of conceptions; and the first to be given will be of conceptions of sounds. Our conceptions of sounds are in general very indistinct, as appeared in the last section. But a person may acquire the power of amusing himself with reading written music. Having frequently associated the sounds with the notes, he has at last such a strong conception of the sounds, that he experiences, by merely reading the notes, a very sensible pleasure. It is for the same reason, viz., because our associations are strengthened by habit, that readers may enjoy the harmony of poetical numbers without at all articulating the words. In both cases they truly hear nothing, but there is a virtual melody in the mind. That our power of forming conceptions is strengthened by habit is capable of being further illustrated from the sight. A person, who has been accustomed to drawing, retains a much more perfect notion of a building, landscape, or other visible object, than one who has not. A portrait painter, or any person, who has been in the practice of drawing such sketches, can trace the outlines of the human form with very great ease; it requires hardly more effort from them than to write their names.-This point may also be illustrated by the difference, which we sometimes notice in people in their conception of colours. Some are fully sensible of the difference between two colours when they are presented to them, but cannot with confidence give names to these colours when they see them apart, and may even confound the one with the other. Their original sensations or perceptions are supposed to be equally distinct with those of other persons; but their subsequent conception of the colours is far from being so. This defect arises partly at least from want of practice, that is, from the not having formed a habit. The per sons, who exhibit this weakness of conception, have not been compelled by their situation nor by mere inclination to distinguish and to name colours so much as is common. §. 118. Of the subserviency of our conceptions to description. tion, when a person's conceptions are readily suggested and are distinct. Even such an one's common conversation differs from that of those, whose conceptions arise more slowly and are more faint.-One man, whether in conversation or in written description, seems to place the object, which he would give us an idea of, directly before as; it is represented distinctly and to the life. Another, although not wanting in a command of language, is confused and embarrassed amid a multitude of particulars, which in consequence of the feebleness of his conceptions he finds himself but half acquainted with; and he, therefore, gives us but a very imperfect notion of the thing, which he would describe. It has been by some supposed, that a person might give a happier description of an edifice, of a landscape, or other object, from the conception than from the actual perception of it. The perfection of a description does not always consist in a minute specification of circumstances; in general the description is better, when there is a judicious selection of them. The best rule for making the selection is, to attend to the particulars, that make the deepest impression on our own minds, or, what is the same thing, that most readily and distinctly take a place in our. conceptions. When the object is actually before us, it is extremely difficult to compare the impressions, which different circumstances produce. When we afterwards conceive the object, we possess merely the outline of it; but it is an outline made up of the most striking circumstances. Those circumstances, it is true, will not impress all persons alike, but will somewhat vary with the degree of their taste. But when with a correct and delicate taste any one combines lively conceptions, and gives a description from those conceptions, he can hardly fail to succeed in it. §. 119. Of conceptions attended with a momentary belief. Our conceptions are sometimes attended with belief; when they are very lively, we are apt to ascribe to their objects a real existence or believe in them. It is not as serted by us, that the belief is permanent; but a number of facts strongly lead to the conclusion, that it has a momentary existence. (1) A painter in drawing the features and bodily form of an absent friend, may have so strong a conception, so vivid a mental picture, as to believe for a moment that his friend is before him. After carefully recalling his thoughts at such times and reflecting upon them, almost every painter is ready to say, that he has experienced some illusions of this kind. It is true, the illusion is very short, because the intensity of conception, which is the foundation of it, can never be kept up long when the mind is in a sound state. Such intense conceptions are unnatural. And, further, all the surrounding objects of perception, which no one can altogether disregard for any length of time, every now and then check the illusion and terminate it.—(2) Place a person on the battlements of a high tower; his reason tells him he is in no danger; he knows he is in none. But after all he is unable to look down from the battlements without fear; his conceptions are so exceedingly vivid as to induce a momentary belief of danger in opposition to all his reasonings.