. Peking Government offered to carry out the convention, and to pay a small indemnity for the lives lost through the misunderstanding. This was refused, and hostilities recommenced, or, as the French preferred to call them, reprisals, for the fiction was still kept up that the two countries were not at war. Under cover of this fiction the French fleet peaceably entered the harbour of Foochow, having passed the forts at the entrance to the river without hindrance. Once inside, they attacked and destroyed the much inferior Chinese fleet which was then quietly at anchor, destroying at the same time a large part of the arsenal which adjoins the anchorage (23rd Aug, 1884). Retracing its steps, the French fleet attacked and destroyed with impunity the forts which were built to guard the entrance to the Min river, and could offer no resistance to a force coming from the rear. After this exploit the French fleet left the mainland and continued its reprisals on the coast of Formosa. Keelung, a treaty port, was bombarded and taken, Oct. 4th. A similar attempt, however, on the neighbouring port of Tamsuy was unsuccessful, the landing party having been driven back to their ships with severe loss.

The

[ocr errors]

The

The attempt was not renewed, and the fleet thereafter confined itself to a semi-blockade of the island, which was prolonged into 1885 but led to no practical results. Desultory operations were continued in the neighbourhood of Shanghai and Ningpo, two old vessels were taken and burnt, but the two or three really powerful boats which the Chinese then possessed took refuge behind the guns of Port Arthur, whither the French admiral did not care to follow them. By way of bringing pressure on the Chinese Government, the French at this time declared rice contraband of war, in order to stop the supplies going forward to the capital by sea. Even this, though raising an interesting point in international law, had no practical effect. Meanwhile the Chinese had been greatly emboldened by the successful defence of Tamsuy, and the failure of the French to push home such successes as they had gained. Preparations on a great scale were made to continue the war, and a rising tone was noticed, not only in the acts of the Government, but throughout the country. new-born native press assiduously encouraged this feeling, and from this time forward began to count as a factor in the situation. Troops were massed on the frontier of Tongking, and the French forces which had pushed their way as far as the border were compelled by overwhelming masses of the enemy to fall back on their base in the delta of the river. Negotiations for peace, however, which had been for some time in progress through the mediation of Sir Robert Hart, were at this juncture happily concluded (April 1885), and the French cabinet was thereby relieved from a very embarrassing situation. The terms were practically those of the Fournier convention of the year before, the demand for an indemnity having been quietly dropped. China, on the whole, came out of the struggle with greatly increased prestige. She had tried conclusions with a first-class European Power and had held her own. In material resources she had not been weakened. The provincial fleet at Foochow had indeed been destroyed, but it was of no serious value as a fighting force. On the other hand she had saved her three armoured cruisers, the value of the new fortress of Port Arthur as a naval base had been proved, and, most satisfactory of all, she was not crippled by the exaction of an indemnity. Morally she might claim a victory. Reasonings such as these, however, omitted to take note of the fact that France was never more than half-hearted over the war. No effective support was given to the French admiral from home, the number of troops sent to Tongking was inadequate to the task they were called on to perform, and no opportunity was afforded to see how Chinese soldiers would stand up against regular European troops. Incorrect conclusions as to the military strength of China were consequently drawn, not merely by the Chinese themselves-which was excusable-but by European and even British authorities, who ought to have been better informed. China was lulled into a false security which proved disastrous when the day of trial came. For the time, however, the lessons of the war were so far learned that the necessity for a strong fleet became generally recognized, and means were at once adopted to that end. War vessels were ordered both from England and Germany, and Admiral Lang, who had withdrawn his services while the war was going on, was re-engaged together with a number of British officers and instructors. The completion of the works at Port Arthur was taken in hand, and a beginning was made in the construction of forts at Wei-hai-wei as a second naval base. A new department was created for the control of naval affairs, at the head of which was placed Prince Chun, father of the Emperor, who since the downfall of Prince Kung in 1884 had been taking a more and more prominent part in public affairs. A tour made by Prince Chun in the spring of 1886, in the course of which he visited Port Arthur and Chefoo escorted by the fleet, attracted much attention, as being the first time that a prince so near the throne had emerged from palace seclusion and exchanged friendly visits with foreign admirals and other representatives.

1885"" 1894.

