§. 218. Of habits of volition or willing.

There are instances, where volition appears to be affected by habit.--In every act of volition or willing there is understood to be a choice or preference. Such choice necessarily implies a comparison of certain things, in reference to their suitableness or unsuitableness, their value or their want of it. The act of volition will be delayed more or less according to the time, taken up in this comparison. But as comparison implies association, it seems clearly to follow, that, provided there be an increased quickness or habit of association, there will also be an increased quickness in the act of willing; that is, a HABIT of willing will be formed.—Hence many of those facts, (for instance, the learning to play on a flute or other instrument,) which illustrate an increased quickness of association, may also be referred to, in illustration of habits of volition.

Among other instances, having a relation to the present inquiry, the case of the equilibrist, who balances a rod on his finger, or performs some such feat, may be mentioned. The feat of balancing the rod demands the constant observation of the eye. The part of the body, which supports the object, is never wholly at rest; for if it were, the object would no more stand upon it, than it would retain its position, if placed upright on a table. The equilibrist, therefore, watches every inclination of the object from the proper position, so as to counteract that inclination by a contrary movement. This watchfulness involves a particular direction of the eye; and this direction of the eye necessarily implies a preceding volition, by which its motion is controlled. Sometimes not only a single rod is balanced in this way by the equilibrist, but two or three on different parts of his body. When attempts of this last kind are made, the performer may be aided in obtaining a knowledge of the particular inclination of the balanced objects from the sense of touch as well as of sight. But there must be an increase of quickness of volition, corresponding to the number of objects, which are balanced. Now as there must be acts of volition (1) to control the

movements of the eye, and, (2) to control the muscular movements, which are designed to counteract the tendencies of the balanced objects, whether those tendencies are learnt from the sight or some other sense, it is evident, that these acts must be exceedingly rapid. As this rapidity or facility of volition is never found in a performer in his first essays, but is acquired by degrees, we may well conclude, that there are HABITS of volition, as well as of other mental acts and laws.

We have a similar illustration of quickened volitions in the performances at the circus. The performer vaults upon a horse, when at full speed; he rises on the saddle; he stands upon one foot; and, in this situation, while his horse is in the most rapid movement, performs a variety of feats, every one of which requires from the mind a multitude of distinct acts of association and of the will.

§. 219. Habits of will or volition further considered. But it is not necessary to refer exclusively to performances of the nature above described, in order to explain the high degree of facility, to which the power of willing may be brought. Perhaps the mere fact of walking, of moving from place to place, which is common to all, places the subject in an equally clear light.

Walking is performed, like the more striking feats of circus actors, equilibrists, and rope-dancers, by means of a series of muscular contractions. In order, therefore, to produce certain movements of the body in walking, it is necessary, that certain muscles should be contracted, and not others; and that they should be contracted to a definite extent, neither more nor less. Although the muscles, from our very constitution, readily obey the power of willing, yet this power, when aiming to secure the particular object in question, is at first greatly hindered and perplexed, as we see in children. They control, in beginning to walk, the wrong muscles, or control them too little or too much. But after repeated attempts, having corrected their mistakes, and having formed a HABIT, they readily govern the requisite movements, so that in walking we are almost

unconscious, in subsequent life, of any exertion of the will.--In this case, as in others, the powers of the will and of association are both quickened at the same time, the acts of the will being generally preceded by other mental acts, which involve association.

§. 220. Habits of reasoning and imagination.

Views, similar to those already advanced, will apply to the powers of reasoning and of imagination.--In moral reasoning, it is often necessary to divide a subject into parts, and whenever this is the case, to give to them a suitable arrangement. The effect of practice in this respect has been before noticed. On entering still more minutely into the nature of reasoning, we discover that the mind compares together various propositions, and ascertains their agreement or disagreement. And here also a readiness of comparison is easily detected in those, who have been in the practice of reasoning, which is not found in others. The same is true in the imagination. Place in the hands of a child the Arabian Nights and the no less wonderful tales of the Edda; let reading of this character occupy the days of his youth, before the eagerness of curiosity has ceased, and certain habits of imagination will be inevitably formed. That creative power, which is appropriate to it, will be greatly strengthened; and to his latest days, it will be a strange thing, if he do not indulge in intellectual visions; calling islands from the deep, erecting castles, and doing whatever else forms the theme of the wildest stories of the Scandinavian and Arabian mithology.

sions.

