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(1) It enables us to take a wide, and, therefore, in general a more accurate view of subjects.

In regard to every science there are some things true and some things false, and we are constantly liable to errour; it may, therefore, well be expected, that he who has a large store of ideas in that science, which he can examine and compare together, stands so much the better chance of having his sentiments well balanced and correct. A person, designing to pursue the study of law or of theology, may be of the opinion, that a knowledge of chemistry, of natural philosophy, or of the physiology of the human system, may be of no advantage to him, as a lawyer, theologian, &c., but there are many things, it may be replied, even if we admit the propriety of this opinion, the knowledge of which may not be so particularly beneficial in one's chosen pursuit, but of which, nevertheless, it would be highly discreditable to be ignorant.

Moreover, a lawyer, who is quite familiar with the principles of his particular department, may sometimes find himself a little perplexed, even when debating in a court of justice, in consequence of his ignorance of the chemical science; and a judge has been known to be confused, in making up a decision on a case of suspected murder, for want of a more intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of our animal organization.

(2) There is a second advantage, resulting from this enlarged and general acquaintance with things, viz. it will help, on the one hand, to preserve us from an excess of credulity or too readily believing every thing, which is proposed to us for our assent, and on the other, will be likely to guard us from a positive, and dogmatical turn of mind.

There are many things, which at first sight appeared strange and incredible, but were afterwards found by us to be true. The more extensive the range of our knowledge, the more shall we have found of instances of this sort. Hence when any thing is stated, however strange it may at first appear, we shall not be disposed to affirm or

deny in respect to it with dogmatism, but shall be willing to make further inquiries.

The more we know also in general, the more we shall, consequently, know, in particular, of intentional deceptions, and of the various unavoidable causes of mistake in cases where it is only candour to suppose, that there is no intention to deceive. We shall thus be strengthened against the indulgence of an extreme credulity, as well as against a too positive and dogmatical spirit,

These are advantages, which are not to be lightly prized, and are a sufficient reason, why we should early attempt to furnish ourselves with many ideas on a variety of subjects, by our personal observation of what things take place around us, by self-examination, by reading judicious books, and by conversation.

NOTE. Those complex thoughts, which embrace ideas of relation, and which, consequently, are in part formed by the aid of the power or susceptibility of RELATIVE SUGGESTION, are more or less examined by writers on the Mind.- See Locke's Essay, ВK. II. CHS. XXV, XXVI. compared with the forty fifth and fiftieth of Brown's Lectures; Buffier's First Truths, Pr. II. CHS. XXVii, xxviii.; Duncan's Elements, CH. IV. and other Treatises of Logic; Good's Book of Nature, Series III. LECT. IV.; also, in respect to furnishing the mind with ideas and on other points of mental discipline, Watt's Improvement of the Mind.

CHAPTER TENTH.

OF CONCEPTIONS.

. 115. Meaning of conceptions and how they differ from certain other states of the mind.

We are now to consider the mind and its susceptibilities in another view, viz. as employed in originating those intellectual states, which are usually called CONCEPTIONS.

This name is given to those ideas, which we have of any absent objects of perception, or of any sensations whatever, which the mind has formerly felt. Whenever we have conceptions, our ideas are replaced, as Shakespeare expresses it, in the "mind's eye," without our at all considering at what time or in what place they first originated. In other words, our ideas or mental states are recalled, and nothing more.

Using, therefore, the term CONCEPTIONS to express a class of ideas, it may be sufficient, in order to give some notion of their distinctive character, to mention, how they differ from perceptions, and from ideas of memory.

(1) They differ from perceptions, because the objects of them are absent. When we perceive any thing, an edifice, a lake, or a mountain; the objects of our perceptions are before us. But we may form conceptions of them, and they may exist in "the mind's eye," however distant.

(2) They differ also from ideas of memory, because they are contemplated exclusively of any considerations of time. But in every act of the memory there is an idea of the past. Hence, as those states of mind, to which we give the name of conceptions, possess these distinctive marks or characteristics, they are entitled to a separate name.

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CONCEPTIONS being merely mental states or acts of a particular kind are regulated by the general laws of the intellect, and make their appearance and disappearance on the principles of association. Those principles are to be fully explained hereafter.Whenever at any time we may use the phrase "power of conception" or "faculty of conception," nothing more is to be understood by such expressions than this, that there is in the mind a susceptibility of ideas possessing the marks, which we have ascribed to this class.

§. 116. Of conceptions of objects of sight.

One of the striking facts in regard to our conceptions is, that we can far more easily conceive the objects of some senses than of others. Suppose a person to have travelled abroad, and to have seen St. Peter's church and the Vatican, or to have visited the cataract of Niagara and the falls of St. Anthony, or any other interesting object of sight; it is well known that the mind of this person afterwards even for many years very readily forms a conception of those objects. Such ideas are so easily and so distinctly recalled, that it is hardly too much to say of them, that they seem to exist as permanent pictures in the mind. It is quite different with a particular sound, which we have formerly heard, and with a particular taste, or any pleasant or painful sensations of the touch, which we have formerly experienced. When the original perceptions have in these last cases departed, we find that the ideas do not readily exist again in the absence of their appropriate objects, and never with the distinctness, which they possessed at first. Ideas of visible objects, therefore, are more readily recalled, or we can more easily form conceptions of such objects than we can of the objects of the other senses. This peculiarity in the case of visible objects may be thus partially explained.

Visible objects or rather the outlines of them are complex; that is, they are made up of a great number of points or very small portions. Hence the conception, which we form of such an object as a whole, is aided by the princi

ples of association. The reason is obvious. As every original perception of a visible object is a compound, made up of many parts, whenever we subsequently have a conception of it, the process is the same; we have a conception of a part of the object, and the principles of association help us in conceiving of the other parts. Association connects the parts together; it presents them to the mind in their proper arrangement, and helps to sustain them there.

We are not equally aided by the laws of association in forming our conceptions of the objects of the other senses. When we think of some sound, or taste, or touch, the object of our conception is a single detached sensation. In every such sound or taste, or sensation of touch, whether we consider it at its first origin or when it is subsequently recalled, there is not that association of the parts, which we suppose to exist in every visual perception, and which must, of course, exist in every conception of objects of sight, which subsequently takes place. Accordingly our conceptions of the latter objects arise more readily, and are more distinct than of the others.*

§. 117. Of the influence of habit on our conceptions.

It is another circumstance worthy of notice in regard to conceptions, that the power of forming them depends in some measure on habit.In what sense we are to understand the terms power and faculty, when used in this connection, has already been explained; and as to the term HABIT, it is sufficient to say of it here, that it is the readiness or facility, whether bodily or mental, which we acquire by a frequent repetition of the same thing.

A few instances will help to illustrate the statement, that what is termed Habit may extend to the susceptibility

* In these remarks we take for granted, that our perceptions of external visible objects are not immediate, but progressive. The mind passes from one part to another of the object, and does not embrace the whole at once. As this, though reasonable, may be considered too much like a mere assumption by some, it is suitable to remark here, that this subject will be examined in some subsequent pages.

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