From 1885 to 1894 the political history of China does not call for extended notice. Two incidents, however, must be recorded, the first being the conclusion of a convention between Great Britain and China, in which the latter undertook to recognize British sovereignty in Burma, to delimit the frontier, and to promote overland trade intercourse between the two countries. Great Britain, on the other hand, consented to the continuance of the customary decennial tribute mission to be despatched by the "highest authority in Burma,' the members, however, to be Burmese, and she also consented not to press a mission which the Indian Government were proposing to send to Tibet and to which China had agreed. The recognition of Chinese suzerainty implied in the sending a tribute mission was sharply criticized, but in point of fact it has never been acted on and is now forgotten. The other incident was the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton by the British fleet (May 1885). Rumours of Russian intrigues in Korea, coupled with recent proceedings in Afghanistan, made it appear desirable that Great Britain should have a naval base farther north than HongS. III. — 5

kong. For this purpose a small group of islands at the southern point of the peninsula of Korea, forming the harbour known as Port Hamilton, were occupied. Objections, however, were raised by the Chinese Government to their continued occupation, and Great Britain expressed her willingness to withdraw on receiving sufficient guarantees against their cession to any other Power. A trilateral agreement was thereupon come to, by which Russia bound herself to China to respect the integrity of Korean territory, and Great Britain thereupon agreed to evacuate Port Hamilton, which was carried out in February 1887. In 1890 occurred an event which, though seemingly insignificant in itself, marks a turning-point in Chinese history, viz., the resignation of Admiral Lang from the command of the Chinese fleet. One of the lessons which the Chinese Government seemed to have learned from the French war was the recognition of the value of a strong fleet. Money was not spared, and a really efficient squadron had been got together and put under the joint command of Admiral Ting and his British colleague Admiral Lang. By tact and judgment the latter had so far avoided directly raising the question of who was really chief. Order and discipline were well maintained, and both men and officers were steadily improving in the knowledge of their profession. During a temporary absence of Admiral Ting, however, the Chinese second in command claimed the right to take charge,- —a claim which Admiral Lang naturally resented. The question was referred to Li Hung-Chang, who decided against Admiral Lang, whereupon the latter, feeling that his authority to maintain discipline was gone, threw up his commission. His resignation was accepted, and he left, never to return. From this point the fleet on which so much depended began to deteriorate. Superior officers again began to steal the men's pay, the ships were starved, shells filled with charcoal instead of powder were supplied, accounts were cooked, and all the corruption and malfeasance that were rampant in the army crept back into the navy. It is needless to point the moral. Chinese superciliousness, jealousy of foreigners, and contempt of foreign instruction, once more proved her ruin. What the dismissal of Admiral Lang cost her was soon to be proved in the fatal battle of the Yaloo. Meanwhile things had not been going well in other respects. Excessive taxation and misgovernment produced a general feeling of unrest which continued throughout 1889-90-91. Rumours of risings and rebellions were prevalent, promoted, it was said, by secret societies, chief of which was the "Ko lao hwei," or Old Brotherhood Society. Numerous arrests and executions took place, especially in the Yangtse valley. In 1891 there was a series of violent anti-foreign outbreaks in the same region. At Wusieh, two Englishmen were murdered, and at Wuhu, Ichang, and Kiukiang, attacks were made on the foreign settlements and serious damage was done. Many missionary establishments in the interior were destroyed. The origin of these outbreaks was the same old story. Placards were circulated accusing foreigners of kidnapping children and of murdering them in order to boil down their eyes, brains, etc., for medicine. Missionaries were charged with the grossest immorality, and with using religion as a cloak to the vilest offences. It was found that a society in Hunan, at the head of which was a notorious exofficial named Chou Han, had been flooding the country with incendiary literature of this class. Repeated efforts were made to secure the punishment of these instigators, but with indifferent success; the Chinese Government, though not exactly screening the offenders, took no energetic measures to put a stop to the calumnies. The anti-foreign agitation, however, gradually died out and things reverted to the normal condition. There appeared even a prospect of considerable railway development—the leading officials having at last come round to the opinion that railways might be beneficial at least for strategic purposes.

