-§. 128. Of general abstract ideas.

We are now to remark upon the second class of abstractions.- -GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS, which is the name commonly applied to them, are our notions of the classes, or genera and species of objects, such as are expressed by the general names, man, bird, sheep, fish, animal, tree.

As they include classes, it is hardly necessary to observe, that we cannot possess them without first considering two or more objects together. We may form, on the contrary, those of the first class or particular abstract ideas by considering individual objects merely.

Whenever, therefore, we see a number of trees of the same kind, or a number of flowers, or of men, or of horses, or sheep, the mind immediately exists in that state, which, when we think fit to give it a name, we call a general abstract idea.

This general idea, however, does not embrace every particular, which makes a part of the individuals before us; it leaves out of consideration certain peculiarities, which belong to each tree, each flower, man, &c. when separately considered. And this is the reason of ideas of this kind being called abstract; because, although they em brace the whole number of individuals in certain respects, they detach and leave out altogether a variety of particulars in which they disagree.-As soon, therefore, as we perceive a number of objects before us of the same kind, we at once virtually dismiss from our view these circumstances of disagreement, and the mind exists, as above remarked, in a new state, which is essentially a feeling of resemblance. So that those mental states, which when put into words may be called feelings or immediate mental discoveries of the relation of resemblance in a number of objects, constitute what we understand by general abstract ideas, and these, as far as the mind is concerned and leaving out the names, are the true ideas of genera and species.—But as a question may arise in the minds of some in regard to this feeling of resemblance, it is proper, in order to meet any such inquiries, briefly to remark further.

§. 129. Of relative suggestions or perceptions of relations. Nothing is more evident than that the objects, which we perceive, are in some way compared, one with another; and that we learn, when such comparisons take place, how they conform to each other or how they differ. We compare objects together in respect to their position, their resemblance and difference, degrees, and in a great variety of respects, as was particularly seen at chapter ninth in the remarks there made on IDEAS OF RELATION. This is conformable to the general experience of men.-There is necessarily implied in every such comparison the existence of certain new states of the mind, which may be called ideas of relation or feelings of relation, and which are essentially different from our simple perceptions or conceptions of the objects, that sustain the relation. But the inquiry arises, By virtue of what principle is this discovery of relations made? The answer is, that there is in the mind an original tendency or susceptibility, by means of which, whenever we perceive different objects together, we are instantly, without the intervention of any other mental process, sensible of their relation in certain respects.

We may here give an illustration of the exercise of this original susceptibility, similar, however, to those already given. When a number of objects are together, belonging to the same species, as two or more sheep, or horses, or men, or trees, or flowers, the mind immediately exists in that state, which constitutes the feeling of resemblance.Here beside the mere perception of the objects we experience a feeling of relation, since that resemblance in the objects before us, of which we are conscious, is one of the many kinds of relation, of the perception of which the mind has been asserted to be originally susceptible. It is by means of this original susceptibility of relations, as it exhibits itself in particular in the perception of the relation of resemblance, that the whole of that class, which we term general abstract ideas, are formed. None we imagine can be formed without it.

All this we know is to be decided, not by the opinions and assertions of an individual, but by the general

experience. In any doctrines, which are laid down is regard to the mind, every person has a right to give his testimony; and whenever that testimony is a correct representation of the intellectual processes, it is valuable, whatever may be its tendency. But it is confidently thought, that nothing more is wanted, than an appeal to what men generally find themselves conscious of, to confirm the above views.

§. 130. Of classifications of objects.

In the classification of objects and in giving general names, the process after what has been said cannot be thought to be either long or difficult. The first step is the perception of two or more objects, which constitutes one state of mind. The second is the feeling of resemblance, which is the general idea. Guided by the feeling of resemblance, we are enabled to say, what objects come within the limits of a particular class, and what do not. The names, which are given to general ideas, are variously called by different writers, sometimes general names, sometimes general or common nouns in distinction from proper nouns, and sometimes GENERA and SPECIES.

§. 131. Of general abstract ideas in connection with numbers, &c.

The ability, which the mind possesses of forming general abstract ideas, is of much practical importance; but whether it be the characteristical attribute of a rational nature or not, as some have supposed, it is not necessary now to inquire. Its subserviency in the forming of classi fications has already been seen.And it is further to be remarked, that without that mental susceptibility, by which we form general notions, we should not be able to number, even in the smallest degree. Before we can consider objects as forming a multitude, or are able to number them, it seems necessary to be able to apply to them a common name. This we cannot do, until we have reduced them to a genus; and the formation of a genus implies a mental susceptibility of feeling the relation of resemblance. Consequently, we should be unable without such mental

Susceptibility to number. How great then is the practical importance of that intellectual property, by which general abstractions are formed!-Without the ability to number, we should be at a loss in all investigations where this ability is required; without the power to classify, all our speculations must be limited to particulars, and we should be capable of no general reasoning.

§. 132. Of the speculations of philosophers and others. There is a characteristical difference between the speculations of philosophers and those of the common mass of people, worthy of some notice. The difference between the two is not so much, that philosophers are accustomed to carry on processes of reasoning to a greater extent, as this; that they are more in the habit of employing general abstract ideas and general terms, and that, consequently, the conclusions which they form are more comprehensive. Nor are their general reasonings, although the conclusions at which they arrive seem in their particular applications to indicate wonderful fertility of invention, so difficult in the performance as is apt to be supposed. They have so often and so long looked at general ideas and general propositions, have been so accustomed, as one may say, to contemplate the general nature of things, divested of all superfluous and all specific circumstances, that they have formed a habit; and the operation is performed without difficulty. It requires in such persons no greater intellectual effort, than would be necessary in skilfully managing the details of ordinary business.

The speculations of the great bulk of mankind differ from those of philosophers in being, both in the subjects of them and in their results, particular. They discover an inability to enlarge their view to universal propositions, which embrace a great number of individuals. They may possess the power of mere argument, of comparing propositions together which concern particulars, and deducing inferences from them to a great degree; but when they attempt to contemplate general propositions, their minds are perplexed, and the conclusions, which are drawn from

them, appear obscure, however clearly the previous pro cess of reasoning may have been expressed.

§. 133. Of different opinions formerly prevailing.

The subject of general abstract ideas, of which we have given a summary view, excited very considerable interest during the scholastic ages; and different opinions. have prevailed concerning them, not only at that period, but more or less down to the present time. The disputes so widely prevailed, and so much interest was taken, that it seems to be necessary to give a short sketch of them.

In this discussion there have been three parties, viz, the Realists, the Nominalists, and the Conceptualists. }

§. 134. Of the opinions of the Realists.

Those, who go under this name, held, that general abstract ideas have a real and permanent existence, independent of the mind. Of a man, of a rose, of a circle, and of every species of things, they maintained, that there is one original form or archetype, which existed from eternity, before any individuals of the species were created. This original model or archetype is the pattern, according to which the individuals of all species are in the most important respects formed. The archetype, which is understood to embrace only the outlines or generic features of things, becomes an object of perception to the human intellect, whenever by due abstraction we discern it to be one and the same in all the individuals of the species.--Such was the doctrine of the Realists, which in its most essential respects was very widely received from the time of Plato and Aristotle down to the commencement of the 12th century. But since that period, excepting a few ineffectual attempts, which have been made from time to time to revive it, it has fallen into as general disrepute, on the ground of its being too hypothetical and not sufficiently sustained by facts.

§. 135. Of the opinions of the Nominalists.

About the commencement of the 12th century, Rosce