Page images
PDF
EPUB

§. 164. Artificial delineations employed as signs of sound.

But it is to be recollected, that the artificial delineations, towards the formation of which the human mind has thus gradually advanced, were used to denote ideas merely, and not sounds or words as they are enunciated. The two systems of oral and written signs are supposed as yet to have been entirely independent of each other. It could not be long, however, before they would assume new relations, and written characters would gradually be employed as significant of sounds, as well as of thought.-The idea, which we express by the word PRISONER, had its correspondent delineation, its appropriate arbitrary figure; it also had its appropriate oral sign or sound. The oral sign would by association call up both the thing itself and the written delineation. And on the other hand, the written character would naturally suggest both the idea and the oral sign. It was in this way, arbitrary written characters gradually gave up their original office, and came to stand as directly representative of sounds, and indirectly of ideas. This was coming back to the original intention of nature, which seems to have framed the powers of the human voice with the design of making them the predominant instrument of intellectual communication, whatever aid might be derived to them from other sources.

§. 165. Formation of syllabic alphabets.

But it was desirable, that every possible benefit should be derived from this new application of arbitrary written marks, as signs of words. The next step, therefore, was to fix upon such sounds as are elementary, and also upon certain characters to represent them. But to ascertain what sounds are elements and their exact number, was exceedingly difficult; and it is highly improbable, that it was done at once.--The improvers of language, howev er, not only succeeded in detecting monosyllables, but also in resolving compound words into their monosyllabic parts. The first alphabets, therefore, as is generally suppo sed, were syllabic; that is, were single syllables, consisting of a consonant sound, combined with a vowel sound.

The base of these syllables being single consonants, variously modified by vowels, the distinction was at some subsequent period made between consonant and vowel sounds; characters and names were appropriated to each; and alphabets consequently assumed a new form.Such, after many laborious-investigations, seems to be the general sentiment as to the progress of human invention through the successive forms of pictures, hieroglyphics, the arbitrary delineations of the Chinese, and syllabic alphabets to alphabets of letters. Abundant proofs are extant, that these various methods of artificial writing have been employed at different periods; and such is their mutual relation it is not difficult to conceive of the progress of the human mind from one to the other.*

Examine Warburton's Divine Legation, VOL. II.; Condillac's Origin of Knowledge, Pr. II. SECT. I. CH. 4, 13.; Reid's Inquiry, CH. IV. §. 2. V. §. 3. ; De Stutt Tracy's Ideology, (Ideologie,) PT. II.; Tooke's Diversions of Purley; Adam Smith's Considerations on the Formation of Languages; Stewart, Vol. III.; Edward's Observations on the Muhhekaneew (Mohegan) Indians; and other Essays of American authors on the languages of the Aborigines.

*Two recent facts throw light upon, and confirm the views of this chapter (1) The discovery, that there existed among the ancient Egyptians an alphabet, representative of simple sounds. The characters, standing for the sounds, are hieroglyphics or symbolical images of objects. On examination, it appears, that the hieroglyphics are taken from objects, the oral signs or names of which begin with the same sounds or articulations, which they are themselves destined to represent. Thus, the image of an eagle, which in the Egyptian oral language is called Acнom, became the sign of the vowel A. Hence it is probable, they began in the examination of this subject with names. It was by the analysis of these names, that ultimately the resolution of the human voice into its syllabic and primary elements was made. And in giving signs to sounds, they selected those hieroglyphics of objects, the names of which had particularly assisted them in their analysis.--(2.) The other fact referred to, is the recent invention of an alphabet of the Cherokee language by a member of that tribe, who appears to have received no instruction from others on the analysis of the human voice. The name of this ingenious man, who has done what some people have supposed beyond the powers of the human mind under the most favourable circunstances, is GUYST. His alphabet is syllabic; the number of characters is eighty six, representing all the principal sounds in the Cherokee language. Each character stands for a single or double consonant sound, combined with a simple vowel sound.

CHAPTER FIFTEENTH.

RIGHT USE OF WORDS.

§. 166. Imperfections of artificial language or words.