We pass on to 1894, a year which was fraught with momentous consequences to China, inasmuch as it witnessed the outbreak of the Japanese war. It opened auspiciously, for in War with November was to be celebrated the 60th anniversary Japan. of the birth of the empress-dowager. It was resolved that it should be marked with unusual magnificence, and loyal contributions poured in from all parts. In the spring, however, the state of Korea began to attract attention. A series of chronic rebellions had baffled the authorities, and help from China was asked for. China responded and sent 2000 men under General Yeh, notifying Japan of the fact, as she was bound to do under the convention of 1885. Japan replied by sending troops also, nominally to guard her legation, which she had a right to do under the same convention. The rebellion was stamped out, and then China proposed that both sides should withdraw. Japan made a counter proposal that both should join in imposing such reforms on Korea as would prevent a recurrence of these internal dissensions. This, in turn, China refused, alleging once more that she was not wont to interfere with the domestic affairs of her vassals. Again Japan retorted, denying the alleged suzerainty, and intimating that whether China joined or not she proposed to prosecute her schemes of reform, and would keep

|

her troops there until the necessary guarantees had been obtained for the security of her trade. At the same time categorical schemes of civil and military reform were laid before the Korean Government, and the Japanese force in Seoul was largely increased. By the beginning of July she had over 10,000 men there. The Chinese Government thereupon proceeded to send more troops to reinforce General Yeh, who was stationed at Asan, a short distance south of Seoul. Among other transports a British steamer, the Kowshing, was chartered and despatched with some 1200 troops. On the way, and when nearing the coast of Korea, the Kowshing met a Chinese man-of-war steaming back full speed to China with evident signs of disorder. As subsequently became known, this vessel, the Chi-yuen, had exchanged hostile shots a few hours previously with a Japanese man-of-war and got the worst of it. The Kowshing was presently accosted by a Japanese war vessel, the Naniwa, and was called upon to surrender. This the Chinese soldiery refused to permit, and the British officer in charge then proposed to take the troops back to China. This in turn the Japanese refused to allow, and after a warning the Naniwa opened fire on the doomed vessel. A scene of indescribable confusion followed. The vessel sank with her living freight, a few escaped by swimming to a neighbouring island, three of the British officers were picked up by Japanese boats, and all the rest perished. Formal declarations of war soon followed. The first battle was fought at Asan on the 27th July. The Japanese attack was repulsed, but the Chinese evacuated their position during the night and retreated northwards. A series of desultory skirmishes followed, but the only real stand the Chinese made was at Pingyang. The division under General Tso-the only capable and honest general in the Chinese armyoffered a stubborn resistance till their leader was killed, when they turned and fled. The defeat became a rout, and left the road to China open to the victorious Japanese. Two days afterwards, on the 17th September, the naval engagement of Yaloo was fought. The Chinese fleet possessed two ironclads heavier than anything in the Japanese navy, but it was hopelessly out-manoeuvred by the Japanese and lost heavily. Five vessels were sunk, burnt, or driven ashore. Night coming on, the Japanese drew off, and the remainder of the Chinese squadron was allowed to seek shelter in Port Arthur. They did not venture to put to sea again, and in the end were captured or destroyed in the harbour of Wei-hai-wei in February of the following year. On land the Japanese continued their progress, crossed the Yaloo river, and entered Chinese territory on 24th October. City after city fell into their hands, and Newchwang, a treaty port, was occupied on the 4th March. Meanwhile a second Japanese army had landed on the Liaotung peninsula, and captured the naval stronghold of Port Arthur on 22nd November. A third expedition was launched against Wei-hai-wei, where the Chinese fleet had now sought refuge. In spite of the inclemency of the winter, operations were vigorously pursued by land and sea, and on 12th February 1895 the fortress and fleet were surrendered. Admiral Ting and the general commanding committed suicide. Further resistance was hopeless, and negotiations were opened for peace. After two abortive missions, which the Japanese refused as being unprovided with sufficient powers, Li Hung-Chang was sent as plenipotentiary, and on 17th April 1895 the treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. The terms included the cession of Liaotung peninsula, then in actual occupation by the Japanese troops, the cession of the island of Formosa, an indemnity of H. taels 200,000,000 (about £30,000,000), and various commercial privileges.