—(3) There are persons who are entirely convinced of the folly of the popular belief of ghosts and other nightly apparitions, but who cannot be persuaded to sleep in a room alone, nor go alone into a room in the dark. Whenever they happen out at night, they are constantly looking on every side; their quickened conceptions behold images which never had any existence except in their own minds, and they are the subjects of continual disquiet and even terror. "It was my misfortune, (says Dr. Priestly,) to have the idea of darkness, and the ideas of invisible malignant spirits and apparitions very closely connected in my infancy; and to this day, notwithstanding I believe nothing of those invisible powers, and consequently of their connection with darkness, or any thing else, I cannot be perfectly easy in every kind of situation in the dark, though I am sensible I gain ground upon this prejudice continually." In all such cases we see the influence of the prejudices of the nursery. Persons, who are thus afflicted, were taught in early childhood to form conceptions of ghosts, hobgoblins, and unearthly spirits; and the habit still continues. It is true, when they listen to their reasonings and philosophy, they may well say that they do not believe in such things. But the effect of their philosophy is merely to check their belief; not in one case in a thousand is the belief entirely overcome. Every little while, in all solitary places, and especially in the dark, it returns and when banished returns again; otherwise we cannot give an explanation of the conduct of these persons. §. 120. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions. The belief in our mere conceptions is the more evident and striking, whenever they are at any time joined with our perceptions. A person walking in a field in a thick foggy morning perceives something, no matter what it is; but he believes it to be a man, and does not doubt it. In other words, he truly perceives some object, and, in addition to that perception, has a mental conception of a man attended with belief. When he has advanced a few feet further, all at once he perceives, that what he conceived to be a man is merely a stump with a few large stones piled on its top. He perceived at first, as plainly or but little short of it, that it was a stump, as in a moment afterwards; there were the whole time very nearly the same visible form and the same dimensions in his eye. But whatever he had in his eye, he certainly had in his mind the conception of a man, which overruled and annulled the natural effects of the visual perception; the concep tion being associated with a present visible object acquired peculiar strength and permanency, so much so that he truly and firmly believed, that a human being was before him. But the conception has departed; the present ob-, ject of perception has taken its place, and it is now impossible for him to conjure up the phantom, the reality of which he but just now had no doubt of.Many a person has waked up in the night and has firmly believed, that he saw a form clothed in white standing in an erect position at some part of the room, but in a moment after the imaginary visitant has vanished, and there is nothing left but the reflection of the moonbeams on the wall.-In cases of this kind, where the conceptions are upheld, as it were, by present objects of perception, and receive a sort of permanency from them, nothing is better known, than that we often exercise a strong and unhesitating belief. These instances, therefore, can properly be considered as illustrating & confirming the views in the preceding section. §. 121. Of our conceptions at tragical representations. These observations suggest an explanation, at least in part, of the effects, which are produced on the mind by exhibitions of fictitious distress. In the representation of tragedies, it must be admitted, that there is a general conviction of the whole being but a fiction. But, although persons enter the theatre with this general conviction, it does not always remain with them the whole time. At certain passages in the poet peculiarly interesting, and at certain exhibitions of powerful and well timed effort in the actor, this general impression, that all is a fiction, fails. The feelings of the spectator may be said to rush into the scenes; he mingles in the events; carried away and lost, he for a moment believes all to be real, and the tears gush at the catastrophe which he witnesses. The explanation, therefore, of the emotions felt at the exhibition of a tragedy, such as indignation, pity, and abhorrence, is, that at certain parts of the exhibition we have a momentary belief in the reality of the events, which are represented. And after the illustrations which have been given, such a belief cannot be considered impossible. The same explanation will apply to the emotions, which follow our reading of tragedies when alone, or any other natural and affecting descriptions. In the world of conceptions, which the genius of the writer conjures up, we are transported out of the world of real existence, and for a while fully believe in the reality of what is only an incantation. §. 122. Application of these principles to diversities in the mental character of individuals. It is a remark sometimes made, that the sanguine ar apt to believe and assert what they hope; and the time |