we form the idea of DURATION; the ideas, forthed from which last, have a claim to be ranked with the simple modes.

We are conscious not only of our existence, but of the continuance of our existence, or of our PERSONAL IDENTITY; we take it for granted, or rather it is forced upon us as an original intimation of our minds, in every thing we do, in every step of reasoning. This indelible conviction, that we are what we have been, being considered in connection with our succession of ideas, gives rise to our idea of duration. So that whenever we can speak or think of our existence as commensurate with or measured by a certain number of ideas, we are furnished with this additional notion, to which the name of duration is given.

As we cannot have the notion of duration without succession, hence it happens, that we know nothing of duration when we are perfectly asleep, because we know not, that there are then any of those intellectual changes, which we term a succession of ideas. If a person could sleep with a perfect suspension of all his intellectual operations from this time until the resurrection, the whole of that period would appear to him as nothing. Ten thousand years passed under such circumstances would be less than a few days or even hours.

That it is only by comparing that consciousness of the permanency of our own existence, which ever attends us in our waking moments, with the successive changes taking place within and without, that we acquire our notion of DURATION, is in some measure proved by a variety of facts, which have been ascertained and preserved.

There is, for example, in a French work, (L'HISTOIRE DE L'ACADEMIE ROYALE DES SCIENCES POUR L'ANNEE, 1719,) a statement to the following effect. There was in Lausanne a nobleman, who, as he was giving orders to a servant, suddenly lost his speech and all his senses. Different remedies were tried, but, for a very considerable time, without effect. For six months he appeared to be in a deep sleep, unconscious of every thing. At the end of that period, however, resort having been had to certain

surgical operations, he was suddenly restored to his speech and the exercise of his understanding. When he recovered, the servant, to whom he had been giving orders, when he was first seized with the distemper, happening to be in the room, he asked him, if he had done what he had ordered him to, not being sensible, that any interval, except perhaps a very short one, had elapsed during his illness.

We get the idea of TIME, by considering any part of duration, as set or marked off by periodical measures, such as days or years. And it should be remarked, when we consider our design of showing the connection of our ideas with the two great sources of sensation and reflection, that we obtain the idea of these lengths or measures by means of the senses, viz. by our observation of the annual and diurnal revolutions of the sun.

Under the simple modes from duration, then, may be reckoned minutes, hours, days, months, years, indeed every division, of which duration is susceptible.

§. 96. Simple modes from extension.

To extension, which is a simple idea, derived from the senses of sight and touch, we give the name of length, when it is contemplated as existing only in one direction.

All our artificial measures of extension, such as an inch, a foot, a yard, a furlong, a mile, a league, a degree, whatever may be the process of the mind in forming those measures, are among its simple modes. That is to say, if we adopt an inch as the original measurement or the unit, from which we are to begin, then a foot consists of parts of extension, signified by the term inch, multiplied twelve times; and a yard is the same measure increased or multiplied thirty six times.

§. 97. Nature of the idea of infinity.

Of our idea of infinity it seems difficult to give any satisfactory explanation or to say with certainty where it should be classed, but there are three things, with which

we are in the habit of connecting it, viz. number, duration, and extension.

We form the idea of infinity of number by adding numbers as far as possible, with the additional notion, that this process may be carried on to any extent whatever.

We form the idea of infinity of duration by repeating the ideas of time, such as an hour, a day, or a year, the same as in number.

We obtain the idea of infinity of extension, or rather of that modification of extension, which is termed length, in the same manner, by repeating the ideas of an inch, a foot, a yard, or other measure, always feeling, when we have carried on this addition to the utmost extent of which we are capable, that it may be prosecuted still further, indefinitely.

We seem to ourselves to receive the clearest idea of infinity from numbering, because the distinction between all its modes is very accurately marked, so that we have a well defined perception of it. Indeed it does not appear, that, without the assistance of numbers, we could ever form the ideas of infinity of duration and extension.

We obtain the notion of ETERNITY by supposing our ideas of time, for instance, a month, or year, repeated in both directions, in time past as well as in that which is to come, always retaining the conviction of the possibility of the further prosecution of this process of repeating.

§. 98. Of the complex ideas called mixed modes.

MIXED MODES are complex ideas, the attributes or dependencies of substances, compounded of simple ideas of different kinds. Instances are the ideas of theft, murder, justice, patriotism, gratitude, &c.

THEFT is a change of property without the consent of the owner, and with fraudulent intentions on the part of the person, who removes it. Consequently, it embraces among other ideas, differing from each other, those of ownership, transference, and consent.

MURDER is putting a person to death with evil inten

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tion or malice aforethought; consequently includes the ideas of man, death, evil feelings, premeditation.

GRATITUDE is an emotion of love or complacency towards a person for some act of kindness, which he has done to us. In this mixed mode, therefore, we have reference, not only to the person, who has received the benefit, but to the person, who conferred it, as well as to the act itself, and to the intellectual emotion excited by it.

4.99. Of the different ways of forming mixed modes.

There are two ways in particular, by means of which we receive into the mind MIXED modes.

(1) The first method is by experience or observation of the things themselves.We see a person wrestling, fencing, or riding, and we thence learn the ideas, which are conveyed by those words.

(2) The second method is by invention or voluntarily putting together several simple ideas in our own minds.

The person, that first invented etching or printing, gave occasion, by combining ideas, which had never been united together before, for the complex notions, which are expressed by those terms. And we may suppose, that the mixed mode, expressed by the word, FALSEHOOD, and many others, were formed in a similar way.

By examining mixed modes and tracing them to their original elements, we shall find them ultimately connected with the great fountains of our knowledge, sensation and reflection.

100. Not the same mixed modes in all languages.

The customs, habits, modes of thinking, political, institutions, &c., are not the same in all countries, but differ in a greater or less degree. Hence there is need of different expressions, that is, of expressions in one language not precisely corresponding to expressions in another.

Thus the words, OSTRAKISMOS in the Greek, PROSCRIPTIO in the Latin, and CORBAN in the Hebrew, expressed ideas, to which most other nations found nothing precisely corresponding, and,consequently, had no corresponding terms

This suggests a remark on the changes, which take place in languages. It is well known, that there are constant alterations in customs, and hardly less frequent fluctuations in feeling and opinion, and hence there necessarily arise new combinations of thought or ideas; and these must be expressed by new names.

If people should be found unable or unwilling to invent new names for the expression of new complex ideas, they would evidently be subjected to great inconvenience. This may be seen, if we deprive ourselves of the benefit of any complex terms, for instance, reprieve and appeal, and attempt to converse on the subjects, where they naturally occur.

We do not consider a mixed mode, as actually exist-The number of ing in a language without a name.mixed modes, therefore, in any language, although it might be greatly increased, is looked upon as limited by the number of names or words, by which they are expressed.

NOTE. Consult, in reference to the above and the preceding chapter, Locke's Essay, ВK. II. снS. 12—24. Brown's Philosophy of the Mind, LECT. X. Clarke's Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God, compared with the Papers of Leibnitz and Clarke, III. §. 3., IV. §. 10., V. §. 42. Stewart's Historical Dissertation, Pr. II. §. 3. Soame Jenyn's Disquisitions, IV, On the Nature of Time, &c