The signature of this treaty brought the European Powers on the scene. It had been for some time the avowed ambition of Russia to obtain an ice-free port as an outlet to her Siberian possessions-an ambition which was considered by British statesmen as not unreasonable. It did not, therefore, at all suit her purposes to see the rising power of Japan seated along the Gulf of Liaotung, and by implication commanding the whole of the coastline of Korea. Even before proceeding to Shimonoseki, Li HungChang is believed to have received assurances from Russia that she would not allow any cession of territory in that region to become operative. At any rate, in the interval between the signature and the ratification of the treaty, invitations were addressed by Russia to the Great Powers to intervene with a view to its modification on the ground of the dis- European

interven

turbance of the balance of power, and the menace to China which the occupation of Port Arthur by the tion. Japanese would involve. France and Germany accepted the invitation, Great Britain declined. In the end the three Powers brought such pressure to bear on Japan that she gave up the whole of her continental acquisitions, retaining only the island of Formosa. The indemnity was on the other hand increased by H. taels 30,000,000. For the time the integrity of China seemed to be preserved, and Russia, France, and Germany could pose as her friends. Great Britain, who had taken no hand in the retrocession, was looked on with coldness, and China

even bore her a grudge because she had not at an early period | stepped in and put a stop to the war. Li Hung-Chang, who had had his honours restored, was personally grateful to Russia for having extricated him from a very awkward position, and cherished the general grudge against England in an unusual degree, a state of mind of which Russia is believed to have taken full advantage during that statesman's sojourn at the Russian court as special representative of the Chinese emperor at the Tsar's coronation. Ample evidence was indeed soon forthcoming that Russia and France had not been quite disinterested in rescuing Chinese territory from the Japanese grasp, for each began to claim a reward as evidence of the imperial gratitude. Russia obtained the right to carry the Siberian railway, which, for the past four or five years, she had been pressing on with eagerness, across Chinese territory from Stretensk to Vladivostock, thus avoiding a long détour, besides giving a grasp on northern Manchuria. France obtained, by a convention dated 20th June 1895, a rectification of frontier in the Mekong valley and certain railway and mining rights in Kiangsi and Yunnan. Both Powers obtained concessions of land at Hankow for the purposes of a settlement. Russia was also said to have negotiated a secret treaty, frequently described as the "Cassini Convention," but more probably signed by Li Hung-Chang at Moscow, giving her the right in certain contingencies to Port Arthur, which was to be refortified with Russian assistance. And by way of further securing her hold, Russia guaranteed a 4 per cent. loan of £15,000,000 issued in Paris to enable China to pay off the first instalment of the Japanese indemnity.

The convention between France and China of 20th June 1895 brought China into sharp conflict with Great Britain, and gave rise to important negotiations which must be briefly Mekong noticed. China, having by the Burma convention of valley 1886 agreed to recognize British sovereignty over dispute. Burma, her quondam feudatory, also agreed to a delimitation of boundaries at the proper time. Effect was given to this last stipulation by a subsequent convention concluded in London (1st March 1894), which traced the boundary line from the Shan states on the west as far as the Mekong river on the east. In the Mekong valley there were two semi-independent native territories over which suzerainty had been claimed in times gone by both by the kings of Ava and by the Chinese emperors. These territories were named Meng Lun and Kiang Hung-the latter lying partly on one side and partly on the other of the Mekong river, south of the point where it issues from Chinese territory. The boundary line was so drawn as to leave both these territories to China, but in consideration of the fact that Great Britain was surrendering to China territory over which she might claim sovereignty as successor to the kings of Ava, and in respect of which sovereign rights had in point of fact been recently exercised, it was stipulated that China should not alienate any portion of these territories to any other Power without the previous consent of Great Britain. The Power contemplated, though not named, was France, who by a treaty with Siam, concluded in 1893, had pushed the boundary of her Annamese possessions up to the left bank of the Mekong, and it was desired to interpose this particular territory as a sort of buffer, so as to avoid any conflict of French and British interests in this remote and difficult region. This object was frustrated by the convention between France and China of 1895. Yielding to French pressure, and regardless of the undertaking she had entered into with Great Britain, China so drew the boundary line as to cede to France that portion of the territory of Kiang Hung which lay on the left bank of the Mekong. Compensation was demanded from China for this breach of faith, and at the same time negotiations were entered into with France for the better determining of the interests of the two countries in Siam and the territories lying between Siam and the Chinese frontier. These resulted in a joint declaration by the Governments of France and Great Britain, dated 15th January 1896, by which it was agreed as regards boundary that the Mekong from the point of its confluence with the Nam Huok northwards as far as the Chinese frontier should be the dividing line between the possessions or spheres of influence of the two Powers. It was also agreed that any commercial privileges obtained by either Power in Yunnan or Szechuen should be open to the subjects of the other. The negotiations with China resulted in a further agreement, dated 4th February 1897, whereby considerable modifications in favour of Great Britain were made in the Burma boundary drawn by the 1894 convention. The net result of these various conventions is, that from the Gulf of Tongking westwards, as far as the Mekong, the French Annamese possessions are coterminous with the southern frontier of China, and from the Mekong as far as the confines of Assam the British Burmese possessions are coterminous with the south-western frontier. In the middle where the possessions meet, the Mekong, from the frontier of China down to the northern boundary of Siam, is the dividing line.

