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lection of simple ideas should be fixed upon in the mind; that it should not remain a matter of uncertainty what simple ideas are included, and what are not. We at once see the value of this rule. If our simple ideas are confounded, one with another, or if we know not accurately the elements of our complex states of mind, these circumstances necessarily diminish very much from the value of the words, standing for them. With this explanation, the rule cannot fail to be understood, viz.-That our words should have a distinct and determinate meaning; or what is the same thing, that the ideas should be distinct and determinate, which the words express.

The application of this rule seems to be particularly important in regard to terms, standing for mixed modes; especially such names of mixed modes, as are of a moral kind. And one reason of this is, that these terms have no settled objects in natures, no archetypes, to which they can be referred, which are external to, and independent of the mind itself. They have been rightly regarded, as a species of mental creations. The materials or simple ideas which compose them, are in a certain sense independent of the mind, but the arrangement of them is not; and they, therefore, have an existence by the mere choice and act of the mind, and are properly intellectual formations.

The word JUSTICE Comes within the class of ideas, called mixed modes, and, being a moral term, is of frequent occurrence; but, although every person may be supposed to attach some meaning to it, that meaning is not always determinate, and, in consequence, the term often causes perplexity. We will imagine the proper definition of it to be this,-The assigning to any one reward or punishment agreeably to LAW. It will readily occur, that the complex term will be involved in obscurity and uncertainty without a clear understanding of the subordinate idea, expressed by the word, LAW; that the compound or the whole will not be fully known, without a knowledge of the number and of the character of the parts;-and the same of other mixed modes.

In respect to the names of substances it should be ob

served, that the ideas, which the names represent, should be not only distinct and determinate, but such, as will accurately correspond to the things themselves.

It will, undoubtedly, be considered troublesome, to be under the necessity of complying with the directions here laid down, and to take so much care in settling in our minds the precise import of our complex notions. But it is a labour, which cannot well be dispensed with. Until it be undergone, men will often be perplexed as to their own meaning, and disputes, which might by a different course be speedily terminated, will be prolonged and multiplied without end.

§. 169. The same word not to be used at the same time in

different senses.

THIRD RULE;We are not to use the same word in the same discourse with different meanings; with this excep tion, that, if we should find it in some degree necessary slightly to vary the signification, which may sometimes be the case, notice should be given of it.' But it is at once remarked, in connection with this rule, that words in all languages have a variety of significations, and that it cannot well be otherwise, unless we are willing to multiply them to an inordinate and burdensome degree. This is true;-but it may justly be replied, that no well constituted language admits varieties of meaning, which the train of the discourse, the natural connection of thought fails to suggest. When, therefore, a person uses an important word in an argument with another, or in any separate discourse, whether the signification be the common one or not, it is rightly expected, that he employ it in the same sense afterwards, in which he was understood to use it when he began. If he do not, there will be unavoidable misunderstanding; the most laborious discourses will fail of giving instruction, and controversies under such cir cumstances cannot be terminated. This making the same word stand for different ideas, is spoken of by Mr. Locke, as a species of cheating; it being much the same, as if a person in settling his accounts, should employ the number THREE, sometimes for three; at others, for four, five,

or nine, which could not be attributed to any thing else, than great ignorance, or great want of honesty.

,170. Of the meaning of words as used by different persons.

We are led to remark, in the further consideration of the right use of words, that different individuals often attach different meanings to the same term in cases, where they imagine they employ them alike. As an illustration, we will suppose a piece of gold to be presented to a child, and, undoubtedly, the prominent idea, which he has of it is, that it is something of a bright, beautiful yellow. Another person, more advanced in years, adds the idea of weight to his complex notion of it; another, who is better acquainted with its true nature, adds malleability, fusibility, and any other qualities, which he may have been enabled to discover.It may be true, that differences of this kind in the meaning of words are to some extent unavoidable, but the mere fact, that they exist in any case, and may possibly exist in very many, renders it of importance, that some principle be proposed, which shall tend to limit the number of them. Without doubt, it is difficult to give a rule, applicable to all differences of this nature;, but an observation of the following cannot fail to check in some measure the evils, which we have in view.

§. 171. Words are to be employed agreeably to good and

reputable use.

THE FOURTH RULE is, that we are to employ names with such ideas as good and reputable use has affixed to them. One great object of language, that of communieating our ideas to others, would fail without an observation of this rule. Since whatever principles may be laid down in regard to good and reputable use, it involves and implies at least that use, which generally prevails. And he, who employs words different from the prevalent use of them, cannot well expect to be understood.-In order with the greater precision to determine what good and reputable use is, the three following rules may be given.

§. 172. What constitutes good and reputable use.

(1) It is one circumstance in favour of the good and reputable usage of a word, which constitutes what is otherwise termed common use, that it is found in the writings of a considerable number, if not the majority of good authors. It is not, in ordinary cases, sufficient to authorize a word, that it is found in one merely, or even in a few such writers, and those, who are supported by such limited authority, cannot count on being generally understood.

(2) A second direction is, that the words, which lay claim to good and reputable use, should not be provincial, or limited to a particular district of country;—Further, those words, which are recently introduced from a foreign tongue, either by merchants in the intercourse of business, or by travellers for other reasons or in other ways, but which are not naturalized, and are not known to be necessary, have not this character. Good and reputable words are such, as are in use among the great mass of the people in all parts of the territories of a country, however extensive, where any language is professed to be spoken. This is what is termed national use, in distinction from that jargon, which often springs up in neighbourhoods, or which, in the ways, to which we have already alluded, is at times introduced from a foreign source.

(3) There is implied, thirdly, in the common and reputable use of a language, that use, which prevails at the present time. If we would employ words with their cus tomary signification, with that meaning, which is ordina rily attached to them, we must adopt the use of the peri od, in which we live. It is not, however, necessarily implied in this rule, that we must limit ourselves to the present year or even the present age. Certain limits, it is true, must be fixed upon, which include our own times, but they may be of greater or less extent, although it is matter of no small difficulty judiciously to ascertain and define them.

§. 173. The nature of the subject is to be considered.

Another and FIFTH RULE is, that, in the use of words, their meaning is to be modified by the nature of the subjects, to which they relate.The great body of our knowledge concerns two distinct classes of existences, material and spiritual. But language, (we speak of artificial language or words,) is not susceptible of a correspondent division; it has but one origin, viz., from material objects. Hence we necessarily have strong associations with words before we apply them to the intellect; and these associations are not always broken up by the subsequent application. It is such associations Bacon has in view, when he says; "Men believe, that reason governs their words, but it often happens, that words. have power enough to react upon reason. This reaction

on the mind can be nothing other than a biassing of the judgment through an inattention to the appropriate nature of the subject, about which language is employed.

The errours, which will result from neglecting the rule laid down, may be briefly illustrated by a reference to some words in our own language, which have relation to the mental operations. Thus we frequently speak of the mind as a RECEPTACLE of thought or ideas. By repeatedly employing the term in this way, people are in time led to think of the mind as a material something, which is scooped out, and which is capable of treasuring or heaping up its acquisitions in the literal sense of the words. Again, we often speak of a CHAIN of ideas. This language implies a notion, which is closely connected with that of a receptacle or repository. Our thoughts are represented in such expressions, as coiled up in the receptacle, ready to be drawn out or taken in as occasion may require. In the following passage of Mr. Locke concerning the memory, he seems to consider it a sort of soft waxen tablet."The memory in some men, it is true, is very TENACIOUS, even to a miracle; but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of those, which are STRUCK DEEPEST, and in minds the most RETENTIVE; So that, if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exer