cise of the senses, or reflection on those kinds of objects, which at first occasioned them, the PRINT WEARS OUT, and at last there remains nothing to be seen."The words, reflect, comprehend, imagine, impress, &c. when applied to the mind, furnish other illustrations to the same purpose. They were first applied to material objects, and were originally expressive of such objects and their qualities merely. And hence in their application to the mind, we are exceedingly apt to transfer the material part of their signification, and to predicate it of something, which has nothing in common with matter. Through the agency of such words, applied in the first place to material things and afterwards to intellectual, many persons are led into serious and permanent mistakes. These mistakes may in a good measure be avoided by an adherence to the rule given, and probably in no other way, viz., by modifying the meaning of terms by the nature of the subject, to which they relate.

§. 174. We have not words for all our ideas.

Words are employed as signs, standing for ideas; but it must not be imagined, and certainly it is not true, that all ideas have words, corresponding to them. This assertion holds in regard to both simple and complex ideas. Among our simple ideas are colours; we call one colour RED; another, WHITE; but it is certainly not too much to say, there are many diversities or grades in those colours, which we have a notion of or perceive, but have never given them specific names. The same may be said of the diversities in our sensations of hearing, touch, and taste.

There are various complex ideas, which a person has, or may have, and yet without names, answering to them. In translating from one language into another, the truth here stated is clearly perceived; in reading the German language, for example, which has a large number of very expressive compounds, we often meet with words, which suggest to the mind very clear ideas, but find no single words in English precisely corresponding. And it is some

times with difficulty, that we can express them even by a number or combination of words. But, in general, we find in every well-formed language words, sufficient for the expression of those ideas, which are most distinctly formed, and which, in the intercourse of life, we have most frequent occasion to communicate.

§. 175. Of the definition of words.

The schoolmen defined terms PER GENUS et differeNTIAM, that is, by a term more general, than the word to be defined, with an additional word or words, expressive of some specific or distinguishing quality. Thus, man was defined by them ANIMAL RATIONALE, an animal endued with reason; ANIMAL being the term, wider in signification or more generic than man, and RATIONALE the epithet, indicative of the difference between man and other animals. A serious objection might be readily raised to this definition. If the schoolmen meant by the epithet RATIONALE What has been termed the discursive faculty or that operation, by which we compare together propositions and deduce conclusions from premises, it might be questioned, whether dogs, horses, and elephants are not men, since it is the opinion of very many that they possess this ability in some small degree.

A better mode of definition is by enumerating and explaining some essential elements, entering into the nature and composition of the thing to be defined; and this analysis of the elementary parts may be more or less particular, as circumstances require.It should be remarked here, that we now speak of the definition of words, standing for complex ideas; since, as already observed in §. 69, words standing for simple ideas do not admit of definition. No one can make the simple ideas of red, white, blue, sweet, bitter, &c. more clear than they are at present by any definitions whatever, which can be given.

Although it be difficult, or rather impossible to define simple ideas, to make them any clearer than they already are, what are called complex ideas, admit of a definition.

Complex ideas consist of various simple ideas combined together; the words, standing for them, cannot, indeed, of themselves, suggest the simple ideas, and show us what they are, independently of the aid of the senses; but they may clearly and readily indicate to us, how these ideas are to be arranged and combined together in order to form complex ones. The word, rainbow, expresses a complex idea. Accurately define it by an enumeration of the colours, entering into its composition, and by a statement of its appearance to a person, who has the faculty of sight, and he will understand or have a conception of it, although he may never have seen one; and this happens, because he has the simple ideas, and the words or description shows him, how they are combined together. But it is impossible to impart such a conception to a person, who has always been blind, because he has never had the simple ideas of colours; and words merely can never convey to him that knowledge.

§. 176. Of an universal language.

The inquiry has sometimes been started, Whether there there might not be a conventional, (that is an oral and written,) language, which should be permanent, and be employed by all nations;-in other words, Whether there might not be an universal language? The impracticability of such an universal tongue appears both from the nature and the history of this mode of expressing thought.

(1) The nature of language shows its impracticability. It is an idea, which observation seems to have well established, that whatever is imperfect has a tendency to work out its own ruin; and language, however excellent an invention, can never be otherwise than imperfect, since the human mind, which forms it, is itself limited, and is often running into errour. It will illustrate this remark, when we are reminded, that the external, material world is one of the great sources of our ideas, but our mental powers being imperfect, different persons form different ideas of the same objects. They then agree in giving the same

names to these ideas or combinations of ideas, and there often arises in this way a mutual misapprehension of that very agreement, which is not only the origin, but the support of language. The seeds of the mutability and destruction of language are, therefore, sown in its very birth, since a very little reflection cannot fail to show how many perplexities, how many discussions, how many changes may arise from this single circumstance, that, in consequence of the imperfection of our faculties, men often agree to consider words, as standing for what they imagine to be the same ideas, but which are not. We cannot, then, reasonably expect an universal and permanent language, until our minds can fully penetrate into the true nature of things, until our ideas are perfect, and different individuals can certainly and exactly inform themselves of the thoughts, existing in the minds of others.

Further; the political institutions of one country, the peculiarities in the aspects of its natural scenery, early associations, occupations, and habits, lay the foundation for a variety of thoughts and shades of thought, which, in other countries, will not exist, because the causes of their existence are not to be found. If thoughts, feelings, imaginations exist under these circumstances, words will be needed to express them, for which there will be no occasion in another country and among another people ;—so that we find here also a permanent and extensive cause of the diversities of languages.

(2) The impractibility of an universal language is seen also from the history of languages in times past.

We cannot conceive of an universal language without supposing it to be permanent, for if there are any causes, which would operate to affect its permanency, the operation of the same causes would be felt in checking and 'preventing its universality. But if we search the whole history of man, in order to find a language, that has remained permanent, unaltered; it will be an entirely fruitless pursuit. Not one such can be found.

There appears to have been originally in Asia Minor a language, spoken to a great extent, which after a time

disappeared, so that the very name was lost. So far from being able to maintain itself and increase the territories, where it was spoken, it was at last broken up into a variety of subordinate idioms, certainly no less than seven, the Hebrew, the Syriac, the Chaldaic, the Arabic, the Ethiopic, Phenician, and Samaritan.*

A common language seems also to have been the original foundation of the different dialects of Greece.

No reason can be given in explanation of the want of permanency in these ancient languages, which would not lead us to expect constant changes in any other tongue, and under any other circumstances. If all the nations of the earth could, by the providence of the Supreme Being, be made to-morrow acquainted with one universal speech, a knowledge of the nature of language and of its history would warrant us in predicting the speedy discontinuance of this universality, and the division of the language of the world into the dialects of islands, continents, and sectional territories. So that the remark of De Stutt-Tracy, that an universal language is as much an impossibility as a perpetual motion,' is not without reason.

§. 177. Remarks of Condillac on the changes, and corruptions of language.

It is a remark of Condillac, to whose treatise on the Origin of Knowledge, we have already had occasion to refer, that it is nearly the same in language, as in physics, where motion, the source of life, becomes the principle of destruction. "When a language abounds (says he) with original writers in every kind, the more a person is endowed with abilities, the more difficult he thinks it will be to sur

*In a former section, the Hebrew was spoken of as probably the oldest language. It might be thought more exact to represent it, a a dialect of the oldest language. But this qualification of the re mark is not absolutely essential, when we take into account the com mon opinion, that the Hebrew approaches nearer to the origina language, than the other dialects. Although time has engrafted in: it certain peculiarities, which go to constitute it a dialect, it retai substantially the features of the primitive tongue.