rous what they fear. This remark implies, and is foundod in part on what every one knows, that there are diversities in the intellectual character of different individuals. Some are constitutionally fearful; every obstacle assumes an undue importance, and every terror is magnified. Others are confident, fearless, ardent. Both of these classes of persons are known to commit frequent mistakes in judging of those things, which are future, and which have any connection with their respective mental characteristics.

The remarks, which were made in the three last sections, will help us to an explanation in this thing.As to what is called BELIEF, it is presumed no one can be ignorant of it, although it would be futile to attempt to explain it by words. It is, however, important to remark, that belief is regulated and controlled, not by direct volition, but by the nature of the circumstances, which are placed before the mind. But it has been already suffieiently shown, that belief is in a measure under the control of our conceptions, when they are very vivid. It isalso undoubtedly true, that vividness of conceptions is always attended with a strong feeling of pleasure, or of desire, or of some other kind. But it is implied in the mental characters of the persons, on whom we are remarking, that their feelings are strong, though opposite; in the one case, confident and ardent; in the other, dejected and timid.

Hence their conceptions will be strong. To the one, all difficulties and dangers will be magnified; to the other, the glory and the fruition of success. And as these distorted conceptions necessarily control more or less their belief, it will follow, that perfect reliance is not to be placed on their opinions, when they are directly connected either with their hopes or their fears. Nor will such distrust always imply an unfavourable opinion of the rectitude of their intentions.-Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, IV.; Stewart's Elements, Cн. III.; Brown's Lectures, XLI.; Priestley's Examination of Reid, SECT. VIII.

CHAPTER ELEVENTH.

1

PARTICULAR AND GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS

§. 123. Origin of abstractions and kinds of them.

THE remarks, which have been hitherto made on our perceptions of present objects, and on our conceptions of those, which are absent, open the way for the consideration of our mental states in another respect, viz., as they are affected by the process of abstraction. By means of that process, they become abstracted or separated; that is, they are made subjects of consideration apart from other ideas, with which they are ordinarily found to be associated. And hence, whenever this is the case in respect to the states of the mind, they are sometimes called abstractions, and still more frequently are known by the name of ABSTRACT IDEAS. They may be divided into the two kinds of particular and general abstract ideas, which are clearly distinct from each other, not only in themselves considered, but also as respects the intellectual proeesses, by means of which they exist.

§. 124. Of the class of particular abstract ideas.

We shall first remark on particular abstract ideas. Of this class the different kinds of colours may be mentioned as instances. When any absent object of perception occurs to us, when we think of or form a conception of it, our thoughts will sometimes fix upon the colour of such object, and make that the subject of consideration, without particularly regarding its other qualities, such as weight,

hardness, taste, form, &c. We may also distinguish in any body its solidity from its extension, or we may direct our attention to its weight, or its length, or breadth, or thickness, and ma'e any one of these a distinct object in our thoughts, even when it is impossible to separate them in the subject, to which they belong.

And hence, as it is a well known fact, that the properties of any body may be separated in the view and examination of the mind, however close and indissoluble their intimacy in their appropriate subjects, we may lay down this statement in respect to the states of mind before us. When any quality or attribute of an object, which does not exist by itself, but always in a state of combination, is detached by our minds from its customary associates, and is considered separately, it becomes a particular abstract idea.The distinctive mark of this class is, that the abstraction is always limited to one quality.

§. 125. Of the formation of particular abstract ideas.

The manner of expressing ourselves on the subject of our abstract notions, to which we have been accustomed, is apt to create and cherish a belief in the existence of a separate mental faculty, adapted solely to this particular purpose. But the doctrine of a power or faculty of abstraction, which is exclusive of other mental susceptibilities, and is employed solely for this purpose, does not appear to be well founded. It will convey an impression nearer the truth to speak of the PROCESS, rather than the power of abstraction.The following statement will be sufficient to show, how those of the first class, or particular abstract ideas are formed.

Although our earliest notions, whether they arise from the senses or are of an internal origin, are simple, or exist in what may be called a state of decomposition, yet those simple thoughts are very soon found to unite together with a considerable degree of permanency, and out of them are formed complex states of mind. All our ideas are recalled to the mind in the absence of their appropri

ate objects by the principles of association; nor does it seem altogether unreasonable to say, that the separate parts of all our complex notions are held together in their state of combination by the same principles. It is at least certain, that complex states of mind involve and imply the existence of elementary ones; and that the selection of these elements and their virtual admission into the complex mental state in preference to others is owing to the power of association. And the question is, how this principle of combination is to be loosened, and they are to be extracted from their present complexity, and reduced to their elementary state? In answer it may be said, that in every case of separating a particular abstract idea, there must necessarily be a co-existent feeling of interest, choice, or desire. This feeling must concern the previous complex state of the mind when viewed in one respect, rather than another; or what is the same thing, it will concern one part of the complex idea rather than another. So that we may truly and justly be said to have a desire to consider or examine some part of the complex idea more particularly than the others. When the mind is in this high degree directed to any particular part of a complex idea, we find it to be the fact, that the principle of association, or whatever it is, which keeps the other parts in their state of virtual union with it, ceases in a corresponding degree to operate; they rapidly fall off and disappear, and the particular quality or attribute, towards which the mind was especially directed, remains the sole subject of consideration. That is to say, it is abstracted or becomes an abstract idea.

This, in the formation of particular abstract ideas, seems to be the process of the mind, and nothing more; viz., (1) The recurrence or suggestion of the complex idea by the power of association; (2) The co-existence of a feeling of desire or choice in respect to some particular part of it; (3) The consequent detention of the part, towards which an interest is felt, and the disappearance of the other parts. Such is the activity of the mind, and in so many ways it views the "images of things," that this striking

process of detaching, and examining, and replacing, and changing the parts of our complex notions, is almost constantly going on. And after the mind has thus shifted its position, and has been now in this state and now in that, as if playfully to show its wonderful readiness in diminishing itself to a part of its previous complexity, it seems as readily to swell back again, if we may be allowed in such figurative expressions, to its former dimensions, and exists the same as before the process of abstraction commenced.

§. 126. Of generalizations of particular abstract ideas.

When we speak of the generalizing of this class of abstract ideas, it seems to be chiefly meant, that in our experience of things we observe them to be common to many subjects. We find whiteness to be a quality of snow, of chalk, of milk, and of other bodies; and whenever with the simple abstract notion of whiteness we connect in our thoughts the additional circumstance of its not being limited to one body but the property of many, the term may be said to be generalized. And this seems to be all, that can be properly understood by generalization when applied to the states of mind, which we are now considering.

§. 127. Of particular abstractions in poetry, painting, &c. The process of abstraction, which is gone through in the formation of particular abstract ideas, is greatly subservient to the exertions of a creative imagination, as they appear in painting, poetry, and the other fine arts.-The poet and the painter are supplied with their materials from experience; without having received ideas from some source, they never could have practised their art. But if they do not restrict themselves, to mere imitation, they must combine and modify the ideas which they have, so as to be able to form new creations of their own. But every exertion of this kind, which they make, of their powers, presupposes the exercise of abstraction in decomposing and separating actual conceptions and in forming them anew.