CHAPTER SEVENTH.

COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

§. 78. Of the relation of simple ideas to complex.

We next examine complex ideas. But before entering fully into that subject, something remains to be said of the relation, which simple ideas hold to them.When we say of any one of our thoughts, that it is COMPLEX, the epithet itself implies, that it is virtually equal to various other thoughts of a more elementary character, which we call simple.. But it is evident both from the nature of the mind, and from the relation of the external senses to it, that simple ideas, (when compared in that respect with complex,) are earliest in origin. A very little reflection evinces this.Thus we cannot have the complex idea of justice without previously having had various others, which are less susceptible of analysis, and which imply in their formation a fewer number of parts. Again, when we ascribe to any particular external object a variety of elementary characteristics, and speak of it as extended, hard, coloured, sapid, sonorous, and the like, these elements undoubtedly, as they were first made known to the mind, must have been separate and simple, because they came in by separate senses.

Hence we see, that it is sufficiently near the truth, and that it is not improper to speak of our complex ideas, as derived from, or made up of simple ideas. This is the language of Locke; and when we consider how much foundation there is for it in the constitution and operations

of the human mind, there is good reason for retaining it. It is true, the language, which expresses the composition and decomposition of thought is, metaphorical, taken from what we notice to take place in material objects, but it cannot be supposed, that this will lead any one astray, who has reflected on the origin of language, and especially who turns his eye inwardly on his own internal experience.

The view, which has now been given of the virtual composition of thought, justifies the expressions, which are used in respect to the power, which we possess over our simple ideas. We are rightly said to possess a power over them, although it is a limited one. We possess no ability to annul or destroy these, or any other class of our notions, by mere direct volition; nor does it appear, that we are able in that way to call up an idea, or to detain one, which we already have, and make it an object of contemplation to the entire exclusion of others. Or if we possess this last power at all, it is only in an imperfect degree. But we have the power, (1,) Of comparing together ideas of all classes in various respects, such as extent, order, degree, time,place. The mind has a susceptibility of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of its thoughts in these particulars.

We have the power, (2,) Of combining or compounding; by means of which we form what are termed complex ideas out of two or more simple ones variously put together. That is; such combinations are the natural and inevitable result of those mental susceptibilities, which we possess. The mind, in the natural workings of its tendencies, cannot fail to possess complex ideas, which sustain to simple ideas a relation, analogous to that of a whole to its parts; in other words, it has power to form them.

§. 79. Division of complex ideas into three kinds.

Those ideas, which are purely simple, are few in number. Out of this small number are formed multitudes of others, which are of a complex nature. The ability, which the mind possesses, of originating complex thoughts from elementary ones, may be compared to our power of uniting together the letters of the alphabet in the formation of

words, which are of themselves few in number, but lay the foundation of almost innumerable combinations.

Complex ideas are divided into three kinds, SUBSTANCES, MODES, and RELATIONS.

Ideas of substance embrace all things of whatever character, which have a separate and real existence. The complex thoughts, called modes, do not stand for separate existences, but are expressive of the attributes, affections, or modifications of things. The class of relations includes those ideas, which have their origin by means of the comparison of one object with another.It would seem, therefore, from the meaning attached to these terms, that this classification, when taken in its full extent, includes all those thoughts of a complex kind, which we are able to form.

§. 80. Complex ideas of substances.

Ideas of substance relate, in the first place, to bodies of matter.- -Material bodies are made up of a number of smaller bodies or particles. But all bodies of matter, whatever may be their capability of a separation into parts, possess a oneness or unity, relatively to our conceptions of them. In other words, our understandings are so formed as to view material things as one, which we suppose and know to be capable of a separation into parts.

In that combined state, in which they are presented to our conception, they exhibit certain qualities, as extension, solidity, colour; meaning by the term, colour, the power of separating and reflecting rays of light. It is these qualities we first become acquainted with; and exclusive of them, there is nothing, which we can consider the direct subjects of our sensations. By means of its qualities, we do indeed have an indirect idea or notion of matter, and learn that it exists. But we cannot from these alone, nor in any other way, learn what it is in itself.

The sentiment here conveyed may be expressed in other terms by saying, that our knowledge of matter is limited to the knowledge of its qualities and properties. The essence, or what the Schoolmen would call the SUB

STRATUM, of material things is beyond our comprehension.

Hence an idea of substance, (speaking now of material existences,) is that complex state of the mind, which considers a number of qualities, belonging to any particular substance as one, or as naturally and permanently united.Instances are the complex ideas, expressed by the words, sun, loadstone, man, horse, iron, tree, indeed all those intellectual states, which correspond to that great variety of separate, material objects, which continually come beneath our inspection.

In the idea of man we have, among others, the simple ideas of figure, colour, motion, conscience.

§. 81. Spiritual existences included under this class.

But ideas of substance are not to be limited to material objects. Under this class is to be included, in the second place, our ideas of immaterial existences, of the mind, of the soul in its disembodied state, of angels, of God himself.*

It is true, they are not substances in the ordinary meaning of the term, that is, they are not material substances, like the sensible objects, with which we are so much conversant, and to which we almost exclusively apply that name. But they are substances in this sense, they are real and not imaginary,-they have an existence,—they are not the mere relations of one thing to another, not the mere dependencies on them, but the things themselves.

But some will doubt, whether we have that clear knowledge of mind and of spiritual things in general, which we have of material bodies; and on this ground think,

*The term SUBSTANCE, from the Latin substantia, was applied first to material objects. An idea, originally derived from matter. and applied to matter exclusively, was subsequently extended to things immaterial. With this more extended meaning, it is employed by Des Cartes. From him it was adopted into the philosophy of Locke with the same extent of meaning, viz., as synonymous with being or existence. And it is now difficult, although the common and popular acceptation of the term is more limited, to introduce anoth er in its stead. Nor will it be essential, provided its meaning, as is here applied, be accurately kept in mind.

that they ought not to be included in the same division of our complex notions.-This is a point, worthy a moment's notice.

§. 82. Our knowledge of spirit the same as of matter.

Although it may appear strange to some, when we say, that we know no more of matter, about which we are daily conversant, and which we see and touch, than concerning mental or spiritual existences, which our bodily senses are unable to approach and examine, it is a sentiment at last almost universally received, and with the very best reason. It has already been remarked of matter, that we know nothing concerning it but by its qualities and properties, and we know nothing of immaterial existences likewise, except in the same way; and our knowledge, therefore, is in both cases on the same footing, being the same in kind at least, if not in degree. Our acquaintance with the properties of material bodies may possibly go further than our acquaintance with those of mind, but it is in both cases circumscribed by the same kind of limitation, unable to advance beyond those properties.

Observing certain mental operations, thinking, remembering, willing, assenting, doubting, and the like, we cannot avoid the conviction of the existence of something, to which they belong, or of which they are qualities; and we call it spirit or a spiritual being.

The same of matter; we learn its qualities, primary and secondary, colour, extension, figure, motion, divisibility, &c.; and these, viewed by the mind in their state of combination or as having a common and coetaneous origin, give us the idea, which we call by that name.

If it be asked, how it happens, that we so uniformly refer these operations and qualities to what we term matter and spirit, or rather how they are so promptly suggested on the observation of their properties, (there being an universal belief in the existence of the material and immaterial world,) the only answer is, that we are thus constituted. We are under a sort of necessity, in consequence of the natural tendencies of our constitution, of connecting