While Russia and France were profiting by what they were

pleased to call the generosity of China, Germany alone had so far received no reward for her share in compelling the retrocession of Liaotung; but, in November 1897, she procceded to help herself by seizing the Bay of Kiaochow in the Klaochow, province of Shantung. The act was done ostensibly Port in order to compel satisfaction for the murder of two Arthur, German missionaries, which had been perpetrated a Wei-halfew weeks before, but it soon was found that she was wel. determined to hold the place in any event. A cession was ultimately made by way of a lease for a term of ninety-nine years Germany to have full territorial jurisdiction during the continuance of the lease, with liberty to erect fortifications, build docks, and exercise all the rights of sovereignty. In December the Russian fleet was sent to winter in Port Arthur, and though this was at first described as a temporary measure, its object was speedily disclosed by a request made, in January 1898, by the Russian ambassador in London that two British cruisers, then also anchored at Port Arthur, should be withdrawn "in order to avoid friction in the Russian sphere of influence." They left shortly afterwards, and their departure in the circumstances was regarded as a blow to Great Britain's prestige in the Far East. In March the Russian Government peremptorily demanded a lease of Port Arthur and the adjoining anchorage of Talienwana demand which China could not resist without foreign support. After an acrimonious correspondence with the Russian Government Great Britain acquiesced in the fait accompli. The Russian occupation of Port Arthur was immediately followed by a concession to build a line of railway from that point northwards to connect with the Siberian trunk line in north Manchuria. As a counterpoise to the growth of Russian influence in the north, Great Britain obtained a lease of Wei-hai-wei, and formally took possession of it on its evacuation by the Japanese troops in May 1898.

[graphic]

"Open

door,"

A

and "spheres of influence."

After much hesitation the Chinese Government had at last resolved to permit the construction of railways with foreign capital. An influential official named Sheng Hsuan-hwai was appointed director-general of railways, and empowered to enter into negotiations with foreign capitalists for that purpose. keen competition thereupon ensued between syndicates of different nationalities, and their claims being espoused by their various Governments an equally keen international rivalry was set up. Germany had insisted upon obtaining as part of the Kiaochow settlement certain preferential railway and mining rights in the province of Shantung. France had previously obtained a similar recognition for the southern provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan, and Russia indicated clearly that she considered Manchuria as her particular field of exploitation. Great Britain, though intimating her preference for the " open door" policy, meaning equal opportunity for all, yet found herself compelled to fall in with the general movement towards what became known as the "spheres of influence" policy, and claimed the Yangtse valley as her particular sphere. This she did by the somewhat negative method of obtaining from the Chinese Government a declaration that no part of the Yangtse valley should be alienated to any foreign Power. A more formal recognition of the claim, as far as railway enterprise was concerned, was enbodied in an agreement (28th April 1899) between Great Britain and Russia, and communicated to the Chinese Government, whereby the Russian Government agreed not to seek for any concessions within the Yangtse valley, including all the provinces bordering on the great river, together with Chekiang and Honan, the British Government entering into a similar undertaking in regard to the Chinese dominions north of the Great Wall. (A supplementary exchange of notes of the same date excepted from the scope of this agreement the Shan-hai-kwanNewchwang extension which had already been conceded to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.) A similar promise of nonalienation in respect of the province of Fuhkien was made to the Japanese Government (April 1898), which thus earmarked that province as the Japanese sphere. As a general partition seemed thus to be in progress the Italian Government stepped in and applied for a lease of a coaling station at Sanmun, on the coast of Chekiang, together with a grant of railway and mining rights in that province. The manner in which the request was put forward gave offence to the Yamen, and a blunt refusal was returned. The incident gave rise to much feeling both in Peking and Rome. The Italian minister was recalled, but his successor fared no better. China, apprehending a repetition of the Kiaochow incident, sent orders to the local troops to resist a landing if such should be attempted on the part of the Italian men-of-war. No landing, however, was attempted, and though negotiations were continued the demand has not been further pressed.