221. Of habits in connection with the emotions and passions. The existence of the same great law of our nature may be detected also in the operation of the emotions and pas-An unfavourable suspicion is indulged by one individual in respect to another; this suspicion, instead of being effectually examined and checked, is permitted to return; it often arises, and is found to gain strength from the mere repetition, until it is converted, by the accession of

strength it has received, into positive dislike, and sometimes into hatred. The feeling of benevolence is subjected to the same general law. If the feeling be indulged, it will gain strength; but if it be subjected to a continued system of repression, it becomes so broken down and weakened, that at last, objects of suffering entirely cease to affect us. So marked will be the results of this course, that scenes of widespread misery, such as the ravages of famine, war, and pestilence, will fail to operate upon hearts, which, in the youth of their feelings, would have been affected with the least aggravated forms of wretchedness.

It is happy for us in the inquiries of intellectual philosophy, if we can confirm what inquisitive men have been able to find out in their closets by an insight into the mental history of common life; by a reference to the experiences, habits, and prejudices of those, who make no pretensions to skill in books. Nor are confirmations of the principles of this science less valuable, when they are given by scholars, whose calling it is to write upon other subjects, but who at times let fall an incidental testimony in respect to them. Thus in a work of the late President Adams is the following passage, which confirms the views of this section; "The passions are all unlimited; nature has left them so; if they could be bounded, they would be extinct; and there is no doubt they are of indispensable importance in the present system. They certainly increase too, by exercise, like the body; the love of gold grows faster than the heap of acquisition; the love of praise increases by every gratification, till it stings like au adder and bites like a serpent, till the man is miserabl every moment he does not snuff the incense; ambition strengthens at every advance, and at last takes possession of the whole soul so absolutely, that the man sees nothi in the world of importance to others, or himself, but in h object."*

* Adam's Defence of the Constitutions of the United States, V I. p. 129.-Philad. Ed.

§. 222. Of the intellectual habits of men in active life.

The subject under consideration admits of being plaed in other lights, and of being confirmed by numerous facts from sources not hitherto mentioned. It is in this portion of our mental history, we are to seek for an explanation of that sagacity, which is often shown by Savage tribes in their hunting and military expeditions, and on other occasions. It is here also we are able to give an account of those striking powers of observation, which are observed in the Deaf and Dumb. But without proposing to pursue the subject here to its full extent, something remains to be said of the habits of men, who, without having received a perfect education, are much occupied in the business of common and active life.

The mental operations of men in active life are often very rapid, the conclusions, at which they arrive on subjects somewhat complicated, are generally correct, but they frequently find themselves unable to state clearly the process of reasoning, by which they arrived at the conclusion. Oliver Cromwell, the English Protector, is said to have been a person, to whom this statement would well apply. Rarely any man has had a clearer insight into events, but when he attempted to explain himself, he was confused and obscure. If we were to give his intellectual character in a single sentence, it would be but just to say, that Cromwell was a man of argument, but no speaker. His mind readily insinuated itself into the intricacies of a subject, and while he could assert with confidence, that he had arrived at a satisfactory conclusion, he could not so readily describe either the direction he had taken or the involutions of the journey. This character of the Protector will apply to multitudes of men in active life, although undoubtedly for the most part in a less degree. Their distinguishing traits are two,-an ability to examine with great quickness all the parts of an intricate subject, and an equal want of ability in stating this process o others.

Concerning the first of these characteristics, it is suficient to say, that the great readiness, which they exhibit,