we regard them, as beings which are spiritual or immaterial. But we do not speak of them, as to their nature and powers, with the same degree of confidence, with which we speak of the human mind and of matter, since they are a class of beings, not coming under the examination of the senses, neither are they to be examined by us in the way, in which we can form an acquaintance with our own intellectual part.

For our knowledge, therefore, of angels and of any other class of beings superiour to ourselves but subordinate to the Deity, we must rest satisfied with what information is given us in the Holy Scriptures.

§. 91. Origin of the idea of God.

Among the complex ideas, included under this class, is to be mentioned in particular that of God. The origin of the idea of the Supreme Being, (supposing it with Mr. Locke not to be innate or connatural in the mind,) seems to be naturally accounted for in this way.

We suppose a person entirely separated from the rest of the world, dwelling in some distant island, and furnished, as it were, only with the senses, and with the variety of objects around him, fitted to operate upon them.

He will, in the first place, connect together certain things, as antecedents and consequents, or what is the same thing, as causes and effects, such as the waving of woods and the blowing of the wind, the wearing away of the shore and the motion of the waves against it.

Having in this way formed an idea of antecedent and consequent, it will be found, in the second place, that the thought will ultimately arise in his mind, that those appearances in nature, which he has been in the habit of regarding as antecedents or causes, should themselves have a cause; that while the tempest breaks down in his own sight the forest, there should, and must be some one to guide the storm, and while the shore crumbles beneath the incursions of the ocean, there must be something, though where or what it is, he cannot tell, which both pushes on and restrains its raging.

The idea at first, it must be admitted, is an obscure one, but it in time becomes less so; for nothing can be more true than the assertion of the Psalmist, that, in reference to the glory of God, "Day unto day, uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge."

We remarked in regard to the great first Cause, which the natural workings of soul in our solitary islander will sooner or later inevitably discover, that he is unable to say, where or what it is; and this inability becomes in the end a favourable circumstance. He cannot say of that first Cause, that it is in the stars, or in the ocean, or in the wild waste of the wilderness, but conscious of this inability to discover it in any particular place, he learns to identify it not with one merely, but with every "local habitation,” and to associate it with all unmeasured space, and although he can in one sense say, it is no where, he can, in another, say, God is every where.

NOTE. It is a thought, which can reach and influence the minds of all classes of people, that the works of nature lead us up to God. This is not human philosophy merely, but of the Bible itself. "The invisible things of God, (Rom. i. 20,) from the creation of the world are clearly seen." Hence all other modes of argument have either failed to be understood; or when understood, have not carried general conviction. This we apprehend to be true even of Dr. Clarke's (so called) DEMONSTRATION. His argument in a few words may be thus given. (1) The human mind is so constituted, (which is no doubt the fact,) that it necessarily forms the ideas of SPACE and DURATION. (2) We do not conceive of these, as having boundaries, but as illimitable. (3) But space and duration are not substances, or independent existences, but the attributes of things. (4) Therefore, there must be a Being to whom they belong, or of whom they may be predicated, and whose existence, consequently, surpasses the limits of all time and place. It is chiefly in the two last steps, that the understanding is bewildered, and that we choose after much painful reflection to read with the Apostle and the Psalmist the excellency of God in his handy-works.

CHAPTER EIGHTH.

SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES.

§. 92. Meaning of modes and classes of them.

THE second great class of our complex states of mind are known in the Essay of Locke, and also in many other treatises, under the name of Modes. The thoughts, which are designated by this name, stand for those things, which are supposed not to exist independently by themselves, but are rather the dependencies on, the attributes, or the affections of substances, such as are expressed by the words honour, gratitude, treachery, credulity, and also by the names of numbers and of mathematical figures, as dozen, twenty, square, parallelogram.

On this class or division of our complex notions we are now to remark; and shall consider them under two heads, viz., simple modes and mixed modes.

§. 93. Of complex ideas called simple modes.

SIMPLE MODES are complex ideas made up of those simple ideas which are all of the same kind; in other words, they are merely different modifications of the same original thought, carried on to a greater or less extent, but without any intermixture of foreign materials.

Of this class of ideas are a dozen, a score, a thousand, which are simple modes formed by the repeated addition of units as far on as the collections specified by those

names.

To this class belong ideas of time, as an hour, a day, a

month, a year, and also ideas of extension in length, as a furlong, a mile, a league.

§. 94. Of simple modes from number.

The idea of unity is derived in some instances from the senses. That is to say, it is always suggested to the mind, whenever we find ourselves able to consider any external object, as distinct and separate from other objects. The consciousness also, which we cannot avoid, that the mind has different ideas or is in different states, and that, consequently, there is a real line of distinction between each succeeding state and that, which went before, gives us the same notion of unity or oneness. So that it is an idea, which we become possessed of, both by means of the senses, and from reflection; but it is a simple idea, as we cannot resolve it into any thing more elementary.

What are termed the simple modes of number, are formed by the repeating or addition of the original idea, and it is worthy of remark, that there is the utmost distinctness, a marked line of separation between each mode. The numbers, one, two, and three, are as distinct and separate from each other, as one hundred and two hundred.

Names are necessary to numbers. We repeat the idea of an unit, and this repetition or addition becomes a collective idea, to which we give the name of Two. To the collective or complex idea, which arises on the addition of another unit, we give the name of THREE; all enumeration being only the addition of units with the giving of names to the collective ideas thus formed. As diversities in numbers are only differences of more or less, and are not distinguished from each other by size or colour, or in other ways, but only by addition and subtraction, there seems to be the more need of names. If it should be admitted to be possible, that we may have simple modes of number without giving names, it is very evident, that without names we could not employ them in enumeration; so that they would in that case be entirely useless.

We find, that many uncivilized tribes of Savages are unable to carry enumeration to any great extent, not be

cause their minds are naturally incapable of this operation, but in consequence of the scanty materials of their languages. Mr. Locke mentions a Brazilian tribe, called the Tououpinambos, who had no names for numbers above five; any number beyond that they made out by showing their fingers and the fingers of those, who were present. When Savages wish to express a very large number, they remind us of the leaves on the trees, the stars in the sky, and the sands on the sea-shore. And the same remark a little qualified will apply to communities somewhat raised above the savage state. Thus Abraham was led abroad

at night, and was commanded to try and number the stars; a much more expressive intimation of the great increase of his posterity, than could have been conveyed by the restricted power of the Hebrew numerals.

In view of such facts as these, two rules are laid down by Mr. Locke in regard to correct enumerations,

(1) That the mind distinguish carefully between any two ideas, which differ from each other only by the addition or subtraction of that primary element, which we call an unit;

(2) That it retain in memory the names or marks of the several intermediate combinations from an unit to the number, which completes the sum. Without an observance of these directions no one can be assured, that he has made a correct enumeration.

§. 95. Simple modes from duration.

Our

It was remarked in speaking of our simple ideas, that our idea of SUCCESSION was obtained in this way. ideas, while we are awake, are constantly going in a train, one coming and another departing. In this way, having this regular appearance and disappearance of thought forced upon our attention, we receive the idea of SUCCESSION; and also by observing what takes place in external objects, such as the removal of bodies and the supply of their place by others, the changes of day and night, &c. It is by the aid of the simple idea of succession, that