In 1899 Talienwan and Kiaochow were respectively thrown open by Russia and Germany to foreign trade, and, encouraged by these measures, the United States Government initiated in September of the same year a correspondence with the great

secured. A contract for a trunk line from Canton to Hankow was negotiated in the latter part of the same year (1898) by an American company, which completed the list for the time being. It would have been more satisfactory if these various concessions, instead of being wrung out of the weakness of China by the rivalry of foreign Powers, had been freely granted in the confidence of strength.

movement.

European Powers and Japan, with a view to securing their definite | Yangtse, as also the Shansi Mining Companies' lines, were adhesion to the "open-door" policy. The British Government gave an unqualified approval to the American proposal, and the replies of the other Powers, though more guarded, were accepted at Washington as satisfactory. A further and more definite step towards securing the maintenance of the open door" in China was the agreement concluded in October 1900 between the British and German Governments. The signatories, by the first two articles, agreed to endeavour to keep the ports on the rivers and littoral free and open to international trade and economic activity, and to uphold this rule for all Chinese territory as far as (wo in the German counterpart) they could exercise influence; not to use the existing complications to obtain territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and to seek to maintain undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese empire. By a third article they reserved their right to come to a preliminary understanding for the protection of their interests in China, should any other Power use those complications to obtain such territorial advantages under any form whatever. On the submission of the agreement under the fourth and last article to the Powers interested, Austria, France, Italy, and Japan accepted its principles without express reservation-Japan first requesting and obtaining assurances that she signed on the same footing as an original signatory. The United States accepted the first two articles, but expressed no opinion on the third. Russia construed the first as limited to ports actually open in regions where the two signatories exercise "their" influence, and favourably entertained it in that sense, ignoring the reference to other forms of economic activity. She fully accepted the second, and observed that in the contingency contemplated by the third, she would modify her attitude according to circumstances.

Meanwhile, negotiations carried on by the British minister at Peking during 1898 resulted in the grant of very important privileges to foreign commerce. The payment of the second instalment of the Japanese indemnity was becoming due, and it was much discussed how and on what terms China would be able to raise the amount. The Russian Government, as has been stated, had made China a loan of the sum required for the first portion of the indemnity, viz., £15,000,000, taking a charge on the customs revenue as security. The British Government was urged to make a like loan of £16,000,000 both as a matter of friendship to China and as a counterpoise to the Russian influence. An arrangement was come to accordingly, on very favourable terms financially to the Chinese, but at the last moment they drew back, being overawed, as they said, by the threatening attitude of Russia. Taking advantage of the position which this refusal gave him, the British minister obtained from the Tsung-Li-Yamen, besides the declaration as to the non-alienation of the Yangtse valley above mentioned, an undertaking to throw the whole of the inland waterways open to steam traffic. The Chinese Government at the same time undertook that the post of inspector-general of customs should always be held by an Englishman so long as the trade of Great Britain was greater than that of any other nation. Minor concessions were also made, such as the opening of new ports, but the opening of the waterways is by far the greatest advance that has been made since 1860. The privilege is hampered as yet by the obstruction of the likin service, but as the Chinese have applied for a general revision of the treaty tariffs it may be presumed that the occasion will be used to put the inland revenue tariff on a more satisfactory footing.

Of still greater importance are the railway and mining concessions granted during the same year (1898), a list of which has already been given above. The Chinese Government had been generally disposed to railway construction since the conclusion of the Japanese war, but hoped to be able to retain the control in their own hands. The masterful methods of Russia and Germany had obliged them to surrender this control so far as concerned Manchuria and Shantung, the lines in which were left to be financed and worked by the Powers interested. In the Yangtse valley, Sheng, the director-general of railways, had been negotiating with several competing syndicates, playing one off against the other to force better terms. One of these was a Franco-Belgian syndicate, which was endeavouring to obtain the trunk line from Hankow to Peking. A British company was tendering for the same work, and as the line lay mainly within the British sphere it was considered not unreasonable to expect it should be given to the latter. At a critical moment, however, the French and Russian ministers intervened, and practically forced the Yamen to grant a contract in favour of the FrancoBelgian company. The Yamen had only a few days before explicitly promised the British minister that the contract should not be ratified without his having an opportunity of seeing it. As a penalty for this breach of faith, and as a set-off to the Franco-Belgian line, the British minister required the immediate grant of all the railway concessions for which British syndicates were then negotiating, and on terms not inferior to those granted to the Belgian line. In this way all the lines in the lower