We now find men furnished, in addition to the language of natural signs, with oral and alphabetical language, and possessed of the great advantages which may be sup posed to flow from this powerful instrument of mental action and communication. It may be said without exaggeration not only to express ideas, but to multiply them. At least, the facility of expressing and communicating thought by means of it sets men upon renewed thinking, and the result is wider views; more correct principles; moral, civil, and scientific improvement. And notwithstanding, it cannot be denied, that language, (we have reference in this chapter particularly to artificial language or WORDS, which is a term standing both for oral and written signs,) is not without its imperfections. It may be said in general, to be imperfect, or to fail of its object, whenever the same ideas are not excited in the mind of the hearer or reader, as in that of the speaker or writer. Nor can we reasonably expect, when we look at the cause or foundation of this imperfection, that it will ever be otherwise; since that cause will be found to exist ultimately in the condition of the mind and in our ideas, rather than in the words, which stand for them. This requires a brief illustration.

It often happens, that men view the same object and actions in different lights; whether it be owing to some

difference in early education, or to local prejudices, or to some other cause, the fact itself is well known, and may well be considered, as frequently unavoidable. Hence different persons very often attach the same name to certain objects and actions, when their views of those actions and objects are not the same. One has a greater number, than another, of simple ideas, entering into his complex notions, and perhaps, in the formation of the compound, they respectively give to those simple ideas a different relation to each other. The consequence, therefore, is, that, in such cases, as have now been mentioned, the names or words, which are used, necessarily fail of exciting in the hearer the same ideas, that exist in the mind of the speaker.

Many of the disputes, which have existed in the world, (and the history of philosophical opinions shows, how numerous they have been,) have been caused by a misunderstanding of this sort; different persons using the same terms, when their ideas are not the same. In support of this remark, it will be enough merely to refer to the often repeated discussions upon virtue, conscience, faith, free will, obligation, religion, &c.-But language, in so far as it is imperfect, fails of the great object, for which it was invented and agreed upon, and it, therefore, becomes important to diminish the amount of this failure and to guard. against it, as far as possible. To this end, the following rules on the right use of words may be laid down.

§. 167. Words are not to be used without meaning. RULE FIRST. In the employment of language, the first rule to be laid down, is this, that we should never use a word without some meaning. It may be thought extraordinary, that any should use words in this way, but a little examination cannot fail to convince one of the fact. Let any one inquire of those persons, who are in the habit of employing such words, as instinct, sympathy, antipathy, and a variety of others, which might be mentioned, and it will speedily appear, that while some are greatly at a loss to assign any sort of meaning to them, others are utterly unable to do it. They are applied, as one may say, by

rote; they have been learnt from hearing others use them, and are repeated, because they have been learnt, without their significancy having ever been inquired into.

There are not only words used in this way, but whole phrases, of which the Peripatetic philosophy readily affords many instances. What can be said of "vegetative souls," "intentional species," "substantial forms,” “abhorrence of a vacuum," and the like, but that they are combinations of terms without meaning; and while they have the appearance of science, are no better, than an intended imposition on the understanding?

This error is much more frequent, than has generally been supposed ;-many words go down from one to another by a sort of hereditary descent, and are passively received and adopted, like a thousand opinions and prejudiees, which exist again, merely because they have existed before. We are exceedingly apt to adopt words from our parents and instructers, and to repeat the peculiar phraseology of our favourite sect or party, and either out of our great reverence for them, or from the circumstance of our being too indolent to make careful inquiries, we rest satisfied in a shameful ignorance of every thing but a mere sound. Hence, if it be considered desirable, that language should retain its value, which chiefly consists in recording and communicating thought, the rule laid down should be strictly observed, -not to employ words withou meaning.

§. 168 Words should stand for distinct and determinate ideas. SECOND RULE;-It is not enough, that we use word with meaning, or have ideas for them, but a second rule i that the meaning or the ideas be distinct and determinat

We apply the epithet, DISTINCT, to simple ideas, mea ing by the expression, that they should carefully be ke separate from, and not confounded with other simple ide The epithet, DETERMINATE, may more properly be appli to the class of our ideas called complex. As compl ideas are made up of simple ones, when we say, that t should be determinate, the meaning is, that a precise

« EelmineJätka »