There can indeed be little doubt that the Powers, engrossed in the diplomatic conflicts of which Peking was the centre, had entirely underrated the reactionary forces gradually The reform mustering for a final struggle against the aggressive spirit of Western civilization. The lamentable consequences of administrative corruption and incompetence, and the superiority of foreign methods which had been amply illustrated by the Japanese war, had at first produced a considerable impression, not only upon the more enlightened commercial classes, but even upon many of the younger members of the official classes in China. The dowager-empress, who, in spite of the emperor Kwang Su having nominally attained his majority, had retained practical control of the supreme power until the conflict with Japan, had been held, not unjustly, to blame for the disasters of the war, and even before its conclusion the young emperor was adjured by some of the most responsible among his own subjects to shake himself free from the baneful restraint of "petticoat government," and himself take the helm. In the following years a Reform Movement, undoubtedly genuine, though opinions differ as to the value of the popular support which it claimed, spread throughout the central and southern provinces of the empire. One of the most significant symptoms was the relatively large demand which suddenly arose for the translations of foreign works and similar publications in the Chinese language which philanthropic societies, such as that "for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge amongst the Chinese," had been trying for some time past to popularize, though hitherto with scant success. Chinese newspapers published in the treaty ports spread the ferment of new ideas far into the interior. Fifteen hundred young men of good family applied to enter the foreign university at Peking, and in some of the provincial towns the Chinese themselves subscribed towards the opening of foreign schools. Reform societies, which not infrequently enjoyed official countenance, sprang up in many of the large towns, and found numerous adherents amongst the younger literati. Early in 1898 the emperor, who had gradually emancipated himself from the dowager-empress's control, summoned several of the reform leaders to Peking, and requested their advice with regard to the progressive measures which should be introduced into the government of the empire. Chief amongst these reformers was Kang Yu-wei, a Cantonese, whose scholarly attainments, combined with novel teachings, earned for him from his followers the title of the "Modern Sage." Of his more or less active sympathizers who had subsequently to suffer with him in the cause of reform, the most prominent were Chang Yin-huan, a member of the Grand Council and of the Tsung-LiYamen, who had represented his sovereign at Queen Victoria's jubilee in 1897; Chin Pao-chen, governor of Hu-nan; Liang Chichao, the editor of the reformers' organ, Chinese Progress; Su Chiching, a reader of the Hanlin College, the educational stronghold of Chinese conservatism; and his son Su In-chi, also a Hanlin man and provincial chancellor of public instruction in Hu-nan.

edicts.

It soon became evident that there was no more enthusiastic advocate of the new ideas than the emperor himself. Within a few months the vermilion pencil gave the imperial The reform sanction to a succession of edicts which, had they been carried into effect, would have amounted to a revolution as far-reaching as that which had transformed Japan thirty years previously. The fossilized system of examinations for the public service was to be altogether superseded by a new schedule based on foreign learning, for the better promotion of which a number of temples were to be converted into schools for Western education; a state department was to be created for the translation and dissemination of the standard works of Western literature and science; even the scions of the ruling Manchu race were to be compelled to study foreign languages and travel abroad; and last, but not least, all useless offices both in Peking and in the provinces were to be abolished. A further edict was even reported to be in contemplation, doing away with the queue or pigtail, which, originally imposed upon the Chinese by their Manchu conquerors as a badge of subjection, had gradually become the most characteristic and most cherished feature of the national dress. Had China possessed a governing class imbued with similar enlightened patriotism to that which induced the Japanese daimios in 1869 to sacrifice their feudal rights in the interests of national regeneration, even the crude series of imperial edicts drawn up by Kang Yu-wei might have proved the starting-point of a new But the bureaucracy of China, which had battened for centuries on corruption and ignorance, had no taste for self-sacrifice.

era.

« EelmineJätka »